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WSIA EDITORS' INTRODUCTION
We are pleased to publish this WSIA edition of Trudy’s Govier’s
seminal volume, Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation.
Originally published in 1987 by Foris Publications, this was a
pioneering work that played a major role in establishing
argumentation theory as a discipline. Today, it is as relevant to
the field as when it first appeared, with discussions of questions
and issues that remain central to the study of argument. It has
defined the main approaches to many of those issues and guided
the ways in which we might respond to them. From this
foundation, it sets the stage for further investigations and
emerging research.
This is a second edition of the book that is corrected and
updated by the author, with new prefaces to each chapter (but
without the previous appendix). We want to acknowledge the
work of Ms. Tamilyn Mulvaney who assisted in the editorial
process and prepared the final manuscript for publication.
Leo A. Groarke
Christopher W. Tindale
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PREFACE
Preface to the First Edition
My interest in the subjects covered in this book dates from
1978, when I came across several texts in informal logic, and
was fascinated both by their practicality and by their
recommendations for rethinking central philosophical traditions
regarding logic and argument. I thought at that time that very
fundamental issues were at stake but that the context of
textbooks did not provide sufficient opportunities to explore
them in depth. This book is an attempt to fill that gap.
I have profited very much over the intervening years from
philosophical exchanges with Tony Blair, Ralph Johnson, and
David Hitchcock. Comments and analyses from Jonathan Adler,
Douglas Walton, Richard Paul, Dennis Rohatyn, John McPeck,
David Ennis, Frans van Eemeren, and Rob Grootendorst have
also been helpful, as have the interesting questions posed when
parts of this book have been read to audiences in Canada
(Lethbridge, Windsor, Calgary, Ottawa, Edmonton, Saskatoon,
Waterloo, and Peterborough); the United States (Newport News
and Sonoma); and the Netherlands (Amsterdam). Materials on
critical thinking tests were willingly supplied by Matthew
Lipton, Robert Ennis, Stephen Norris, and John McPeck, whose
cooperation is appreciated. I would also like to thank the editors
and contributors to the Informal Logic Newsletter (now the
journal Informal Logic) for their interest in, and comments on, my
work, especially in the period 1979-1982.
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I am extremely grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada for generous financial support
during the period 1982-1984. Without this support, the book
would not have been completed. Trent University also provided
some support in 1981, enabling Jennifer Dance Flatman to lend
valuable bibliographical assistance. Equally important has been
moral support – especially that of David Gallop, William H.
Dray, Bernard Hodgson, Sandy McMullen, Michael Scriven,
Nettie Wiebe, Janet Keeping and, most of all, my husband, Anton
Colijn. For errors or omissions that may remain, I am solely
responsible.
Preface to the Second Edition
For many years, this book has been difficult to obtain, and I felt
badly about that. I was delighted to learn that the series Windsor
Studies in Argumentation was interested in re-publishing the
work so as to make both electronic and print versions available.
After some difficulties, I was able to retrieve the copyright from
the large Walter de Gruyter firm (Berlin), which had taken over
the original publisher, Foris (Dordrecht, the Netherlands) and
dramatically increased the price of the work. Hopefully, this new
edition will be accessible to all who wish to consult it. People
often expressed to me their frustration about the inaccessibility
of the original book. They did not indicate a desire for a re-
working of its themes in the light of subsequent research. That,
in any event, would require a massive amount of work. In this
second edition I have for the most part kept the original material
intact, while adding introductory essays to each chapter in an
effort to convey my present sense of what I said decades ago.
This book was an early one in the development of informal
logic and argumentation studies. My youthful excitement about
topics and problems in these fields stemmed of course from their
intrinsic interest but also from my sense that they had rarely
been explored and seemed to emerge, when they did, mainly
from pedagogical experience and treatments in textbooks. I
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wrote my own textbook A Practical Study of Argument (currently
in its seventh edition), and I enjoyed doing that, but I was
convinced that such topics as missing premises, the inductive/
deductive distinction, and the principle of interpretive charity
required treatment different from what would be appropriate in
a textbook. Hence, this work. Some topics here — for example,
fallacies and social epistemology — have subsequently been
explored by many other theorists. Others, including the
argument/explanation distinction, a priori analogies, and the
principle of charity, have received less attention. In any event,
I hope that this version of Problems in Argument Analysis and
Evaluation will be of interest to persons now active in the study
of argumentation.
I am extremely grateful to Michael Williams for his assistance
in scanning the original book so as to generate electronic files.
He and his fast scanner saved me weeks of work.
The research, thinking, and writing for this work was done
in the period 1982 – 1986. During much of that time I was an
independent scholar based in Calgary, Alberta, and I benefited
from financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities
Council of Canada. Presently my finances are secure, but my
gratitude to the council persists.
x TRUDY GOVIER
CHAPTER 1.
RIGOR AND REALITY
This chapter was written in an atmosphere of challenged change in
the teaching of logic. According to Howard Kahane, whose book on
fallacies (Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric) went through many
editions, his interest in that topic stemmed from the career of Spiro
Agnew. Spiro Agnew was Vice President of the United States from
1969 to 1973. His highly imaginative and well-publicized rhetoric,
incorporating such famous expressions as “nattering nabobs of
negativism,” led several of Kahane’s students to ask what the tools of
logic could offer for the evaluation of Agnew’s claims and arguments.
Kahane realized that formal logic had little to offer, a realization that
led him to develop his own text, emphasizing the understanding of
fallacies. In that work, the examples were taken from American politics,
a selection that prompted Ralph Johnson and Tony Blair to produce
their book, Logical Self-Defence, with Canadian material. That work
was an important stimulus for my own.
In the early nineteen eighties, “logic” as used by philosophers, meant
“formal logic”, and the standard presumption was that by studying logic,
students could learn to reason, detect poor reasoning and argument, and
construct good arguments. This presumption was coming into question
in the nineteen eighties but in my experience it was still strongly
defended by many philosophers. In the context, I was astounded when
I heard in 1978 from Michael Scriven – still active in the field – that
formal logic had little or nothing to offer as applied to real arguments
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expressed in natural language. There were problems of translation,
argument type, structure, premise assessment, dialectical context,
audience, and much else. For all its rigour and status, formal logic
was of little use as applied to real arguments. To me the discovery
was shocking. How could philosophers have been so wrong about
practicalities? Were they deceiving themselves? They prided themselves
on knowing how to argue, but were sadly lacking when it came to
theorizing about that. I was not only shocked; I was excited about the
many under-explored themes that emerged from this failure.
In 2017, the situation has changed significantly. Argumentation
studies is a recognized field, inter-disciplinary and international.
International conferences are many, and are well-attended by
philosophers, academics in speech and communication studies, cognitive
scientists, linguists, and others. The term “informal logic” is used to
name a thriving and recognized journal. To some extent, the problems
described in this chapter have disappeared. Not entirely, though.
Psychologists and neuroscientists may claim expertise in critical
thinking, unaware of work on argumentation, apparently on the
grounds that they understand some of the workings of the brain. Within
philosophy, people are sometimes hired to teach critical thinking,
informal logic, or argumentation in the absence of any expectation that
they should have studied these fields. Among mainstream philosophers,
these areas of study do not generally enjoy a high status. Certainly, they
are not accorded the status given to formal logic. Even in a difficult job
market, it is possible to be hired to teach critical thinking or informal
logic without having studied the topics. What is assumed in this
practice? That a philosopher will have that expertise simply because
she is a philosopher? That some background in formal logic will do
the trick? That the material is, at root, remedial in nature and simple
to understand? I cannot claim to know the answer. The phenomenon
described in this chapter persists to some extent. And it is regrettable.
There was a time when science was thought to be perfectly
objective, immune from political influences, when scientific
2 TRUDY GOVIER
theories were deemed certain and true, when absolute scientific
proof was thought to be possible. That time has passed.
Philosophers of science and scientists themselves now hesitate
to distinguish categorically between theory and observation,
between metaphysics and science, between conviction by proof
and the decision to accept.
Logic is deemed by logicians to be a science, but a comparable
sense of the ambiguity of things has not been conveyed to
logicians. They continue to regard logic as a fully objective study
in which results can be shown true to anyone who understands
the problem and proofs are models of strictness and rigor. Here
enter no values, no history, no politics, no uncertainty, no
ambiguity. Logic is a science in the old-fashioned sense. Perhaps
it is the last such science.
1. The Prestige of Formal Logic
Since the turn of the century, formal logic has been closely
linked with mathematics. A formal logician does not do his work
primarily in a natural language. Rather he deals in artificial
languages and formal systems. Here, symbols like ‘v’, ‘-‘, and ‘.’
are precisely defined and used to represent a core element of the
meaning of such natural words as ‘or’, ‘if-then’, ‘not’, and ‘and’. In
such systems, every term used has a perfectly precise definition;
strict rules govern one’s every move. If natural language
arguments are considered at all, they are re-stated so that their
structure (or form) is represented in the symbols of a formal
system. An argument valid in virtue of its form may be provably
valid if this form is the kind of form the system has been devised
to deal with. Arguments in which connections depend on formal
aspects not covered by the system, or on meaning, or on features
that cannot be handled in deductive logic, do not come out very
well by such tests.
The highly technical and intimidating nature of formal logic
as currently practiced by professional logicians can be conveyed
by a look at just a few recent titles in the field: ‘Large Matrices
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which Induce Finite Consequence Operations’; ‘Counterpart
Theoretical Semantics for Modal Logics’; ‘S5 without Modal
Axioms’; ‘More about the Lattice of Tense Logics’.
Formal systems are created structures, beloved in some
quarters for their provision of endless opportunities to
manipulate symbols in blissful isolation from the ambiguities of
real language and the uncertainties of the real world. ‘If’ and
‘implies’ in English mean many things in many contexts, but
the material implication symbol in standard propositional logic
means one and only one: ‘p→q’ says that q is never false when p
is true, and it says nothing other than this.
Logic, understood as formal logic, has enormous prestige. In
part, this is because the study of logic is supposed to help us
construct sound arguments, reason well, and find flaws in shaky
or deceptive arguments. Logic does not describe or explain the
way people in fact think. Rather, it is an evaluative discipline,
which originally was supposed to set forth standards delineating
good reasoning from poor. Formal logic, however, is now so
technical, so rarefied, and so specialized, that it is greatly
removed from this original concept of what logic is supposed to
do. A person could study formal logic for years and gain no idea
that it was supposed to have anything to do with differentiating
good arguments from poor ones.1 Logic as it exists now is
primarily the study of artificial formal systems. The idea that it
has something to do with the construction and understanding of
good arguments and the development of critical skills that apply
to natural discourse surfaces largely in student texts and the
pedagogic rationalizations logic professors offer to curriculum
committees.
That formal logic cannot capture all of the factors we need
when we evaluate a real piece of argumentation in a natural
language is, in an important way, quite obvious. In fact, no formal
logician would seriously dispute this claim, for all recognize the
distinction and difference between formal and natural languages,
and the role of information in the premises of arguments. What
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is strange is that in view of these substantial gaps between real
arguments and the subject matter of formal logic, formal logic is
still widely regarded as having something important to offer to
the non-specialist.2 The dichotomy between formal systems and
the chaotic reality of discourse is no mystery but the persistence,
in the face of this dichotomy, of formal logic as an educational
and intellectual institution, should give pause for thought.
So great is the prestige of formal logic that those who try
to teach more practical argument and reasoning skills at
universities are under some pressure to label their endeavors
so as to avoid using the term ‘logic’. Such activities merit a less
prestigious title: critical thinking, rhetoric, or communication
skills, perhaps. The shocking truth is that if courses have the aim
of treating natural argumentation, there is scarcely a pertinent
body of academic expertise on which they can be based.
Nonformal matters pertinent to the assessment of natural
argumentation have been long neglected. (Since the Renaissance,
some would say.) Of late, concerned instructors in departments
of philosophy and literature have come to think that it is
desirable to teach students how to identify and evaluate
arguments expressed in ordinary English prose. When they set
out to do this, they apparently make surprising discoveries.
Textbooks in applied logic make peculiar reading for the
philosopher trained to respect the traditions of formal logic.
Their authors seem to have found that when they try to apply
traditional logical categories to real arguments in natural
languages, things do not work out well.3
2. Formal Validity
In formal logic, the category ‘valid’ is of the all-or-nothing
kind. If an argument is such that, given its premises, it is
absolutely impossible for its conclusion to be false, it is valid.
If not, it is invalid. Period: there is nothing in between. But for
many real arguments, things are not so clear-cut. For example,
John Kenneth Galbraith, discussing inflation, once argued that
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the problem should not be avoided by our becoming content to
accept inflation as a natural fact of life. He gave a number of
distinct reasons for his view: inflation leads to social inequities
and instability; inflation makes contracts difficult to arrange
because prices for future dates may be uncertain; inflation causes
difficulties in international trade. Now these factors clearly do
not substantiate or demonstrate the conclusion in the logician’s
strong sense of showing that it is absolutely impossible for that
conclusion to be false. They are relevant to the point. They
clearly go some way towards establishing it. Galbraith gives us an
argument for his view. When we come to assess it, if we follow
the canons of formal logic, we are left asking is this argument
valid or invalid? And somehow this doesn’t seem like the right
question to be asking. We are inclined to assess the argument
as one which goes part way toward establishing its conclusion,
though not all the way.4 In the face of these and other difficulties,
philosophically minded analysts of actual arguments have been
driven to suggest that perhaps validity will have to be understood
as a matter of degree, or redefined in terms of an ultimate
consensus of reflective normal minds. From the standpoint of
logical tradition, both proposals are shockingly heretical. Validity
is supposed to be a formally demonstrable and absolute feature
of an argument.
Then there are problems with the hallowed old distinction
between inductive and deductive arguments. Most logic texts
state that deductive arguments are those that ‘involve the claim’
that the truth of the premises renders the falsity of the conclusion
impossible, whereas inductive arguments ‘involve’ the lesser
claim that the truth of the premises renders the falsity of the
conclusion unlikely, or improbable. This distinction proves
difficult to apply to actual arguments.5 Few arguers are so
considerate as to give us a clear indication as to whether they are
claiming absolute conclusiveness in the technical sense in which
logicians understand it. In assessing arguments we need to arrive
at some view as to how good the reasons put forward are. Asking
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whether they were supposed to be conclusive or not is often
not a useful stage in the assessment procedure. The distinction
between deductive and inductive arguments is hard to apply to
actual arguments, and not clearly useful. Yet modern logic has
developed around this distinction.
Thus traditions wobble against the pressures of the
surprisingly new task of analyzing actual arguments. In the face
of such problems, the teaching of courses in practical logic is not
easy. Surprisingly radical things are suggested by the authors of
texts for these courses. With few exceptions, they do not publish
their radical suggestions in professional journals of logic and
philosophy. Either they are afraid to buck tradition, or their
writings are edited out.6
3. Actual Arguments
The uninitiated reader might wonder why I refer so often to
actual arguments and what contrast is intended here. An actual
argument is simply a piece of discourse or writing in which
someone tries to convince others (or himself or herself) of the
truth of a claim by citing reasons on its behalf. I speak of actual
arguments because I do not wish to speak of the contrived
arguments-series of statements constructed by logicians to
illustrate their principles and techniques. It is common practice
for a logician to state a principle in a formal system and then
invent an ‘argument’ to illustrate that principle. This custom
provides bizarre exercises for logic students. A selection:
If she comes closer, she will seem even more beautiful. Provided that she
marries you, she will seem even more beautiful. Hence if she does not
marry you, she will not come closer.7
If he has ten children, then that character will be written on his face. If his
character is written on his face, he cannot deceive us. So either he cannot
deceive us, or he does not have ten children.8
If the weather is warm and the sky is clear, then either we go swimming
or we go boating. It is not the case that if we do not go swimming, then the
sky is not clear. Therefore, either the weather is warm or we go boating.9
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Any author is successful if and only if he is well read. All authors are
intellectuals. Some authors are successful but not well read. Therefore all
intellectuals are authors.10
These sequences of sentences can be more or less represented
in the apparatus of formal logic, but the so-called arguments
they express are totally unrealistic. A common rationalization for
setting out such treats before student eyes is that the interesting
content of more realistic arguments, whether these deal with
issues of the day or enduring intellectual concerns, could distract
people from purely logical considerations. (For ‘purely logical’
here, read ‘purely formal and resolvable by a mechanical
procedure’.) Critics suspect that the real reason for the strange
examples of the logic texts may be that a purely formal analysis
is only rarely helpful in evaluating that argument. Students need
exercises to develop skills. Since they cannot use formal skills on
real arguments, they need invented ones.
The science of logic, formal logic, has progressed by ignoring
real arguments and attending to constructed systems. Stipulated
definitions and rules make objectivity and rigor possible, but
only because the logician is not analyzing a real argument. He
is doing something else, and doing it very precisely. But when
he has completed his task, neither he nor anyone else can easily
apply his formal rules and definitions to anything but his own
systems. Nevertheless, formal logic is a venerable intellectual
institution. Ordinary people, who know little about it, regard it as
terribly technical and difficult, and often feel a little embarrassed
about what they suspect would be their personal ineptitude at
high-level symbol manipulation. (Tell someone you are writing a
book on logic and he will give you a look of respect you will never
get if you tell him you are writing on equality or the early Cold
War.)
Because it deals with the artificial, formal logic can exhibit
rigor and objectivity. In an artificial system, we can obtain
certainty in results. After all, we have provided for this in the very
construction of the system. Formal logicians primarily devote
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themselves to developing systems and to working out the
implications of the rules and definitions around which they have
decided to construct those systems. If they theorize about why
this or that rule has been adopted, or what the interpretation
of various systems might be, they call this study philosophy of
logic, rather than logic per se. The genuine logician, in the modern
world, is an adept manipulator of symbols, a creator of elegant
proofs. Proofs in a formal system can be perfectly rigorous; they
depend on no undefended move. With such proofs, we know
exactly where we start, where we finish and why we are entitled
to make the moves we do. It is the quest for rigor and certainty,
the drive to achieve that impeccable result, which has led
logicians more and more to concentrate on formal systems.
But such rigor and certainty are achieved at the cost of
emptiness. Real arguments in natural language are not amenable
to fully precise treatment. They deal with topics of controversy,
disputed facts, plausible hypotheses, approximately correct
analogies. To evaluate them, we must sort out ambiguities, see
how diverse factors fit together, weigh pros and cons, consider
the credibility of those on whom we may depend for testimony
or expertise. Formal logic is, by its very nature, incompetent
to address such matters. At best, it will apply to (only) some
arguments in natural language, after virtually all interesting
questions about the interpretation, content, and substantive truth
they contain have already been resolved.
4. An Example
An example seems the best way to illustrate the truth of this
claim. Alasdair MacIntyre once argued that Christianity does not
require any fully objective justification for beliefs about God.
MacIntyre defended this conclusion by saying that anyone
founding his religious belief on an objective justification proving
God’s existence would, in effect, be unfree in his belief in God. He
put it this way:
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(S)uppose religion could be provided with a method of proof. Suppose for
example . . that the divine omnipotence was so manifest that whenever
anyone denied a Christian doctrine he was at once struck dead by a
thunderbolt. No doubt the conversion of England would ensue with a
rapidity undreamt of by the Anglican bishops. But since the Christian
faith sees true religion only in a free decision made in faith and love,
the religion would by this vindication be destroyed. For all the possibility
of free choice would have been done away. Any objective justification of
belief would have the same effect. Less impressive than thunderbolts, it
would equally eliminate all possibility of the decision of faith. And with
that, faith too would have been eliminated.11
This is a complex passage, and one has to do some work to
unearth the main argument. Essentially, it is:
1. If people were struck dead by being bolted with thunder
after denying any Christian doctrine, there would be mass
conversions due to fear.
2. Christian faith sees true religion only in free decisions made
in faith and love.
3. Conversion due to this kind of fear would not be due to free
decisions made in faith and love.
So,
4. Conversion by thunderbolt would destroy Christian faith.
5. Conversion on the basis of an objective justification of
Christian belief would similarly eliminate all possibility of
free decisions made in faith and love.
6. Therefore,
7. The objective justification of the beliefs of Christian religion
would eliminate the Christian faith.
To decide whether MacIntyre has a good case here, we have,
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essentially, to decide how he is using the concept of freedom,
what sort of freedom it makes sense to expect in contexts where
people are believing as opposed to acting, how good the
comparison between believing from fear and believing on the
basis of an objective justification is, and how sound his comments
about the freedom of the decision to believe being essential to
Christian faith are. None of these issues are formal. To bend and
twist this argument by analogy into a representation to which the
rules of a formal system would apply would be useless even if it
were possible.
Now formal logic is a prestigious academic subject with
important connections with the foundations of mathematics. It
is not likely to go out of existence, and no one is recommending
that it should. The problem is, logic is supposed by many to
provide us with standards by which to assess arguments. And
as it is taught today, formal logic does not adequately do this.
Logic in western universities and as standardly taught in North
America has become formal logic and formal logic, whatever its
hardheaded virtues, simply does not provide a sufficient basis
for the assessment of actual arguments.12 Formal logicians who
try to support their academic endeavors by making courses
compulsory on the grounds that students’ reasoning will thereby
be improved should be met with scepticism. In view of the
rupture between the rigorous precision of formal logicians and
the complexities of real argumentation, such claims are at best
the unthinking repetition of slogans and at worst outright
dishonesty.
5. The Desire for Rigor and Certainty
Rigor and the resulting certainty are not ideals that formal
logicians have adopted out of perversity and foisted upon an
unsuspecting public. Rather, they have roots in the history of
philosophy, roots that go back at least as far as Plato. Mathematics
has long been the philosopher’s envy, mathematical knowledge
the ideal of perfect knowledge. For mathematics, which is non-
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empirical, is in an important sense liberated from the real world.
In mathematics there can be uncontrovertible proofs and perfect
agreement. Against its eternal verities, philosophical systems
appear weak and insecure.13 Philosophers have long sought to
emulate mathematical proof and produce mathematical certainty.
According to Descartes, human knowledge was to be constructed
so as to presume nothing. After the apprehension of an undeniable
and fundamental truth, one would proceed by clear and
uncontrovertible proofs to deduce simple, certain propositions
from which, in turn, more complex knowledge could be
concluded. Spinoza set his Ethics forward in a system of axioms,
theorems and propositions, like a geometric system. Kant
compared philosophy unfavorably with mathematics and
speculated that the certainty of mathematics came from the fact
that in that discipline the mind creates its own objects and is
thereby able to know them with perfect certainty. The model of
mathematical knowledge has had immense appeal and influence
throughout the history of western philosophy. It is perhaps this
model which motivates formal logicians. Within the artificialities
of constructed systems, issues are clear, perfectly true answers
possible, and completely rigorous proofs discoverable.
Nor is the attainment of perfect certainty an exclusively
philosophical idea. People do not have to be taught to desire
certainty. There is something satisfying and secure in the sense
that one can know for certain that what one believes is true,
that things must be as one thinks, that anyone who disagrees is
simply mistaken. For teachers such knowledge carries a position
of authority not likely in more realistic contexts. There premises
may be only partially warranted, new information may outweigh
that which is at hand, analogies may appear persuasive and yet
not entirely convincing. ‘Valid’ or ‘invalid’, we may pronounce of
the stylized, contrived arguments in the formal logic textbooks.
In real life, things are rarely so simple. And yet the ‘valid’/’invalid’
verdict is a more satisfying one than a qualified judgment to the
effect that an argument gives relevant reasons but not conclusive
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reason for accepting the conclusion. In formal logic, the desire
for rigor, certainty, and categorical answers may be satisfied, but
at the cost of applicability. To grasp ‘objectivity’ and rigor at this
price seems more neurotic than scientific.
For more than two decades, Chaim Perelman has sought to
distinguish argument from formal demonstration, defending the
view that much to be said about actual argumentation transcends
the bounds of formal logic. Perelman wrote in French, but his
major works have been translated into English. Gilbert Ryle, P.F.
Strawson, Stephen Toulmin, C.L. Hamblin, Carl Wellman, and
F.L. Will are English-language philosophers who have expounded
related views. In one way or another, several of the English-
language thinkers have been influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein
who, in his later philosophy, railed against the imposition of
scientific standards of rigor and precision in contexts where they
had no proper place. Wittgenstein emphasized the value of
attending to particular cases and the concrete phenomena against
which (on his view) general theories should be tested. To follow
his advice in developing a logic of argument would constitute a
radical departure from tradition in logic. For as we have already
seen, models of correct argument have been stipulated a priori
and then used to evaluate actual instances of argument.
These ‘back to the phenomena’ thinkers have had exceptionally
little influence on the development of logic. Though philosophers
no longer venerate Wittgenstein, they continue to study his
works. Yet the implications of his methodological views for logic
itself are rarely remarked.14 The other authors mentioned are
scarcely read in standard North American graduate programs in
philosophy, and rarely considered in university courses in logic.
Toulmin’s book on argument seems to have been the least
successful of his many works, among philosophers at least. It was
largely as a concession to sixties’ student demands for relevance
that philosophy departments started to teach courses in which
actual arguments, expressed in natural language, were the
primary basis for study. Only recently have courses about critical
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thinking or ‘informal logic’ been the focus of attention. Such
courses now proliferate but are regarded in many circles as poor
siblings, feeble substitutes for the ‘real logic’ in which students
should be taught, above all else, the ideal of rigor.
Many intellectual factors should have led to the loosening of
the formalist model of successful argument. Descartes’ theory of
knowledge has been subjected to severe attack in our century.
Few epistemologists would accept Cartesian certainty as a
reasonable goal for human knowledge; few believe that first
principles should be proven or that knowledge can proceed from
them in deductive steps that are intuitively clear. The formalist
ideal of rigor and certainty, the model of successful argument
that has emerged from formal logic, is Cartesian in concept and
in origin. Yet it has not been subjected to criticism in logic as it
has elsewhere. The distinction between deductive and inductive
arguments, around which modern logic is erected, is closely
related to another distinction philosophers have made, between
analytic and synthetic statements. The latter distinction is now
regarded with scepticism, as one which it is difficult to draw with
exactitude. Such doubts, however, have not been transferred
back to the former distinction. The hallowed tradition of
inductive and deductive seems immune from serious criticism.
Curiously enough, philosophical arguments are not exclusively
deductive in character. They are not, on the whole, valid in virtue
of logical form alone, not easily translatable into the technical
symbols of formal systems. Nor are philosophical arguments like
the arguments studied in inductive logic. In accepting the model
of successful argument presumed in traditional logic,
philosophers have put themselves in an absurd position, because
they are unable to apply what passes as a theory of argument to
many of their own arguments. This difficulty would be merely
silly had it not such a venerable philosophical history. Scholars
have often pointed out that Descartes, Hume, Kant, and the
logical positivists all have difficulties in getting their own
practice to conform to their own theory.15
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These problems should have produced a more flexible basis for
argument analysis than that provided by formal logic. They did
not. Although rigor pulls away from applicability, formal logic
continues to be regarded as a science that offers something
relevant to real arguments. To serve this function, however, it
would have to offer canons of reasoning and argument that are
more than techniques for manipulating symbols in meticulous
respect for the stipulated rules of an artificial game. Formal logic
shows little tendency to develop in this way, yet its practitioners
seek to maintain its authority as offering the ultimate standards
against which natural arguments should be assessed. Its
continuing authority in the face of this disparity is a phenomenon
that calls for explanation. Sociologists of knowledge should take
a look at it.
6. Paradigms
While awaiting their accounts, I am led to reflect on the
philosophy of science of Thomas Kuhn. Philosophers have been
impressed and greatly influenced by Kuhn’s work. They delight
in applying it to the social and physical sciences but are not quite
so ready to apply it to themselves. Certainly no one has been so
presumptuous as to apply it to the venerable establishment of
logic as the formal, entirely rigorous, science of reasoning.
Kuhn introduced to philosophy of science a novel concept,
that of the scientific paradigm. A paradigm is an example or
model of successful work which dominates an intellectual field
to determine what problems will be seen as interesting, what
methods will be seen as rational, and what the standard of a
good solution to a problem will be. Kuhn argued that students in
science are taught, in effect, to see the world in a particular way,
to ask questions within a specified range, to look in particular
directions and not others for answers to those questions. The
paradigm dominates a science, making consensus and rapid
progress possible. Scientific questions and projects remain
within a delimited range, though the limitations become so
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routine to practitioners as to be virtually indiscernible. Kuhn
regarded paradigms as necessary and therefore legitimate, but
he emphasized that their force lies more in education and
established institutions than in their pure objective truth. When
there are paradigm shifts in science, these are grounded as much
in psychological and historical factors as in data or
experimentation. So radical is a paradigm shift that Kuhn terms
it a ‘revolution’ in scientific theory.
It is illuminating to look at the current situation in logic from
the perspective of Kuhn’s theory. Formally valid arguments seem
to be functioning as a kind of paradigm. This paradigm works so
strongly on formally trained logicians and philosophers that they
are unable to take account of the obvious. The obvious is that
rigor and reality are uneasy mates, that real argumentation is not
easily or usefully amenable to formal treatment, and that there
are many interesting nonformal questions about arguments.
They cry out for attention.
In logic, a paradigm is at work. But it blinds us. I recommend
revolution.
Notes
1. I once knew someone who did, and did very well in terms
of marks. However, this comment is less accurate now (1987)
than it was when this essay was first written (1980), due to the
influence of practically oriented textbooks and, in some
jurisdictions, such as California, state imposed requirements for
education in critical thinking.
2. Compare Patrick Suppes, Introduction to Logic, (Princeton: Van
Nostrand, 1957), Michael Resnick, Elementary Logic, (New York:
McGraw- Hill, 1970), Irving Copi, Symbolic Logic (New York:
Macmillan, many editions). Copi’s text has been so widely used
that it may be said to represent a consensus over some decades.
It and other texts traditionally taught formal skills, but
nevertheless commenced with bold promises as to the practical
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advantages a study of the formal subject matter would have,
even for those not aspiring to be professional logicians or
mathematicians.
3. For instance, S.N. Thomas, in his successful text, Practical
Reasoning in Natural Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice
Hall 1974) recommends that validity be seen as a matter of
degree and boldly claims that the distinction between inductive
and deductive arguments is a useless dogma.
4. This reinterpretation is suggested by Carl Wellman in
Challenge and Response: Justification in Ethics (Carbondale, Ill.:
University of Illinois Press, 1970). It recalls C.S. Peirce’s notion
of truth as the doctrine which trained minds will, in the final
analysis, come to accept.
5. Definitions of ‘inductive’ vary. (Compare ‘The Great Divide’,
Chapter 3.) The conception I’m alluding to here is common,
however, as one may see from examining a variety of first year
formal logic texts including those referred to in note 3.
6. This is less true than it was in 1980, due in part to the success
of the Informal Logic Newsletter. Essays on the pedagogy of the
‘new logic’ have appeared in Teaching Philosophy, and relevant
theoretical papers have appeared in Metaphilosophy, the Canadian
Journal of Philosophy, and the American Philosophical Quarterly.
Reviews of texts and pertinent books have appeared in these
journals and in Dialogue and Canadian Philosophical Reviews. It
would, however, still be accurate to say that there is a vast
disparity between the popularity of applied logic courses among
students and the perceived importance of related theoretical
issues as research topics.
7. Resnick, Op. cit., p. 105.
8. Ibid., p. 105.
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9. Copi, Op. cit., p.27.
10. Ibid., p. 90.
11. Alasdair Maclntyre, in Metaphysical Beliefs. (London: SCM
Press, 1957).
12. Pure logic is formal logic. High prestige logic is formal logic.
Research logic is primarily formal logic. Logic for philosophy
majors is primarily formal logic. But logic for nonprofessionals,
textbook logic, and college logic, are no longer primarily formal
logic. My comment was true in 1980 but needs qualification in
1987.
13. I am told by those in the know that this overstates the
epistemic virtues of mathematics, that nonformal reasoning is
needed there also, and that formal proofs have been found wrong
after being accepted by mathematicians for decades. If this is
true, then ironically, the formalist model of proof may fail even
to accurately capture its own paradigm of adequacy.
14. Notable among Perelman’s works is The New Rhetoric: A
Treatise on Argumentation (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University
Press, 1969), written jointly with Mme. L. Olbrechts Tyteca.
Other works on argument in a ‘back to the phenomena’ vein
are Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge, Eng.:
Cambridge University Press, 1958); C.L. Hamblin, Fallacies
(London: Methuen, 1970); Carl Wellman, Challenge and Response
(Carbondale Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971); and
F.L. Will, Induction and Justification (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1974). The most relevant essay by Ryle is in
Dilemmas (London: Cambridge University Press, 1954). Strands
of resistance to formal approaches to handling natural language
also appear in P.F. Strawson’s Introduction to Logical Theory
(London: Methuen, 1952). Wittgenstein’s approach is evident in
his Blue Book, where he said, ‘Our craving for generality has another
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main source: our preoccupation with the method of science. I mean
the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the
smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in
mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a
generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before
their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in
the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics,
and leads the philosopher into complete darkness … Instead of ‘craving
for generality’, I could also have said ‘the contemptuous attitude towards
the particular case’.’
15. Descartes sought to doubt all his prior beliefs and found a
system on the cogito and deductions from it and basic principles
of logic. But he presupposed beliefs from ordinary life and
medieval philosophy more than he knew, and this was not
accidental. Hume said that reasonings neither quantitative nor
experimental should be committed to the flames in apparent
obliviousness to the fact that many of his own reasonings fell
into that category. Kant stated that we could not know things-
in-themselves, but seemed committed to knowing the human
mind and its capacities as more than appearances. The logical
positivists rejected as meaningless any claim which was not
either made true by rules governing the use of symbols or
verified by sense experience. Critics were quick to point out
that their own key principle turns out to be meaningless if these
criteria are applied to it.
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CHAPTER 2.
IS A THEORY OF ARGUMENT POSSIBLE
Reading this chapter in 2017, I am struck by its length, which seems
excessive, and also by my selection of authors covered. The name ‘John
McPeck’ is largely forgotten in philosophical circles today. When I
was working on this material, his claims about informal logic and
critical thinking posed a significant challenge, both pedagogically and
theoretically.
Would critical thinking not be something different for different
subjects? McPeck claimed it would. If so, how could philosophers – even
formal logicians – be justified in their claims to teach it? If informal
logic was about good and bad arguments, wouldn’t standards of
assessment similarly vary from one subject to another? Again, the
question posed a pedagogical challenge. As for theory, on McPeck’s view
there would be nothing general to be said. Those interested in critical
thinking and informal logic were not inclined to accept these challenges,
but felt pressed to respond. My own response is here. McPeck derived
some of his views from Stephen Toulmin, whose work on argument
structure and appraisal is still studied and used today. Looking back, I
would have done better to discuss Toulmin’s account, as distinct from
that of McPeck. But I did not. Current versions of discipline-specificity
have been developed in detail by Mark Weinstein.
The theme of deductivism retains its temptations. I still resist
deductivism and would still insist that the fact that a reconstructed
argument is clear and cogent does not mean that it is an accurate
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version of something else. We need to distinguish between the clarity
of a reconstructed argument and its accuracy as a rendition of the
unreconstructed version. It remains tempting not to do so. Recently, I
find deductivism more common in application than in professed theory.
As was the case decades ago, deductivism is still used as an ad hoc
presumption to resolve questions about missing premises.
As to Stephen Thomas, a search revealed that his text Practical
Reasoning in Natural Language, went into many editions. There may
have been seven. The fourth edition (1997) was several hundred pages
longer than the first one. I never met Stephen Thomas or heard him
speak. The idea of a spectrum theory, wherein the inference aspect of
argumentation can be appraised as having degrees of strength, was
innovative in its time and retains some interest and plausibility.
My notion here of what a theory of argument should include began
in a traditional way: one would need an account of various legitimate
(and illegitimate) types of inference and of conditions of premise
acceptability. These beginnings would seem too narrow today; their
narrowness in fact emerged even as I explored them in the mid eighties.
I was led to consider broader aspects: principles of interpretation and
criticism; relations between principles of interpretation and standards
of assessment, and between arguers and their audiences. More recent
writings on the theory of argument extend into these and broader
themes of discourse, rationality, and rhetoric. Noteworthy is Harald
Wohlrapp’s The Concept of Argument: A Philosophical Foundation
(German 2008, English 2014).
Except in certain limited circles, there is no recognized subject
called ‘the theory of argument’. Yet there are clearly a number of
questions about arguing and argument not answered by formal
logic and of considerable importance. A theory of argument
would discuss the nature and purpose of argument and specify
and defend standards for the appraisal of arguments. It would
specify how many different types of arguments there are and
what standards are appropriate to assess each type. It would
explain when and why it is reasonable to read into discourse
PROBLEMS IN ARGUMENT ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 21
claims that are not explicitly stated, and whether and how the
personalities and beliefs of arguers and audiences logically affect
the merits of argumentation. Ideally a theory of argument would
apply to all natural arguments. But is there, or could there be, any
such thing as a theory of argument?
Although there have been works on the theory of argument
and calls for such theory in some circles, many remain sceptical
about the quest. They regard the theory of argument as a non-
subject, unless it is identified with the formal study of valid
and invalid inference patterns. Such a response – either there
is nothing general to be said about arguments or what there
is to be said is formal and the proper subject of formal logic
– was common among philosophers some years back and still
persists in some quarters. We are used to thinking of the study
of argument as being primarily a matter of logic, and of logic
as being primarily formal; hence the call for a nonformal theory
of argument may seem novel or contrived. However, such
questions as ‘How many different types of arguments are there?’,
‘When and why should we regard an argument as having
unstated premises?’, and ‘Is the truth of premises too strong a
requirement for soundness of argumentation?’, cannot be
answered by formal techniques. To respond to them, we need
observation, reasoning, the justification of normative standards,
and philosophical theorizing.
1. Against the Idea of a Theory of Argument
In his book Critical Thinking and Education, philosopher and
educational theorist John McPeck contends that the very notion
of a nonformal theory of argument is a non-starter. Referring to
a suggestion that the pedagogy and theory of informal logic and
critical thinking would be immensely aided by the development
of a theory of argument, McPeck says:
We might ask what it would be like to have a general theory of ordinary
argument or reasoning. For one thing, the theory would provide a set
22 TRUDY GOVIER
of rules or principles to which we could appeal in the evaluation of
arguments. But if informal logicians were ever successful at developing
all these rules and principles, they would then have a formal logic of
ordinary argument or reasoning: that is, the desired theory would vitiate
the informal dimension of their reasoning and render their enterprise a
bonafide logic, which could then be taught as the formal logic of ordinary
reasoning.1
According to McPeck, there could not be a nonformal theory
of argument, because any general account we could produce
would be formal.
To sort out McPeck’s view it is necessary to distinguish
between a more general and a more specific sense of the key
word ‘formal’.2 The word ‘formal’ may mean ‘systematic, well-
ordered, having universal or general scope’. In this sense, a
theory of argument would surely be a formal theory, just as
theories in ethics, political philosophy, and epistemology are (in
this sense) formal theories. However, there is no problem about
informal logicians developing a theory of argument which is in
this broad sense formal. The incompatibility between informal
logical principles and a formal theory emerges only when we
consider a more specific and narrower sense of ‘formal’, that
which is intended when we describe such systems as C.I. Lewis’
S5, or an axiomatized version of number theory as formal
systems. Formal systems have clearly stated rules, definite
criteria for well-formed strings or formulae, and axioms to serve
as the basis for derivations. They are written in technical, not
natural, languages. As formal systems they are not, strictly
speaking, about anything; they may be given one or more
interpretations. If a formal theory of argument were formal in
this sense, that would indeed be incompatible with what
informal logicians have been saying about arguments. They have
been saying that formal systems do not cover all the topics we
need to raise in discussing natural language arguments, and that
many such topics bring in nonformal questions about context
and substance.
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Informal logicians, contesting the drive for complete rigor and
purity among formalists, contend that the appraisal of natural
arguments requires something other than translation into a
technical formal language and application of formal rules to test
validity. However, it is only in the narrower sense of ‘formal’ that
informal logicians deny that a theory of natural argument will
be a formal theory. Nothing precludes the development, within
informal logic, of a theory of argument that is formal in the
broader sense.
McPeck’s claim that informal logicians would vitiate
themselves and ‘go formal’ if they ever managed to develop a
theory of argument is based on a failure to distinguish these two
senses of ‘formal’. McPeck has, in effect, conflated the general
and the formal.3 A perfectly general principle might be
formulated, handling such an issue as when an arguer’s personal
reliability is relevant to the acceptability of his or her premises.
Such a principle would not be formal in the sense of being in
an artificial language or of being an axiom or rule in a formal
system, but could nevertheless be part of a general theory of
argument.4
As it occurs in ‘formal logic’, the word ‘formal’ usually has
the second, narrow meaning explained above. In this sense of
‘formal’ there is no more reason to believe that the principles of
a theory of argument would be formal than there is to believe
that the principles of moral, political, or epistemological theories
would be formal. That is to say, there is no reason at all to believe
this.
Since logic has for so long been regarded both as intrinsically
formal and as the science or art of argument, the move from
‘it’s a general theory of argument’ to ‘it’s a formal theory of
argument’ may seem enticing and plausible. But it has no more
force than the analogous move for moral or scientific theories;
that means that it has no force.
In fact, theories of argument that are, in the requisite sense,
nonformal are more than possible. They are actual. Although
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many philosophers seem to hold that the theory of argument is
a non-subject, many others (and some of the same ones) hold
philosophical theories of argument to which they frequently
appeal for pedagogical and other purposes. Some popular
theories are inadequate in various ways. There is an unfortunate
tendency to state such theories in a few words and go on to
appeal to them as the basis for other work. So far, theories of
argument have been more epigrammatic than thoughtful.
2. Are Argument Standards Discipline-Specific?
Though he contends in Critical Thinking and Education that
there can be no such thing as a nonformal theory of argument,
John McPeck in fact states a nonformal theory of argument in
that same work. He puts forward a discipline-specific theory in
which the understanding and evaluation of arguments is left as
a task for particular academic disciplines. This theory maintains
that the premises and inferences of all natural arguments are
properly assessed only by reference to the standards of one or
more specific disciplines. Standards for sound argumentation
may vary from one discipline to another, according to this
theory. There are as many types of good arguments (at least)
as there are disciplines. Any attempt to develop general, cross-
disciplinary standards of argument is misguided. A good
argument in physics satisfies standards quite different from
those which are applicable to a good argument in law or in
history. Evaluating arguments requires critical thinking and
critical thinking amounts to a judicious, reflective scepticism
which must be based on a sound knowledge of the inner
workings of a particular area of thought.
McPeck proposes his discipline-specific theory as follows:
Since critical thinking is always critical thinking about X, it follows that
critical thinking is intimately connected with other fields of knowledge.
Thus the criteria for the judicious use of scepticism are supplied by the
norms and standards of the field under consideration.5
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Just as the rules of a particular game do not necessarily apply to other
games, so certain principles of reason apply within some sphere of human
experience but not in others. A principle of reason in business or law, for
example, might be fallacious in science or ethics. This is neither surprising
nor profound but it is a point that is continually obscured by informal
logicians and it may explain their optimism about the development of a
general theory of argument.6
The existing disciplines are already steeped in their own reasoning
procedures, fallible as they might be at times. But learning to use those
procedures properly involves learning the idiosyncrasies of those
disciplines. 7
McPeck is led to a discipline-specific theory partly by a study
of Stephen Toulmin’s works and partly by the idea – expressed
in the first passage quoted above – that arguments deal with
specific subjects and each specific subject is located within some
discipline or other. His presupposition here is, apparently, that
the norms come from the subject matter.
Toulmin wrote an early book, The Uses of Argument, decrying
the dominance of formal logic in argument analysis. He urged
that there were many diverse types of argument appropriate to
diverse human activities. Several decades later, he followed his
early monograph with a text, coauthored with Richard Rieke and
Allan Janik.8 The text echoes the earlier theory. However, it does
impose a common structure on argumentation. Each argument
has, according to Toulmin, a claim (what standard analysis would
call the conclusion), a ground or grounds for the claim (in
standard accounts, the premises), and a warrant and backing. The
warrant is a general proposition linking the grounds and claim
and the backing is comprised of other claims that can be used
to back up the warrant. For example, a simple argument such as
‘you shouldn’t smoke because you might get lung cancer’ would
be seen as having ‘you might get lung cancer’ as the ground and
‘you shouldn’t smoke’ as the claim. The warrant, which must be
constructed and read into the argument, would be something
like ‘Smoking often causes lung cancer’. The backing would be
26 TRUDY GOVIER
found in the medical theories which support belief in the
warrant.
Toulmin emphasizes the important role of disciplinary
knowledge and procedures in the understanding and appraisal of
argument. Thus it is in some sense natural that McPeck should
appeal to his account for support.
In another way, however, what Toulmin says is not consistent
with what McPeck wants to say. Oddly enough, in view of
Toulmin’s strong dissent from traditional logical approaches, his
analysis commits him to imposing a common structure on all
arguments. They will all have the same modus ponens form, when
the warrant is supplied. And yet there are cases where the fit is
rather unnatural. Even in the simple example about smoking, for
instance, we have to restrict ourselves to backing and warrant
from one field in order to make Toulmin’s style of analysis fit.
Why not supplement the medical evidence with a claim about
obligations not to unnecessarily risk one’s health and a backing
from canons of ethics or prudence? If we did this, we would
immediately have an argument to which at least two ‘disciplines’
were relevant.
Despite some rather dramatic statements to the contrary,
Toulmin is in fact committed to the belief that there are many
general points about argument structure and evaluation which
are correctly super-imposed (as it were) on the standards of the
various disciplines. This makes his account an unpromising
source for a view such as McPeck’s, which disclaims any
possibility of general standards working across disciplines.
The reception of Toulmin’s ideas on argument is itself a matter
of some interest. His ideas have been roundly rejected by most
philosophers and yet have gained wide acceptance in other
circles, notably among scholars of argumentation whose
background is in rhetoric or communication, rather than logic
and philosophy. Nevertheless, an examination of several recent
accounts of Toulmin’s theory seems to indicate that the
philosophers’ rejection was on solid grounds.
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In an excellent and thorough review of Toulmin’s text, Ralph
Johnson worked hard with his theory and eventually decided
that it faced serious problems.
Many of the warrants Toulmin cites as examples do not seem to belong
to any identifiable field. But this only raises another problem. What is
to count as a field? Law and science qualify, of course. Does astrology?
Does common sense? Does philosophy? And what happens when, as is
often enough the case, an arguer provides grounds from different fields?9
Arguments in which several distinct grounds are offered at once
and each ground comes from a different ‘field’ are very common
in everyday life, and yet Toulmin’s model does not seem to apply
to them.
F.H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, and T. Kruiger, offer a
thorough analysis of Toulmin’s work in their book The Study
of Argumentation. They offer many criticisms, among them the
following, regarding Toulmin’s positing of four essential
elements in argument (claim, ground, warrant, and backing)
instead of the traditional two (premises and conclusion):
In fact, however, he assumes in his model that the data (grounds) are
accepted at face value; if this is not the case, then, he says, it will have
to be made the case by way of a preliminary argument. Then the datum
from the one argument will be the claim in the other. There is absolutely
no reason why the same should not apply to the warrant. If a warrant
is not immediately accepted as authoritative, then an attempt must be
made to remove the objections to it by means of another argument, in
which the warrant from the first argument appears as the claim. And if
an argument contains a backing for the warrant, then in fact there are
two arguments.10
At this point it should be clear that no solid basis for McPeck’s
theory can be found in Toulmin’s theory.
The other line of thought that leads McPeck to a discipline-
specific theory is equally unconvincing. He reasons that since
every argument and every thought are about some specific thing,
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and since every specific thing is properly understood within
some specific discipline, every argument is properly assessed
only with reference to the standards of some specific discipline.
This argument is glaringly incomplete, as reviewers of McPeck’s
book were quick to note.11 The opening premise is obviously
uncontroversial. Surely all thought is about some subject. You
cannot just think, without thinking about some thing or other.
However, it does not follow that that something or other is
appropriately located in some one academic discipline. Also,
from the fact that thought must be about an object, we certainly
are not entitled to conclude that standards for appraising that
thought fall into the one specific discipline (in which the object
is located).
McPeck gives no good grounds for his view that arguments fall
into distinct disciplines and that only these disciplines can offer
the proper tools for their understanding and evaluation.
Even if we were to grant McPeck’s assumption that arguments
fall into disciplines, those disciplines might very well employ
common standards of reasoning. Indeed, this is what
philosophers and others have commonly supposed. McPeck
obviously dissents from this view but he nowhere gives a
sufficient logical, epistemic, or psychological basis for his
dissent. In response to critics, McPeck has indicated that the
philosophical background for his view is to be found in
Wittgenstein and should be understood as an adaptation of
Wittgenstein’s notion of forms of life. But such a reference offers
poor logical support, given the notorious slipperiness of this
Wittgensteinian notion. McPeck seems so convinced of the
discipline dependence of argument analysis that he simply
assumes that there are no common standards of reasoning in
different disciplines.
A discipline-specific theory of argument can be stated in more
or less radical versions. If the theory insists only that in order
to evaluate the premises of arguments, we need information,
which will come from various different disciplines, then it is
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relatively uncontroversial. No logician formal or informal – has
ever denied this first view of what it means to be discipline-
specific. None has ever seriously claimed that logic alone could
supply the necessary tools to determine the truth or acceptability
of the premises of arguments, and few would be so bold as to
maintain that logic gives you all you need to be a critical
thinker.12 Presumably McPeck does not mean only to claim this
first view that some extra-logical information is needed for the
evaluation of arguments; otherwise he would not be so strongly
objecting to the theory of argument as a general subject. More
significantly, a discipline-specific theory might state a second
view to the effect that some judgments about the merits of some
inferences can only be made from within specific disciplines.
That qualified claim is suggested when McPeck says ‘a principle
of reason in business or law, for example, might be fallacious in
science of ethics.’ Most radical would be a third view, according
to which all appraisal of both premises and reasoning depends
on standards which are developed by, and only intelligible
within, the particular disciplines. On this third view there would
be no such thing as a good analogy or invalid syllogism as such.
There would be good analogies-within-psychology, invalid
conditional arguments-within-law, and so on.
McPeck’s major pedagogical claim is that attempts to improve
reasoning and critical thinking by offering separate courses in
either formal or informal logic are misguided, as they presume
false theories of reasoning and argument. The uses to which
McPeck seeks to put his view, and the supplementary comments
he makes about it, require that he endorse the third and most
radical version of discipline-specificity. It is only on this version
that the idea of teaching generally applicable standards of
argument appraisal would cease to make sense. The major
purpose of McPeck’s book is to make a point about educating
people to think critically. He contends that it is not possible
to do this by teaching formal logic, informal logic, or critical
thinking as distinct subjects. The correct way to do it, he says,
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is to teach the separate academic disciplines in an epistemically
alert way so as to cultivate in students a judicious scepticism that
is appropriate to whatever particular subject is being studied.
McPeck’s account combines a theory of argument with a
pedagogical theory of critical thinking. The first view holds
nothing novel. If McPeck were to hold only the qualified second
view he would have to admit that there could be many useful and
important cross-disciplinary standards for good argument and
that these might fruitfully be taught in critical thinking courses
that were generally about good and poor reasoning. This view
would not support McPeck’s strong pedagogical claims. He
needs the third view.
No one would dispute the first view. Indeed, typically
argument premises cannot be assessed without the particular
knowledge which often comes from specific disciplines. This
obvious truth does not entail that a discipline-specific theory
of argument is true, however; it says nothing about types of
arguments, types of inference, means of appraising inference,
and so on. The second view says something about some
arguments, and issues a warning that we should not expect
standards to transfer automatically from one area to another.
This modest version of the discipline-specific theory may be
correct. It does not preclude either the possibility of standards
that apply to most arguments, or the existence of general
categories of classification which would transcend disciplinary
boundaries. It is possible, for instance, that this second view
should be true and that the third view is false. Such patterns
as modus ponens, analogies, syllogisms, and inductive
generalizations are found in a wide variety of contexts and
disciplines, and should be assessed from the same standpoint,
using the same rules, whenever they occur.
The third view, which amounts to a radical discipline-specific
theory of argument, is simply not plausible. First of all, not every
subject fits neatly into one and only one academic discipline.
An argument about nuclear weapons development, for instance,
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might very well include both psychological considerations about
the likely reactions of an enemy to a strategy and financial
considerations regarding the comparative costs of conventional
and nuclear weapons. Indeed, discussions of issues pertaining to
nuclear weapons quite commonly draw from politics, history,
military strategy, ethics, and engineering, as well as psychology
and economics. Many issues are like this one, and many
arguments about them do not fit well into a neat framework of
established academic fields or disciplines.
The point was put humorously by Perry Weddle, who said in a
review of McPeck’s book:
… Recall One Week in the Life of the Typical Educated Person. Five to
ten hours reading the newspaper: There was the case of Ariel Sharon, a
cartoon depicting Reagan as Western gunslinger confronting Andropov,
an editorial defending multiple-choice exams for teachers. There were
stock market tips, astrological counsel and advice on health via
vegetarian diets. That’s just a small sample, of course, … This week
the Typical Educated Person has to find a new mechanic, listen to
the broker, advise a friend’s child on her career, choose toilet paper,
decide whether to fight an undemocratic harsh but fair administrative
decision, to trouble-shoot a malfunctioning vacuum cleaner, to turn
down a thoughtful and appreciated invitation to spend the weekend
at Mendocino. The Typical Educated Person argued politics, music,
psychology, sports, religion … Academic fields cover only a fraction of
such stuff.13
A discipline-specific theory of argument will be hard to apply
in practice because it will require us to sort arguments in a way
that is most unfaithful to action discussion, decision-making,
and debate.
There are also more theoretical arguments against discipline-
specific standards of argumentation and reasoning. Even if we
could put every argument in its own disciplinary cubby-hole,
we cannot guarantee that existing academic disciplines as we
presently understand them accurately reflect the ontology of
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the real world in the ways in which they divide and categorize
objects and problems.
A discipline-specific theory of argument such as the third
version, which is so radical as to claim that all the important
standards of argument appraisal are specific to the various
academic disciplines, is simply implausible. In many respects,
various disciplines at least appear to employ common standards
of reasoning at a number of significant points. In all disciplines,
we find a concern for consistency; the need to rely on testimony
some of the time and an attendant concern to distinguish reliable
from unreliable testimony; the need to deduce further
conclusions from explicitly stated knowledge; occasional uses of
analogies; and many other apparently similar logical features. It
is possible that in some subtle ways the appraisal of testimony is
logically different in history, physics, and law. But such a claim
has not been shown even for one aspect of argumentation, and it
is highly unlikely that it would be true for all.
The continuity and co-ordination of distinct disciplines
during some periods of history and with reference to some
specific topics would be hard to account for if each discipline
had its own standards of reasoning, so embedded within the
discipline that they could not be ‘detached’ and applied to
discussions within other disciplines. So too would the tradition
of successful external criticism of disciplinary practices.
For all these reasons the discipline-specific theory in the
strong form advocated by McPeck has small claim to be a
descriptively accurate theory of argument. Nor is it normatively
appealing, because it is implicitly uncritical and conservative. If
existing disciplines are to provide us with the only standards
appropriate to use for the assessment of argument, then it will
be impossible to give a good argument for the conclusion that
the standards of any one of these disciplines are flawed. This is
a counter-intuitive result that leaves too little room for rational
criticism of disciplinary practice. In addition, it is untrue to the
actual history of thought. Strong criticism of disciplines both
PROBLEMS IN ARGUMENT ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 33
from within and without is a prominent feature of the actual
history of academic subjects.
In short, a radical discipline-specific theory of argument is not
tenable. It will pose many problems of application; it does not
offer a natural description of the phenomena of argument; and it
is normatively too weak.
3. Are All Good Arguments Deductively Valid?
Another theory of argument, more popular among
philosophers than the discipline-specific theory, is the
deductivist theory. According to this theory, there is no need to
sort arguments by discipline, for there is fundamentally only one
type of (good) argument. A good argument must be deductively
valid: the premises must entail the conclusion. In a good
argument, it is logically impossible for the conclusion to be false
provided that the premises are true. Furthermore, the premises
are true. Because the argument is deductively valid, the true
premises provide full and sufficient reasons for the conclusion,
and thus justify it. Thus good arguments should serve the
purpose of convincing an audience that a conclusion is true. All
good arguments are as tight and firm as proofs in mathematics.
They are comparable to ‘All men are mortal; Justin Trudeau is
a man; therefore Justin Trudeau is mortal’, in that true premises
are stated, and provide compelling, conclusive support for a
conclusion. Any argument not meeting these conditions is
logically inconclusive and, as failing to meet these standards,
logically worthless.
Many logicians – both formal and informal – endorse a
deductivist theory of argument. These theorists are aware that
most naturally occurring arguments fail to be deductively valid
as stated. Few wish to draw the conclusion that most naturally
occurring arguments are worthless. To avoid this consequence,
deductivists often urge that many naturally occurring arguments
are enthymemes. They need to be ‘filled in’ with premises that
were unstated by the arguer. Many naturally occurring
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arguments can be filled in with true or plausible premises in such
a way that the amended set of premises entails the conclusion;
they thereby qualify as inferentially good arguments on the
deductivist theory.
In a paper on deductivism published in 1970, D. Stove reported
being unable to find any explicit statements or defenses of the
theory, which he nevertheless claimed was a basic tacit
assumption of many philosophers.14 Stove argued in great detail
that Hume was a deductivist, in order to show that the critique
of the theory presented in his article had some real application.
Presently, statements of deductivism are rather easy to find in
texts and other sources. Here is one from a text on formal logic,
by Karel Lambert and William Ulrich. (Lambert and Ulrich do
not purport to cover informal logic in the text; however they do
purport to eliminate it as a legitimate subject of study.) They say:
An argument is sound if and only if (1) it is valid and (2) all its premises
are true. An inference is sound just in case the argument representing it
is sound.15
This is a classic statement. Further explanation in the text makes
it clear that Lambert and Ulrich understand ‘valid’ to mean
‘deductively valid in virtue of form’.16 That is, the premises
would have to entail the conclusion, and the entailment
relationship would have to hold in virtue of the structure of
the argument, as based on standardly logical words such as ‘all’,
‘some’, ‘none’, ‘not’, ‘if then’, ‘and’, ‘or’, and so on.
Formal deductivism would have it that all good arguments
are deductively valid in virtue of their logical form; nonformal
deductivism that they are deductively valid in virtue either of
meaning or of form. It is often important to distinguish between
formalist and nonformalist versions of deductivism. Lambert
and Ulrich do not clarify this distinction. However, the points
made here apply to both versions, so the distinction will be
ignored for the moment. In the simple deductively valid
argument ‘Joan has a cousin; therefore Joan has a parent who
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has a sibling’, validity is due to the meaning of ‘cousin’, ‘parent’
and so on, not to logical form. This argument is deductively valid
in virtue of the meaning of such terms, and not in virtue of its
logical form.
The central claim of deductivism is that anything less than
a relation of entailment between premises and conclusion is
unsatisfactory. On this theory there are no degrees or kinds of
logical support. Lambert and Ulrich’s statement of deductivism
also includes a condition that premises must satisfy: they must
be true. This condition has been questioned as too strong; but
we shall skirt that issue at the moment and consider only those
aspects of deductivism that concern the classification of
arguments and the appraisal of inferences.17
Lambert and Ulrich’s book is a text on formal logic. But
deductivism is not restricted to formalist circles. Deductivist
views are also to be found in texts on informal logic, as we see in
Gerald Nosich, Reasons and Arguments:
Truth and validity are two basic concepts in logical analysis because, for
an argument to be sound (to prove its conclusion), it must be both valid
and have true premises. Moreover, if you have a valid argument and all
of its premises are true, you have proved the conclusion. When it comes
right down to it, validity and truth of the premises are all there is to a
good argument.18
Challenging the view, Carl Wellman’s book, Challenge and
Response, has this to say about deductivism:
Deduction is that form of reasoning in which the claim is made that the
conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. If it is possible for all
the premises to be true and the conclusion false, then the argument is
invalid; if the truth of the premises is a sufficient condition for the truth
of the conclusion, then the argument is valid. It is deductive reasoning
that has been the traditional subject matter of logic. Deductivism is
the view that this is the only form of reasoning. If so, and if only
reasoning can justify any statement, then clearly all justification is by
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deduction. The obvious question to ask is what reason there is to accept
deductivism.19
Although deductivism is stated by Wellman as a theory about
reasoning and not a theory about arguments, the move from one
to the other is immediate, in context. If all arguments are based
on reasoning, and all reasoning is deductive, then all arguments
are based on deductive reasoning. Wellman states deductivism
in order to criticize it. He does not hold this theory himself. He
believes, rather, that there are many plausible natural arguments
which it does not readily apply and he objects to the way in
which premises have to be added in order to make some of these
naturally occurring arguments deductively valid.
Stove distinguishes two senses of conclusiveness for
arguments. Arguments are positively conclusive if the premises
would give a completely rational being some positive degree of
belief in the conclusion, and they are absolutely conclusive if
they would give such a being as great a degree of belief in the
conclusion as there is for the premises. An argument is absolutely
irrational if the premises would add no support whatever to the
conclusion.20 With this apparatus, Stove defines deductivism as
the thesis that all deductively invalid arguments are absolutely
irrational. Stove then goes on to point out that deductivism
entails the epistemic equivalence of ‘All of the ten flames
observed in the past have been hot, so the next flame observed
will be hot’ and ‘All of the one million flames observed in the past
have been hot, so the next flame observed will be hot.’ It entails
that these two arguments are equally, and absolutely, irrational.
The extremity of this conclusion implied by deductivism makes
Stove fear he is addressing a straw man. But as he points out, the
rather common philosophical practice of showing an argument
to be invalid and then inferring immediately that no further
criticism of it is needed, does presuppose deductivism in just this
extreme form.
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3a. Deductivism as a Simple Theory
Deductivism has the advantage of being an extremely simple
theory of argument. On this theory, there is only one type of
argument; therefore there is no need to sort or classify
arguments and to develop criteria for doing so. Problems
regarding examples that do not fit tidily into the requisite
classificatory categories do not arise: there is only one category.
There is only one type of argument, deductive, and only one
standard for appraising the quality of the inferential aspect of
arguments. This requirement all arguments will have to satisfy.
In systems of formal logic there are clearly articulated standards
for formal deductive validity. If deductivism is the correct theory
of argument, we have the assured relevance of an established
and recognized body of precise knowledge, applicable to all
arguments.
This simplicity comes at a cost, however. There are alternate
ways of paying. One way is to face the consequence Stove spells
out so clearly: all invalid arguments are equally and totally
flawed. Since most arguments in empirical science and in
ordinary life are not, as stated, deductively valid, this theory will
leave the deductivist in a radically sceptical position. Indeed,
if we have no view as to how the accumulation of empirical
evidence can rationally support hypotheses, it is a mystery as
to how we can ever generate the premises that are needed for
deductively valid arguments. This difficulty was emphasized by
John Stuart Mill and, in a different way, by Sextus Empiricus.
Most contemporary deductivists will not pay such a high price
and prefer instead to borrow in the currency of reconstruction.
Recognizing that most natural arguments are not deductive as
stated, they regard such arguments as incomplete. To apply their
theory in a plausible and non-sceptical way to naturally
occurring arguments, they reconstruct them, seeing them as
having tacit premises not spelled out by the arguer. Arguments in
law, ethics, administration, empirical science, literary criticism,
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and ordinary life do not look like the watertight proofs of
mathematics. As stated, they are rarely deductively valid. To
avoid the conclusion that they are all equally and absolutely
‘irrational’, these arguments are regarded as enthymematic. This
approach is surely preferable to the radically sceptical and
counterintuitive consequence of applying the theory literally to
unreconstructed natural arguments. Nevertheless, it too is
costly.
The pro-and-con situation in which we find ourselves with
many issues does not naturally fit a deductivist account, which
makes the merit of an argument an all-or-nothing affair. When
a natural argument is supplemented, and thereby rendered
deductively valid, the added premises are regarded as ‘missing’.
The deductivist will say that they were implicit in the original
argument, but left unstated for one reason or another. Perhaps
they were too obvious to mention and recognized as such by the
arguer and the audience. Perhaps they were controversial and
deliberately omitted. Perhaps they were omitted simply because
the arguer lacked a perfect ‘deductive sense’ and didn’t
understand that they were required to make the argument valid.
The deductivist who wishes to avoid radical scepticism about
naturally occurring arguments has no problem classifying
arguments and no problem deciding which inferential standard
to apply to which argument. He does, however, have to face quite
a task reconstructing natural arguments. Since few arguments,
as stated, are deductively valid, a deductivist who seeks to avoid
scepticism is committed to a ‘reading-in’ policy which is
extensive. This involves labor, but that is the least of the
problems.
A major challenge lies in the fact that any argument can be
supplemented with extra premises in such a way as to make it
deductively valid. In fact, some texts advise students to do this.
If all else fails, an argument can be made deductively valid by
adding a premise of the form ‘If (P, Q, R, J) then C’, where P, Q, R
and J are the stated premises and C is the conclusion. The added
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statement is a conditional with the stated premises, conjoined,
as the antecedent and the conclusion as the consequent. Such
a statement is commonly referred to as the associated
conditional.21 To some this reiterative procedure seems a mere
subterfuge, but to others it appears a natural manoeuvre – quite
legitimate. An associated conditional can always be formed, and
a determined theorist can always insist that it was implicit in
the argument. A major problem with this view, though, is that
for every naturally occurring argument there is such an available
associated conditional. There is, then, always a way to make an
argument deductively valid, whether or not it was valid in its
unreconstructed form.22
3b. Deductivism and Missing Premises
Though preferable to literal deductivism the reconstructivist
approach is cumbersome and, for that reason, objectionable. In
many cases it also appears to misrepresent the character of the
original argument. There are reasons, surely, why arguments
from observation and experience have been characterized
historically as different in degree of conclusiveness from the
deductive arguments of geometry and mathematics. Even if we
consider a ridiculous argument, such as ‘Roses are red; violets
are blue; therefore Ed loves Sue’, we can render it deductively
valid. We just add a premise ‘If roses are red and violets are
blue, Ed loves Sue’, and insist that this associated conditional was
implicit, but unstated, in the original. The addition is reiterative
in that it merely repeats the original argument, turning it into
a conditional statement that links the premises with the
conclusion. If one acknowledges a problem with simple
reiteration, one can avoid it by generalizing on this reiterative
condition. For instance, one could instead regard ‘If some
flowers are coloured, then all people called Ed love all people
called Sue’ as the unstated premise.
There is always a way to make any argument deductively valid
by adding premises. Furthermore there is always more than one
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way. If you don’t like merely reiterating the whole argument,
you can choose from countless prospective premises which will
entail the reiterative conditional statement. Literal deductivism
has the consequence that almost all arguments in empirical
science, scholarly endeavor and ordinary life are absolutely
worthless. But reconstructive deductivism, unless very
elaborately qualified, will have the consequence that they are
all absolutely worthy, from an inferential point of view.23 This
consequence emerges because any argument can easily be
rendered valid, and the reconstructive thrust behind this theory
commits us to regarding the content of argument as largely
indeterminate.
Despite the prominence of reconstructive deductivism as a
theory of argument and despite its compatibility with significant
elements of logical theory and pedagogy, it ultimately runs
counter to strong traditions in logic. One such tradition is that
there are nonconclusive but nevertheless reasonable arguments,
especially in empirical science. Another is that there are fallacies.
A fallacy is an error in reasoning.24 Fallacies in the logical sense
are not mistaken assumptions or beliefs; they are errors in
reasoning. For fallacies in this sense to exist, people must
sometimes make mistakes in inferring conclusions from
premises. But on this common understanding of ‘fallacy’, there
will be no fallacies for the deductivist, because every argument
that is not deductively valid as stated is to be made deductively
valid by reconstruction. This result will not be welcome.25
Deductivism makes a distorting lens through which to
examine the phenomena of natural argument. It recommends
too much revision of the data to save the theory. The problem is
not that there exist arguments that cannot be reconstructed on a
deductivist model. Rather, it is that although it is often quite easy
to read into natural arguments extra premises so as to render
them deductively valid, the procedure of doing so is frequently
merely reiterative and, if not that, ad hoc.
Reconstructive deductivism allows and requires us to do too
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much to the data. If we look at the world through purple glasses,
it will appear purple, but little is proven by such observations.
Similarly, if we look at people’s arguments through deductivist
spectacles, all arguments will appear as complete or incomplete
deductions. But little that is real is seen through these spectacles.
We need some good reason as to why this is the right way to
look at arguments. Apart from simplicity, the only one seems
to be the question-begging insistence that in a good argument
premises must suffice to prove the conclusion, where by ‘suffice
to prove’, ‘deductively entail’ is implicitly meant. But this view is
contestable and, in the context, question-begging.
4. Degrees of Validity? Degrees of Support?
We move now to another theory of argument, the spectrum
theory. This theory is not nearly so common as deductivism. Nor
has it yet been thoroughly developed by philosophers. It is found
only in scattered statements – oral and written – by some who
have paid close attention to the analysis of naturally occurring
arguments. According to the spectrum theory, the strength of the
connection between the premises and conclusion of an argument
is susceptible to degrees. There are tighter and looser
connections. The deductive connection is the tightest, but it is
not the only kind. Arguments may work with looser
connections; the various possibilities fall on a kind of spectrum.
A source for the spectrum theory is Stephen Thomas’ text,
Practical Reasoning in Natural Language. Like deductivists,
Thomas requires that sound arguments be valid and have true
premises. But unlike deductivists, Thomas defines ‘valid’ in a
broad sense so that it applies not only to deductively valid
arguments. In the first edition of his book, Thomas speaks
frankly of degrees of validity. In the second edition, such
references are no longer to be found. But Thomas continues his
departure from deductivism by defining ‘valid’ in a way much
broader than ‘deductively valid’. For him, ‘valid’ serves as a kind
of umbrella term which can embrace a whole spectrum of ways
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in which the premises can be connected to a conclusion. He puts
the point this way:
Valid argument: an argument in which the reasons, assuming or
supposing that they were true, genuinely would justify believing or
expecting the conclusion to be true.26
A later passage gives further clarification and explains why
Thomas refrained from using the expression ‘degrees of validity’
in the second edition of his text.
This book differs from previous logic textbooks by recognising that in
natural language, different reasons can support their conclusions with
different degrees of support. The concept of ‘degree of support’, or ‘degree
of strength’, as it will be called also, corresponds to what some
philosophers call ‘degree of confirmation’, in the context of the proof
or disproof of scientific theories. If, for example, certain assumptions
and evidence highly confirm a certain hypothesis or conclusion, then the
degree of support of these assumptions is ‘very strong’. The similar phrase
‘degree of validity’ has been recently used in natural logic … for the same
purpose. However, some formal deductive logicians … oppose this way of
using the term ‘valid’. So to avoid controversy, the more neutral phrase
‘degree of support’ will be used in this textbook to describe the extent to
which a given set of reasons makes the truth of a given conclusion likely
or probable. We will distinguish five degrees: nil, weak, moderate, strong,
and deductively valid.27
The degrees of support may be thought of as lying on a spectrum
of looser and tighter connections between the premises and
conclusion. At one end of the spectrum we have no support at
all; at the other end, we have deductive entailment, regarded as
full support. Support is not an all or nothing matter. Whereas
deductivists would say that failure to achieve full support
constitutes total failure of support — that is to say, no support
at all — this will not result from a spectrum theory. Thus, the
severely counterintuitive ‘all or nothing’ character of
deductivism is avoided. Premises that fail to entail a conclusion
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may still support it – weakly, moderately, or strongly, according
to this view.
Thomas is an appropriate source for the spectrum theory
because his is a well-known and widely used text. He really
does endorse the theory in the sections of the text quoted here.
However, Thomas’ commitment to the spectrum theory is in the
final analysis less than whole-hearted because he includes in his
text (both editions) a section on missing premises that commits
him to deductivism and thereby undercuts his commitment to a
spectrum theory.28
Thomas does not consistently maintain his spectrum theory.
His initial statement of the spectrum theory locates the
deductive connection in a paradigmatic role on the spectrum. It
is the strongest, tightest form of support. That role may explain
his later desire to supplement arguments with ‘lesser’
connections to the point where they become deductively valid.
He works with an uneasy and inconsistent combination of
deductivism and a spectrum theory.
Another source for the spectrum theory is Maurice
Finocchiaro’s article, ‘Fallacies and the Evaluation of Reasoning’.
In that paper, Finocchiaro’s main concern is the interpretation
of natural argumentation. He sees a tendency among some
informal logicians to rely on insensitive and uncharitable
interpretation in order to find fallacies in natural argumentation.
In developing this theme, Finocchiaro briefly states a theory of
argument:
if a fallacy is defined as a type of common but logically incorrect
argument, the various types would have to be the following: (1)
arguments claiming to be deductively valid but which are actually
invalid; (2) arguments claiming to be inductively strong but which are
actually inductively weak; (3) arguments claiming to have some
inductive strength but which have none. There is no way for an
argument to be a fallacy without falling into one of the three above-
mentioned classes.29
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We may understand Finocchiaro as maintaining a spectrum
theory. He locates fewer divisions on his spectrum than Thomas
did on his, but the basic theme is similar: there are different
degrees of support. Finocchiaro speaks of the connections
‘claimed’ in an argument, rather than speaking of the
connections which actually exist. This phrase poses interpretive
problems, since many arguers are not readily interpreted as
‘claiming’ any degree of support. It is merely that, insofar as they
are putting forward premises in support of a conclusion, they
are claiming support. In other words, we can interpret them
as claiming support but not some particular degree of support.
Language (at least English) does not have the vocabulary to
reliably express claims about degrees of inferential support.
Just as Thomas’ theory was stated with an apparent reliance on
deductive connection as the tightest (best?) kind of connection,
and is uneasily combined in his text with deductivism,
Finocchiaro’s theory has echoes of another concept of reasoning.
He seems to have the inductive-deductive dichotomy in his
mind, and to superimpose it on a spectrum by seeing ‘weak
inductive strength’, ‘strong inductive strength’, and ‘deductive
validity’ as three different degrees of the same thing.
Several people with practical experience teaching students to
analyze naturally occurring arguments have expressed interest
in and sympathy for some kind of spectrum theory. It is
unfortunate that there seems to be no detailed statement of such
a theory in the philosophical literature. Statements of the theory
cited here are brief, and echo aspects of other incompatible
theories.
It is not surprising that teachers and students of natural
argumentation should find a spectrum theory initially attractive.
It strikes a convenient balance between monolithic and
pluralistic theories. Like monolithic theories, it avoids the need
to classify arguments. Given the flexibility of language and the
indeterminacy of arguers’ intentions, this is an attractive aspect
of the theory. However, like pluralistic theories, the spectrum
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theory is able to avoid the need to impose one demanding
standard for good inference on all natural arguments. This too is
a desirable result, given the immense variety we find in naturally
occurring arguments. The spectrum theory is flexible and avoids
two undesirable results. It does not imply that most natural
arguments are worthless. Nor does it imply that all natural
arguments have inferential merit. Fallacies will presumably be
those arguments which have no connection (nil, according to
Thomas) between premises and conclusion or in which the
connection ‘claimed’ is stronger than the connection that exists.
Though Finocchiaro in particular is sceptical about the actual
existence of fallacies in real argumentation, there is nothing in a
spectrum theory as such which implies this result.
4a. What’s on the Spectrum?
The chief flaw with the spectrum theory is that it is too
undeveloped to offer real understanding. It appears admirably
flexible and easy to apply because of its allowance for various
degrees of connection, ranging on a spectrum from no
connection at all to a deductively valid entailment. And yet it
is no accident that one version of the theory wandered into
deductivism and another is stated with strong echoes of the
positivistic theory that all arguments are either inductive (as in
empirical science) or deductive (as in logic and mathematics).
These aspects reflect the lack of theoretical underpinning for
the spectrum theory. The problem is that we are given no
explanation of what the degrees of support are degrees of. They
cannot be degrees of deductive validity, because that notion
makes no sense. Deductive validity is all or nothing. An inference
from P to Q either is deductively valid or it is not; there is no such
thing as making it part way.
If P fails to entail Q, but seems nevertheless to offer some
reason for Q (as in ‘the car has a good repair record according
to Consumer Reports, so you will not have much problem with
repairs if you buy it’), we may say P does support Q, though it
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does not entail Q. But support in this case is not a weaker version
of deductive support. It is not a ‘degree’ of deductive support.
Rather, it is something else.
A closely related point is that the nature of the ‘spectrum’ on
which the various degrees of support are located has yet to be
explained. Consider three arguments which are, on the face of it,
non-deductive in type:
A. (Context: A young philosopher contended that the academic
institution of tenure was unjust because it worked to deprive
young people of opportunities that older people had had.
The following was written in reply by a senior professor.)
But consider this ‘injustice’ as well. My home was purchased only
a decade ago, at less than half what it would bring on the market
now, and throughout that period interest charges on the mortgage
have averaged a single-digit percentage. A much younger person
would find it difficult, if not impossible, to purchase a comparable
dwelling now. Yet now one would suggest that, because of this, I
should give up ownership and compete with homeless individuals
for the three or five year leasing of it. Had that ever been a
foreseeable eventuality, I would obviously not have ‘bought’ it in
the first place. And one can multiply examples of similar
‘injustice‘.30
B. (Context: This brief argument appears in an essay in which
the author contends that theology is not an open-minded
and reasonable inquiry, and that this fact about theology
constitutes the major difference between it and philosophy.)
‘That a man’s being an atheist is an absolute bar to his occupying a
chair (in theology) proves that theology is not an open-minded and
reasonable inquiry.’31
C. (Context: This passage is taken from Michael Walzer, Just
and Unjust Wars. Walzer is discussing the principle that
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those who are going to do the actual fighting in a war should
have to consent, before going off to fight, to the idea that the
war is indeed a just one.)
‘Napoleon is said to have boasted to Metternich that he could
afford to lose 30,000 men a month. Perhaps he could have lost that
many and still have maintained political support at home. But he
could not have done so, I think, had he had to ask the men he
was about to ‘lose’. Soldiers might agree to such losses in a war
forced upon them by the enemy, a war of national defence, but not
in the sort of wars that Napoleon fought. The need to seek their
consent… would surely limit the occasions of war, and if there were
any change at all of reciprocity from the other side, it would limit
its means too.’32
Example (A) is an attempt at refutation by logical analogy. The
senior philosopher compares the younger philosopher’s claim
with a comparable claim about housing or other goods that are
purchased at varying times under varying conditions. He
maintains that the tenure argument is parallel to an implausible
argument that could be given in those contexts and is, therefore,
itself implausible. Example (B) is hard to classify. A single point
about the institution of chairs in theology is said to ‘prove’ that
theology is not an open-minded and reasonable inquiry. This
seems to be ‘good reasons’ argument, with only one reason
advanced. Example (C) might be called a hypothetical induction.
The author envisages a situation regarding Napoleon’s troops
and states that these troops would not have consented to heavy
losses in a war of conquest. He infers from premises about what
would have happened in those circumstances a more general
conclusion to the effect that asking soldiers’ consent would limit
the occasions of war.
Now let us try to apply a spectrum theory of argument to these
examples. If there are degrees of support, and if these degrees
are locatable on a kind of logical spectrum as ‘more’ and ‘less’
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of something or other, then we should be able to roughly locate
these examples. All seem to be cases in which the premises offer
‘some support’ to the conclusion. No doubt it is this appearance
of degrees and qualifications of support, as opposed to the all-
or-nothing of deductive validity, that makes the spectrum theory
initially appealing. The problem is that the spectrum theory tells
us nothing about these degrees of support. It does not indicate
what kind of support premises might offer, or whether and why
(for example) A might be a stronger argument than B. It is not
even clear that it makes sense to think of A as having more or less
than the same kind of ‘connection’ which either holds or fails to
hold in C. The spectrum theory is only a metaphor until it can tell
us more about what degrees of support (or connection, between
premises and conclusion) are degrees of and what constitutes a
greater or lesser degree. Are what appear to be different styles
of argument, as exemplified in these cases. When we come to
concrete cases, we do not seem to know what to put where on the
spectrum and why, or even why there is just one spectrum. The
theory is only a metaphor, and unless we are prepared to develop
the idea that there are degrees of deductive validity, we cannot
turn it into more than that.
5. Better Theories are Needed
We have several nonformal theories of argument, coexisting
almost unnoticed with the common philosophical view that the
very notion of a nonformal theory of argument is absurd. And
yet the notion of a nonformal theory of argument is not absurd.
Interesting issues of justification and pedagogy could be
illuminated by such a theory. The cultivation of skills in
reasoning and critical thinking will surely require, among other
things, a sensitivity to the phenomena of natural argument and
a good understanding of various types of legitimate and
illegitimate inference. Indeed, nonformal theories of argument –
especially the three treated here – are very commonly stated and
appealed to by philosophers. The problem is that such theories
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are merely cited. They are not articulated, developed, or
defended. More work is clearly needed. A fourth nonformal
theory of argument, called here Positivism, is discussed in the
next chapter.
This account has emphasized a single problem throughout:
inference assessment. Traditional logic virtually restricted itself
to that dimension of argument appraisal, so that current theories
tend also to emphasize it. But this is not the only aspect of
argument analysis open to theoretical scrutiny. We can see this
even by looking at themes and issues that arise from the theories
considered here. The discipline-specific theory, for instance, tells
us how to appraise the premises of arguments. We should locate
the argument in a discipline and go to that discipline in order to
discover the epistemic standards that will allow us to determine
whether its premises are true. The deductivist theory, in its
reconstructivist version, depends on a view of the correct way
to interpret discourse; this dependence arises from the need for
extensive supplementation with premises regarded as missing.
Interpretive principles are also presumed by some theories (not
considered here), that emphasize arguers’ intentions as a central
factor in the classification of arguments. Finocchiaro’s
suggestion that we have to see what kind of strength is ‘claimed’
relates to these views. We have seen that common versions of
deductivism make the truth of premises a necessary condition
for the soundness of arguments. Some theorists have argued that
this condition is too demanding and that the acceptability of
premises to the audience to whom the argument is addressed
is preferable as a condition of premise adequacy.33 The nature
of argument as a social institution for inter-personal persuasion
and debate, and the bearing of features of and relations between
persons on logical appraisal are further topics that need to be
considered.
These issues arise from a preliminary examination of theories
of argument primarily occupied with the traditional issue of
inference appraisal. Topics in a full-fledged theory of argument
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will extend beyond the classification of arguments as to type
and appraisal of the correctness of the inferences on which they
depend and lead to broader issues of epistemology, pragmatics,
and ethics.
These further topics fall broadly into two areas. One involves
principles and policy having to do with the interpretation of
discourse: the identification of arguments; the location of their
premises and conclusions; the task of supplying unstated
premises or conclusions; charity as a principle of interpretation;
and the role of arguer’s intentions and beliefs in proper
interpretation. The other has to do with the pragmatics and
dialectics of argument: whether premises in a good argument
need be true or only acceptable to an audience; whether personal
attributes of arguers having to do with their authority or
credibility ever have a legitimate bearing on their appraisal of the
argument; how rebuttals, pros and cons, and counter-arguments
are to fit within our structural models; and many related topics.
The role of such factors in a theory of argument is already tacitly
acknowledged in logical tradition because they bear upon our
understanding of the traditional fallacies of begging the
question, ad hominem, straw man, and appealing to authority.
Doubtless other theories of argument could be stated. The
widely held belief that there are two basic kinds of argument,
deductive and inductive, merits treatment on its own. The
theories discussed here were chosen either because of their
apparent wide appeal to philosophers in general or because of
their appeal to persons interested in informal logic. These
theories are not satisfactory: we await a better one.
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CHAPTER 3.
THE GREAT DIVIDE
So far as I can tell, it is still common both in textbooks and in
research papers, to draw the distinction between deductive and inductive
arguments. Considering the centrality of the topic and the fact that no
account proposed seems to solve the problems raised in this chapter,
this situation appears to be rather anomalous. The inductive/deductive
distinction is problematic but sets a great divide that has prevailed as
a framework for study and research. One might argue that standard
practice on this matter is all right because the distinction is intuitively
understandable, traditional, and so practical as to be necessary. One
might wish to make that case despite the problems explained here,
arising for accounts based on form; necessitation or its lack; what
is intended or ‘claimed’ by an arguer; or the proper application of
standards. But I would urge that the underlying theory is not adequate.
I submit that the problems raised here remain real and important.
They were keenly explored in early editions of the Informal Logic
Newsletter (now Informal Logic) but have not been central in more
recent discussions of informal logic and argumentation theory.
In this essay, I cite a number of examples to illustrate problems of
application with various versions of this distinction. These examples
indicate that one can easily find arguments, both in colloquial and
academic discourse, that are hard to classify as inductive or deductive.
Readers can readily test that claim for themselves, to explore the claims
and considerations made here. I was especially concerned with the
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dichotomous nature of logical tradition on induction and deduction.
The standard presumption has a positivist heritage. It was assumed
(and, I suspect, still is) that the inductive/deductive distinction is both
exclusive and exhaustive. That is to say, no argument is both
inductive and deductive, and every argument is either inductive or
deductive. At a time when many binaries are being rejected, this
particular one appears to enjoy undeserved security. I argue here that
its status poses dangers, especially as to the matter of exhaustiveness: the
supposition that all good reasoning is either empirical or purely logical
serves to distort and buttress false dilemmas of method and justification.
Logical positivism is widely discredited, but its implications for the
theory of argument continue to be sturdy survivors of their ancestor.
Presuming exhaustiveness, one too easily ignores interesting argument
types such as a priori analogy (appeals to consistency) and conductive
or ‘balance of consideration’ arguments. Both are common within
philosophy itself. In past years, these arguments have received more
attention from theorists. The question as to whether a priori analogies
are deductive has been of some interest, and there have been many
accounts, and many doubts expressed, concerning conductive
arguments. These types of arguments, one putatively deductive, the
other putatively inductive, are discussed in Chapter Four.
It is traditional to divide arguments into two basic types:
deductive and inductive. The division is regarded as important,
because it is thought that deductive arguments meet standards
that inductive arguments do not meet, and that inductive
arguments serve epistemic purposes that deductive ones cannot
serve. The theory that there are two and only two kinds of
argument, deductive and inductive, may be termed the positivist
theory of argument. Where deductivism is monolithic, the
positivist theory is dualistic. Theorists long impressed with the
force of deductive arguments of course noted the importance
of empirical cumulation of data, particularly in scientific work.
Recognizing that an entirely deductive account of everyday and
scientific knowledge was not plausible, they departed from
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deductivist rationalism to allow for a second type of argument
based on empirical reasoning. The tradition that arguments are
either deductive or inductive goes back to Aristotle and was a
prominent feature of logical positivism. It fits naturally into a
positivist theory of knowledge within which knowledge must
come either from logic and mathematics (sources of deductive
arguments) or from the empirical sciences (sources of inductive
arguments).
1. Versions of the Great Divide
Perhaps because of this venerable tradition, there are several
versions of the distinction between deductive arguments and
inductive ones. For Aristotle, it was a matter of form. Deductive
arguments were syllogistic in nature; inductive ones went from
particular premises to universal conclusions. Aristotle’s way of
putting the distinction is no longer influential today because it
is regarded as too narrow. A look through contemporary texts
and monographs will produce a number of different versions
of the ‘inductive/deductive’ distinction. These versions differ in
two ways. First, they vary in how they explain the content of
the distinction. Second, they vary in strategy for applying it –
some to arguments directly, some to what is ‘claimed’ for the
connection in an argument, some to arguers’ intentions, and
some to the standards of appraisal for arguments, rather than
to arguments themselves. Here we primarily consider matters
of content. In some versions, the two blend together, as will be
apparent.
On some accounts, deductive arguments are those in which the
premises entail the conclusion, thereby necessitating the truth of
the conclusion in any case in which the premises are themselves
true. Inductive arguments are those in which the premises, if
true, would make it probable that the conclusion is true. Such
an account is given in Wesley Salmon’s Logic. On this view, in a
deductive argument:
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1. if all the premises are true, the conclusion must also be true,
and
2. all the information in the conclusion is already contained –
at least implicitly – in the premises.
whereas in an inductive argument,
1. if all the premises are true the conclusion is probably true,
but not necessarily true.
and
2. the conclusion contains information not implicitly in the
premises.1
On this version of the distinction, we have a dichotomy of
good arguments. Bad arguments would fail to be either deductive
or inductive, based on these definitions. If an argument has
premises that are irrelevant to the conclusion, or contains an
error in deductive reasoning, it will fall in neither category.
A similar account is offered in Robert Neidorf’s text, Deductive
Forms, where the inductive/deductive distinction is stated as
follows:
In an inductive argument, the conclusion probably follows from the
premises. In a deductive argument, it certainly follows. An argument
which fails as deductive may nevertheless constitute a good inductive
argument.2
Henry Kyburg’s distinction in Probability and Inductive Logic is
essentially similar: the distinction is given in terms of success
and bad arguments fall into neither category.3 The account
appears to be exhaustive, not for all arguments but for all good
arguments. Bad arguments are in limbo.
Another way of drawing the inductive-deductive distinction
puts all the bad arguments in the inductive category. On this
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view, deductive arguments are those in which the premises entail
the conclusion. Inductive arguments are all the rest. This version
may be adopted for the express purpose of guaranteeing
exhaustiveness. Often this intent is made obvious by the
replacement of ‘inductive’ by ‘nondeductive’, ‘nondemonstrative’,
or ‘nonconclusive’. This is the version which Nicholas Rescher
must have had in mind when he said: ‘an inductive argument is
simply an argument whose conclusion outruns the information
provided by its premises.’4 The scheme was also adopted by
Baruch Brody in his text on theoretical and applied logic. Brody
defined validity, and discussed deductive arguments and
deductive validity. Then, potentially in a departure from the
positivist theory, he allowed that arguments which fail to be
deductively valid are nevertheless sometimes ‘perfectly
acceptable’ in some other way. 5
With this approach the category of inductive arguments will
be large indeed. It will include all poor arguments, as well as
a motley variety of good arguments. All deductive arguments
will be valid by definition. (That is to say, there will be no such
thing as an invalid deductive argument.) Inductive arguments
will include those in which the premises, if true, would make the
conclusion probable; those in which the premises are completely
irrelevant to the conclusion; all formal and informal fallacies;
analogies; inferences to the best explanation; so-called ‘good
reasons’ arguments; and potentially many others. Thus the
‘inductive’ category will explicitly serve as a leftover category.
This way of drawing the distinction will guarantee, by definition,
an exhaustive and exclusive dichotomy. The result that there
are no invalid deductive arguments will be unsettling to many
traditionalists, however, and the inductive category will exhibit
little coherence.
On a third view, deductive arguments are those in which it
is claimed that the premises entail or necessitate the conclusion.
Inductive arguments are those in which it is claimed that the
premises make the conclusion likely or probable. This kind of
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account is suggested in Max Black’s Encyclopedia of Philosophy
article on induction. Black says:
The name ‘induction’, derived from the Latin translation of Aristotle’s
epagoge, will be used here to cover all cases of nondemonstrative
argument in which the truth of the premises, while not entailing the truth
of the conclusion purports to be a good reason for belief in it.6
The most important sources for this version of the inductive/
deductive distinction are Irving Copi’s classic texts. In the fourth
edition of Introduction to Logic, Copi put it this way:
Accordingly, we characterize a deductive argument as one whose
conclusion is claimed to follow from its premises with absolute necessity,
this necessity not being a matter of degree and not depending in any
way upon whatever else may be the case. And in sharp contrast we
characterize an inductive argument as one whose conclusion is claimed
to follow from its premises only with probability, this probability being a
matter of degree and dependent upon what else may be the case.7
This version of the inductive-deductive distinction may be the
most standard one. It allows for the commonsensical result that
there are both valid and invalid deductive arguments and both
strong and weak inductive arguments.
The problems with this account begin with the expression ‘is
claimed to‘. When people present arguments, it is often unclear
whether logical entailment or merely some less tight support
is ‘claimed‘. Their words often do not suggest one or the other.
Furthermore, the expression “is claimed” is ambiguous. One may
mean by it that the arguer intends one or the other connection
or one may mean that the wording, context, and nature of the
argument themselves suggest either a deductive or an inductive
goal. Since Copi and others who follow him have not made their
distinction explicitly intentional, it seems best to follow the
direction of the second interpretation of ‘is claimed’ here.8 To
see what connection is claimed in an argument, we have to study
the nature of that argument itself: the stated premises and
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conclusion, the context, the indicator words, qualifying or
hedging words such as ‘probably’ or ‘in all likelihood’, and the
logical relationships that exist between the premises and the
conclusion. These are in the argument, not in the intentions
and beliefs of the arguer. Given the inscrutability of arguers’
intentions, especially when they are distant or dead, this seems
a more promising direction. However, it is not without its
difficulties.
To see how problems can arise when we try to apply Copi’s
version of the inductive-deductive distinction, we can consider
several examples from his own exercises. Here is an argument
which Copi takes from Etienne Gilson’s The Unity of Philosophical
Experience. Since man is essentially rational, the constant recurrence
of metaphysics in the history of human knowledge must have its
explanation in the very structure of reason itself.9
The argument here is:
1. Man is essentially rational.
Therefore,
2. The constant recurrence of metaphysics in the history of
humans has its explanation in the very structure of reason
itself.
One could say that the word ‘must’ provides reason to take the
argument as deductive. It seems to be functioning as an inference
indicator rather than as a modal term within the conclusion
claim. However, the word ‘must’ has empirical inference uses
too, as in ‘you must be tired after all that hiking yesterday’. One
might, alternatively, think that since Gilson is dealing with an
explanation for the recurrence of metaphysics, he is
hypothesizing, and that his argument should be taken as
inductive, a kind of ‘best explanation’ appeal. It will hardly do
to say that since Gilson is a philosopher and writing as a
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philosopher, the argument must be deductive. The case is not
easily classified using Copi’s distinction.
Another perplexing case is the following, which Copi quotes
from Adam Smith.
A gardener who cultivates his own garden with his own hands unites
in his own person the three different characters of landlord, farmer, and
laborer. His produce, therefore, should pay him the rent of the first, the
profit of the second, and the wages of the third.10
Copi classifies this argument as deductive on the grounds that
it does not appeal to experience to establish what is probably the
case, but appeals to principles of equity to prove what should be
the case. (This appeal must be a tacit one.) Principles of equity
are presumed here not to come from experience, which has been
classically associated with induction. Now, there was no
reference to experience in Copi’s definition of induction and it
is that notion which has been omitted from modern accounts,
presumably in the interests of obtaining an exhaustive
dichotomy between deduction and induction. What should be at
issue, strictly, within Copi’s account, is whether conclusiveness
is ‘claimed’ in the argument. The matter of principles of equity
has no bearing on this issue: we might appeal to them hesitantly
or assuredly; one might cite them to deduce a conclusion about
a particular case, or to hypothesis. We can of course make Adam
Smith’s argument deductively valid by adding three premises:
1. If a person serves the role of a farmer, he should receive the
profit of a farmer.
2. If a person serves the role of a landlord, he should receive
the rent of a landlord.
3. If a person serves the role of a laborer, he should receive the
wages of a laborer.
But the fact that the argument can be supplemented so as
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to be deductively valid does not show what is ‘claimed’ when
it is unsupplemented. As we have seen, any argument can be
supplemented so as to become deductively valid. If that were
sufficient to make it ‘claim’ deductive validity, Copi’s view would
amount to deductivism. Clearly, that is not his intent, since he
seeks to explain a distinction between deductive and inductive
arguments.
These difficulties do not arise just because Copi has selected
unfortunate examples. The problem is that the inductive/
deductive distinction as Copi draws it is difficult to apply to
real arguments. Everything depends on what is claimed in the
argument about the tightness of the connection between
premises and conclusion. This interpretation must somehow be
inferred from the wording and the context. But indicators may
go in different directions or fail to be present at all. Neither
contexts, nor indicator words, nor the logical ordering of claims,
nor the nature of the subject provide firm guidance as to what an
argument ‘claims’ about the connection between its premises and
its conclusion.
Some years back, readers of the Informal Logic Newsletter were
treated to a series of critical articles on the viability of the
inductive- deductive distinction. Perturbed by the difficulty in
applying the distinction to naturally occurring arguments,
several writers defended versions of the positivist theory that
would transfer the inductive-deductive dichotomy into another
domain. Difficulties in applying various versions of the
distinction to arguments directly generated suggestions that the
distinction must apply elsewhere. One suggestion, put forward
by Samuel Fohr, was that the inductive-deductive distinction
did not apply to arguments themselves but rather to arguers’
intentions and thereby (derivatively) to arguments as put forward
by particular arguers. Another suggestion was that it applied to the
standards by which arguments could be assessed.
Fohr maintained that arguments were not merely sets of
statements to be found in textbooks, but rather claims made
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by persons seeking to justify further claims. On this notion of
argument, Smith and Jones might make the same claims, using
the same words, but offer different arguments, if their intentions
were relevantly different. An explicitly intentional account had
been offered earlier by Robert Olson in his text, Meaning and
Argument. Olson said:
The term ‘imply’ has a stronger and weaker meaning. In its stronger
meaning, the premises of an argument ‘imply’ a conclusion if and only if
they give conclusive evidence for it. In its weaker meaning the premises
of an argument ‘imply’ a conclusion if and only if they give reasonably
good but less than conclusive evidence in its favor. If the arguer believes
that the premises of an argument necessarily imply the conclusion, the
argument is deductive (or necessary). If the arguer believes that the
premises of an argument probably imply the conclusion the argument is
nondeductive (or probable).11
Fohr endorsed Olson’s account, and put his own distinction this
way:
If a person intends that his premises necessitate his conclusion, he is
giving a deductive argument. If he intends only that his premises render
his conclusion probable, he is giving an inductive argument.12
We see a shift here from beliefs to intentions. As Fohr was
forced to admit, this version of the distinction makes it non-
exhaustive. There are many cases in which those who compose
arguments intend only that their premises provide support for
their conclusion and fail to have any intention regarding
necessitation or making probable. The concept of logical
necessitation is a philosopher’s concept that is difficult to teach
to students, and that we cannot expect the bulk of ordinary
people to contemplate regularly in their day-to-day lives, even
whenever they are offering reasons. Many arguments will fall
into limbo so far as this statement of the positivist theory is
concerned. As one critic pointed out, the man who tells his wife
that she should help him paint the kitchen because she promised
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to do so is likely to have little idea as to whether he intends to
prove his conclusion or merely make it probable. He wants her
to help with the painting, and he’s telling her why she should
do it. In response, Fohr urged that such arguments be assessed
according to both kinds of standards (those appropriate for
induction and those appropriate for deduction) and maintained
that ordinary arguers should have the required intentions
regarding their premises and conclusions.
Fohr’s approach would make the philosophical distinction
between necessitating and making probable a norm for
argumentative intentions. If arguers do not grasp this norm, we
have to consider their arguments from both perspectives.
However, these arguers should brush up on epistemology and
order their intentions to fit our theory of argument.
Another proposal regarding application was stated by Brian
Skyrms in Choice and Chance and defended in the Newsletter
interchange by David Hitchcock. It moves the dichotomy from
arguments to standards of appraisal.
Skyrms criticizes the intentionalist account in a footnote,
saying:
.. this will not do, for arguments do not intend anything. People who
advance arguments intend many things. Sometimes they intend for the
argument to be deductively valid; sometimes they intend it to be
inductively strong; sometimes they intend it to be a clever sophistry; and
sometimes they don’t know the difference.13
The positivist theory of argument, on this version, would say
that there are many diverse arguments – some hard to classify –
but that there are, broadly speaking, only two types of standards
for appraising arguments. These are deductive standards and
inductive standards. On this account, the distinction between
inductive and deductive is not a distinction between types of
argument. Nor is it a distinction between types of intention
arguers might have. Rather, it is a distinction between types of
standard that may be used for appraising arguments. There are
66 TRUDY GOVIER
two broad types of standard: deductive standards and inductive
standards. Deductive standards are used when we wish to
determine whether the premises of an argument entail its
conclusion. Inductive standards are used when we wish to
determine whether the premises of an argument make its
conclusion probable. Skyrms put it this way:
We defined logic as the study of the strength of the evidential link
between the premises and conclusions of arguments. We have seen that
there are two different standards against which to evaluate the strength
of this link: deductive validity and inductive strength. Corresponding
to these two standards are two branches of logic: deductive logic and
inductive logic. Deductive logic is concerned with tests for deductive
validity – that is, rules for deciding whether or not a given argument
is deductively valid – and rules for constructing deductively valid
arguments. Inductive logic is concerned with tests for measuring the
inductive probability, and hence the inductive strength, of arguments
and with rules for constructing inductively strong arguments.
David Hitchcock defended Skyrms’ view, saying that the
inductive/deductive distinction provides an exhaustive
dichotomy of standards of appraisal, rather than an exhaustive
dichotomy of types of argument. Hitchcock said that in
deductive logic, we are offered a theory of the circumstances in
which premises do or do not make it logically impossible for
a conclusion to be false given the premises. In inductive logic,
we have a theory of the circumstances in which an argument is
inductively strong or inductively weak – that is, in which it is
more or less probable that its conclusion is true, given that its
premise(s) are true. Within each theory there are various types
of logic. In deductive logic we have the logic of truth-functional
sentence connectives, first-order quantifiers, the logic of identity
and so on. Within inductive logic we have the logic of the
confirmation and disconfirmation of hypotheses, the logic of
analogical arguments, the logic of inferences from sample
characteristics to population characteristics, the logic of
controlled experiments to prove causal claims, and so on. Then
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there is the logic of conductive or balance of considerations or
good reasons arguments. Possibly there are other standards.14
Both Skyrms and Hitchcock argue that it is not always easy to
decide which sort of standard to apply to a particular argument.
For this reason, they believe that it makes more sense to think
of a dichotomy of standards rather than a dichotomy of arguments.
There are two puzzling aspects of this view, however. First, we
may question why we have a dichotomy of standards, rather than
a plurality. This question will certainly strike forcefully if we
look at Hitchcock’s list for the inductive standards. It is hard
to see what analogy, balance-of-considerations reasoning, and
the use of controlled experiments to justify causal conclusions
will have in common. One suspects that they have been lumped
together, seen as involving a common inductive standard
(whatever that might be) precisely in the interests of getting an
exhaustive dichotomy. The account is slightly anomalous, as
Hitchcock acknowledged in reply to critics, because one would
presume a connection between the articulation of standards for
appraising the inferences within arguments and the existence of
arguments to which those standards are appropriately applied.
The former should presuppose the latter. The view can be
amended to incorporate this point if one says that standards exist
and there are arguments to which it is clearly appropriate to
apply those standards. But at that point the issue will be whether
standards fall broadly into just two types: deductive and
inductive.15 Again, the great divide can be questioned. It is
reasonable to suppose that we develop standards of one kind
or another because there is a substantial group of arguments to
which they are appropriately applied.
Among philosophers, the positivist theory of argument seems
to be the most popular theory. It is Copi’s version which is the
most commonly accepted, perhaps due to the influence of his
texts over several decades. It is also because this view and it
alone allows one to apply the inductive-deductive distinction
to all arguments and to have good and poor arguments within
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each category. Salmon, Neidorf, and Kyburg give a version of
the distinction applicable only to good arguments. Black and
Rescher state one which allows inductive arguments to be either
good or poor, but leaves all deductive ones as valid. Fohr transfer
the distinction to intentions, with the result that it cannot be
exhaustive after all.
Most who rely on a positivist theory of argument have not
articulated a particular version, for it has been ‘common wisdom’
amongst logicians and philosophers. They would hold that the
theory is exhaustive, that it applies to arguments (as distinct from
intentions or standards) and that it allows for good and poor
arguments (inferentially speaking) within each category. These
presumptions make Copi’s account the most attractive one.
As we have seen, significant problems arise in applying Copi’s
distinction, due mostly to the phrase ‘is claimed to’ in the
definition. This phrase does not make explicit reference to the
intentions of arguers. A person might use words that, as
normally understood, make a claim she did not actually intend
to make. The Copi version of the inductive/deductive distinction
does not commit us to the tight relationship between the
intentions of the arguer and the direction and force of the
argument. Rather, it requires that we look at the wording of the
argument and try to determine whether the argument as stated
is claiming a necessary or probabilistic connection between the
premises and the conclusion. The difficulty at this point is that
indicators may give conflicting signals, or be absent altogether.
Hence we are frequently left not knowing whether to classify an
argument as deductive or as inductive. We saw problems even
with examples that Copi himself selected for exercises. Here is
another:
The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it is
robbing the human race: posterity as well as the existing generation;
those who dissent from the opinion still more than those who hold it. If
the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging
error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit,
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the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its
collision with error.16
In this argument of J. S. Mill’s we may ask whether ‘it is claimed’
that the conclusion follows with absolute necessity from the
premises. The conclusion is that suppressing the expression of
an opinion always robs the human race especially ‘posterity’ and
dissenters. It is quite clear what this conclusion is, and it is also
fairly clear as to what premises are stated in defence of it.
(Interpreters may dispute as to whether the argument contains
unstated premises. But for now it is only the classification of
the argument as inductive or deductive on the basis of what
‘is claimed’ that is at issue.) There seems to be no conclusive
evidence as to how tightly the conclusion ‘is claimed’ to be
related to those premises. One might regard the argument as
deductive or as inductive.
Nor is this example unrepresentative. As Skyrms, teachers of
informal logic, and a number of writers on the inductive-
deductive distinction have noted to their consternation,
examples like this are all too easy to find. Consider again:
It is the singular feature of such ethnic explanation (of poverty) that
it is all but exclusively confined to conversation. The reputable scholar
unhesitantly adverts to it in casual interchange but rarely if ever puts it
in his books or even his lectures. What is wholly plausible in conversation
is wholly impermissible in print. There is obviously something odd about
an explanation of poverty and well-being that must be so discreetly
handled.
Here John Kenneth Galbraith, in a discussion of mass poverty,
argues from the absence of ethnic explanations of poverty in
print and in lectures to the ‘oddity’ of these explanations of
poverty.17 It is clear what his conclusion and premises are, but
unclear what ‘is claimed’ about the relation between them. The
word ‘obviously’ indicates that Galbraith confidently believes his
conclusion to be true, but does not indicate whether he believes
it to be necessitated, or rather made probable, by his premises.
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It is no accident that such examples are easy to find. People
who argue do (at least implicitly) distinguish conclusions from
premises and ‘claim’ that the latter provide reasons for the
former. But they often do not, even implicitly, make claims about
what sort of connection is supposed to hold between these
premises and their conclusion. A major reason for this is that
most arguers have not reflected on the difference between
deductive entailment and making probable, and hence would not
raise the question about strength of connection as philosophers
would like them to raise it. They do not, explicitly or implicitly,
‘make claims’ about an issue that for them does not arise at all.
A further problem is that even if ordinary arguers did wish to
indicate whether a necessary or probable connection existed, our
language provides very few words which would conveniently
serve the purpose. (At least, that is true of English.) Indicators
such as ‘therefore’ and ‘must’ are sometimes urged by textbook
authors to indicate deductive arguments, but are also to be found
in arguments that tradition would label as non deductive. Given
that the notion of deductive entailment and the related notion
of ‘following with absolute necessity’, which Copi uses in his
definition, are philosophical constructs, it is not surprising that
ordinary language lacks terms that reliably indicate a claim to
either sort of connection.
Those who continue to believe that ordinary arguers would
do well to master this distinction and learn to observe it should
recall that the closely related distinctions of analytic versus
synthetic statements, and of necessary versus contingent
statements, are contested. It is a commonplace of modern
philosophy that these distinctions are difficult to draw with
precision. Since Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ and
Waismann’s ‘Analytic-Synthetic’ series, few philosophers have
used these distinctions with confidence. Current analyses of
scientific reasoning emphasize the difficulty of classifying terms
as either conceptual or observational and the related difficulty
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in classifying statements as either logical or empirical. Given
such acknowledged difficulties, it is a tribute to the sheer force
of unanalyzed tradition that the inductive-deductive distinction
has remained so prominent as the basis for a theory of argument.
Depending on which version of the positivist theory we are
dealing with, we need to find out whether all the information ‘in’
the conclusion is already ‘in’ the premises; whether the truth of
the premises would make the falsity of the conclusion ‘logically
impossible’; whether the argument or the arguer ‘claims’ or
‘intends’ either of these; and so on. If there are many borderline
cases when we try to determine whether statements are analytic
or synthetic (or necessary or contingent, or a priori or empirical),
there will obviously be borderline cases for arguments as well.
The question for arguments can be collapsed into the other: we
ask whether the associated conditional is empirical or necessary
instead of asking whether the argument is deductive or
inductive. If the argument is deductively valid, its associated
conditional is necessarily true. If it ‘claims’ deductive validity,
it ‘claims’ that the associated conditional is necessarily true. If
its author intends it to be deductively valid, he intends that its
associated conditional is necessarily true, and so on.
To illustrate this point, consider the following argument from
Thomas Kuhn’s early book, The Copernican Revolution. Early in
his career, Kuhn felt an obligation to defend what was then an
unusual practice – combining the history of science with the
philosophy of science. He said:
.. the combination of science and intellectual history is an unusual one.
Initially it may therefore seem incongruous. But there can be no intrinsic
incongruity. Scientific concepts are ideas and as such they are the subject
of intellectual history.18
There is a subargument structure here:
1. Scientific concepts are ideas.
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So,
2. Scientific concepts are the subject of intellectual history.
Therefore,
3. There is nothing intrinsically incongruous about combining
science and intellectual history.
Asking whether this argument is deductively valid is, in effect,
asking whether its two associated conditionals are logically
necessary. These are ‘If scientific concepts are ideas, then
scientific concepts are the subject of intellectual history’ and ‘If
scientific concepts are the subject of intellectual history, then
there is nothing incongruous about combining science and
intellectual history’. Are these statements logically, or necessarily
true? It is not clear in either case. The first might be said to
assume that all ideas are the subject of intellectual history, and
thus not to be necessarily true as stated, on the grounds that it
assumes something false. On the other hand, it might be said to
assume only that scientific ideas are serious ideas and all serious
ideas are the subject of intellectual history, and the claim might
be made that these assumed statements are true, perhaps even
necessarily true. The matter is arguable. Nor are standards of
incongruousness precise. It is by no means easy to work out
an answer to the question of whether the second conditional
is necessarily true. Probably the most cautious answer is to say
that neither conditional is necessarily true. We can see from
this example just how directly difficulties with the necessary/
contingent and analytic/synthetic distinctions transfer to the
inductive/deductive distinction. If we ask whether Kuhn intended
either or both conditionals to be interpreted so as to come out
as necessarily true, or claimed implicitly that either or both were
necessarily true, the problem would not be more easily resolved.
To add to these difficulties, there are further problems that
appear when we consider the possibility that arguments have
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unstated premises. As the topic of missing premises is a large and
thorny one for any theory of argument, we cannot pose it as a
special problem for the positivist theory. However, it augments
difficulties of classification because, as we have seen, any
argument can be reconstructed as a deductively valid argument
by suitable addition of premises.19 Perry Weddle, among others,
once urged that such possibilities for reconstruction leave too
much indeterminacy in classification. He urged a shift to a
monolithic theory as a result. One might urge that if an argument
can be reconstructed so as to be deductively valid, this in itself
may be seen as a reason to think that the arguer must, in effect,
have ‘claimed’ that his premises (stated and understood or
unstated) would lead with absolute necessity to his conclusion.
Some who believe that such reconstructions more accurately
depict the direction and force of the original argument will see
the emerging ‘fact’ that the reconstructed argument is
deductively valid to be a reason for thinking the arguer ‘claimed’
an absolutely necessary connection. But it is not a good reason.
It is not easy to sort actual arguments into the two positivist
categories on the basis of the Copi sort of account which
constitutes standard logical wisdom on the part of many
philosophers today. That many difficulties arise in applying the
distinction cannot be denied. What is debatable is not the
existence, but the significance, of these difficulties. The
distinction between A’s and B’s may be important even though
there are many items that are borderline cases and might be
classified either as A’s or as B’s. Yet one must acknowledge that
application problems do not by themselves show that a
distinction is untenable. It is likely that the classifying problems
that plague the positivist theory of argument have their
counterparts in other pluralistic theories of argument. We might
have to choose between a theory with classifying problems and
a monolithic theory. That theory would presumably be
deductivism, given that no one doubts that there exist at least
some arguments that are deductively valid.
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There are almost always several ways of interpreting what
people say and write. This point applies to arguments as it does
to all other discourse. Any theory of argument allowing for
several categories of argument will have to make some allowance
for this flexibility in interpretation. Those who adopt the theory
will have to develop a policy for borderline cases. The fact that
there are many cases that are not easily classified according to
the positivist theory does not count conclusively against that
theory. If one is convinced that the basic dualism of the theory
is built around something fundamental and important, one may
attribute the many borderline cases to variations in context, the
flexibility of written and spoken language, and the problem of
missing premises, and decide to maintain some version of the
theory.
The key issue is the nature of this basic dualism. The term
‘positivist’ is appropriate for the theory of the great divide
because that divide owes much of its domination of our thought
to the belief, common some decades back, that mathematics-
logic and the empirical sciences are the only two sources of
human knowledge. The different versions of positivism are all
dualistic, though the dualism appears in different places in the
various versions. The key common idea is that there is a basic
kind of connection between premises and conclusion that is
deductive, and there is one other kind of connection. Only one.
The deductive side of the dichotomy seems relatively
unproblematic. To be satisfied with the positivist theory,
however, we have to be satisfied with both sides. Moreover, and
most significantly, one has to convince oneself that this
dichotomy is exhaustive. The key issue for any version of the
positivist theory, is whether there is just one kind of
nondeductive connection.
The usual way of describing an inductive connection between
premises and conclusion is to say that the premises, if true, make
the truth of the conclusion likely or probable. This may be a
way of saying only that the premises have some bearing on the
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conclusion but fail to entail it. If so, no independent
understanding of inductive connection is gained. One has simply,
in effect, reiterated one’s belief that deductive connection is an
important thing to understand and negatively defined a second
derivative category. To have a good understanding of the
dichotomy around which the positivist theory of argument is
built, one should have an independent and clear understanding of
inductive connection. If the theory is to dichotomize arguments,
this understanding should yield a distinction that will be
relatively easy to apply and that will exclusively and exhaustively
divide arguments into the two types.
The term ‘probable’, which is often used in defining inductive
arguments, is most naturally applied to contexts where we are
expressing roughly quantifiable degrees of confidence in
empirical statement and where we are willing, in at least a rough
sense, to make quantitative judgments. Probability theories deal
with the quantitative assessment of confidence or likelihood of
some empirical statements, given a prior quantitative assessment
of others, based in the final analysis on relative frequencies. If
one is to use ‘probable’ or a related term in order to specify a
sense of ‘inductive’ which will provide a firm basis for a clear and
exhaustive ‘inductive/deductive’ distinction, one need to define
the term more broadly. There are many arguments that have
conclusions that are non-empirical and in which, nevertheless,
the supporting reasoning is, on the face of it, not deductive. (They
appear to be a priori and yet not deductive.) In such contexts, a
standard conception of probability is a poor fit.
Consider arguments of the following types:
• consistency arguments by analogy. In such arguments it is
urged that case (a) is relevantly similar to case (b); that case (b)
has been treated as such-and-such; and that therefore case (a)
should be similarly treated. The conclusion is normative; the
reasoning is based on parallel cases.
• arguments of the type that Carl Wellman has called
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‘conductive’ and which others have referred to as ‘balance-of-
consideration’ or ‘good reasons’ arguments (Baier) or as
‘convergent arguments’ (Thomas). In such arguments, several
reasons are cited; these appear to bear independently on the
conclusion. All premises may be relevant; none taken alone is
likely to be sufficient. Frequently the conclusion is normative;
it may also be about an issue of classification or
interpretation.
• non-conclusive philosophical arguments. These may be of one
of the above types. They are noted separately here in the hope
that philosophers will be particularly familiar with the idea
that in their own discipline there are often arguments that
seem to have some force, yet not to be deductively valid. (For
example, the failure of many physicalistic terms to apply
naturally to such phenomena as belief and thought counts
against the mind-brain identity thesis, but how seriously? It
does give a reason to think there may be something wrong, or
overly-simple, about the thesis. But it does not entail its
falsehood. Nor would it be natural to say that this linguistic
fact makes it ‘improbable’ that the identity thesis is true. The
notion of probability does not fit the case well. And obviously,
the truth or falsity of the thesis is not straightforwardly
empirical.)
p class=”import-Normal indent” style=”margin-left: 0.7pt;
margin-right: 0.5pt; text-indent: 10.05pt;”>There are two themes
underlying the idea that an inductive connection is probabilistic
rather than necessary. The first is a negative idea: the premises do
not necessitate the conclusion. The second is a positive idea: the
premises offer some support to the conclusion. This second idea
requires clarification; ‘some support’ should not be understood
merely as ‘nondeductive support.’ How helpful is it to say that
the premises will (if true) make the conclusion more probable? I
submit that it is not very helpful.
Appeals in this context to the term ‘probable’ are not useful
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outside contexts where the conclusion is empirical. The reasons
we offer for and against normative and conceptual conclusions
are not naturally understood as making these more or less
probable. For example, an argument in which abortion is
assimilated to infanticide is not one in which the premises, if
true, make it probable, or more probable, that abortion is wrong.
They provide some reason to think that abortion is wrong. It
makes little sense to attach probabilities to normative
conclusions of this type.20
If a probabilistic connection is any connection other than a
deductive one, then of course consistency arguments,
conductive arguments, and many philosophical arguments are
based on such a connection. If that connection is allowed to
define what an inductive connection is, the inference in question
may be said to be inductive. But little understanding is thereby
gained.
One may understand probabilistic connection in this broad
way. But no information is thereby provided as to what the
various inductive arguments have in common. It will not
elucidate the category ‘inductive’ so as to yield a balanced
dualism in the positivist theory of argument. On this
understanding, one has deductive arguments (in which an
entailment of conclusion by premises is exemplified, intended, or
‘claimed’) and one has other arguments (in which no entailment
is exemplified, intended, or ‘claimed’). The inductive is the ‘other’,
about which one has said nothing informative. The broad
understanding of probabilistic connection is misleading insofar
as concepts of probability are most commonly associated with,
and most straightforwardly applicable to, the confirmation of
empirical statements by empirical evidence. This association,
together with the more fundamental association between
induction and scientific reasoning, has led many to ignore the
fact that reasoning that is probabilistic in the broad sense is often
not probabilistic in the narrower sense. Non-empirical
conclusions may be defended by reasoning that is non deductive
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in the sense that it does not exemplify (or is not intended or
claimed to exemplify) the connection of logical entailment of
conclusion by premises. The shifting between a broad and a
narrower sense of ‘probable’ and related terms makes it too easy
to ignore the existence of nondeductive arguments that are
primarily non-empirical in character.
In light of these considerations, the basic dualism underlying
the positivist theory of argument is not sufficiently clear and
compelling to outweigh classificatory problems. Though this is
probably the theory of argument most popular among
philosophers, and it has a venerable history going back through
Hume even to Aristotle, I contend that it is not a satisfactory
theory.
The strong philosophical attachment to the positivist theory of
argument may be due to two beliefs, both prominent in tradition
and both having a firm hold on many. There is first the tradition
going back to Aristotle, which maintains that there are two and
only two broad types of argument: deductive arguments, which
are conclusive, and inductive arguments, which are not. There
is secondly the tradition – with the same venerable history –
that inductive arguments are the arguments of science:
fundamentally induction deals with the empirical confirmation
of scientific hypotheses. The problem is not with either of these
traditional beliefs but with their conjunction. If one is loyal to
both at once, one is led to ignore many arguments common in
morality, history, literary interpretation, law, and philosophy.
There are many issues that are neither amenable to techniques
of empirical confirmation (not straightforwardly, in any case)
nor settled deductively. Inductive logics have dealt primarily
with arguments that are classically inductive (enumerative
inductive). They may venture occasionally into inferences from
correlational data to causal hypotheses, or to the inference-to-
the-best-explanation. But generally they fail to include many
patterns and style of argument which a naturalistic analysis of
discourse would reveal: appeals to authority, arguments from
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separate reasons, interpretive arguments, ad hominem arguments,
consistency arguments by analogy, and various other types of
philosophical and legal argumentation. In fact, such arguments
are rarely systematically studied under any name.
This is the real danger of the great divide in the positivist
theory of argument. One sets up the inductive-deductive
dichotomy, making it true by definition that all arguments are
either deductive or inductive. Then one looks at the work which
has in fact been done by logicians. There are systems articulating
various aspects of deductive logic and there are systems called
‘inductive logic’. The latter deal with sampling, generating
empirical hypotheses, causal inference, and so on. One readily
comes to believe that the types of arguments covered in these
standard systems are all the types there are. But many arguments
that are inductive in the broadest sense have not been covered.
This theme has been emphasized by Chaim Perelman and L.
Olbrechts-Tyteca.21 In their substantial book, The New Rhetoric,
they offer illustration after illustration of such arguments,
castigating logicians and philosophers for having been so
mesmerized by the traditional ‘inductive/deductive’ distinction
as to have denied their very existence.
The great divide between deductive and inductive arguments
is spurious and theoretically dangerous, because it makes it too
easy to ignore the many non deductive arguments which are
not classically inductive. Confidence in this spurious dichotomy
leads one to false simplicity in classificatory categories and
falsely founded problems of justification in philosophy and
elsewhere. Acknowledging the existence and epistemic
legitimacy of other types of argument would alter approaches to
such problems as the justification of normative and interpretive
statements while at the same time enhancing our understanding
of natural argumentation.
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CHAPTER 4.
TWO UNRECEIVED VIEWS ABOUT REASONING
AND ARGUMENT
My interest in these topics continues to this day, and I have written
and commented further on both of them. I remain grateful to John
Wisdom for permitting me to read his lectures on explanation and proof,
popularly known as the Virginia Lectures, and to Roger Shiner for
loaning me his copy of that fascinating material. The doctoral work of
Jerome Bickenbach and the summary provided by Renford Bambrough
were also helpful and should remain of interest to scholars. The topic
of analogical arguments has been of interest to others, notably Marcello
Guarini and Lilian Bermejo-Luque and their students.
The question of whether a priori analogies should be considered as
distinct from deductive arguments also remains of interest; I sense some
consensus in favour of an affirmative answer to that question. In any
analogy the target case (topic in question) and the analogue are both
similar and different. Assessment of an argument based on analogy
presupposes awareness of those similarities and differences, and hinges
mainly on the issue of their significance (in support, or in objection) to
the conclusion claim. Reconstructing those arguments with a universal
claim regarded as a missing premise remains a temptation for analysts
and theorists. It is a temptation I would still resist, for reasons given
here. Of course reconstructing by adding a universal missing premise is
not the only way of rendering a priori analogies deductively valid; one
can take a modus ponens approach using the associated conditional.
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Clearly, if one thinks that a priori analogies are not deductive
arguments, one presumes a distinction between the a priori and the
deductive. One might say that a question is a priori if it is to be resolved
by considerations of concepts, criteria, meaning, and significance;
accordingly a style of argument would be a priori if these features
characterize it. When we ask whether a priori analogies are deductive
arguments, we need to ask what sort of argument counts as deductive.
The matter is problematic. One might say that an argument is deductive
if the truth of its premises render the falsity of its conclusion impossible
or if the arguer intends that to be the case. On such a definition, it
is clear that the a priori and the deductive may be distinguished. (Of
course Kant thought so long ago, for different reasons.) Given these
conceptions of the a priori on the one hand and the deductive on the
other, I continue to maintain that a priori analogies are not deductive.
John Wisdom argued that due to its role in settling questions about
the application of words, case-by-case reasoning was more fundamental
for human thought than either deduction or induction. So far as I am
aware, that challenging hypothesis has not been seriously studied.
Carl Wellman’s ideas about conductive argument received little
attention for many years, but have recently been subject to sustained
discussion and criticism. My own developments of Wellman’s ideas have
been part of that picture. A key volume, resulting from a Windsor
conference is Conductive Arguments: An Overlooked Type of
Defeasible Reasoning, edited by Ralph Johnson and J. Anthony Blair.
Topics considered in recent discussions include the convergent/linked
distinction, ways of diagramming the structure of conductive argument,
the role of counter-considerations in argument, the distinction between
counter-considerations and objections, and the appropriacy of such
language as ‘weighing’ and ‘balancing’ in considering the significance of
cumulating factors. In his work The Concept of Argument, Harald
Wohlrapp argues that the pros and cons of conductive argument can
better be understood as stages in an ongoing discussion, so that in
a process (as distinct from product) model of argument, the category
‘conductive’ will disappear.
It is quite possible that a priori analogies and conductive arguments
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are not the only types of arguments ignored because of the misleading
and spurious exhaustiveness of the inductive/deductive distinction. If
‘inductive’ is so broadly defined that every non-deductive argument
counts as inductive, the inductive category will include a large variety
of argument types. For example, it is common to think of abductive
arguments as inductive. Abductive arguments have not been ignored
by theorists, a fact that may be due to their importance in scientific
reasoning. A close study of a variety of works inside and outside
philosophy might well reveal other candidates that are neither deductive
nor empirically inductive in nature. I suspect it would. Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s The New Rhetoric could serve as an excellent
starting point in the quest for examples.
The prevailing theories of argument among philosophers seem
to be deductivism and positivism. Of course there have been
dissenters from these views. Some dissenters, such as
Wittgenstein, Toulmin, and Perelman, were people of
considerable professional prominence. Despite this, their views
on argument have not greatly influenced thinking about logic and
argument.
Among dissenting views on reasoning and argument, two are
of particular interest. The first is that of John Wisdom,
elaborated most completely in the unpublished lectures
‘Explanation and Proof’, presented at the University of Virginia
in 1957, and commonly known as the Virginia Lectures. In these
lectures, Wisdom described what he called ‘case-by-case
reasoning’ or ‘reasoning by parallels’.1 He argued that it was a
nondeductive, noninductive, type of reasoning which was, in
fact, more basic than either deduction or induction. The second
neglected, but interesting, view is that of Carl Wellman,
articulated in 1971 in Challenge and Response: Justification in
Ethics.2 Like Wisdom, Weldon challenged the prevailing belief
that arguments are either inductive or deductive. He defined a
third category which he called ‘conductive’, in which distinct,
separately relevant factors are cited to support a conclusion.
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Wellman was concerned to show the relevance of conductive
arguments to issues about the justification of moral beliefs;
however his account has broader application as well as this single
important one.
Although case-by-case reasoning and conductive reasoning
are not the same, they fit into a similar gap in the theory of
argument and may have been widely ignored by philosophers
for similar reasons. Both fail to supply deductive support to
conclusions and yet are frequently used in a priori contexts to
resolve issues that are conceptual, philosophical, normative, or
in some other sense nonempirical. In addition, both seem
recalcitrant to treatment by general rules. Case-by-case
reasoning depends on specific similarities and differences
between individual cases. These cases have to be compared and
‘seen’ as such, rather than handled by covering generalizations.
Conductive reasoning depends fundamentally on judgments of
positive and negative relevance and on how these separately
relevant pro and con factors are significant when considered in
the balance.
1. Wisdom’s Virginia Lectures
John Wisdom’s Virginia Lectures offer a sustained elaboration
and defence of a view which he applied and formulated more
briefly in some of his published work. The lectures are
conveniently and accurately summarized in a paper by D.
Yalden-Thomas, available in a collection of essays on Wisdom’s
philosophy. They were the subject of several doctoral
dissertations in the late nineteen fifties and of a thorough
analysis in a 1977 doctoral dissertation by Jerome Bickenbach.
To some extent, Wisdom’s views have been promulgated by his
former students and colleagues: several works on meta-
philosophy and meta-ethics, including Renford Bambrough’s
Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge. Stephen Barker’s Elements
of Logic shows Wisdom’s influence, particularly in footnotes and
cautionary comments in the third edition. Barker was in the
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audience in Virginia, and some of his questions and comments
appear in the typescript of the lectures.3 On the whole, however,
Wisdom’s views have had little influence on those who reflect
on the nature and types of argument.4 Even a recent paper
concerned to defend analogy as a distinct form of inference and
referring to a wide variety of sources neglects Wisdom’s view.
According to Wisdom, the most basic, primary, kind of
reasoning is case-by-case reasoning. This reasoning is used,
either explicitly or implicitly, in order to show that a word is
properly applied to a particular case. Since both deduction and
induction presume the proper application of words to particular
instances, any kind of reasoning which is a prerequisite of doing
this can lay claim to ‘most basic’ status. Examples of instances
where issues of correct application of a term arise are whether
a pattern of behavior amounts to negligence; whether the Jews
constitute a nation; and whether a trailer that has been fixed
in one position is still a mobile home. There may be important
disputes in such cases and there is a rational way to resolve
them. We find an instance which is clearly a case of negligence,
nationhood, being a mobile home, or whatever, and we closely
compare and contrast that instance with the unresolved one. The
only way to show that terms have been correctly applied is to
reason from agreed instances of their correct application. In this
way, we can argue for a conclusion on the point. Case-by-case
reasoning is a species of argument from analogy.
Wisdom considered four sorts of contexts in which case-by-
case reasoning is necessary: where we need to resort to
comparison with a paradigm; where we are evaluating
‘paradoxical’ statements such as those commonly made in
metaphysics; where we are trying to resolve borderline cases;
and where criteria are not sufficiently explicit to bring out
correct standards of applicability in a process of deduction. The
second context here is tied to metaphilosophical disputes in the
forties and fifties, and merits some explanatory comment.
Wisdom had in mind such claims as ‘nothing is really solid’.
88 TRUDY GOVIER
His concern was to show that reasons could be offered for and
against such metaphysical statements, and that they were not
meaningless as positivists had maintained but were, rather,
significant statements — though not about either matters of fact
or matters of verbal usage.
Questions about the correct application of such terms as ‘solid’,
‘negligence’, ‘nation’, ‘race’, ‘solvent’, and many others are not
purely verbal: they may have profound legal, political, moral,
or psychological significance. Wisdom had an ingenious way of
contrasting purely verbal disputes with significant conceptual
ones. He claimed that if two people have a purely verbal dispute,
their disagreement could be explained by the way in which they
have used words in the past. Their past usage would be divergent.
However, in a case where two people are disagreeing on a
significant conceptual issue, such as whether anything is really
solid, in the light of particle physics, this disagreement is not
necessarily reflected in differences as to how they have
previously applied the term. Rather, it is a difference as to the
correct decision about how the term should be used in the future,
in the light of significant new data. Nor is the difference between
them a factual one, for it will not be resolved by future
observations. In an inductive argument, we reason to a
conclusion that can, in principle, be determined in some other
context to be true or false on the basis of empirical observation.
But here, the issue is one that requires decision as distinct from
prediction.
Where some authors have contrasted a priori and inductive
analogy, Wisdom tends to use ‘analogy’ to refer to inductive
analogy and to call what others term ‘a priori analogy’ case-by-
case reasoning. The difference as he understands it is that in
standard, or inductive, analogy we support a prediction about a
case by comparing it with an actual known case. (For example,
one might seek to predict the effects of cyclamate on humans by
comparing humans at a certain dosage with rats at what would
be a comparable dosage for them. Or one might seek the correct
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diagnosis of symptoms in one patient by comparing her with
another patient known to have had a specific disease.) In such
cases, we use actual instances to predict unknown ones, and
future experience will show whether we are right or wrong.
1a. A Priori Analogy
With Wisdom’s case-by-case reasoning (or a priori analogy)
it does not matter whether the instance used as a basis for
comparison is actual or hypothetical, and the reasoning issues
in a decision, not a prediction. Consider, for instance, Judith
Thompson’s famous analogy between the woman carrying an
unwanted fetus and the person who unexpectedly finds herself
hooked up to a dying violinist.5 The analogue is obviously
hypothetical, but this fact does not affect the merits of the
argument. Thompson is arguing that the two cases are relevantly
similar, so if we grant that there is no obligation to restrict one’s
activities to support the life of the violinist, we ought, in
consistency, to believe there is no obligation for the
unexpectedly and unwillingly pregnant woman to adapt her
activities so as to support the life of the fetus. In case-by-case
reasoning, as contrasted with inductive analogy, there is no way
of taking further measures to find out by empirical observation
whether the parallelism suggested here is or is not the case.
In his systematic study of Wisdom’s theory, Bickenbach
referred to case-by-case reasoning as ‘reflective reasoning’,
following Wisdom’s emphasis. In the present discussion the
terms ‘a priori analogy’ and ‘logical analogy’ are used. Because
there is reasoning that goes from one case to another and that is
inductive, the expression ‘case-by-case reasoning’ does not quite
serve to pick out the kind of reasoning Wisdom was dealing
with: it is too broad. So too is the concept of reflection.
The thrust that underlies logical analogies is that of
consistency – not the consistency required in order to avoid
assenting to contradictory propositions, but rather, the
consistency required for consistent behavior. This is the
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consistency of treating relevantly similar cases similarly. It is
inconsistent to say that all men are poor listeners while
admitting that John and Fred, both men, are good listeners. It
is, in another and equally important sense, inconsistent to treat
relevantly similar cases differently. If one organism is regarded
as alive and another as not alive, there must be a relevant
difference between them, at pain of inconsistency. If one man
is given three years for theft and another three months, there
must be a relevant difference between them, or else the law is
inconsistently (and unjustly) administered. Logical analogy
focuses on similarities between cases, and arguments based on
such analogies urge us to make a decision on a case based on the
consideration of a closely similar one. We are pushed to do so
by considerations of consistency: similar treatment for similar
cases.
The negative use of logical analogy is found in the technique
of refuting arguments by citing parallel flawed arguments. If two
arguments are fundamentally similar as to structure, and the
first is flawed, the second is flawed also. To regard one of the
arguments as cogent and the other as not cogent would be to
make decisions inconsistently. This is a familiar use of logical
analogy. Wisdom, in his lectures, emphasized the philosophical,
moral, and legal contexts in which such reasoning is ubiquitous
and necessary. The appeal to consistency is also extremely
important in law, moral reasoning, and administration.
When he gave the Virginia Lectures, Wisdom seems to have
been more interested in reasoning and epistemology –
particularly the epistemology of philosophy itself – than he was
in argument as such. Nevertheless, it is clear that he thought that
case-by-case reasoning was not only a distinct and important
type of reasoning but was the basis for a distinct and important
type of argument. Any temptation to remodel logical or
inductive analogies into deductive or inductive arguments
should be resisted, because the type of reasoning such arguments
employ is not only a distinct and quite proper type of reasoning
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but is, in fact, more fundamental than the alternative to which it
is to be ‘reduced’. Arguments based on appeals to cases are not
reducible to arguments of some other type.
As with other nondeductive arguments, a priori and inductive
analogies can be recast as deductively valid arguments, if we are
willing to add general premises of a sufficiently sweeping nature.
Consider any analogy:
1. (1) Case x has features a,b,c.
2. (2) Case y has features a,b,c.
3. (3) Case x is of type e.
Therefore,
4. (4) Case y is of type e.
One might regard such an argument as elliptical, insisting that
cases (x) and (y) must both be subsumed under the appropriate
generalization. Thus:
1. Case x has features a,b,c.
2. Case y has features a,b,c.
3. Case x is of type e.
Missing Premise: All things which have features a,b,c, are of
type e.
Therefore,
4. Case y is of type e.
But there are significant objections to such an approach.
The added premise makes two of the stated premises
redundant as far as the logic of the inference is concerned. If we
know that all things with a,b,c, are of type e, then we can apply
that universal statement to case (y) directly. We have no need
for premises (1) and (3), which cite information about case (x).
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The comparison of cases is unnecessary. The supplementation
makes the key premises which describe the analogy redundant.
In effect, the reconstructed argument ceases to be an analogy.
A particular (case y) is simply subsumed under a generalization.
The analogy has been destroyed, not recast.
In defense of this enthymematic approach to analogy, one
might seek to incorporate case (x) into the argument in a purely
psychological way, saying that it serves to remind us of the
general truth under which case (y) is subsumed. This suggestion
still leaves the conclusion that there are no inferences-by-
analogy: analogy is purely a psychological crutch. In fact, this
view has been taken seriously by some authors of logic
textbooks, including Susan Stebbing and Monroe Beardsley.6
Nevertheless, given that the generalization must bear the whole
weight of the argument, it is rather unsatisfactory to have to
admit that a subsumed particular case is psychologically
necessary in order for us to remember what that generalization
is. We may ask why the generalization is not more directly
accessible, if it is known. And the word ‘if’ should be taken
seriously here.
The requisite generalization is typically not known and this,
indeed, is usually the primary reason for appealing to analogy
in the first place. We do compare cases as such, and we can do
this in the absence of a known generalization. As W.H. Shaw
and L.R. Ashley point out in their article on analogical inference,
much familiar reasoning involves the direct comparison of cases
without appeal to an intermediate generalization. Ashley and
Shaw say:
Alternatively, consider the rich employment of analogies in contemporary
ethical writing. Where is the implicit enumerative induction? We do not
perform inductions about lifeboat situations, kidnapped kidney donors,
trapped spelunkers, out of-control locomotives, or any of the other bizarre
cases which moral philosophers spend their time inventing, when we reason
analogically from them to the moral situation actually facing us.7
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Usually, to supplement analogies with universal statements is
to distort their logical character and weaken them epistemically:
in most cases, those universal statements will not be known. In
fact, even to formulate them is often a challenge.
If we knew, somehow, that all reasoning had to be deductive,
we would have grounds for insisting that such reconstruction
of a priori analogies is necessary. But we do not know this, and
we have no such basis. Analogies are, and should be, appraised
not by formulating and criticizing generalizations, but by careful
consideration of the relevant similarities and differences
between the cases considered. This point holds for both a priori
and inductive analogies. (Wisdom, as explained, was
emphasizing the former over the latter.)
In Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge, Renford Bambrough
defends Wisdom’s claim that reasoning about cases is logically
prior to reasoning by the application of universal claims or rules.
If a case is to be settled, and we try to settle it by deducing a
conclusion from a universal rule, the epistemological problem is
that the universal rule already includes a resolution of this case.
Bambrough says:
Once we are convinced that there will be no exceptions we may state our
conclusion in the form of an exceptionless rule, but such a rule cannot
be the fundamental ground upon which we accept a conclusion about
one of its own instances. Whatever is to provide us with grounds for a
conclusion about this instance of an argument in this form must take the
form of considering other arguments, other instances. A rule will not do
the work, for a rule cannot refer to the others without referring to this
one as well. It does not compete, but simply awards itself the prize.8
Here, Bambrough turns the tables on those who would make
individual judgments about cases dependent on universal or
general rules. He sees general rules as arbitrary considered
simply in themselves and as gaining their credibility (implicitly
or explicitly) from their correct application to instances. On this
analysis, Bambrough follows Wisdom in thinking that cases can
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stand alone. Mill, Moore, and Wittgenstein also accepted this.
But it is a minority position in philosophy. Philosophers have
usually been inclined to have universal principles stand alone as
‘self-evident’ logical or moral truths.
1b. The Universal and the Particular
The issue raised here is whether the universal or the particular
is logically prior. We may say, with Wisdom, Moore, and
Bambrough, that nothing can have greater force than a clearly
understood particular case, and that what universal truths we
know are in one way or another derived from our knowledge
of such cases. Or, as is more common in a generalizing and
theorizing discipline, we may regard particular cases as
epistemically incomplete, as being mere expressions of intuition
or common sense unless ‘grounded’ in universal principles. In
fact, this general issue itself may be stated in a way that is too
insensitive to particulars. Perhaps the truth is that what is
epistemically prior varies from case to case and from context
to context. But at the very least we can find in Wisdom and
Bambrough, as in Mill, Moore, and Wittgenstein a useful,
reminder that arguments from universal premises are not
without their epistemic problems.
Despite their insistence that analogical inference is a distinct
type, Shaw and Ashley take the opposite view to Wisdom’s about
particulars and universals. They see the general as more
fundamental than the particular and urge that a full
understanding of relevance and irrelevance depends on
background theory. On their account, a full understanding of
the cases compared in an analogy will ultimately require a
background theory, in which we are told why certain features
a,b,c are relevant to the judgment that cases x and y are of type e.
Shaw and Ashley allow that analogies, both a priori and inductive,
constitute a distinct type of argument. They acknowledge the
epistemic difficulty of formulating and knowing the requisite
generalization for remodelling the arguments. And yet they see
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the appeals to relevant similarities on which analogies depend
are theoretically incomplete.
Consistency is a basic constraint on human reasoning, and we must at
the very least judge similar situations similarly …. even in the absence
of a clear notion of relevance, the resemblance of two situations provides
some warrant for the inference that what is right in one case is right in
the other. But this may be thought to beg the question. Do we not need
a theory to designate the relevant and irrelevant similarities? Ultimately
yes. But in the meantime we have, prior to any particular normative
theory, a perception of two situations as similar, and this is enough
(along with our commitment to consistency) to provide some intrinsic
plausibility to the analogical move.9
Wisdom would have regarded such a view as symptomatic
of ‘Euclid’s disease’, an ailment he and Wittgenstein diagnosed
in those who disparage particular cases and regard universal
knowledge, by ‘criterion’ or general reason, as the only
knowledge. He saw judgments about the relevance and
significance of features of individual cases and resemblances
between those features of cases as being ultimate, and as not
requiring or being amenable to further justification by appeal to
anything more basic. According to the manuscript of the Virginia
Lectures, Barker asked Wisdom why it was that the particular
case always had more epistemic force than a universal that might
be cited in support. In raising that question, Barker suggested
that each might have force and, in some context, require revision
of the other. Barker, in effect, anticipated a version of Rawls’
influential view that we seek ‘reflective equilibrium’ between
theoretical principles and nontheoretical judgments about
particular cases. In response, Wisdom reiterated the
predominance of the particular as a ground for generalization,
saying:
What most plainly presents the data on which the rest is based is the
argument from particulars to particulars.10
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Following Wisdom, Bickenbach contended that a major
symptom of Euclid’s disease is the belief that systematization is a
precondition for genuine or complete understanding.11
Whether the judgments about the relevance of various
similarities and differences that underlie our evaluation of
analogies are in some ultimate sense theory-dependent is a broad
philosophical issue that cannot be resolved here. The notion of
reflective equilibrium between theoretical and case judgments
has been applied by Goodman to deductive and inductive logic
and by Rawls and others to ethical and political theory. It
requires that both particular judgments about cases and
theoretical principles have some initial credibility. Sometimes it
is reasonable for us to revise our pre-theoretical judgments about
individual cases on the basis of principles; sometimes, we seek
to build up theoretical principles on the bases of knowledge of
cases. We may revise principles if they do not fit our judgments
about particulars that would be subsumed under them. We may
also revise our judgments about cases according to principles
that we have accepted. Thus principles and case-based judgments
must each be adjusted in the light of the other.12
Even if the disputable view that the general is always logically
prior to the particular were to be true, the pertinent background
theories often do not yet exist. In the meantime, it is clear that
analogies, both a priori and inductive, have a real epistemic use.
Hume’s Dialogues on Natural Religion contain many vivid
illustrations of arguments of this type. Consider, for instance,
this example:
The Brahmins assert that the world arose from an infinite spider, who
spun this whole complicated mass from his bowels, and annihilates
afterwards the whole or any part of it, by absorbing it again and
resolving it into his own essence. Here is a species of cosmogony which
appears to us ridiculous because a spider is a little contemptible animal
whose operations we are never likely to take for a model of the whole
universe. But still, here is a new species of analogy, even in our globe.
And were there a planet wholly inhabited by spiders (which is very
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possible), this inference would there appear as natural and irrefragable
as that which in our planet ascribes the origin of all things to design
and orderly system and intelligence, as explained by Cleanthes. Why an
orderly system may not be spun from the belly as well as the brain, it will
be difficult for him to give a satisfactory reason.13
This argument is an a priori analogy between two arguments;
the spider’s argument that the world has been spun from the
bowels of an infinite spider is compared to the human’s
argument that the world has been designed by an infinitely
expanded human mind. Hume invites us to see the second
argument as being as ridiculous as the first.
Apart from Hume, other prime philosophical sources for a
priori analogies include Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and
Utopia, and Stanley Cavell’s The Claim of Reason. Given that this
technique of arguing is common among philosophers, it is
surprising that it has not received more attention from theorists.
Such analogies are common, not only in philosophical
thinking about moral problems, but in ordinary non-
philosophical thinking as well. Nor is this kind of reasoning
restricted to the moral realm. It is also used in conceptual and
interpretive contexts, by philosophers and others. Consistency
reasoning is prominent in law, especially in the common law
system where cases may be resolved by appeals to precedent.
Even where there are explicit statutes, constituent terms are
interpreted according to their prior application to cases. The
core of legal reasoning is, as Wisdom noted, case by case. The
appraisal of such reasoning requires careful attention to the
similarities and differences between the cases, and a judgment
as to how relevant these similarities and differences are to the
decision at hand.
A type of argument of obvious prominence and importance
has been widely ignored by theorists. Probably this is due to
the fact that it is less prominent in science and in mathematics
than in moral life, law, administration, criticism, and philosophy.
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Philosophers have tended to construct theories of knowledge
and argument as though positivism were true.
Case-by-case reasoning as Wisdom describes it is not itself
amenable to extensive theoretical analysis. Case-by-case
reasoning is recalcitrant to treatment by general rules, because
we cannot say in general what cases are going to be similar
and why. This may lead us to think that endorsing it will lead
inevitably to scepticism or relativism. But no such consequences
follow.
In isolation from information about which cases are at issue
and why they are being compared, what may be said? One
possibility is to explore further cases. If two cases are deemed
to possess feature e in virtue of other features a,b,c then that
implies that the features a,b,c, function to establish e, other things
being equal. This relationship should hold in general. If we find
a third case in which the relationship does not hold, we then
must seek further to see how that case might undermine the
basis of the analogy. It might turn out that the new case differs
from the original analogue with respect to some feature f and
that it is f which undermines e. If so, the original analogy tacitly
depended on the two compared cases both lacking feature f. By
a close examination of relevantly similar and relevantly different
cases, we can rationally adjudicate differences of belief as to
whether comparisons are apt and whether particular similarities
and differences are significant.
It is an open question as to whether we can set out a general
‘logic’ for appraising a priori analogies. Wisdom and others
following him tend to write as though this could not be done.
Their opinion has probably been shared by systematic logicians,
who have always found analogy less interesting than deductive
reasoning and empirical inductive reasoning. Whether a set of
rules for the comparing and contrasting of cases can be devised
remains to be seen. But even if it cannot, this would not entail
that case-by-case reasoning fails to exist at all. Whether or not
such reasoning is recalcitrant to systematization, it is real.
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My point, like Wisdom’s, is not merely descriptive. It is
normative as well. Case-by-case arguments, or a priori analogies,
are both real and epistemically legitimate. I would urge that some
such arguments are good ones and can establish a conclusion.
Though rules may not exist to resolve disputes about the merits
of these arguments, there remains room for rational debate and
reasonable resolution. Similarities and differences can be pointed
out, and the significance of these can be rationally discussed.
To the Euclidean theorist who is not satisfied with such a
response, we can reply by turning the tables. Rules and
generalizations do not stand independently. They themselves
ultimately require justification, and in the final analysis will
receive it from their application to cases.
2. Carl Wellman and the Concept of Conductive Argument
Do philosophers prove by chains of demonstrative reasoning what they
wish to say or without attempting to support in any way one thing
by another, just set out the self-evident or what appears to them self-
evident? This question gives one a queer feeling because one wants to
answer that they do both and neither … It is true that, when we read,
for example, Hume’s appendix on the analysis of right and good or
Broad on theories of the nature of matter, we find that a number of
what Mill might call ‘considerations capable of influencing the intellect’
are advanced. But they are not connected chainwise. They bear
independently upon the issue.14
Carl Wellman’s Challenge and Response was ostensibly about
meta-ethics, but in fact dealt largely with the subject of
justification in general. Wellman devoted much time and care
to discussing the question ‘What is justification?’, and had some
rather unorthodox things to say in reply. He summed up his view
as follows:
… justification is to be understood essentially as a process of responding
to challenges made. It may be observed and described as a psychological
struggle in which one person tries to force another to back down, or one
person struggles to come to terms with his own doubts and conflicting
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convictions. But it is more than a psychological struggle because at
its core are certain critical claims to truth, validity, to be upsetting,
to be reassuring, and to be adequate. Therefore the actual outcome of
any particular psychological struggle never settles once and for all the
issues being fought over in the process of justification. It is this peculiar
ambivalence of justification that enables what we actually do in
discussion and thinking to serve as a test of critical ideas like truth,
validity, and being justified.15
Much justification proceeds by argument and Wellman said
some interesting and unusual things about arguments in his
book.
Wellman argued that the inductive/deductive dichotomy is not
exhaustive and that there is at least one other type of argument,
which he termed ‘conductive’. Wellman’s definitions of
‘deductive’ and ‘inductive’ are somewhat unusual. He defines
deduction much as Copi does: a deductive argument is one in
which the claim is made that the conclusion follows necessarily
from the premises. In ethics, which is his primary concern,
Wellman associates deduction with deriving conclusions about
cases by subsuming the cases under general principles. Induction
according to Wellman, is that sort of reasoning by which a
hypothesis is confirmed or disconfirmed by establishing the
truth or falsity of its implications. Conduction, a third type of
reasoning, is distinct from both deduction and induction, being
that sort of reasoning in which (1) a conclusion about some
individual case (2) is drawn nonconclusively (3) from one or
more premises about the same case (4) without any appeal to
other cases. In conductive reasoning where there are several
supporting premises, we draw together these independently
relevant factors to support a conclusion. A conductive argument,
then, depends crucially upon the concept of relevance. It differs
from a deductive argument because the factors cited do not
entail, and are not put forward as being sufficient for, the
conclusion stated. It differs from an inductive argument in that
it is not a case of confirming or disconfirming hypotheses by
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instances and in that (typically) separately relevant reasons are
cited in support of a normative, conceptual, or philosophical
conclusion. The issue is frequently not empirical.
Wellman sought to establish this third category of argument
in order to show that there is more flexibility than most of us
suppose in the matter of justifying conclusions. He was especially
concerned to combat the common view that justification in
ethics must be a matter of deriving particular conclusions from
universal or general principles. On Wellman’s account there are
at least three different types of ethical reasoning, all of which are
used to justify conclusions about what we should do. First, we
may deduce such conclusions from general principles, in cases
where we are certain enough of such principles to use them
in this way. Second, we may confirm or disconfirm general
hypotheses using judgments about particular instances, thus
reasoning inductively in Wellman’s sense. Third, we may support
a conclusion about a particular problem by citing a fact or several
facts that are nonconclusively relevant to it.
Suppose one says, ‘You ought to take your son to the movie
because you promised to do so, it is a good movie, and you
have nothing better to do this afternoon’. One is reasoning
conductively to a conclusion about what to do.
Wellman’s discussion may appear less generally interesting
than it is due to his contestable accounts of deduction and
induction. There are problems with defining deductive
arguments in terms of ‘claim to necessary connection’; in many
arguments there is just nothing to indicate whether such a
connection is claimed or not. Furthermore, Wellman
unnecessarily limits himself to deduction from the universal to
the particular. Obviously, there are other forms of deduction.
Then again, Wellman’s definition of ‘induction’ is highly
idiosyncratic, as he recognizes himself. One might maintain that
it is useful to have an account which allows for induction in
a priori contexts. A problem arises because many modus tollens
arguments, which are deductively valid, will count as inductive
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in Wellman’s sense. Consider, ‘If all my students are computer
science majors, then since Joe is my student Joe will be a
computer science major. But Joe is not a computer science major.
Therefore the hypothesis that all my students are computer
science majors is incorrect’ is an argument in which a hypothesis
is disconfirmed by an instance. It is inductive according to
Wellman’s definition. But obviously it is deductively valid. And
it could be claimed to be deductive in Wellman’s sense too – it
can easily be regarded as ‘claiming’ deductive validity. Wellman’s
notion of induction is too broad because it will include some
deductively valid arguments to count as inductive. But it is also
too narrow, given that causal reasoning, reasoning to the best
explanation, and reasoning from generalizations based on past
experience to a future case will not count as inductive in this
sense. These results are highly (and unnecessarily) counter-
intuitive. With such an unorthodox concept of ‘induction’ the
claim that there is a distinct type of non-deductive and non-
inductive reasoning may appear to be no more than the result of
an unorthodox classificatory system.
As Wellman noted, but did not emphasize, conductive
reasoning is not restricted to ethical contexts. It is common in
contexts where we are trying to reach a decision about a
classificatory issue, in interpretive contexts, and in contexts of
philosophy and theory. Arguments that are conductive typically
bring forward several relevant factors in the premises. It may
happen that only one non conclusively relevant factor is cited; in
this case, the difference between the conductive argument and a
deductive one is that the factor is not sufficient and other factors,
not mentioned, could have been mentioned to count as well.
Also, conductive argumentation is a favoured context for ‘pros’
and ‘cons’ in arguing. We may allow that there are factors
relevant to the conclusion that count against it, mention these
in the argument, and then cite supportive factors for the
conclusion. We judge, and ask our audience to judge, that the
supportive factors outweigh the counter considerations.
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Consider, for example, the following interpretive argument:
Hume is not a sceptic, for although he argues that our basic beliefs are
not rationally justified, he rails against classical sceptics, and he maintains
that we are as much determined to believe as we are to think and feel.
This is a conductive argument of the ‘pro and con’ type. One
factor is cited which would count towards Hume being a sceptic,
and two other factors are cited which would count against that
view. The latter two factors are deemed to outweigh the first
one so that the argument overall presents good reason to believe
that Hume is a sceptic. Much actual reasoning seems to involve
this kind of consideration of pros and cons, and estimating or
‘summing up’ their collective significance. A conductive
argument may be the product of such reasoning about pros and
cons. It will typically involve the specification of several such
factors and adduce a conclusion on the basis of what the arguer
takes to be their cumulative force. Such arguments had been
tacitly recognized by other writers.
2a. Related Views
Kurt Baier’s emphasis on ‘good reasons’ arguments in ethics
is one case in point. In The Moral Point of View, first published
in 1958, Kurt Baier described the variety of reasons available to
justify moral conclusions, and seems to have had something like
conductive arguments in mind. He said:
To say that a certain fact is a consideration, a pro or a con, is to say
that this fact gives rise to a presumption, namely, that the agent ought
or ought not to enter on the course of action in relation to which the
fact is a pro or a con. Exactly the same point is made when it is claimed
that some reasons are prima-facie reasons, or reasons other things being
equal. All that is meant is that the facts which are the reasons give rise
merely to a presumption that the agent ought or ought not to enter on the
line contemplated.16
Both Michael Scriven and Stephen Thomas noted the
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existence of arguments in which distinct factors cumulate, or
converge, to support a conclusion. However, in neither case was
there much discussion of such arguments as a distinct type.17
Thomas, in fact, incorporated theorizing inconsistent with the
claim. As a result of my critical notice in the Informal Logic
Newsletter, calling attention to Wellman’s account and arguing
for its significance, David Hitchcock incorporated a recognition
of conductive arguments in his textbook. In general, however,
Wellman’s account did little to upset philosophers’ confidence
in deductivism and positivism as theories of ordinary
argumentation.
The notion of conductive argument does not owe its interest
solely to Wellman’s somewhat idiosyncratic classificatory
system. The idea that in many arguments the basic notion is
that of nonconclusive relevance and that such arguments readily
incorporate ‘pro and con’ considerations is important and had
been explicitly or tacitly recognized by other analysts. What I
should like to do here is endorse Wellman’s ideas about relevance
and pros and cons and drop some other features of his account.
I do not wish to endorse his definitions of ‘induction’ and
‘deduction’, nor his limitation of conductive reasoning to
contexts where a particular conclusion is defended. Wellman
made conductive arguments by definition about particular cases.
But this seems unfortunate, as it is easy to think of examples
where separate facts are cited to nonconclusively support
generalization. Consider, for instance:
Blacks are equal to whites because they are as healthy as whites, they
are biologically similar to whites, they are as intelligent as whites, and they
share basic needs with whites.
Whatever the substantive merits of this argument, we can
readily see that it is based on separate nonconclusively relevant
premises. It is the sort of argument where ‘cons’ could be
acknowledged and ‘weighed’ with the ‘pros’. The various
premises about blacks and whites are separately relevant to the
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conclusion in the sense that if one were false, the others would
remain unaffected. Thus the example fits much of what Wellman
has to say, and yet the conclusion is not particular in form.
Clearly, we may reason about cases by citing relevant factors, and
in addition, much conductive reasoning is about cases. However,
conductive reasoning may also be used to support conclusions
that are general or universal in form.
Conductive argument and a priori analogy are distinct types.
Wellman says that in conduction the link between premises and
conclusion is not established on the basis of the experience of
analogous cases; it is entirely a priori.
Conductive reasoning and Wisdom’s case-by-case reasoning
fit into a similar gap unnoticed by many who have supported
deductivist and positivist theories of argument. Both deal with
nonempirical reasoning that is nonconclusive, or at least not
‘conclusive’ in the deductive sense. Conductive arguments
require separately relevant non-sufficient factors and readily
admit counterconsiderations as part of the argument; a priori
analogies use comparison of cases to press for consistency of
treatment, and depend fundamentally on the concept of relevant
similarity.
To clarify the contrast between conductive arguments and
others, it is useful to refer to different ways premises may
combine to support conclusions in multi-premise arguments.
These different styles of support have to do with the structural
arrangement of premises, and not with the strength or character
of the support those premises are able to give to a conclusion.
Nor do they concern the truth or plausibility of the premises.
They concern the diagramming of arguments, not their
classification or inferential appraisal. The classic accounts of this
style of support are Beardsley’s early text and Thomas’ text on
reasoning in natural language. The latter is justly famous for its
exposition of structure and adaptation of Beardsley’s techniques.
The distinction presented is between convergent and linked
argumentation.18 When the pattern of support is linked, one
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premise is not even relevant to the conclusion without the
others. In a convergent support pattern, premises bear separately
upon the conclusion. All conductive arguments exemplify the
convergent pattern or support, except in the limiting case where
there is only one premise. However, the converse does not hold,
as Wellman was careful to note. It is possible to offer an
argument which exemplifies the convergent support pattern, in
which there are several different premises, each of which, taken
alone, deductively entails the conclusion. This situation may
occur either because the arguer expects that some of his premises
will be contested or because he is not aware that the entailment
relationships hold and make some of his premises logically
redundant. He offers more reasons than are logically required.
In a conductive argument, the premises strengthen each other
as support, even when they are not in question: ‘it is the logical
force, not the probative force, of the argument that is increased with the
addition of each new premise’, Wellman says.19
We cannot define conductive arguments solely with reference
to the convergent support pattern, because if we were to do
so, some deductive arguments would be conductive. There is
a similar problem with induction. Some inductive arguments
use the convergent support pattern, particularly if a number of
distinct, and apparently unrelated cases, are cited to support a
generalization. Typically, in a conductive argument no one
premise deductively entails the conclusion. Nor do the premises
entail the conclusion when considered together. The premises
count in favour of the conclusion in the sense that they are,
or are taken by the arguer to be, positively relevant to it. Here
‘relevant’ does not mean ‘sufficient.’ The method by which we
assess a conductive argument is not to test for deductive validity.
Rather, it is to ask ourselves whether the premises are relevant,
how much support they give to the conclusion, and whether
unmentioned factors that are also relevant to the conclusion
would ‘outweigh’ the premises. We may also consider further
cases to test claims of relevance. The conclusion is not a
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generalization from cases, as it would be in an enumerative
induction. Nor does it presume empirical regularities among
considered cases or the kind of background empirical knowledge
needed for explanatory or causal inductive reasoning. Whether
X is relevant to Y, in these contexts, is a conceptual, normative,
or ‘criterial’ issue.
A priori analogies, like all analogies, employ the linked pattern
of support. They are of the general type:
1. X has features a,b,c.
2. Y has features a,b,c.
3. X has feature e.
Therefore,
4. Y has feature e.
The premises link to support the conclusion, as they do also in
the more schematic version of analogy:
1. X is similar to Y.
2. Y has feature e.
Therefore,
3. X has feature e.
Wisdom dealt with analogy arguments in which support is
linked and reasoning moves from a point about one case to a
conclusion about another. Wellman deals with arguments in
which the support is convergent and connections are by criterial
relevance, not comparison. Thus we must have two types, not
one.
2b. Further Examples
Since Wellman’s main concern was with the justification of
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ethical propositions, he gave examples primarily from the
domain of moral reasoning. But this restriction is not essential;
examples dealing with many subjects can be found. Here is one,
cited by Scriven.
We can be proud that America has turned the corner on the depression
of the last few years. At last the many indexes of recovery are showing
optimistic readings. The rate of inflation has slowed, unemployment has
more or less stabilized, inventories are beginning to drop, advance orders
are starting to pick up, and – the best news of all – the average income
figures are showing a gain. The doomsayers have been discomfited, and
the free enterprise system once more vindicated.20
Here, a number of distinct pieces of evidence are cited to
support the proposition that America is recovering from the
depression: slowing of the inflation rate, stabilization of
unemployment, increase in advance orders, and gain in average
income figures.
An example from the field of literary criticism is the following:
There can be no doubt that Emily Bronte cast a vague incestuous aura
over the entire plot of Wuthering Heights. Heathcliff marries his lost
love’s sister-in-law; his wife’s son marries her brother’s daughter;
Cathy’s daughter marries her brother’s son. An unconsciously incestuous
love between the two leading characters would not run counter to the
tone of a novel filled with violent and savage scenes, such as the sadistic
rubbing of a wrist over a broken window pane, Cathy’s fierce delirium,
or the sight of Heathcliff smashing his bloody head against a tree.21
Here, four separate premises are given to support the
conclusions that there is an incestuous element in the novel:
three specify quasi-incestuous relationships, and the fourth cites
other violence, claiming that the savage mood of the novel is such
that incest would not be out of place. A conductive argument is
used to support an interpretive claim.
We can also find examples of conductive arguments within
philosophy. Consider, for instance:
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We found that either (a) the corresponding sense-datum is usually not
identical with the observed surface of the object or (b) the corresponding
sense-datum usually lacks the qualities it is sensed as having. For (1) the
qualities which it is sensed as having are usually incompatible with the
qualities of the surface: and (2) the qualities which different observers
sense their corresponding sense-data as having are usually incompatible
with one another.22
The conclusion is the disjunction of (a) and (b); statements
(1) and (2) constitute separately relevant premises. That sensed
qualities are usually incompatible with those on the surface of
the object and that sensed qualities, as sensed by different
observers, usually differ and are incompatible, are two distinct
claims put forward as support for the conclusion. Neither entails
it; both are conceptually relevant to it.
Another philosophical example, this time incorporating
counter considerations, is:
That ‘this exists’ has any meaning in such cases, where, as Mr. Russell
would say, we are using ‘this’ as a ‘proper name’ for something with
which we are acquainted is, I know, disputed; my view that it has
involves, I am bound to admit, the curious consequence that ‘this exists’
when used in this way is always true, and ‘this does not exist’ always
false; and I have little to say in its favor except that it seems to me so
plainly true that, in the case of every sense-datum I have, it is logically
possible that the sense-datum in question should not have existed – that
there should simply have been no such thing.23
The conclusion is that ‘this exists’ has meaning. There is one
major reason advanced for it: ‘this’ names a sense datum
(understood as part of the background and context) and it is
logically possible that any particular sense datum should not
have existed. It is acknowledged that there are two points
counting against the conclusion. One is that ‘this exists’ will
always be true. The other is that ‘this does not exist’ will always
be false. The author (G.E. Moore) makes it clear that the single
pro factor outweighs the cons in his judgment. (He does not tell
the audience why he thinks this.) My point here is not that
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Moore’s argument is a good one, or even that it is a clear one. The
point is that it is a philosophical argument that is conductive in
type.
I have noticed a tendency among beginning students in
practical logic to approach arguments in a way which is
inappropriate for standard deduction and induction. Students
often seem to believe that the more premises an argument has,
the better it is. They find it almost impossible to believe that
a perfectly cogent argument may have only one premise.
Furthermore, asked to assess the connection between premises
and conclusion, they will often begin by looking at the premises
one at a time, to try to determine, for each premise, whether it is
relevant to the conclusion and what support it might offer. Such
preconceptions are often incorrect, but they are appropriate for
conductive arguments. It is likely that their prevalence among
beginners is a kind of testimony to the presence, in ordinary
argumentation, of many conductive arguments in which various
reasons are offered to support a claim.
There is a tendency in some philosophical circles to want to
reduce conductive arguments to deductive ones. The standard
strategy is available here: we regard conductive arguments as
being enthymematic. Wellman spends some time rejecting this
approach and offers a splendid account. Briefly, the major
objection is that if we try to turn such an argument as ‘you
should return the book because you promised to do so’ into a
deductively valid argument, we will need an additional premise,
deemed, of course, to have been ‘missing’ in the original. But
candidate added premises will turn out to be either false,
unverifiable independently of a judgement about the case in
question, or impossible to formulate in advance. That you should
always keep promises is false; that you should always keep
promises other things being equal is unverifiable independently
of a judgement about the case at issue; that you should always
keep promises in circumstances of type (abc) is impossible to
formulate in advance. The enthymeme approach, here as so
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often, makes an inference watertight at the cost of introducing an
unknowable premise. Wellman denies
that such reformulated arguments can be used to justify ethical
conclusions in the way that their originals can. This is because one is
often not in a position to justify the premises that must be added to make
the arguments deductive in form. Since I believe that arguments really
do, at least in some cases, justify the conclusions drawn from them, I
conclude that it is a mistake to try to save deductivim by trying to find
additional premises.24
Proposed additions are likely to distort the original argument,
which is typically not put forward as being conclusive, and make
the merits of the argument impossible to determine. If one adds
a premise with an ‘other things being equal’ clause, then in order
to determine whether this premise applies to the case at issue,
one will have to make a prior determination of the case. (Thus
the deductive reasoning is not what is providing the answer.) In
a case where several premises appear, the problem is even worse,
because one argument is turned into several, each ‘conclusive’
from an inferential perspective and having an unknowable
premise.
Like Wisdom, Wellman insists that we can and do reason about
particulars without relying on linking generalizations. Such a
position, though a minority one within philosophy, has a
venerable history, and was clearly put by Descartes. When
Descartes introduced the Cogito, some critics argued that ‘I
think therefore I am’ was really a syllogism, with the missing
premise ‘Everything that thinks exists’. Descartes denied it. 25
He who says, I think, hence I am, or exist, does not deduce existence from
thought by a syllogism, but, by a simple act of mental vision, recognises
it as if it were a thing that is known per se. This is evident from the fact
that if it were syllogistically deduced, the major premise, that everything
that thinks is, or exists, would have to be known previously; but yet that
has rather been learned from the experience of the individual – that
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unless he exists, he cannot think. For our mind is so constituted by nature
that general propositions are formed out of the knowledge of particulars.
In a letter, Descartes anticipated some of Wisdom’s themes when
he said:26
... But the greater error here is our critic’s assumption that the knowledge
of particular truths is always deduced from the universal propositions in
consonance with the order of the sequence observed in the syllogisms of
the dialectic. This shows that he is but little acquainted with the method
by which truth should be investigated. For it is certain that in order
to discover the truth we should always start with particular notions, in
order to arrive at the general conceptions subsequently, though we may
also in the reverse way, after having discovered the universals, deduce
other particulars from them.
When Descartes said that ‘everything that thinks exists’ would
have to be ‘learned from the experience of the individual’, he did
not mean to say that the premise is empirical, but rather that we
are able to know it because we have had insight, in one or more
particular cases, into the logical connection between thinking
and existence. The idea that the universal may be known in and
through the particular is also prominent in Aristotle’s theory of
knowledge.
There is no good reason for the belief that all particular
inferences require supplementation with universal premises.
Such a view ‘clarifies’ arguments logically only by weakening
them epistemically. The logical structure in which a particular
case is resolved by being subsumed under a generalization is,
indeed, simple and lucid. But its logical elegance masks epistemic
weakness: all too often that generalization is one we do not
or cannot know. There is no sound basis for insisting that all
conductive arguments be recast as deductive ones in which cited
factors are linked to the conclusion by supplementary universal
premises.
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3. Cases, Relevance and Rules
Neither conductive reasoning nor case-by-case reasoning is
fully amenable to treatment by general rules. Perhaps it is for this
reason that these kinds of reasoning have been so widely ignored
by logical and philosophical theorists. There seems little scope
for theory construction and research projects. So far, theorists
have done little more than make some rather general comments
about their appraisal. How much systematization is possible
remains in doubt. Those who insist on general rules as a
presumption of correct argumentation will find this situation
disturbing. These arguments quite certainly exist although the
rules that are allegedly required do not seem to. It is often alleged
that any judgment of merit – whether in the domain of logic
or elsewhere – is based on a rule. With no rule, there can be
no sound or unsound, no valid or invalid, no better or worse. If
that claim were true, we might have to admit that there can be
no critical discrimination for a priori analogies and conductive
arguments. Their existence would make at best a negative
contribution to logic and epistemology.
There is a discussion of this view in Wellman’s book.27 He
counters it by citing an independent basis for judgment as what
is necessary for objective content and then remarking that there
is at least some sense (a weak one) in which this condition can
be met in the case of arguments for which there are no generally
application rules of validity. That is, ‘Argument A is sound’ will
admit of truth or falsity if there is something relevant to its truth
apart from our believing in it. This condition can be met to
some extent, even in the absence of a general rule. If we think
about A and find its premises relevant to its conclusion, and
sufficient for the truth of that conclusion, this does not itself
guarantee that they are so. We have a way of checking up on
whether we are right. This is, on Wellman’s account, to ‘think
it through again’. Judicious and careful reflection on the matter
can make us change our mind. We do this and find it pertinent.
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We do sometimes change our minds, and we are sometimes quite
certain that we were right to do so.
Is this all that can be said? Perhaps not. The issue will hinge on
two further ones: first of all, whether judgments of relevance can
be rationally adjudicated, and secondly whether the ‘weighing
up’ of factors is subject to any general principles of method. It
has been suggested that judgments of relevance can be tested by
bringing factors to bear on other cases. (For instance, if equality
of distribution counts for justice in consideration of property, it
ought similarly to do so in contexts of punishment or reward.)
Another possibility is that procedures might be sought for
assessing the significance of pros and cons. These possibilities
need exploration. Wellman may not have taken this matter as
far as it can be taken. However, even if he is right about the
limitations of rules in contexts of conductive argument, this
limitation would not show either that the arguments fail to be a
genuine type or that they are never logically cogent.
The same can be said for analogies. We may find an analogy
striking and convincing and then, on reflection, spot a key
difference between the cases that is relevant to the point and
decide that the analogy is faulty after all. Or a scrutiny of further
comparable cases may reveal the significance of other factors
we had not noticed at first. Such processes are not as elegant
and person-independent as the application of a formal or general
rule, but it exists and is more than nothing.
Theories of reflective equilibrium require that sometimes
judgments about particulars have to stand as a check on rules.
This requirement presupposes that there is such a thing as logical
adequacy in the absence of rules. To serve as a check on a rule, as
much current theory in linguistics, science, and ethics requires,
a judgment about a particular case must have its own logical
credibility which is not dependent on a rule.
For a number of reasons, Wellman rejects the view that validity
must be formal and must be demonstrable by appeal to formal
rules. Prominent among them is the ultimate dependence of
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formal rules on nonformal, extrasystematic judgments of
validity.28
(S)urely the existence of valid reasoning does not presuppose the existence
of any such calculus of derivation rules, for the inferences formalized by
Hilbert and Ackerman, say, were valid before they invented their logical
system, just as the syllogism was valid long before Aristotle. As a rule, the
logician tries to construct his calculus so that it will reflect some sort of
reasoning that is recognized to be valid independently of his system. To
be sure, the inventive logician can think up queer logics which suggest
new, and sometimes strange, ways of reasoning. But if these queer logics
become too queer, they are no longer considered logics, but only symbolic
games of some similar sort. This indicates that even here, our standards
of validity arc outside and independent of the derivation rules in any
uninterpreted calculus.
This kind of point has been strongly emphasized by such
theorists of formal logic as Arthur Pap and Susan Haack. Validity
is not by definition formal validity, and legitimate connections
between premises and conclusions need not be formally
appraisable in order to be real. The absence of formal, or even
general accounts does not rob critical judgments about such
arguments of all content.
Suppose we were to have a background theory pertinent to a
specific argument. The theory might, for instance, include laws,
principles, or rules explaining the relevance relations on which
both conductive and case-by-case reasoning ultimately depend.
Surely such a theory would be useful in evaluating the argument.
Ashley and Shaw pressed this point of view in their article on
analogy, and it might be extended to conductive arguments as
well. It is not comfortable to be left insisting that something
just is relevant and something else just is not relevant. To defend
our judgments, we have to try to explain connections: a well-
established theory would help to do that. Insofar as general
theories are obtainable, they can help to buttress these
arguments. Such background theories may be empirical,
normative, or conceptual; what matters is that they cover the
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phenomenon in question, and be widely accepted and well-
confirmed.
Granting this belief, one might be inclined to see analogies and
conductive arguments as temporary crutches needed only in a
time of incomplete knowledge. That seems to be the direction of
Ashley and Shaw’s account. Analogies would not be necessary if
we had general knowledge about all the things that interest us.
Since we don’t, they are, according to these authors.
I submit that such a view is not plausible. It ignores the
dependence of theoretical principles on particulars.
Furthermore, it neglects the key role of analogical reasoning in
language learning and use. No amount of theory could entirely
avoid the need for a priori analogical reasoning. To determine
whether a new case should be subsumed under a law or principle
of the theory we would have to compare and contrast that case
with others so subsumed. We would still create and learn
language by tacit assimilation of relevantly similar cases. We
would still seek consistency in logic, law, ethics, and
administration. Case-by-case reasoning is a key stage in
establishing theoretical principles and remains a key stage in
applying these once they are established. It is not doomed to
extinction by prospective all-encompassing theories.
A similar point can be made about conductive argumentation.
All current accounts of theory acceptance specify several distinct
conditions as relevant to the merits of theories. If empirical, they
must be well confirmed; they must have explanatory value; they
must be consistent with established theories; they must have
predictive power; they must be simple; they should have research
potential (be ‘fruitful’). Different philosophers of science vary
the list and have varying interpretations of what the items on it
mean. But all agree that there is more than one item on that list.
Competing theories will almost always measure up differently
on different criteria. Thus an argument for the acceptance of
a theory is bound to be a conductive argument. Comparable
comments can be made about normative theories: there is more
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than one desideratum and competing theories will satisfy these
differently. For moral theory we want sensitivity to considered
judgments; coherence; ready teachability; and ease of
application.
Meta-theoretical arguments about the various merits of
competing theories will be largely conductive. In addition, after
normative and empirical theories are accepted, novel cases not
handled by the theories are bound to arise. These will not be
fully covered by existing principles, and we will have to deal
with them as best we can: by specifying various relevant factors
and seeing how they add up, or by comparing and contrasting
new cases with standard ones. That means using conductive
reasoning and defending our conclusions with conductive
arguments. No amount of theory is going to eliminate the need
for these.
As nondeductive, a priori, and particularistic ways of arguing,
a priori analogy and conduction are real and important. They
are not about to disappear. I believe that much of what Wisdom
and Wellman had to say is true. Their work gives us significant
additions to epistemology and the theory of argument.
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CHAPTER 5.
THE PROBLEM OF MISSING PREMISES
Missing premises – or the allegation that they are needed – often play
a kind of deus ex machina role in deliberations about argument type
and structure. That is to say, premises said to be missing can too easily
be imported into an account to serve or save a favoured account. The
strategy enables ad hoc defenses of one or another interpretation, and
should be avoided.
With few exceptions (David Hitchcock is clearly one), scholars have
been hesitant to seriously address the rather messy set of issues that
constitute the problem of missing premises. Which arguments have
missing premises? How do we know, or how should we judge, what
those missing premises are? And how do our responses to these questions
depend on broader theories about argument typology? Argument
interpretation? Argument criticism? Not all assumptions amount to
missing premises, but how is the distinction between assumptions and
missing premises to be drawn? I think I can safely say that none of
these questions have been answered and few, if any, have been given
sustained consideration.
As mentioned in this essay, various terms are used as roughly
equivalent to “missing premises”. These include “implicit premises”,
“unstated premises”, “hidden premises”, and “assumptions.” I argue, and
would still maintain, that the term “assumptions” is too general and
hence unsuitable as a substitute. But what about the others? It has
been maintained (in a 1985 article by Jim Gough and Christopher
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Tindale) that the term “hidden premises” should be preferred, because
that term suggests that the material to be added is present in a discourse
in a slightly disguised form; it is there to be found; it is not simply
added. I agree that one should carefully consider what is there before
supplementing with something that is not there. But there are challenges
hidden in the notion of ‘hiding’. We can dispute as to whether the
associated conditional or a universalization of it is hidden in a
succession of two particular claims, just as we can dispute whether such
claims are missing.
More radical is a suggestion urged by Dan Levi in 1995: he argued
that the problem of missing premises emerges only because analysts
insist on setting out arguments in a premise-conclusion (PC) structure.
Then, looking to their structure and finding it to be less than complete
and clear, they sense that something is ‘missing’. If people following
this strategy – including of course myself – would employ a different
method, shifting away from PC models, the problem of missing premises
would disappear. Avoiding the strategy of standardization, one would
preserve relevant rhetorical aspects of context and voice, and these
aspects would assist in interpreting the argument. If one did not seek a
PC structure, one would not have to worry whether this or that version
of it was correct. This radical suggestion would challenge much work in
informal logic and does not seem to have been seriously pursued. It is
similar in some respects to suggestions made later by Harald Wohlrapp
in The Concept of Argument.
In this chapter I challenge deductivism both as a theory and as
providing a response to the problem of missing premises. I also consider
how the role of charity — the ways in which a commendable desire to
be polite and fair to an arguer — may lead us to rework that person’s
argument so as to make it fit with our own views. As I argue here,
charity can be taken too far. It needs to be qualified, and when it
is, its implications for missing premises are altered. Whether it is a
deductivist lens or the generosity of charity, we tend to reconstruct
arguments to be clear and cogent in the ways we would like. The risk
we face is that this tendency will produce distortions; the fact that a
reconstructed argument strikes us as clear and cogent does not show that
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the improvement constitutes an accurate version of the original. What I
call in this chapter ‘strong charity’ has been more recently discussed as
‘steelmanning.’ Steelmanning is the opposite of strawmanning: instead
of addressing a weak version of an opposed position as in the straw
man, one addresses what one takes to be a strong version of an opposed
position. Among those who discuss steelmanning, many seem to favour
it, but some object on the grounds that a person who purports to
strengthen a position may distort it and, in any event, displays
arrogance in presuming the ability to know best what the best opposed
argument is.
One thing which makes people differ as to theory of argument
and as to the analysis of particular arguments is different
approaches to the matter of missing premises. For instance, some
people insist that analogies all have a missing premise and that
when this is filled in, they can be seen to be deductive arguments.
Others find no need for such supplementation and would regard
analogies as a distinct type.
In fact, the ‘problem’ of missing premises is too complex to be
just one problem. There are a number of distinct problems. To
begin with, we must distinguish the question of which arguments
have missing premises from the question of how to decide just
which missing premises they have. In addition, there are several
different purposes for which people may examine arguments,
and for different purposes, quite different approaches to
reconstruction through the addition of premises are appropriate.
Of course, premises are not the only thing that can be missing
from arguments. Arguments may have unstated or missing
conclusions as well. This is less often discussed than the problem
of missing premises, for it makes less difference to the overall
structure of the argument. It does, however, make an immense
difference to the classification of discourse as being
argumentative or not. Often people write in an argumentative
tone, in a context of controversy, indicating they are ‘opposed’
to something, but do not state explicitly that the thing is wrong
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or incorrect. Rather, they strongly imply it. Here, it seems
interpretively appropriate to regard what is said as an argument,
though the conclusion is not stated explicitly.l Those who are
generous in adding premises and ungenerous in supplementing
conclusions will find few fallacies in natural argumentation.
Those who are ungenerous in adding premises and generous in
adding conclusions will find many. We can see, then, how the
matter of missing conclusions has a significant effect on one’s
overall view of argument.
There are a number of different terms used as virtual
synonyms of ‘missing premise’. These include ‘tacit premise’,
‘unstated premise’, ‘hidden premise’, ‘suppressed premise’,
‘implicit assumption’, ‘assumption’, ‘underlying assumption’,
‘suppressed assumption’, and others. It is a serious mistake, I
think, to identify unstated premises with unstated assumptions.
Many assumptions that are required for arguments to work are
not required to fill inference gaps-the standard role for missing
premises.2 For this reason it is better to speak of missing or
unstated premises rather than missing or unstated assumptions.
As to other variations in terminology, these do, to be sure, have
nuances that could be exploited to good purpose and would
become significant. For instance, to speak of premises as ‘hidden’
suggests that the stated material contains good cues that these
premises are endorsed by the arguer and contained in the text,
though not in the form of explicit statements.3 To say that they
are ‘missing’ does not suggest those cues in the text, but does
suggest a strongly realist notion of interpretation. Here, these
nuances are not exploited: the standard philosophical usage,
according to which ‘unstated premise’, ‘missing premise’,
‘implicit premise’, ‘tacit premise’, and ‘hidden premise’ are used as
virtual synonyms, is followed.
1. Deductivism and Missing Premises
Deductivism is the view that all good arguments are
deductively valid. Applied to the problem of missing premises,
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deductivism yields the suggestion that an argument should be
supplemented with additional premises to the point where (as
reconstructed) it becomes deductively valid. When thus
reconstructed, it is a fully ‘filled out’ argument that can then
be subjected to critical scrutiny. Sometimes the added premises
make the argument a sound one, for they are true, and thus
the reconstructed argument is valid and has true premises.
Sometimes they show the argument to depend on unverifiable
premises. And sometimes these added premises are false, or
implausible, and show the argument to be a poor one. On a
strong deductivist view, all arguments have, implicitly, all the
premises needed to make the stated premises and the added ones
entail the conclusion. Criticism of an argument is not
appropriate until these unstated premises have been filled in.
This is often an extensive task, to say the least.
Understood in this way, deductivism has the curious
consequence that logic is relevant solely to the reconstruction of
arguments and not to their appraisal, once reconstructed. When
appropriately reconstructed, all arguments are logically equal
inferentially, and all are logically good. The difference between
cogent arguments and poor ones can only be found in the truth
or plausibility of their premises.
The deductivist account will be natural and familiar to many
readers, and is often appealed to by philosophers — in both
theoretical and practical contexts. It is at work in many texts
on natural reasoning. Here we will look briefly at one such text,
that of Stephen Thomas. Thomas is interesting in this regard
because his deductivist policy on missing premises is, in fact,
incompatible with his broader theory of argument. That is a
Spectrum Theory. The fact that Thomas lapses into this policy
when trying to handle the problem is evidence of the naturalness
and very great intuitive appeal of the deductivist approach.
In Practical Reasoning in Natural Language, Thomas goes into
considerable detail telling students how to add premises to
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arguments in order to render them deductively valid. He says
that when all these premises have been added, then:
Any uncertainties about the truth of the final conclusion which were
due to inconclusive inferences in the original argument have now been
driven back onto the total set of basic reasons in the new constructed
revision. That is, all uncertainty about the inferences has been
eliminated (since all are now ironclad) and it remains only to determine
whether every member of the new set of basic reasons is true.4
(The ‘basic reasons’ are the premises.) Once the missing
premises, or premises deemed to have been missing, have been
added, the argument is valid. It is valid because it has been made
valid. We should note, as Thomas does, that it is always possible
to make an argument deductively valid. One can sometimes do
this with significant and genuinely illuminating additions, as
Thomas points out. Failing this, we can do it with trivial and
unilluminating additions, as he and a number of other analysts
have pointed out.
The simplest method for achieving deductive validity is to
link up all the stated premises to form a conjunction. Call this
conjunction CON. Then, calling the conclusion C,
supplementing the original with the claim ‘If CON, then C’ will
render the argument deductively valid. The statement ‘If CON
then C’ may be called the associated conditional.5 Of course,
the associated conditional is not the only possibility here. Any
statement that entails the associated conditional will do equally
well. Another vacuous, but always available possibility is to the
add conclusion, or a generalization of it, as a missing premise.
This strategy will also make the argument deductively valid —
though question-begging. Again, there are an indefinite number
of possible variations on this move, for we could add any
statement which entailed the conclusion, in order to make the
argument deductively valid.
Naturally enough, Thomas now recommends premise
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assessment as the next (and only possible) stage of argument
criticism.
Only if one or more of them is false can the argument’s final conclusion
be false. If all the basic reasons in the revised argument (i.e., original
plus new reasons) are true, then so too is the argument’s final conclusion.
So if you know that all the basic reasons are true, then you know that
the conclusion is also true. But if a falsehood arises in every possible
set of suppressed assumptions whose addition would create a deductively
valid expansion of the original argument, then the original argument is
unsound.6
The emphasis is added here to indicate the link, in Thomas’
analysis, between deductivism as a solution to the problem of
missing premises and deductivism as a theory of argument. This
is an unqualified deductivist view.
Thomas supposes that the premises needed to make the
original argument deductively valid are somehow part of the
original argument and that their evaluation is pertinent to the
evaluation of the original argument.7 Nondeductivists would
deny this. Consider, for instance, the case of analogy. If we add
to an argument by analogy sufficient premises to make that
argument deductively valid, those added premises may very well
be seen by a critic going beyond the original premises. If the
added premises turn out to be false or unacceptable, that will not
(at least, not in the eyes of the non-deductivist critic) indicate
that the original argument was at fault. On the critic’s view, the
original argument was not deductive. The fact that a premise
needed to make it deductively valid turns out to be a false
premise shows nothing about the merits of the original
argument.
Thomas is committed to disagreeing with such a position: he
insists that when the added premises are false, the original
argument is shown to be unsound. This indicates that he thinks
of the original argument as having really depended on these
claims; although they were not stated, they are necessary to make
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the argument work. But making it work means making it work
as a deductively valid argument. Since the account is applied to
all arguments, without qualification, we can only suppose that
Thomas holds that for an argument to work, the premises have
got to entail the conclusion. This stance is, of course, that of
deductivism. The relevance of the supplemented premises to the
critique of the original, unreconstructed argument presupposes
that whatever sort of argument the original seemed to be, it was
actually an aspiring deduction which, as stated, didn’t pass the
(deductive) test. If this theoretical presumption were false, the
falsity (or unverifiability, or implausibility) of the added premises
would show nothing about the original argument.
Another significant feature of this account is Thomas’ claim
that only if one or more premises in the argument is false can we
regard the original argument as unsound. The original argument
will be unsound only if ‘a falsehood arises in every possible set
of suppressed assumptions whose addition would create a
deductively valid expansion of the original argument’. The
problem is that there is an indefinitely large number of ways
of expanding a stated argument so as to produce a deductively
valid argument. (This result is obvious even from the possibilities
generated by the trivial associated conditional and ‘add the
conclusion’ strategies described earlier. Of course there are many
other devices which can be employed.) Given this fact, it is hard
to see how we could ever be in a position to assert with
confidence that a falsehood will arise in every possible set of
supplementary premises. Thomas seems to be aware of the
difficulty, because he says:
For practical purposes, you can take this to mean that if every reasonable
attempt to supply the argument’s suppressed assumptions requires the
addition of some falsehood, then for all intents and purposes, you may
regard the original argument as unsound.8
This position is neither practically satisfactory nor theoretically
adequate.
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An unqualified deductivist policy on missing premises licenses
overabundant expansion of arguments. One way in which it is
overabundant is that it raises the prospect of all arguments which
are not, as stated, deductively valid, being enthymemes — a
counterintuitive prospect, to put it mildly. On this view, there
are no fallacies (formal or informal), no enumerative inductions
(hasty or otherwise), no analogies, no inferences to the best
explanation, and so on. This is a counterintuitive result which
runs contrary to established traditions in logic and to recent
work in the philosophy of science. 9 Another way in which
unqualified deductivism is overabundant is that it licenses an
indefinitely large number of expansions for each argument.
Finding a flaw in any one of these will not constitute a definitive
criticism of the original argument, for there are always many
alternative reconstructions remaining to be considered; on
purely deductivist grounds, these reconstructions are all of equal
merit. Thus deductivism by itself cannot provide a complete and
adequate policy on missing premises. It must be qualified so as to
apply only to some arguments and supplemented so that not all
deductivist reconstructions are of equal critical relevance. Later
we will consider what some of the appropriate qualifications
might be.
The problems with a deductivist approach to missing premises
appear in a more concrete guise when we consider specific
examples. First, let us look at an example of a poor argument,
and see how a deductivist policy on missing premises will advise
us to reconstruct it. As an example, here is a short argument of
Garret Hardin’s on sterilization.10
It should be easy to limit a woman’s reproduction by sterilizing her at
the birth of her nth child. Is this a shocking idea? If so, try this ‘thought
experiment’: let n equal 20. Since this is not shocking, let n diminish
until population control is achievable.
Here Hardin argues from the premise that it would be tolerable
to sterilize a woman after her twentieth child to the conclusion
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that it would be tolerable to sterilize a woman at whatever point
was necessary in order to achieve population control. The
argument appears to be an outright fallacy of a rather original
kind.11 (Is it some kind of reverse slippery slope?) And yet the
inference from permissibility in the one context to permissibility
in the other seems simply mistaken: there is an enormous, and
morally significant, difference between them. We can add
premises which will fill the gap in various ways. Three
possibilities are:
3. If it is permissible to sterilize a woman after her twentieth
child, then it is permissible to sterilize her at whatever point
is necessary in order to achieve population control.
or
4. If it is permissible to perform an operation on a woman
in an extreme case, then it is permissible to perform that
operation on a woman in a less extreme, but socially
significant, case.
or
5. Whenever it is permissible to do anything in an extreme
case, then it is permissible to do that same thing in a less
extreme, but socially significant, case.
(3) will suffice to make the argument deductively valid. However,
this is a redundant and useless addition, because (3) is the
associated conditional, which simply reiterates the original
argument. If we can assess (3), we can assess the original
argument directly and have no need of (3).
The other additions are not purely reiterative. However, unlike
(3) they may not by themselves suffice to make the argument
deductively valid. They are generalizations on the associated
conditional, and we have to grant that the generalization is done
appropriately. This, for (4), means granting that sterilization is an
operation; that sterilizing a woman after she has had 20 children
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is sterilizing her in an extreme case; and that sterilizing a woman
at whatever point is necessary to achieve population control is
sterilizing her at a socially significant, but non-extreme, point.
Similar points arise for (5). More importantly, (4) and (5) go
considerably beyond the original argument in scope. It is perhaps
not fair to commit the unhappy author to these sweeping
premises, which are so much more easily attacked even than
his original inference. The generalizations on the associated
conditional have the critical virtue of non-redundancy. But they
can be critically useful only insofar as they open the door to
considerations which are not exactly what would be called for
by the original inference. There is, then, some critical benefit
from adding these more general premises. But exactly the feature
which makes them appear critically useful makes them
interpretively questionable.12
Another example reveals further peculiar problems. Consider
the following brief passage from Stephen Toulmin and June
Goodfield’s The Architecture of Matter. Toulmin and Goodfield
report describing to a colleague who commented on Voltaire’s
efforts to weigh fire. They asked their colleague how he would
have persuaded Voltaire that experiments directed toward the
weighing of fire were useless. The man replied lightly that he
should have told Voltaire to use his common sense. Of this
response, Toulmin and Goodfield comment:
The common sense of Voltaire’s time was not, and could not have been,
identical with the common sense of our own period. For Lavoisier helped
to create our contemporary common-sense ideas about matter, just as
Newton, earlier, had helped to establish our common-sense picture of the
planetary system. If, in retrospect, it seems too obvious that fire is not a
substance, we should regard this ‘obviousness’ with grave suspicion.13
Here, we have a subargument and then an argument, both with a
single stated premise and conclusion:
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1. Lavoisier helped to create our contemporary common-sense
ideas about matter.
2. The common-sense of Voltaire’s time was not identical with
the common-sense of our own time.
3. The ‘obviousness’ of the idea that fire is not a substance
should be regarded with suspicion.
Neither the subargument from (1) to (2), nor the main argument
from (2) to (3) is deductively valid as it stands. We have seen,
above, that there are certain problems which arise when the
associated conditional or generalizations of it are used as
supplementary premises. We shall approach the Toulmin and
Goodfield example in another way, then, by trying to add
premises which will make the argument deductively valid and
which are neither the associated conditional nor generalizations
of it. Some natural and plausible additions, which would appear
necessary whether one was a deductivist or not, are:
4. Lavoisier had not yet created our contemporary common-sense in
Voltaire’s time.
5. What seems obvious depends upon our common-sense.
6. Common-sense that can fluctuate from one time to another
should be regarded with suspicion.
But still, (1) and (4) do not entail (2); (2) and (5) and (6)
do not entail (3). We need more additions yet. For the
subargument, for instance, we need:
7. No two sets of common-sense beliefs are identical unless
they are created at the same time.
8. The common-sense of Voltaire’s time had been created at his
time.
Even this may not be sufficient.
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When we do not revert to the associated conditional or a
generalization of it, the necessary additions start to seem
indefinitely many and excruciatingly pedantic. A
‘reconstruction’ of two very simple arguments which has seven
or more supplementary premises is a critical and pedagogic
monster. Are these premises really ‘there’, unstated, because they
are ‘needed’ in order to make the original inferences work in a
deductive sense of ‘work’?
These examples indicate that deductivism does not always
make for easy and elegant criticism. It is not always
interpretively plausible, and it can be cumbersome in practice.
Reiterative addition of the associated conditional is simple and
always applicable; however it is a critically redundant
manoeuvre. Generalizations of the associated conditional are
not by themselves sufficient without further premises spelling
out the ‘assumption’ that the generalization is an appropriate
one. It may be interpretively incorrect to attribute the
generalization to the arguer. If the arguer is not committed by
the original argument to that generalization, then any analysis
of that argument via a reconstruction with the generalization
as a missing premise will be misdirected. In addition, attempts
to make some arguments deductively valid will be cumbersome
when they avoid the associated generalization and its
conditional – as some deductivists have, themselves, admitted.
But in so many contexts, and to so many people, deductivist
instincts on missing premises seem correct. The above account
will doubtless not dissuade convinced deductivists. Why is this
approach to missing premises so appealing to so many people,
despite its running counter to strong theoretical traditions in
logic and to economy in criticism and analysis? There seem to be
at least two plausible explanations.
First of all, the deductivist reconstruction of an argument will
often be straightforward and elegant. It will make sense. It will
provide a model in which the stated premises, together with
other claims, lead in a direct logical way to the stated conclusion.
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The model will be a logically clear and coherent argument, even
though some of the premises of that argument may be
disputable. Such an argument has definite logical appeal; its
appealing character may make it seem an excellent substitute
for the original argument, which lacked such logical coherence
and structure. Given all this, it is easy to confuse two issues:
the real issue of whether the model is an accurate rendition of
the original argument and the quite distinct issue of whether
the reconstructed model is a logically ‘virtuous’ argument. The
second matter is guaranteed in the nature of the case. The first
is something else entirely. It is one thing for a reconstructed
argument to be clear and another for it to be the correct (or even
a correct) model of a stated argument.
We should not let the logical appeal of a reconstruction lead us,
by itself, to the belief that the reconstruction accurately reflects
an original. The beauty of a portrait does not show that it
accurately represents its subject. There is perhaps a tendency to
confuse the clarity of the reconstruction considered on its own
terms with its interpretive accuracy as a plausible version of the
original argument.
Secondly, the following line of reasoning is tempting: If a
person argues for a conclusion, C, then provided that he or she is
arguing sincerely, he or she believes C to be true. If that person believes
C to be true, then he or she must believe a set of claims which entails C.
Thus, if the arguer’s stated premises do not entail C, it is appropriate to
supplement them to the point where they do entail C.
The problem with this account comes in the second statement.
First of all, the ‘must’ is ambiguous as between a psychological
and a logical must. Interpreting ‘must’ as psychological, the
statement is false, because people often believe claims with no
support or with some partial support, or on fallacious grounds,
as a matter of psychological fact. Also, psychologically
interpreted the claim could require a vicious infinite regress
of beliefs. The logical interpretation of the ‘must’ makes the
statement somewhat more plausible. The claim would then
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amount to the insistence that anyone who believes a conclusion
C is logically committed to some set or other of claims which
entails C. On this view, if we take an argument which that person
puts forward for C and we read into it enough premises to make
the stated premises, together with the new ones, entail C, we
will not go beyond anything to which that arguer is not already
committed.
On this interpretation, the claim amounts to an especially
strong version of foundationalism. It is open to all the criticisms
which can be made of traditional foundationalism, and more
besides.14 Furthermore, even if it were true that anyone who
believes C is committed to some set of claims that entails C,
given that the number of such sets is indefinitely large, the
connection between this set and the one generated by a logician
reconstructing the original argument is likely to be remote.
Thus, deductivism cannot offer a complete and satisfactory
policy on missing premises. The intuitive appeal of the policy
disappears when we look more closely at theory and practice
and when we examine some of the accounts which may underlie
those intuitions. To add to arguments all premises necessary
to make those arguments deductively valid and regard these
additions as premises which were missing in the
unreconstructed version of the argument is not, in general, a
reasonable thing to do.
It may be suggested that a deductivist approach to missing
premises can be endorsed, in the interests of clarity and elegance,
without any commitment to a deductivist theory of argument.
David Hitchcock has taken this approach, which he regards as a
kind of heuristic deductivism. But there are two problems with
this approach. First of all, it is hard to give a good reason for
seeking to reconstruct an argument so as to render it deductively
valid, if one does not endorse a deductivist theory of argument.
We can find a missing premise, or gap-filler, such that, if it is
added, the resulting argument becomes deductively valid. But
if someone asks, why should we want to render this argument
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deductively valid, no answer will be forthcoming. Secondly, as
indicated here, deductivism does not in fact generate an elegant
solution to the problem of missing premises.15
The story is different so far as missing conclusions are
concerned. If an arguer has stated several claims and there is
good reason to interpret these claims as premises in an
argument, then there is never any problem about ‘reading in’
a statement which is, in fact, entailed by those claims. Anyone
who does so will attribute to an arguer no more than he or she
is already logically committed to. We are not committed to all
claims which entail beliefs we hold, but we are committed to all
claims which are entailed by beliefs we hold.
Suppose that an advertisement reads as follows:
The bigger the burger, the better the burger. The burgers are bigger at
Burger King
We can justify adding the unstated conclusion that the burgers
are better at Burger King. The entailed claim can appropriately
be regarded as a conclusion that is supported by the stated
material. There is good reason for taking advertisements of this
type as arguments. Sometimes there are problems about
interpreting passages as arguments, and the issue of whether to
add a conclusion which is not stated but is entailed or suggested
is linked to this interpretive issue. Whether a person is trying
to prove a point or is rather merely giving a description,
explanation, illustration, or comment is often a moot point. This
interpretive problem can make the addition of conclusions
questionable in some contexts. But in general, it seems a more
manageable problem than the problem of missing premises, and
a deductivist approach to it will always give results within
reasonable interpretive bounds.16
2. Missing Premises and Assumptions
Often the problem of missing premises is thought to be a
problem about assumptions. The idea is something like this:
138 TRUDY GOVIER
when people present arguments, they do not always mention
all of the beliefs which they hold which are pertinent unstated
claims, the truth of which is a necessary condition of the
argument’s working the way it should. People could not state
everything pertinent to the argument in this way. They
necessarily leave much unstated. Often unstated assumptions
would be accepted by virtually everyone, and it would be a great
bore for the arguer and the audience to spell them out.
Sometimes arguers are not aware of their unstated assumptions;
sometimes these assumptions are highly questionable, and
neglecting to spell them out lulls the unwary audience into
accepting things it would not have granted on critical scrutiny.17
It is often said that such unstated assumptions are the missing
premises of the stated argument.
A statement of this view appears in Irving Copi’s Symbolic
Logic, in a discussion of the logic of relations:
Relational arguments are often used, and many of them depend
essentially on the transitivity, or symmetry, or one of the other properties
of the relations involved. But that the relation in question has the
relevant property is seldom – if ever – stated explicitly as a premise. The
reason is easy to see. In most discussions a large body of propositions
can be presumed to be common knowledge. The majority of speakers
and writers save themselves trouble by not repeating well-known and
perhaps trivially true propositions that their hearers or readers can
perfectly well be expected to supply for themselves. An argument which is
incompletely expressed, part of it being ‘understood’, is an enthymeme.18
It is clearly true, as Copi says, that in most discussions many
propositions are presumed true, as common knowledge.
Discussion would be completely impossible without such
presumptions. But whether all such presumptions should be
counted as assumptions that amount to missing premises and
all arguments depending on them should be regarded as
enthymemes, are further questions.
In On Certainty, Wittgenstein argued that in order for some
problems to be discussed and considered, many other aspects
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of life and language must be accepted as givens. In a specific
context, someone might wonder whether his hand is made of
real human flesh. (Perhaps someone had a hand transplant and
cannot remember whether it was the left or the right — my
example.) But to contemplate even such a radical question, a
person must nevertheless take for granted other aspects of
mundane life-such as knowing what ‘hand’, ‘flesh’, and ‘human’
mean. On Certainty gives us a sustained elaboration of the fact
that we cannot question everything at once. Questions and
problems require a background.
That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the
fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are, as it were, like
hinges on which those turn
. . it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things
are indeed not doubted.
But it isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t investigate
everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with
assumptions. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.19
This view of the background of questions can be applied
directly to the case of arguments. A person who presents an
argument puts forward reasons to support his conclusion, trying
to raise the credibility of that conclusion to an audience he is
addressing. The argument can be seen as aimed towards its
conclusion, and as attempting to resolve a particular question-
whether that conclusion is true. In the context, the question is
open.20 This question, like others, will make sense only against
an assumed background of beliefs and practices.
What is wrong with Copi’s account is not his claim that
discussion requires assumptions, but the conflation of such
assumptions with missing premises. Copi is following logical
tradition when he says that if part of an argument is missing,
that argument is an enthymeme. But the parts of an argument,
according to logical tradition, are its premises and conclusion.
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Thus an enthymematic argument is one in which one or more
premises, or the conclusion, is not stated. So far, so good. But
logical tradition also has it that there exist non-enthymematic
arguments. This is an element of the tradition worth preserving,
if ‘enthymeme’ is to play a useful role in the classification,
understanding, and criticism of arguments. If unstated
assumptions and missing premises are identified, then every
argument will be an enthymeme, because it is clearly true, as
Copi says, that in every argumentative discussion there are
unmentioned presumptions on which the arguer and his or her
audience agree.
Missing premises constitute a subset of these unstated
assumptions, not the whole set. One important first step in
resolving the problem of missing premises is to distinguish
between those assumptions that are required by the argument
but are not missing premises, and those assumptions that do
amount to missing premises. There are many ways in which an
argument may be based on an assumption, A. These include at
least the following:
1. The truth of A may be a necessary condition for the terms
used in the argument to have a referent.
2. The truth of A may be a necessary condition for the subject
of the argument to be of interest to anyone.
3. The truth of A may be a necessary condition for the
meaningfulness of any language.
4. The truth of A may be a necessary condition for properly
inferring the conclusion from the stated premises.
5. The truth of A may be a necessary condition for the
appropriacy of the methodology used by the arguer when he
or she cites the premises as support for the conclusion.
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6. The truth of A may be a necessary condition for the truth of
one of the stated premises.
7. The truth of A may be a necessary condition for words used
in stating the premises and conclusion to have the meaning
which they do have, and on which proper understanding of
the argument depends.
To make matters worse, these do not exhaust the possibilities. If
we think of missing premises as premises that should be added in
order to make the inferences of the stated argument work, then
at most assumptions of the type in (4) and (5) would qualify as
missing premises. (As we shall see later when discussing Lewis
Carroll’s argument, level (5) assumptions should not be regarded
as premises.) Copi’s account seems to require that all
assumptions pertinent to the workings of an argument be
incorporated within that argument as premises. This would
make even short arguments indefinitely long when they were
completely ‘filled out’.
That this is really what Copi means is confirmed by his
discussion of an example from the logic of relations. After the
passage quoted earlier, he goes on to say:
In most cases there is no difficulty in supplying the tacit premises that the
speaker intended but did not express. Thus, the first specimen argument
stated at the beginning of this chapter:
Al is older than Bill.
Bill is older than Charlie.
Therefore, Al is older than Charlie.
ought to be counted as valid, since it becomes so when the trivially true
proposition that ‘being older than’ is a transitive relation is added as
an auxiliary premise. When the indicated missing premise is supplied, a
formal proof of the argument’s validity is very easily set down.21
But this must be wrong. The argument which, according to
Copi, has the missing premise ‘Being older than’ is a transitive
relation’ is in fact, deductively valid as stated. Copi’s account goes
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beyond deductivism in that he seeks to make the argument not
just deductively valid, but deductively valid in virtue of its form as
identified within a specific system of logic. The stated premises
do entail the stated conclusion. It is just not formally provable
that this is the case. One can formally derive the conclusion
from the premises, given the apparatus developed to that point in
Copi’s book, if one adds the auxiliary premise.
The proposed auxiliary premise is meta-linguistic. But other
metalinguistic premises are also ‘assumed’ in the argument Copi
discusses. For instance, the argument ‘assumes’ that ‘Al’ can be
used to name something that has an age, and that ‘Al’ names
the same entity in the conclusion as in the first premise. These
meta-linguistic assumptions are essential to the workings of the
argument. If the first did not hold, the first premise and the
conclusion would be meaningless. If the second did not hold, the
premises would not be relevant to the conclusion. If we follow
Copi in adding one meta-linguistic premise and insisting it was
‘missing’ from the original argument, why should we stop at one?
That language and concepts work is ‘assumed’ by every
argument. If all the pertinent workings need to be spelled out in
auxiliary premises, even the smallest, clearest arguments will be
enthymemes that have to be filled out in an highly cumbersome
way. Following through on the demand that meta-linguistic
assumptions be incorporated as premises will lead us to a vicious
infinite regress. The supplemented arguments will use new terms
and premises spelling out assumptions requisite to these will also
need to be added, and so on.
Copi is quite entitled to add a premise for some specific
purpose, but he is not entitled to regard the original argument
as an enthymeme solely because this can be done. The policy
of adding meta-linguistic premises because what they say is
‘assumed’ is not a constructive one. Missing premises are a
subset of the unstated assumptions behind an argument. The
problem is to specify what that subset is.
There is an unfortunate tendency to use ‘missing premise’ and
PROBLEMS IN ARGUMENT ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 143
‘missing assumption’ virtually as synonyms. This can be seen in
Michael Scriven’s early work at one point. Scriven advises that
‘in assumption hunting you’re trying to reconstruct the premises
that someone would have put forward if stating the argument in
full. He continues as follows:
The requirement that the extra or ‘missing’ premise (which is what
an assumption is) be new immediately precludes a mere repetition of
the supposed connection between the given premises and the required
conclusion. There’s nothing new about the statement that what is
already being provided is supposed to give support to what is alleged to
be the conclusion of the argument. So, typically, an assumption should
be referring to something else that hasn’t been mentioned in the given
premises.22
The same sort of thing occurs in the first edition of Johnson
and Blair’s Logical Self-Defense. The authors begin their
discussion of missing premises by saying that a missing premise
is a proposition which, though unstated in an argument, is
needed in order to link the stated premises with the stated
conclusion. Later they say that a missing premise is necessary
for the intelligibility of the argument, and may be called an
assumption.23 They seem to have decided that this equivalence
was a mistake, because the second edition of the work says
instead that missing premises are one type of assumption.24
Not all assumptions underlying an argument are its missing
premises. There are assumptions that must hold if one argues
about anything (general pragmatic assumptions), assumptions
that must hold if anyone is to argue about this particular thing
(specific pragmatic assumptions), meta-linguistic propositions
about the meaning and appropriate use of words used to state
the argument, evidence which would support stated premises,
and much else. None of these assumptions are properly regarded
as missing premises.
Missing premises are to fill a quite specific role, one not filled
by these kinds of assumptions. As Robert Ennis argued in an
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important paper, they are to fill a ‘gap’ identified in the stated
argument.25 The gap is an inference gap, and is deemed by the
critic to arise because the stated premises do not, by themselves,
lead to the stated conclusion in the appropriate way. If we have
interpreted a passage as containing an argument, and we are
sure that that argument is supposed to work as a syllogism, we
will easily be able to supply the appropriate missing premise.26
If we have interpreted it as a passage containing an argument
and we are sure that the argument is supposed to work as a
formally valid propositional argument, again we can supply the
appropriate missing premise.27 In both cases, inserting the
missing premise presupposes the interpretive judgments, and
once these are made, we apply a familiar model to generate a
missing premise. We have a theory of argument that tells us that
the model is of a type of argument which exists and is legitimate,
and we have interpreted the passage in question as containing an
argument of this sort. The theory of argument, and considerable
interpretation are presupposed to give a solution to the problem
of missing premises.
One difficulty with deductivism is that the theory of argument
and the policy on missing premises are too intimately related. In
order to maintain deductivism, we need to apply a deductivist
policy on missing premises practically everywhere. Yet there
seems no rationale for such a policy save in deductivism itself.
The deductivist approach to interpretation thus seems question-
begging and self-serving or, to put it another way, too ad hoc.
I would say, with Ennis, that arguments have missing premises
when they have inference ‘gaps’. These gaps are identified when
we apply our theory of argument and canons of interpretation
to the discourse in which the argument appears. If we see the
argument as an inference to the best explanation, and we
understand that kind of argument as one in which the inferential
pattern must go in such-and-such way, then when the argument
fails to exemplify the appropriate pattern, it will have a ‘gap’.
Something will be missing, and we can make this something
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appear by adding a premise. Clearly, perceiving these gaps is
tantamount to perceiving some inferences as inadequate.28 This
perception depends on our perception of how the inference is
working in the stated argument, which is a matter of
interpretation. It also depends on our view of how it should
work, to yield an argument without ‘gaps’. This is a matter of
logic. This issue explicitly reveals the need for a theory of
argument, for our view will depend on our view as to how many
types of good inference there are.
That missing premises fill gaps in arguments does not yet tell
us which of several possible gap-fillers should be selected as
‘best’. One problem about missing premises is to apply a theory
of argument and to interpret a discourse and generate the
judgment that there is an argument there with a missing
premise. Another is, given different candidate statements which
would all fill the identified gap, to select one of them as the most
appropriate gap filler. Even when we limit the role of missing
premises to that of filling inference gaps, there is considerable
room for disagreement about them. Some people see gaps where
others don’t, due to disagreements about the theory of argument.
And some people see gaps where others do not because of
disagreements about the explicitness or implicitness of inference
rules. All this has only to do with the first question of whether
a gap exists. Needless to say, there is also disagreement about
the second problem, that of selection of candidate fillers from an
array of possible ones once we have granted that there is a gap to
be filled at all.
On the matter of premises and inference rules the locus
classicus is, of course, Lewis Carroll’s famous dialogue about
Achilles and the Tortoise. The stubborn Tortoise shows us the
possibility of finding inference gaps in even the most
straightforward modus ponens reasoning.29 This meticulous
character insists that in reasoning ‘A and B; If A and B, then Z;
Therefore, Z.’, we ‘assume’ that if A and B, and if A and B, then
Z, then Z. He insists that the ‘assumption’ be written into the
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argument, since the shorter version required the ‘assumption’.
But then his lengthened argument requires a comparable, but
longer assumption, in the form of a new associated conditional.
The same problem arises at every stage; it repeats. The dialogue
shows that inference is impossible unless the mind is willing
to move from some claims to others according to a rule which
is not ‘written in’. That is, principles of inference according to
which inferences are made cannot, on pain of a vicious infinite
regress, be written into the argument as unstated premises. They
must be used and not said, at some point, or no inference is
possible.
Every argument ‘assumes’ the associated conditional, ‘if CON
then C’. There is no point in adding this conditional as an explicit
premise in the interests of completeness, for the amended
argument will again depend on just such a principle — namely
its own associated conditional. There is no point in adding it for
critical understanding, for it is no easier and no harder to assess
than the original unreconstructed argument. Whatever else we
say about the determination of which statements are the missing
premises, we can agree to ban the associated conditional as one
of them.
Carroll’s Tortoise seems especially meticulous and demanding
because he will not reason according to modus ponens without
having that rule stated as a premise in the argument. Logicians
feel outraged because modus ponens is, paradigmatically, a
logically sound principle, and because the unamended argument
exemplifying the modus ponens pattern is paradigmatically not
enthymematic. However, comparable moves seem more
plausible when we move from deductive to nondeductive
inference or from formal deductive inference to substantive
deductive inference. (Substantive deductive inference depends
on meaning rather than on form.)
A hot topic for discussion among philosophers of logic used
to be whether the inference from ‘this is red’ to ‘this is colored’
required another premise, ‘whatever is red is colored’. Many
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people believed that it did, for the inference was ‘material’ and
not ‘formal’. The example is like the relational argument Copi
discussed, in that it is deductively valid in its original unamended
form, in the perfectly straightforward sense that a state of affairs
in which the premise is true and the conclusion false is an
impossible one. It seemed to some logicians to be incomplete,
because it did not exemplify a formal pattern of valid inference.
Gaps will appear when one’s theoretical expectations are not
satisfied. For a non-formalist deductivist, this argument is
complete as it stands; for a formalist, it needs amendment.
Judith Jarvis Thomson discussed the problem, and took the
following stand:
there is no such possibility as the possibility ‘if this is red, it is colored’
were not true, for ‘if this is red, it is colored’ is not merely true, but
necessarily true. And therefore, ‘this is red’ does by itself imply ‘this
is colored’. And therefore there is in this no reason for saying that a
man who so argues suppresses a further premise. Even if we grant that
such a man is not reasoning unless he believes that if the thing is red,
it is colored, there is in this no reason for saying that what he must
believe if he is to be reasoning must be called a suppressed premise of his
reasoning.30
The point emphasized here is a generalization of the point
Carroll made with reference to the associated conditional.
Anyone arguing from some premises (CON) to a conclusion (C),
must is committed to the claim that if CON then C. This
commitment is indicated by his reasoning in the way he does
reason, and it is ‘assumed’ by his argument. However, to say this
is not to say that it is a missing premise in the argument.
Thomson reiterates the point in general terms, saying:
to show that you must believe that p is a reason for q if you are to be
reasoning in saying ‘p, so q‘ is not yet to show that ‘p is a reason for q‘
must be construed as a suppressed premise of the argument.31
It is important, then, to distinguish within those assumptions that
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are necessary in order for the inferences of an argument to work.
Only some, bearing particularly and usefully on the argument at
hand, are properly regarded as missing premises. The associated
conditional should not be regarded as a missing premise. Nor
should the conclusion. Nor should a necessary truth which
relates the meanings of terms used in an argument already
deductively valid without the addition of such a truth. Nor
should methodological principles. In reasoning and arguing, we
work according to some explicit or implicit rules, and these work
as rules, not as premises of our arguments. The mind needs some
such rules in order to reason and argue at all. Writing them in
as missing premises will not avoid this need. It is a primary task
of logic and the theory of argument to articulate and rationalize
these principles of inference. However, that is not to say that they
are to appear as premises in every argument in which we reason
according to them. Carroll showed why this is so for simple
deductive logic. The point can be extended.
It is easy to ignore this point, as we can see in a recent paper
discussing hidden premises. In ”Hidden’ or ‘Missing’ Premises’,
James Gough and Christopher Tindale incorporate a
methodological principle as a missing premise in their analysis
of an analogy. They discuss the following argument:
A man who drives his car into the rear of another car is not guilty of
careless driving if his brakes failed. Similarly, if a man kills another
man he is not found guilty of murder if his mind failed to perceive reality
due to mental illness. Mental instability is not sufficient to establish
insanity, as Mr. C. contends. Our judicial system justly requires that
a person must have rationally formed the intention to kill another
person to be considered a murderer. Insanity is, therefore, an appropriate
defense for murder. 32
As Gough and Tindale point out, in this argument the analogy
between failing brakes in a car accident and a failing mind in
a murder is used to support the conclusion that insanity is an
appropriate defense for murder. But it is not the sole basis for
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that conclusion. The analogy is used to support what our judicial
system requires – namely that one intend to kill in order to be
considered a murderer. However, what is at issue in the present
context is not the structure of the larger argument, but the way
in which the analogy works. Gough and Tindale say:
Here the conclusion: ‘Insanity is, therefore, an appropriate defense for
murder’ is supported by a number of premises including the following
hidden assertion of a comparison:
HP – The two situations are comparable, so if you accept the principle
in the case of the driver/brakes, you should also accept it in the case of
the murder/mental illness.
The authors are arguing, throughout their paper, that it is
better to think of the problem of hidden premises than of the
problem of missing premises, because this rendering of the
problem makes us more likely to stick closely to the exact text
or discourse and less likely to ‘read in’ whatever suits our logical
fancy as part of someone else’s argument. They believe that the
statement which they would add to the analogy is in this sense
‘hidden’ in the original argument.
This assertion is not missing, but can actually be found in the
argument. One of the considerations in assessing the strength of this
argument will be the adequacy/legitimacy of this analogy.33
At this point we have a slide into incorporating methodology
as premises. Any argument from analogy does assume that from
some similarities, others follow or are made likely. We have to
assess this part of the argument. Of course this involves
determining how closely similar the things are in the relevant
respects; that is what is involved in the evaluation of an
analogy. But that does not mean that some assertion to the effect
that the things are ‘comparable’ and inferences can be made from
their comparability needs to be contained. If a person did not
believe that this was the case, or that the two cases he compares
‘are comparable’, he would not reason by analogy, just as a person
would not reason ‘p, so q’ unless he believed that p is a reason
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for q. In the latter case, as we have seen, we should not regard the
inferential assumption as a missing premise.
We do not put into every deductively valid argument the
supplementary premise ‘when the truth of the premises makes
the falsehood of the conclusion a logical impossibility you can
infer the conclusion from the premises’ or ‘no contradictory state
of affairs is possible’. We do not put into classically inductive
arguments the supplementary premise ‘unexamined cases are
more likely than not to resemble examined cases’. We do not put
into arguments by explanation a supplementary premise that ‘the
best explanation of observed phenomena is likely to be correct’.
To do so would be to emulate the Tortoise, in wanting our rule
of procedure to be spelled out as a premise. Missing premises are
those gap-fillers that will make inferences from stated premises
to conclusions work as they ‘should’ and that meets further
conditions – to be specified. The gaps they fill are identified by
interpreting discourse in the light of a theory of argument. No
theory of argument should identify gaps on the grounds that
inference rules are unstated, as Carroll’s arguments show.
It is seriously misleading to use ‘missing premise’ and ‘unstated
assumption’ as though they were synonyms. Only some unstated
assumptions are in the proper sense missing premises. Other
unstated assumptions are worth noting, sometimes, and
criticizing them often provide important insights. Nevertheless,
pragmatic, meta-linguistic, necessary, or methodological
propositions which must hold in order for the argument to work
are not, as such, propositions which fill in a specific inference gap
in an argument. They do not play the role missing premises are
supposed to play.
3. Pragmatism, Scepticism and Missing Premises
When we perceive an inadequacy in the inferential basis for an
argument, we may decide that that argument has one or more
missing premises. Then we have to select from among an
indefinitely large number of candidate premises that could fill
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this logical gap. There are various considerations that enter in
here. There is the desire to be charitable and fair to the arguer,
often taken to entail attributing to him or her tacit premises
which will be true or plausible and will strengthen the argument
from an epistemic point of view. There is the desire for
interpretive accuracy, leading to a perceived need to justify
supplementation with reference either to other stated material or
to the known background beliefs and assumptions of the arguer.
And there is the desire for efficiency and simplicity in argument
analysis. Obviously, these can pull us in different directions.
At this point we encounter a broader issue. That is the purpose
of argument interpretation and criticism. There are two
directions we may go, one emphasizing the issue which the
argument is about, so that we try to fill out the best argument
possible for the conclusion; and the other, a more closely
interpretive approach, emphasizing what the arguer said and
whether the stated reasons should be amended, in accordance
with his or her implied beliefs and intentions.
The idea that argument evaluation should be closely linked
with very charitable reconstruction is rather popular among
philosophers and logicians. However, it is open to more
objections than many people realize. Reconstructing an
argument is not the same thing as appraising it, and argument
analysis should not be construed as a task which involves the
ambitious accumulation of all evidence bearing on the
conclusion. The reconstructive view, in its most strongly
charitable sense, leaves it a mystery why we should pay any
attention to the stated premises at all. If our purpose is to
determine whether the conclusion is true or not, then we can
think about the conclusion directly, and the appraisal of
anybody’s argument for it is a subsidiary project. Pedagogically,
the matter is of some importance. A course on argument analysis
deals primarily with the structure of argument and the appraisal
of inference. Arguments on such issues as abortion or evolution
are examples. If the primary purpose of examining such
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examples were to determine the truth of the conclusion, then
the course on argument analysis would have to be a course on
abortion and everything else. No one is qualified to teach such a
course.
How charitable we should be is an issue that will arise when
other principles have already been applied. First we use
interpretation and our theory of argument to show that a stated
argument has inference gaps. Then we have an array of candidate
gap-fillers, all of which will do the logical work of filling the
gap or gaps. From these, we can select those that cohere with
the beliefs, intentions, and commitments of the arguer, so far as
we are able to determine these. We have to decide how much it
matters whether we have evidence that arguers did accept these
candidate premises, and whether our own standards of truth and
plausibility are going to be used in reaching our beliefs about
what these arguers would have been likely to believe. We have
to balance charity and interpretive accuracy, and how we do
this is likely to depend in part on our purpose in appraising the
argument in the first place. Overly strong charity ignores the
possibility that other people may actually think and reason in
ways which would strike us as implausible, odd, or downright
wrong. Overly literal interpretation may produce accusations of
pedantic, non-substantive, and uninteresting analysis.
When we look at other people’s arguments, we should try to
understand what they have said and determine whether they
have good reasons for their conclusions. Everyone would agree
on this, but people have different standards of what real
understanding is, some linking it with charity in that
understanding must mean making sense of from our own point
of view. If we apply the principle of charity to see how well we,
or someone, could defend that conclusion, we move argument
analysis in the direction of reconstructive discovery and
substantive investigation. If we stick closely to the text and
immediately implied beliefs of the arguer, argument analysis
looks more like an interpretive project.
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Thus, it appears that what missing premises an argument has
will depend not only on how it is classified and how ‘gappy’ it
is found to be from a theoretical point of view, but also on the
purposes we have in analyzing it. If our purpose is to discover
whether the conclusion advanced is true, we will find one tacit
premise, perhaps, whereas if our purpose is to see how the arguer
in fact reasoned from the stated premises to the stated
conclusion, we may find another. Thus, pragmatic
considerations enter into the identification of the very structure
of an argument. To the classically trained mind, this conclusion
will doubtless appear bizarre and unacceptable. We might think
that if missing premises have to be identified with reference to
the purposes of the critic, the game is given away altogether.
The missing premise is altogether a product of the critic’s
imagination, rather than being a feature of the argument itself.
In an earlier paper, I made the sceptical suggestion that
missing premises are nowhere except in the mind of the critic.
In that paper, I linked the discovery of missing premises to a
concept of ‘complete argument’ which could be universally
applied. I said that we have no obviously applicable notion of
exactly what would have to be there in order for the argument to
be complete. I asked whether it is as though we judged a young
family of man, wife, and two small children to be complete, but
had no basis for a view as to how large their complete family
should be. I then suggested that in this situation, when a person
judges that an argument has a missing premise, he is virtually
reduced to saying he would expect as part of the argument,
something which is not there. He would expect one or more
additional premises. But why? The argument as it stands is not
complete. But why? What are complete arguments like, and why
does this argument fail to be one? In the absence of a universally
applicable notion of complete argument, it appears that the
missing premise is a product of the reflective mind. Like
Humean causes, it is thrust upon the external text by the active
intellect-of the critic.34
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What now strikes me about these earlier reflections is the
presumption that we need one single general account of what a
complete argument is in order to say that a particular argument
has a missing premise. I now believe that this is not required.
What we need is something less ambitious though perhaps still
hard to obtain in some cases. We need a concept of complete
argument which we can properly apply to the case at hand. That
account need not be applicable to all arguments. Seeing an
argument as having a missing premises means seeing its explicit
inference structure as inadequate. There is a ‘gap’ to be filled,
not because there are some unstated assumptions that bear on
the argument, not because the argument fails to be deductively
valid, and not because some stated premises need defense. The
gap exists because the premises, as stated, cannot give the
appropriate support to the conclusion. We can either see the
argument as inferentially flawed or see it as having missing
premises. But many judgments have gone into the identification
of this gap and many more are needed in order to determine
which of the various candidate fillers is most appropriate.
Are gaps there in the argument? Or are they projected by the
critic? They are really there, presuming that correctness of all the
critic’s interpretive and theoretical judgments. They are not ‘just
there’ in a theory-neutral sense. Dogmatic pronouncements to
the effect that arguments surely have this or that missing premise
should always be regarded with suspicion.
All of these considerations suggest that the problem of missing
premises is much more complicated that it might seem at first. It
involves all the following factors:
1. Interpretation of the discourse as containing an argument
in which particular statements are the stated premises and a
further statement is the stated conclusion.
2. Classification of the stated argument as being of some
particular type. (Application of one’s theory of argument.)
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3. Logical judgment that the stated argument is not
inferentially sound as an example of that type.
4. Logical judgment that the stated argument would be
inferentially sound if one of a candidate set of
supplementary premises were added.
5. Logical/epistemic interpretive judgment that the argument
is some kind of enthymeme rather than a fallacy or non
sequitur and that the gap identified should be filled
6. Selection of one candidate from others, based both on
epistemic (modest charity) considerations and on
interpretive considerations – respect for the actual
discourse and beliefs which the arguer held or would have
been likely to hold.
Confident statements to the effect that such and such
argument clearly has some statement as its missing premise are
inappropriate. Whether a statement is a missing premise in some
argument depends on our theory of argument, our purpose in
analyzing the argument, and much else.
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CHAPTER 6.
A DIALOGIC EXERCISE
This chapter is written in a favourite form of mine, that of the
philosophical dialogue. I continue to enjoy writing philosophical
dialogues; most of these are either about social issues (revenge, tolerance,
offensive speech) or the views of historical philosophers (Kant,
Condorcet, Diderot, Locke). Looking back, I find myself rather amazed
that I used this form for this material. Prima facie, the fit would seem
poor. The participants explore two perspectives on argument analysis.
Charmides takes the view that its point, even when one is focused
on a particular argument, is to discover whether the conclusion of
that argument is true. If one is inquiring into that subject, further
claims, evidence, and inferences are relevant to one’s inquiry; one will
therefore feel free to augment a particular argument so as to improve it
and provide stronger reasons for the conclusion. From that perspective,
strong charity may be defended; one seeks a strong case to explore
the best support for the conclusion whose truth one is investigating.
Charmides is defending what some have more recently called
‘steelmanning.’ Reconstruction should be generous and can be
ambitious. The second perspective, that of Lysis, is narrower: one
attends to a particular argument to consider its merits as an argument
put forward by a particular arguer. One is exploring how well the
proffered premises support the proffered conclusion in this argument
by this arguer. The arguer’s likely knowledge and beliefs should be
taken into account when one seeks to understand the argument;
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understanding it is a necessary prelude to assessing it. Lysis urges
against Charmides that a person evaluating an argument should not
assume an obligation to fix up the argument first, especially given that
she is likely to fix it up according to her own standards and thereby
distort the original.
In this dialogue, I sought balance between the two perspectives. My
own perspective is closer to that of Lysis, a fact which may emerge
in the dialogue itself and which surely emerges in subsequent chapters
here and in the various editions of my textbook, A Practical Study of
Argument.
Reading this dialogue again, my thoughts turn naturally to a
question not explicitly raised here; that concerns dialogue models of
argument. These models are popular and have been endorsed by Frans
van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, Erik Krabbe, Douglas Walton and
many others. They have been challenged by some, including J. Anthony
Blair and myself. Blair, in “The Limits of the Dialogue Model of
Argument,” (1997) points out that there are plenty of arguments that are
not put forward in dialogue settings. A person, solo, presents a case in a
book, scholarly article, or letter to the editor. In expressing his case, this
person should ideally consider how others may respond to it, and may
seek to consider possible objections to it. But he and he alone, working
solo, has the power to construct and select possible objections; there is
no one else with whom he is interacting and responding. Argument
should be dialectical in the sense that likely or potential doubts and
disagreements are taken into account in constructing the argument. But
that is not to say that they are dialogical in the sense of being a turn-
taking exchanges. Blair urges that we draw a clear distinction between
‘dialogical’ and ‘dialectical’. I agree.
Blair does not emphasize, as I would myself, that those who favour
dialogue models typically construct the dialogue themselves. The
supposed opponent is not real; often the proponent is not either. The
dialogue is a constructed model and one that does not reflect that real
context of many real arguments. In “When They Can’t Talk Back”
(1999), I argued that the dialogue model is distorting for the many
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cases in which arguments are put forward in contexts where interaction
between the arguer and her critics is impossible.
In the present dialogue, one may say that the only real arguers are
the authors whose arguments are quoted and subject to analysis by
the characters Charmides and Lysis – that is to say F. Chatelet, Hugh
Lafollette, R.L. Gregory and J.G. Wallace, C.S. Peirce, C.W. Lewis,
and Janet Keeping; their arguments provide data examined here. The
constructed characters Lysis and Charmides analyze and evaluate that
data (first level arguments). Their accounts, being about the first level
arguments, are on a second level. Lysis and Charmides discuss their
style and principles of argument analysis and evaluation. The dialogue
itself is about their accounts and is thus on a third level. Accordingly,
you might call this a meta-meta-discussion. No one is genuinely in
dialogue, in the sense in which being in dialogue means being engaged
and interacting with another person with opposed views. The exercise
has all been constructed, solo, by a single author: myself. This absent
personage has selected all the data and has constructed the norms and
claims of both of the perspectives that are portrayed as having interacted
(though they never really did). At this point reader’s eyes may glaze and
heads may ache, as the mind starts to ponder post-modernism and its
themes. I assure readers that I knew nothing of post-modernism when I
wrote this (fictional) dialogue.
As mentioned, my own textbook is written from a perspective close
to that of Lysis. In contrast, a recently successful book Reason in the
Balance (first edition 2010) by Sharon Bailin and Mark Battersby
proceeds from a perspective similar to that of Charmides. Bailin and
Battersby urge that students learn to carefully examine an issue in
order to come to a reasoned judgment about that issue. Students will be
enabled to go beyond analysis of individual arguments, though fairly
standard material of argument analysis and evaluation is provided in
the work. One’s goal when reflecting on the merits of arguments is
to find out whether conclusions (about a given issue) are true or not.
Students’ attention is directed not to the question of what this or that
person may have claimed and reasoned in her presented argument, but
rather to the question of whether her proffered conclusion is true. The
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authors urge that students should employ a constructive, open-minded,
yet disciplined inquiry toward that end. Dialogues presented in the work
are realistic, though not real. As in the solo case, persons constructing
the dialogues retain the freedom to consider those objections and
counter-proposals that they select.
I hope the unorthodox form of this chapter does not make it difficult
to read, and I urge readers to consider some emerging questions. Is it
desirable that participant and spectator roles of argument assessment
presume the same norms? Is it more charitable to attribute problematic
premises than questionable inferences to an arguer? And inside every
poor reasoner, is there a good reasoner struggling to get out?
LYSIS: What’s this all about, Charmides?
CHARMIDES: What’s what all about, Lysis?
LYSIS: This business of trying to analyze and evaluate other
people’s arguments? What do we do this for, anyway?
CHARMIDES: The answer should be painfully obvious. We
study arguments with a view to finding out whether their
conclusions are true. In many contexts it is really important to
know what is true or probable. A very basic way of showing
that a claim is true or probably true is to justify it using a good
argument. We study arguments because we seek the truth.
LYSIS: Do you really think so? My idea is that we evaluate other
people’s arguments to see whether they have given good reasons,
enough to convince us of their views. We aren’t just looking to
see whether their conclusion is true or not. We want to see how
well the conclusion has been supported. After all, we sometimes
find poor arguments for conclusions we know to be true and
even, occasionally, good arguments for conclusions we know
to be false. Anyway, if our primary concern were to discover
whether a conclusion were true, I think that analyzing other
people’s arguments would be a pretty indirect way of doing this.
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CHARMIDES: No it wouldn’t. What’s your model of directness
anyway? There’s no way of directly investigating a hard question
all by yourself. You have to approach the truth by looking at what
other people have to say. You look at their arguments and by
appraising these, you can get the best estimation of whether the
conclusions they state are true or not.
CHARMIDES: Well really, Lysis, this is all beneath discussion.
Of course that’s what I try to do, and that what any rational
person would do. You have to use charity when you interpret
an argument, especially when people don’t say all they have to
say. You will often find arguments that are not very good or that
seem incomplete or unclear in some way. And then you can fix
these up, by adding a premise or several premises that are true,
and plausible, and will improve the argument. Then you should
add these, interpreting the arguments so as to make them as
sensible as you can. All this is obvious and necessary because you
are seeking truth. By reconstructing an argument you can best
determine whether its conclusion is true.
LYSIS: I don’t understand why you find this all so obvious. To me
it is just false. You see, I study arguments to see whether there are
good grounds given for the conclusion. I don’t keep my attention
fixed on the general question of whether the conclusion is true
or could be shown true by some argument other than the one I
am studying. I focus on the direct and immediate question of
how well the conclusion is supported in the actual argument I am
considering, the argument that has been stated.
You know, this makes argument analysis a much more viable
and manageable task than it is on your view. You see, if someone
omits considerations pertinent to his case, or relies on an
inference that is hasty or unclear, then on my view that person
has offered an argument which is inadequate. The argument
should not rationally persuade anybody, because the reasons
given don’t fully support the conclusion. That is the end of the
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story, so far as the analysis of this particular argument is
concerned.
Now if you want to go further, and ask whether the conclusion
might be true for some further reason, not given by the arguer,
or whether some new information could be added to the original
reasons, and would justify the conclusion, you can of course do
this. Nobody is stopping you. But why say it’s argument analysis?
You are not evaluating the original argument any more. Instead,
you are embarking on an independent quest for knowledge. It
just confuses things if you try to identify this task with that of
argument interpretation and appraisal.
I like to keep life lean, spartan, and simple. If someone gives me
a good argument, fine. If he doesn’t, I look at what’s there, find
the holes in it, and state my reasons for seeing it as unsatisfactory.
None of these fancy charitable fillings for me!
CHARMIDES: But really, this is too uncharitable to be correct!
Don’t you think that extra filling is ever necessary? Why would
we even mention the problem of missing premises if there were
no missing premises? People do, after all, omit necessary steps
from their arguments, sometimes because the arguer deems these
truths too obvious to be worth stating, sometimes because they
are so controversial the arguer would rather you didn’t notice
them, and sometimes because the arguer does not realize they
are required. Or sometimes out of sheer carelessness. When we
do this, it is our moral responsibility as critics to fill in these
gaps. Your kind of criticism will amount to nothing but hasty nit-
picking. You won’t get even to the stage of understanding other
people’s arguments, much less criticizing them, unless you add
the required connecting links.
LYSIS: But, my charitable friend, how charitable are you being
right now? Why do you not fill in some plausible intermediary
steps in my case, if you think it fails to hold up? Practice what
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you preach, I’d say. Seriously, though, I do agree that occasionally
arguments have missing premises. We need to supplement
sometimes, but this is only legitimate when we have some basis
for believing that the missing premises are, or would have been,
accepted by the author of the argument. After all, you know, the
discovery of missing premises is not like the discovery of early
human fossils. Missing premises are not buried logical objects.
Sometimes I think they are more like frustrated expectations.
They are found not in any logical earth, but in the active mind of
a critic.
CHARMIDES: So, the ontology of discourse – quite the
metaphysical theme! And these are quite the metaphors! But
really, you know, we already to have to read in a very
considerable amount of background information just to
understand words and grammatical relations, and the point of
the argument, and the significance of facts. People are always
active when they understand what is written or spoken, and they
always have to bring in information that is not explicitly stated.
Given that this is necessary all the time, I can’t see why you
suddenly want to be so literal-minded so far as missing premises
are concerned. Of course we often need to fill in people’s
arguments, in order to make them sensible and plausible. This
is charitable, reasonable interpretation, and it’s done in the
interests of the fair and efficient pursuit of truth.
LYSIS: Well, I do agree that we sometimes have to resort to
supplementing an argument with additional premises. What
really bothers me about your view is not the idea that premises
could be missing but the fact that it is charity which will provide
some guidance on when to add premises and which ones to add.
Your approach seems to ignore the very obvious fact that there
are often differences between an arguer’s ideas and beliefs and
those of the critic. When you say the critic should be charitable,
this all sounds very nice, but the critic may well read in things
that he thinks are improvements and by doing so, change the
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original argument so that it is more his own than that of the
author. Surely we should only add premises the arguer would
have agreed with, or at least only those that he is logically
committed to. A fringe benefit of my approach is that it saves an
awful lot of work.
Fundamentally, though, the reason for it is that it keeps us from
taking flights of fancy on the wings of other people’s thoughts.
Call your own arguments your own. Don’t go reading them into
the work of everybody else. This is misplaced charity and won’t
help you understand anyone.
CHARMIDES: My good friend, this approach seems most
pedantic. What matters, fundamentally, is our quest for truth.
What is pertinent to the truth is not whether this or that arguer
in fact held this or that belief or used these exact words or some
slightly different ones. It is not the arguer and his or her beliefs
at all. It is the argument. Even though every argument is put
forward by some person or other, it does not follow that every
argument is inseparable from its author, bound to him or her
forever by logical ties of ownership. The argument, once given,
is a set of statements in the public domain, and for the purposes
of systematic rational thought, it is this argument which is
interesting. Who cares what its particular author might have
happened to believe? Usually he or she is far away, and quite often
they’re even dead.
LYSIS: You started out as though you, and not I, were the
charitable, sympathetic critic. You, not I, were the one who would
seek the most sympathetic and careful interpretation of what
people have to say. Yet now you are telling me to forget about
the arguer, who put forward the argument in the first place,
and push relentlessly ahead toward some abstraction called ‘the
truth’. You seem to be saying that one can best appraise other
people’s reasoning by forgetting the other people. One can ignore
these people and ignore their beliefs. I say, when it comes right
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down to it, this approach of yours is thoroughly disrespectful.
And it is incoherent as well. If there are reasons to attend to the
arguments other people present, then attend to those arguments
that those people present. If there is no reason to attend to those
arguments, just ignore them, or take their premises as data to
be added to your general pool of information. You proceed and
make up your own arguments. In a curious way, I think my hard
line approach actually shows more respect for the ideas of others
than your approach. Better to have been understood and rejected
than never to have been understood at all.
CHARMIDES: You are begging the question, my friend. You say
that you understand a person’s reasoning if you stick very closely
to his or her stated premises, and you only add premises if you
can give good evidence that the arguer either believed them or is
logically committed to them. You imply that I do not understand
that reasoning, when I add material, in order to fill out what
is explicitly there. But this is just the issue, isn’t it? What is it
to really understand someone’s arguments? That is the issue. It’s
completely tendentious for you to insist that what you do gives
genuine understanding and what I do does not. Arguers usually
intend to give good rational support for their conclusions, and
any arguer would be pleased to have plausible or true
supplementary premises added to an argument by the critic.
LYSIS: Well maybe I did beg the question, but you just
equivocated. Of course it’s true that most arguers intend to offer
a good argument, but what this means is that when they do offer
some specific argument, they regard this specific argument as a
good one. What it doesn’t mean is that they intend to offer just
that argument which you regard as a good one. What they offer
they see as rationally adequate but they don’t necessarily intend
to offer that which you see as rationally adequate. I won’t say
you created an intentional confusion here, but you are surely
confused about intentions.
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CHARMIDES: We don’t seem to be getting very far in this
dispute. I guess our two approaches would differ most for what,
on the face of it, look like bad arguments. Here I would be
inclined to charitably add, and you would be inclined to reject.
LYSIS: Right. When both these approaches are so easy to
rationalize you can see why people disagree so much about
fallacies.
CHARMIDES: I suppose. But that’s another problem. Why don’t
we both do the best we can to construct a policy on missing
premises and then we can apply our policies to the same
examples? We can see what results we get, and then we can
continue our discussion in a more concrete way.
LYSIS: All right. But where will these examples come from? Will
we know enough about all the subjects to be able to appraise
them sensibly?
CHARMIDES: It’s strange, but I have this feeling that we are
being guided by an external force. When we are made aware
of them, we will at the same time be told enough about the
immediate contexts in which they were used. Thus we will be
able to understand them.
LYSIS: Goodness, that is peculiar. Well, I hope you are right.
We shall work for a week and then meet again to compare our
results. I’m sure you’ll see that my policy is much more
streamlined and efficient than yours, and much more true to
arguers’ actual reasoning.
CHARMIDES: And I’m sure you’ll see that mine is much more
fair and leads more quickly to the truth.
LYSIS: See you in a week then.
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1. Charmides‘ Proposal on Missing Premises
1. To say that an argument has missing premises is to say that
it has inference gaps. The conclusion does not emerge from
the stated premises as it should in the type of argument
given.
2. When we find such an inference gap in an argument, we
should try to fill it. The original arguer could not have
intended the argument to work as stated, because human
reason does not aspire to create gappy arguments.
3. Gaps should not be filled by statements of general
methodological principles, because that just means a gap has
been misidentified. Nor should they be filled by a statement
of the conditional associated with the argument, or a
generalization of that conditional. Those would be
reiterative and useless additions.
4. The main point in adding premises is to improve the original
argument. Missing premises should be selected so as to fill
identified inference gaps and so as to be either true or
plausible.
5. Since not all good arguments are deductive arguments,
proper addition of premises will not necessarily make a
reconstructed argument deductively valid. It will, however,
make it an inferentially correct argument of some type. With
proper reconstruction, there are no fallacies in the sense
of arguments involving inference errors, though there are
many nondeductive arguments.
2. Lysis‘ Policy on Missing Premises
1. To say that an argument has missing premises is to presume
that it has inference gaps. That is to say, the inferences we
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need to make in order to reason correctly from the premises
to the conclusion do not go through as they should.
2. When we find a gap in an argument we may, under some
conditions, attempt to fill it by inserting extra premises.
However, we should not always do this when we find a gap,
and we should not be too confident in doing it. The original
arguer may have intended the inference to go through just
as the argument is stated, and he or she may have different
standards for inference than ours. Adding may distort the
original argument that was put forward.
3. There are critically useless ways of filling gaps and these
should not be employed even when we do decide that gaps
have to be filled somehow. It is redundant to fill gaps with
statements of general methodological principles. It is
reiterative and critically useless to fill them with the
associated conditional, a statement with the conjunction of
the premises as its antecedent and the conclusion as its
consequent. Nor should we use a generalization of the
associated conditional.
4. It is the author’s beliefs, intentions, and logical commitments
as expressed in the discourse in which the argument appears
that give proper guidance for missing premises. If we are to
insert any missing premise, we must be able to give good
reasons to show that the arguer accepted this claim when
the argument was made or that he or she was logically
committed to it by other things actually stated. No premises
should be inserted that are inconsistent with stated premises
or with the conclusion, and none should be added which
make any stated premises redundant from a logical point of
view.
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3. Results of the Exercise
Case One
. . if the perception of wax appeared to me more precise and distinct, after
that not only sight and touch, but many other cases besides, rendered it
manifest to my apprehension, with how much greater distinctness must I
know myself, since all the reasons that contribute to the knowledge of the
nature of wax, or of any body whatever, manifest still better the nature of
my mind? (Descartes, from Meditation ll; as quoted in The Rationalists
(New York: Anchor Books, 1974), pp. 126 – 7. Translation by John
Veitch.)
(Here Descartes is trying to show that, contrary to popular
opinion, the mind is better known than physical things. He has
just claimed that any judgment that a physical thing such as a
piece of wax, exists, commits the subject to a judgment that he
himself exists, and that this judgment about his mind is known
with greater truth and certitude than the judgment about the
physical object.)
Stated Premises and Conclusion
1. Sight and touch and many other things make wax manifest
to my apprehension when I perceive it.
2. All the reasons that contribute to the knowledge of wax or
any other body contribute even better to the knowledge of
my mind.
3. Even if I appear to know a body such a wax precisely and
distinctly, I know my mind much more distinctly.
LYSIS: I know that this man Rene Descartes acquired a great
reputation, and that he worked out some marvellous theories.
But even though this feeling is working in me, I can’t see this
particular argument as a very good one. First of all, premise (2)
is quite implausible. Secondly, there is an inference gap because
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this premise speaks of contributing to the knowledge of the
mind, whereas the conclusion is about the distinctness with
which the mind is known. Knowing more facts about the mind
wouldn’t necessarily mean knowing the mind with greater
distinctness, because distinctness is a matter of differentiation,
and when the facts in question are to come from the mind’s
knowledge of other things, there is no obvious way they could
contribute to this differentiation. There isn’t really any basis in
Descartes for filling in this gap. So we should just recognize that
the gap exists and that he has given us a poor argument, with
both a very implausible premise and an inference gap.
CHARMIDES: I differ. This fascinating argument must have
been part of something very important. As it stands, it isn’t very
clear, but it can be filled out so that the conclusion will be
strongly supported inferentially by fairly plausible premises.
There is an inference gap in the argument. We need to relate
the greater number of contributions to knowledge that we have
regarding the mind, according to premise (2) to the greater
distinctness alleged for knowledge of the mind in the conclusion.
What we need to do is construct a missing premise which will be
as plausible as possible and will connect (1) and (2) with (3) in the
most logically acceptable way. Descartes himself may have been
a deductivist, but I still think that the most plausible link is going
to be less than deductive. Having a greater number of facts about
an item does not mean knowing it with greater distinctness. It
is most reasonable to say that it will generally go along with
knowing it with greater distinctness. Because there could be
exceptions – as when if a thing had one and only one feature
which defined it uniquely and you could know it with absolute
distinctness by knowing only this one thing. The argument has a
missing premise. It is:
MP1: In having more contributions to knowledge about one
thing than another, I generally know that thing with more
distinctness than I would know the other.
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When this extra premise is read into the argument, we can see
that there is some inductive reason for Descartes’ conclusion,
granting of course his original premises. There is still a problem:
the problem that the second premise needs defense, and a
thorough reconstruction would add more reasons to support
that as well. But we are only working on inference gaps right
now, we are not supposed to do anything about the need for
subarguments to support premises.
Case Two
Our degree is not recognized, but we have more students than ever. They
come because they think they might learn something. Sure there are idiots.
And I have given them credits. There are bigger idiots in the Government.
Is it up to me to be more rigorous than the electorate? (Francois Chatelet,
as quoted in the Canadian Association of University Teachers
Bulletin for September, 1978.)
Chatelet was defending university professors in France against
charges of irresponsibility and incompetence.
Stated Premises and Conclusion
1. Idiots have been given credits by faculty members teaching
in universities.
2. There are even bigger idiots in the government.Therefore,
3. University faculty are not to be criticized for giving credits
to idiots.
LYSIS: This person can’t have been nearly so famous as Rene
Descartes, even though he seems to have the same nationality.
This example is a straightforward instance of a fallacy of
relevance. It seems to be a case of ‘two wrongs make a right’
reasoning. The author cites a deplorable fact in the second
premise. He tries to infer from the claim that the so-called idiots
in the government are even stupider than the so-called idiots
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in universities that university faculty should not be criticized.
This is irrelevant reasoning, because standards for government
officials have nothing to do with standards for universities.
University faculty are supposed to pass and fail students
according to proper judgments of those students’ competence in
their areas of study. Government officials’ stupidity, even if it
exists, has nothing to do with this. The argument is a gross non
sequitur.
CHARMIDES: Now here is an argument which requires
extensive supplementation. It is stated only briefly. Somehow the
author believes that standards of competence indicated by the
electorate are relevant to standards for credit given out by faculty
members at universities. The problem is that we have to find a
manner of supplementing the argument in order to express this
intended connection in a plausible way, and we have to do this,
making not only the inference link but the connecting statements
plausible. Without such supplementations, the argument would
look like a non sequitur. But from the very fact that it was given, we
know the author thought government competence was relevant
to the allotment of student credits. We have to make the
connection. The whole argument may be set out like this:
1. Idiots have been given credits by faculty members teaching
in universities.
2. There are even bigger idiots in government.
MPl: The electorate, in tolerating these bigger idiots in
government, indicates that community standards are
tolerant of idiots.
MP2: University faculty, in giving credits to idiots,
indicate that they are tolerant of idiots.
MP3: It is not the obligation of university faculty to be
more rigorous in their standards than is the electorate.
Therefore,
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3. University faculty should not be criticized for giving credits
to idiots.
The argument has three missing premises and should be
reconstructed accordingly. The third missing premise is
suggested by the rhetorical question in the original argument.
The first and second missing premises are read in to make the
stated material cogent. The argument has no fallacy, but its
premises are controversial, especially MP3. We can surely judge
that this premise is false. Faculty are awarding specialized
degrees for which special qualifications are necessary. In
addition, the second missing premise is not plausible, because
even if it is a fact that government people turn out to be idiots,
that does not show that people were willing to tolerate idiots
when they first elected them. The argument is rather weak,
because of these problems with its premises, but it is not a non
sequitur or fallacy of any kind when it is properly filled in.
Case Three
Our society normally regulates a certain range of activities; it is illegal
to perform these activities unless one has received prior permission to do
so. We require automobile operators to have licenses. We forbid people
from practicing medicine, law, pharmacy, or psychiatry unless they have
satisfied certain licensing requirements.
Society’s decision to regulate just these activities is not ad hoc. The decision
to restrict admission to certain vocations and to forbid some people from
driving is based on an eminently plausible, though not often explicitly
formulated, rationale. We require drivers to be licensed because driving an
auto is an activity which is potentially harmful to others, safe performance
of the activity requires a certain competence, and we have a moderately
reliable procedure for determining that competence. The potential harm
is obvious: incompetent drivers can and do maim and kill people. The
best way we have of limiting this harm without sacrificing the benefits of
automobile travel is to require that all drivers demonstrate at least minimal
competence. We likewise license doctors, lawyers, and psychologists because
they perform activities which can harm others. Obviously they must be
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proficient if they are to perform these activities properly, and we have
a moderately reliable procedure for determining proficiency. Imagine a
world in which everyone could legally drive a car, in which everyone could
legally perform surgery, prescribe medications, dispense drugs, or offer
legal advice. Such a world would hardly be desirable.
Consequently, any activity that is potentially harmful to others and
requires certain demonstrated competence for its safe performance, is
subject to regulation – that is, it is theoretically desirable that we regulate
it. If someone has the requisite competence, then the action is not only
subject to regulation but ought, all things considered, to be
regulated. (From Hugh LaFollette, ‘Licensing Parents’, in Philosophy
and Public Affairs, 1980.)
LaFollette uses this argument to introduce his major theme,
namely that people should be licensed in order to become
biological parents.
Stated Premises and Conclusion
1. Driving is licensed because it is potentially harmful and
requires a testable competence.
2. Doctors, lawyers, and psychologists are licensed because
they perform
3. A world in which anyone at all could drive, operate,
prescribe drugs, or offer legal advice, would be very
undesirable.
Therefore,
4. Any potentially harmful activity requiring testable
competence should be regulated, in the sense that regulating
it is theoretically desirable.
LYSIS: This argument is a kind of hasty generalization. The
premises provide an insufficient range of cases on which to base
the conclusion, which is a universal one. The author seeks to
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ground a universal conclusion on a considerations of four kinds
of activities. He fails to consider that these four may not be fully
representative. In the context of his later use of the argument,
this failure is very significant. The author uses this argument
later to defend his idea that the biological parents of children
should be licensed. But considerations of privacy, the human
instinct to reproduce, and the harmfulness to individuals’ lives
of any failure in society’s administration of judgments affect this
case far differently than those cases cited by the author.
The argument as it stands fails, and not in such a way that
it would require supplementary premises to back it up. The
direction of the argument is clear. There is no inference gap:
we can understand how we are supposed to connect the stated
premises with the conclusion. Furthermore, there is nothing in
the existing premises or surrounding text that could be used to
construct any satisfactory missing premise even if we set out to
look for one. The conclusion might be true, but the argument in
support of it is hasty and weak.
CHARMIDES: There is a gap in this argument between the
premises, as explicitly stated, and the conclusion. In order to
support the conclusion with these premises, we have to make
an additional supposition about the activities cited. It is a rather
difficult matter to construct a plausible version of that
supposition, since it is hard to see just what we need to assume
about driving, doctoring, giving legal counsel, and giving
psychological advice which makes these activities license a
conclusion about all potentially harmful activities which require
testable competence. We might add something like ‘Other
activities that are potentially harmful and require testable
competence are relevantly similar to these’. This is still a bit too
open-ended and will be hard to verify, but we need something
like this in order to fill the logical gap between the cases cited
and the universal generalization. The argument becomes
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deductively valid when this premise is added, and its merits will
depend on our appraisal of the added premise.
Case Four
…throughout Hebb argues that the position in the child is basically similar
to that of the adult whose vision is restored at operation. Is this a tenable
assumption? The adult, after all, has developed a ‘touch world’ which has
served him well for many years, and which has become accepted as the
principal vehicle of his occupational and social adaptation. The child,
on the other hand, is concerned to develop a ‘visual world’ ab initio,
and although tactile and motor activities contribute in an important way
to its evolution, it is difficult to think of the two cases as in any real
sense similar (From R.L. Gregory and J.G. Wallace, ‘Recovery from
Early Blindness: a Case Study’, in Paul Tibbets (editor), Perception,
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), p. 385.)
Gregory and Wallace are arguing that it is a mistake to
assimilate the case of an adult with a tactile-motor world but
no visual world until an operation restoring sight with that of
a child who is simultaneously constructing a visual world and a
tactile-motor world on the basis of perceptual experience.
Stated Premises and Conclusion
1. An adult who recovers vision after years of blindness has
had a touch world which has served him well for many
years.
2. An adult who recovers vision after years of blindness has had
a touch world which has become accepted as the principal
vehicle of his occupational and social adaptation.
3. A child beginning to see is developing a visual world right
from the start.
4. A child beginning to see does not have tactile sensations
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which constitute a coherent alternative touch world.
So,
5. An adult who recovers vision after years of blindness is
significantly different from a child developing visual
perception.
LYSIS: This is a good clear argument. There are no inference gaps
and it has no missing premises. The authors show that Hebb’s
position was unreasonable.
CHARMIDES: This is a good argument, and the conclusion is
adequately supported by the premises. Since the argument works
as it stands, there is no need for any reconstruction using missing
premises.
Case Five
The object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration of what
we already know, something else which we do not know. Consequently,
reasoning is good if it be such as to give a true conclusion, from true
premises, and not otherwise. (From C.S. Peirce, ‘The Fixation of Belief,’
in Pragmatism: the Classic Writings, edited by H.S. Thayer. New York:
Mentor Books, 1970, p. 63.)
Stated Premises and Conclusion
1. The object of reasoning is to find out from the consideration
of what we already know something else which we do not
know.
So,
2. Reasoning which gives us a true conclusion from true
premises is good reasoning.
and,
3. Reasoning that does not give us a true conclusion from true
premises is not good reasoning.
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LYSIS: This is an ambitious argument. The philosopher seeks
two conclusions from a single premise. The problem is not with
inference. It is that the premise requires clarification. If the word
‘know’ is understood too narrowly, the premise will be false, for
the purpose of reasoning is also to form reasonable beliefs on
the basis of other things which we have good reason to believe.
However, since this philosopher was a fallibilist, he would likely
have been willing to equate having good reason to believe with
knowing. If this is done, the premise is all right. The direction of
the argument is clear enough.
But just as we had to clarify ‘know’ in the premises, we have
to look at the semantics of the conclusions. First we have to
understand them as being about reasoning of a type; because if
we don’t do this, (2) is vulnerable to counterexample. You can
easily reason from a true premise to a true conclusion without
employing good reasoning, just by being lucky. So we must
understand that the references to reasoning are to general
patterns of reasoning. Right after making this argument, Peirce
goes on to speak of ‘habits of the mind’, so this interpretation
has a good textual basis. However, there is still a problem with
(3). Whereas (2), as explained here, can be inferred from (1) –
reasoning has such-and-such purpose; reasoning of so-and-so
type serves this purpose; therefore reasoning of so-and-so type
is good reasoning, (3) cannot. The only way to make (1) true is,
as we have seen, to understand ‘know’ in a flexible sense that
would be suggested by Peirce’s fallibilism. On this interpretation
of (1), (3) does not follow from (1), because reasoning might give
us probable conclusions from probable premises, satisfying (1),
but not (3).
Since this argument needs so much clarification, we can rightly
accuse the author of vagueness, and since it can only work when
‘know’ is understood in two incompatible ways, we can also
accuse him of equivocation. However, these problems do not
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generate inference gaps and the clarification needed is not to be
supplied by extra premises.
CHARMIDES: This certainly is a challenging case. It doesn’t
work very well as it stands, so something must be added to it to
make it more clear. The argument is really about the purpose of
reasoning, which Peirce specifies in (1). Of course here, we will
get too limited a purpose if we understand ‘know’ in a restrictive
way as requiring both solid justification and truth. So we shall
have to understand ‘know’ more loosely, as including believing
for good reasons. The point of the argument is that reasoning is
good reasoning if and only if it serves its purpose, as stated in (1).
The reference to reasoning in (2) and (3) must be understood as
referring to reasoning of a type, for otherwise (2), at least, is too
easily vulnerable to counterexample. The most elegant thing to
do here is to turn Peirce’s passage into two separate arguments.
The first:
1. The object of reasoning is to find out from the consideration
of what we already know something else which we do not
know.
MPl: Reasoning that gives us a true conclusion from true
premises lets us find out something we do not know from
something we do know.
MP2: Reasoning that serves its purpose is good reasoning.
So,
2. Reasoning that gives us a true conclusion from true premises
is good reasoning.
The second argument is:
1. The object of reasoning is to find out from the consideration
of what we already know, something else which we do not
know.
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MP3: Reasoning that does not give us a true conclusion from
true premises does not let us find out something we do not know
from something that we know.
MP4: Reasoning that does not serve its purpose is not good
reasoning.
So,
2. Reasoning that does not give us a true conclusion from true
premises is not good reasoning.
There is still a problem of language, even after this inferential
clarification. It affects the second argument. To get a charitable
interpretation of (1), we understood ‘know’ as a fallibilist would.
Yet such an understanding would make MP3 false. Nevertheless,
MP3 is needed to reach the conclusion. If we revert to a more
classical understanding of the word ‘know’, consistency of
meaning is restored, but on this interpretation (1) is either false
or highly controversial. Peirce gave one good argument and one
unsound one. Both, when properly understood and filled in, are
deductively valid.
Case Six
You can get a large audience together for a strip tease – that is, to watch
a girl undress on the stage. Now suppose you came to a country where
you could fill a theatre simply by bringing a covered plate onto the stage,
and then slowly lifting the cover so as to let everyone see, just before the
lights went out, that it contained a mutton chop, or a bit of bacon, would
you not think that, in that country, something had gone wrong with the
appetite for food?(From C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, quoted by R.
Olson in Meaning and Argument (New York: Harcourt Brace and
World, 1960.)
Lewis is trying to defend traditional Christian sexual morality.
He uses the analogy to argue against sexual display for titillation
and amusement.
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Stated Premises and Conclusion
1. If people enjoyed watching the uncovering of a mutton chop
or a bit of bacon, which they were not going to eat,
something would have gone wrong with their desire for
food.
2. People enjoy watching a girl undress on stage when they are
not going to have sexual relations with her.
So,
3. Something has gone wrong with our desire for sexual
expression.
LYSIS: This amusing argument is quite complete as it stands.
The direction of the inference is clear. The argument obviously
is based upon the analogy between the hunger for food and the
desire for sexual expression, both being human appetites. From
the first premise, stating hypothetical circumstances, and a
posited judgment that in these circumstances, something would
have gone wrong, and the second premise, revealing the
similarity between the strip-tease and this hypothetical case, we
are to infer that something has gone wrong with sexual appetite
in the world of strip-tease. Whether the analogy is good or not
seems to be a moot point, but in any event there is no need to
insert a supplementary premise; the intended direction of the
inference is entirely clear. A full appraisal of the argument
depends on an exploration of the relevant similarities and
differences between hunger and the desire for sex.
CHARMIDES: The argument as it stands is quite clear, but the
inference structure could be improved if premises were added
formulating and clarifying the basic analogy between the desire
for sex and the desire for food. We need to add a premise to the
effect that the desire for food and the desire for sex are human
desires that are fundamentally similar with regard to deliberate
arousal and subsequent satisfaction. We don’t say they are
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fundamentally similar in all respects, because this assertion
would be stronger than the argument requires, and implausible.
We specify those respects required for the argument to work.
Provided this added premise is true, the argument is a good one.
Case Seven
In order to prosecute for using the mail to send obscene material,
the police should require the consent of the Attorney General.
So urged Janet Keeping, President of the Calgary Civil Liberties
Association, in a letter to the Alberta Attorney General. Her letter
was provoked by a recent prosecution in that province against
Joseph MacDonald for an ‘obscene letter’ he reportedly wrote to
the Unemployment Insurance Commission. Frustrated by delays
in the processing of his unemployment claims, Mr. MacDonald
had written a letter to the UIC in which he allegedly compared
public servants to certain parts of the human anatomy and
admonished them to commit unnatural acts. While the court
ultimately acquitted Mr. MacDonald, the Calgary civil liberties
group is seeking assurances that such matters will not be
prosecuted in future.
‘There is a distinction between bad taste and criminal conduct’, said
lawyer Sheldon Chumir, an executive member of the Calgary group.
‘If using coarse language is to be considered a crime’, said Chumir, ‘half of
us are going to end up in criminal court.’
(From the Canadian Civil Liberties Association Newsletter,
September, 1980. Thanks to David Gallop for bringing this
example to my attention. It is Mr. Chumir’s argument, as
reported that will be dealt with here. We are told that he used this
argument to back up the Civil Liberties group in its contention
that the use of coarse language should not be an offense that is
prosecuted.)
Stated Premises and Conclusion
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1. If using coarse language is to be considered a crime, half of
us are going to end up in criminal court.
2. There is a distinction between bad taste and
criminal conduct.
So,
3. People should not be prosecuted for using obscene language
in letters.
LYSIS: Here is a case which really does have a missing premise,
at least as reported. The need for this premise is apparent when
we see that (1) is supposed to provide the basis for (2), and yet
as these are stated there is no clear connection between the
statements. We know that Mr. Chumir, the author, is a lawyer
speaking for a civil liberties group, and so it is reasonable to
attribute to him a linking belief: namely that it is not desirable
for half the population to wind up in criminal court. This can be
added as a missing premise in the argument.
CHARMIDES: Several points arise here. Obviously the inference
from (1) to (2) is not clear as it stands. We need to add something
which will bring out the intended connection. Also, if we take (1)
literally, we might think that it requires some defense. The author
has a rather dramatic estimate of the numbers of people who use
coarse language. But missing premises are to fill inference gaps,
not to buttress stated premises. The argument should be filled
out so that it reads as:
1. If using coarse language is to be considered a crime, many
people are going to end up in criminal court.
MPl: It is not desirable for large numbers of people to end up
in criminal court.
2. There is a distinction between bad taste and criminal
conduct.
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MP2: People who are prosecuted for using obscene language
in letters are being prosecuted for bad taste.
MP3: People should not be prosecuted for bad taste.
So,
3. People should not be prosecuted for using obscene language
in letters.
We can see that there are two strands in this argument: the
numbers who might be in court, and the relation between bad
taste and prosecution.
4. Analysis of the Results
CHARMIDES: That was quite exhausting. I am certainly glad it’s
over.
LYSIS: So am I. Now the interesting part begins. We can discuss
our results.
CHARMIDES: Well, our results do seem to indicate that
arguments can come out looking structurally different when one
is more or less charitable on missing premises. Usually my
analyses were quite a lot longer than yours, and I was far more
willing to add extra premises. Yet, I wouldn’t say, when I look
at your exercises, that they really seem wrong. It is sometimes
almost as though one and the same passage really can be
understood in several quite different ways.
LYSIS: I wouldn’t say your analysis looked wrong to me either.
Really, it even makes me wonder a little about right and wrong
in finding the structure of an argument. Maybe some natural
arguments have more than one structure.
You know, it used to be that people thought there was such a
thing as the structure of a sentence. There was one single logical
form that the sentence had. Then some came to a more
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sophisticated and flexible view and decided that what form a
sentence had could vary depending on why we were looking for
its form. A sentence like ‘Joe is happy’ could be represented a
universal statement that all things identical with Joe are happy,
or as a single existential statement that this one individual Joe
is happy, or even just by an atomic statement represented by a
single letter. It’s not wrong to show it as one or the other. It’s
more or less useful, depending on where the sentence appears
and what we are trying to do when we are interested in its form.
Different versions of argument structure might work like this.
Maybe your longer versions and my shorter versions can equally
count as representation of the structure of natural reasoning, and
mine is better for some purposes, whereas yours are better for
others.
CHARMIDES: I don’t know about that. That sort of structural
relativism seems at least as confusing as the problem of missing
premises itself.
LYSIS: Pragmatic considerations have to play a role here, I think.
Couldn’t it be that your approach best represents the structure of
an argument for some purposes and mine for others?
CHARMIDES: Perhaps. But it would be nice to have a more
elegant and definite solution than that. Actually, we did agree in
some cases, after all. We thought the argument by Gregory and
Wallace, the two psychologists refuting that other psychologist,
was successful without any supplementation. And that last
argument, you know, the amusing one about obscenity in the
mails, we saw it in almost the same way.
LYSIS: Those were good arguments. The inferences were pretty
solid and clear. In that last case, it was obvious from the context
what had to go in, and what we inserted was obviously true
and obviously accepted by the author. Those aren’t the kinds of
cases where our views differ. Good arguments don’t need a lot
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of supplementation. Usually, a person who puts forward a good
argument knows enough that there is not a big contrast between
adding plausible claims and adding claims that he or she clearly
accepts. It is perfectly understandable that we don’t differ much
on the analysis of good arguments. We differ on poor arguments.
I have the impression that the more hastily an argument is stated,
the more carelessly it is put, the crazier its premises, the sloppier
its inferences, the more we shall differ. You see a need for more
and more additions, and I just reject things as incorrect – having
problematic premises or hasty or irrelevant inferences.
CHARMIDES: It’s funny though. Even there, the differences
between us can be exaggerated. For instance, although we had
very different looking analyses for that argument by Descartes
and the other one about the French professors giving credits
to idiots, we didn’t really disagree on the substance of the case.
We just located problems in different places. On Descartes, for
instance, you just said he made a hasty inference, explained why
you thought it was hasty, and that was that. Whereas I went to
a great deal of trouble to set out the argument clearly, adding a
claim which I thought was logically presumed in order for the
inference to work. It was a hard case, and I’m still not sure I have
it right. But then, when I had finished setting out the argument,
I could see that the premise I had added was false or at least
very implausible. So I didn’t say the argument contained a hasty
inference but I had to say it was a weak argument, because it
had an unacceptable premise. You say Descartes made a hasty
inference. I see him as reasoning accurately from premises which
are not acceptable. Our structural models were different, but
as far as the substance of the issue is concerned, we are really
in complete agreement. We both think that Descartes has not
established in this reasoning that the mind is better known than
any physical body. We both think this because what the mind
knows about itself when knowing a body is not the sort of thing
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that would make the mind distinctly known, as Descartes’
conclusion requires.
LYSIS: I noticed that. Although we state our results in different
ways, there is not a single case where we really disagree on a
matter of final assessment. It almost seems to me as though you
think of the same criticism which would occur to me and then
you form the negation of it and write in that negation as a
missing premise. You then find, after reconstruction, that the
argument is quite all right, except for that one premise, which
is false, or at least highly controversial. With that example about
regulating activities, that happened. I said the four cases cited
by the author might not be representative. You said that the
author presumed that the cases were representative, and then
questioned the presumption, regarding the inferentially
reconstructed argument as having a controversial or false
premise.
Your critical route seems roundabout to me. It is supposedly
motivated by charity, by the desire to make out as good a case
as possible even for those arguers who express themselves in
a hasty way. Given that you almost always have to go on and
judge the premises you have added as unacceptable, I must say I
am not even sure why this amounts to charity. You are making
the same critical points, essentially, and just locating them in
different places.
I see your use of missing premises not so much as charity but
rather as a powerful critical weapon. In fact, sometimes your
technique reveals critical problems I never would have noticed
without it.
CHARMIDES: Let me tell you a little story. There was a society
in which many people are fat, and these people, especially if
they were very fat, were quite often criticized, insulted, and even
ostracized by others. The fat women were very different from
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the fat men. There were more of them, they worried more about
being fat, and they responded to criticism and personal attack in
a very timid way, quite differently from the way men did. They
usually made excuses for themselves, and pretended to be on a
diet even if they really weren’t. The fat men, on the other hand,
were pretty aggressive about handling criticisms of themselves
for being fat. They fought back, verbally at least, when attacked.
LYSIS: Really, Charmides, this is rather depressing. Besides, what
on earth could it possibly have to do with charity and missing
premises? We weren’t working on dietary supplementation, you
know! Some of this background information we got must really
be churning up your mind and brain!
CHARMIDES: Wait a minute. I’m getting to the point. One man
who was told he should go on a diet said to his acquaintance, ‘I
don’t have any problem. At least it’s easier for me to change my
body than for you to change your stupid brain and smarten up.’
Some people who heard about this response thought that it was
warranted by the insult. But others were shocked. Think about
why one might be shocked. We can learn something here, which
bears on this matter of charity and missing premises. I mean, why
would one find the idea of attacking another’s brain or mind so
much worse than the idea of attacking another’s body?
LYSIS: Gosh, I’m overwhelmed. What kind of analogy are you
using here anyway? There have to be some missing inferential
links in this one. I am glad you’re here to fill them in, because I
certainly wouldn’t be able to do it.
CHARMIDES: We all have our limitations. Look, the thing is, it is
more offensive to insult a person’s mind or brain, or intelligence
than to insult his or her body. This is because we tend,
fundamentally, to identify the real person much more with the
mind than with the body. We are like Rene Descartes in this
respect. We think a person is essentially a thinking reasoning
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thing, and we think of the thinking and reasoning capacities as
relatively fixed.
LYSIS: Goodness. I think I can see now what you’re getting at.
You suggest that in just the way a person’s mind is more
essentially that person than his or her body, a person’s reasoning
is more essentially him or her than that person’s assumptions and
beliefs. So it is more charitable, and less threatening, to claim that
a person has made questionable assumptions than to claim that
he or she has reasoned badly. Assumptions and beliefs can come
and go, but our reasoning powers are a fundamental part of us,
one that we have forever.
CHARMIDES: That’s it exactly. So even though we agree on the
substance of the various issues with the arguments I am still
being more charitable and more respectful of persons than you.
It is because of the way I locate my criticisms. Beliefs and
assumptions are more easily shed than styles of reasoning.
LYSIS: Well, there is so much I want to question about these
assumptions – yours, I mean. I think, you see, that people may
inadvertently reason badly. Bad reasoning on an occasion need
not express a permanent poor quality reason in a person. And also,
I think beliefs and assumptions can be a fundamental aspect of
a person’s cognitive style. So the contrast between reasoning as
expressing a relatively permanent aspect of a person’s capacity
for thinking, and assumptions and beliefs as more easily
droppable is not really valid. As a general contrast, it won’t hold
up.
I’m fascinated, though, by your analogy. We might think of the
common saying that inside every fat person there is a thin person
struggling to get out. You could imagine that inside every poor
reasoner, there is a competent reasoner, struggling to get out.
I don’t think people who make hasty or irrelevant inferences,
errors formal or informal, have something in them called ‘poor
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reasoning ability’. Rather, they share with everyone some
capacity to reason well. It is just that, for whatever reason, that
capacity has not been productively applied to the argument we
are criticizing. Perhaps the person was careless, or distracted,
or overly emotional about the issue, or so committed to the
conclusion that it didn’t seem necessary to find very good
evidence for it. Good reasoning can emerge. One thing that will
make it emerge is sharp, pungent criticism that points out errors
in reasoning and explains why these are errors.
Anyone, however great, original, or profound, can make
mistakes in reasoning, as in everything else. To say that this man
Descartes, who we were told was a very great philosopher, made
a mistake in reasoning is not to insult him or to imply that he
lacked reason, or even that he was not a great philosopher. It
is simply to show that one particular inference wasn’t correct,
period. Anyway, what makes people great or profound is not just
the correctness of their inferences. It is their originality, capacity
to identify and resolve new problems, ability to synthesize, and
much else. So much else.
CHARMIDES: I see what you’re saying. And yet it is more
charitable to reject arguments on the grounds of containing
unacceptable premises than to reject them on the grounds that
they have hasty or irrelevant reasoning. People regard reasoning
capacity as a more essential and less variable aspect of themselves
than their various assumptions and beliefs. They would far more
readily accept a criticism along my lines than yours. Criticism of
suppressed premises will be perceived as more charitable – and
for that reason it will be more charitable.
LYSIS: You mean, in this context to be perceived is to be?
CHARMIDES: Of course not. But if you can make the same
point in two different ways, and one of them is likely to be
more psychologically effective than the other, because people’s
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underlying assumptions make them more receptive to it, then
you should use that approach.
LYSIS: Well, I don’t know. You seem to be shifting grounds.
We are now moving from logical and interpretive issues to
psychological and pedagogical ones. After all, it could be that
what is most effective in causing people to produce clearer, better
arguments, using better reasoning, is my approach. It will more
quickly shock people out of their sloppy habits and more rapidly
lead to carefully structured reasoning. My approach would more
quickly improve reasoning and would for that reason be more
‘kind’ than yours.
CHARMIDES: I won’t pursue the subject further then, because
we are getting off the topic. Surely which premises are missing
doesn’t depend on which teaching technique is most effective!
LYSIS: The one analysis of yours that really bothered me was that
case where the French professor was trying to defend himself
against the criticism that he had given credits to stupid students.
Remember? It seemed to me that what he said about the
government having even worse idiots was clearly irrelevant to
the issue. Yet you, with your astounding patience and tolerance,
managed to weave a fairly plausible argument around his
comments. Of course, as in other cases, it turned out that you had
to use several rather implausible premises. But what bothered me
was that you did so much work yourself. You were constructing a
new argument, rather than analyzing his. Also his argument was
just tossed off in a moment of annoyance, it seemed. Because it
was amusingly bad, it was quoted in a newsletter. I don’t think it
deserved the amount of attention that your approach made you
give it.
CHARMIDES: I was frustrated by that example for just those
reasons. But you know there is another kind of case in which
your approach seems inappropriate. We sometimes have to deal
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with fragmentary texts by great thinkers, or with texts written in
a deliberately elusive way, by writers who want their readers to
think for themselves and, to achieve this, quite pointedly do not
spell everything out in a pedantic and literal fashion. Here, if you
fail to read in, you won’t find claims and arguments at all. And
yet some of the greatest thinkers have given us, or left us, only
fragmentary or elusive texts.
LYSIS: With fragments, I rather think it’s better to leave them
as fragments, with their poetic flavor intact, and read in a lot
of claims and arguments. And as for elusive writers, that’s a
different case. They do give you the basis in another part of
the text for the various attributions you need. You’ll be able to
add the requisite premises to arguments using my approach,
assuming that you want to get an explicit argument in that sort
of case. Often, the statement of problems and the suggestion of
hypotheses or images is more the issue than the actual argument.
CHARMIDES: But on the French professor example – not
Descartes, the other fellow, perhaps that case does reveal
something of general importance about my approach. I agree
that the amount of work I put into the thing was out of all
proportion to the seriousness and worth of the original piece.
Perhaps this is because the argument was not the argument of a
great man. I didn’t owe him the kind of respect I would owe to
Descartes or Peirce, or even C. S. Lewis, for that matter. Perhaps
I should qualify my policy of charity, and only apply it when the
argument was put forward by a person who has a claim to be
taken seriously.
LYSIS: I just can’t go for that. It’s so undemocratic! You’re
implying that some people have a greater claim to be taken
seriously than others. And when people have a greater claim
to be taken seriously, then we should adopt your sort of policy
toward them, and do a lot of filling out, if necessary, to make their
arguments plausible. Whereas, when people have less claim to be
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taken seriously, they merit less charitable treatment? I don’t like
this approach. My view is that everyone who enters the realm
of rational argumentation deserves equal treatment. If your view
is going to be amended so as to apply only to the elite, then it
appeals to me even less than it did before.
CHARMIDES: Just as some people have greater credibility as
witnesses, or experts on scientific facts than others, so too some
people have greater credibility as arguers. It is one thing to
attribute a hasty inference to your local bank teller and quite
another to attribute it to Descartes or Peirce.
LYSIS: I don’t like it. I don’t like it at all. It’s dialectical elitism,
that’s what it is.
CHARMIDES: Well, a label isn’t an argument. It’s just true that
different thinkers have different levels of credibility and merit
different amounts of respect. Calling it ‘dialectical elitism’ won’t
make it false.
LYSIS: Now we’re back to the other problem. Is criticizing
someone’s argument on the grounds that it contains hasty or
irrelevant reasoning disrespectful? I can’t see that it is, frankly.
After all, your criticisms and mine do not differ in substance,
only in location. You attack beliefs, and I attack inferences. I
never really conceded that that difference makes the difference
you ascribe to it.
CHARMIDES: Well it does.
LYSIS: Let me ask you something else. There is a distinction that
becomes blurred when people try to argue about the theory of
argument. It is the distinction between sitting down to do an
‘analysis’ of an argument, which pops up out of nowhere and is
an example some theoretician is using to illustrate a point, and
actively rebutting or accepting someone’s real argument in the
context of a live conversation or debate. We might call the first
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spectator analysis and the second participant analysis. People
who try to theorize about arguments are likely to do unusual
amounts of spectator analysis. And people who try to teach
others how to argue well are likely to do unusual amounts of
it as well. Since it is often the very same people who teach and
theorize, there is a tendency for the spectator point of view to
predominate when these people think about arguments. Yet
surely it is participant analysis which is the more fundamental
of the two, isn’t it? I maintain that it is. Arguing is defending
claims with reasons, and people do this in order to rationally
persuade others of what they have to say. Typically, people argue
and respond to arguments in contexts of actual ongoing debate,
where there is controversy and disagreement. If it were not for
participants, there would be nothing for the theory of argument
to be a theory of. Participant analysis is primary, and spectator
analysis is derivative. Spectator analysis should be in accord with
what participants do when they respond to each other’s
arguments.
You and I have been participants in a debate about spectator
argument analysis. As theorists, we are stuck doing lots and lots
of spectator analysis. It’s an occupational hazard, we might say.
Just as judges should refrain from seeing all humans as potential
court cases and doctors should refrain from looking at everyone
as prospective patients, we should avoid looking at every
argument from the view point of spectators. An argument is
not primarily a thing written on a page; it is primarily a set of
claims advanced by a person who is trying to rationally persuade
someone else. And responding to an argument is above all,
rejecting or accepting claims and inferences, on the basis of
reasons that can be put forward to the arguer. Any theory or
policy which we come up with, for handling arguments, should
apply to participant analysis as well as to spectator analysis.
CHARMIDES: Get to the point, will you?
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LYSIS: The thing is, I can apply my policy on missing premises
equally as a participant and as a spectator. When I argue, actively,
with you, I point out that some inference involves hastiness, or
irrelevance, unless the immediate context and my knowledge or
your related beliefs permits me to fill in the gaps in your case. If
things don’t seem right, I just say so, and I let you respond. I can
apply my policy in real ongoing debates, as well as in spectator
analysis of sample arguments. Can you do this too? Do you?
I don’t feel, really, when we are arguing together that I, as a
participant, get the treatment you recommend for filling in gaps
when you articulate your policy for spectator analysis. You imply
that when you are doing spectator analysis, but you don’t seem
to apply it when you are participating in a real debate like the
one we are having now. Is your policy like those philosophical
theories that won’t bear up in practice?
CHARMIDES: Well then, yours just might be one of those
debater’s practices that doesn’t bear up in theory! I’ll think about
it. The question is whether I apply my charitable policy in real
debate. This can be turned into two questions. First whether
the policy could be applied in this way; second, whether I do in
fact apply it this way. The answer to the first question here is
yes and the answer to the second is no, and for good reasons. I
don’t think this involves any pernicious or wicked split between
theory and practice. Let me explain.
Of course people could employ my policy when they are
actually participating in ongoing debates. It would make these
debates much slower than they actually are, but it would probably
make them more careful, tolerant, and polite too. I suspect it
is uncommon for people to use my sort of approach in actual
ongoing debates, although I wouldn’t know for sure. What I do
know is that even I, an advocate of the policy, do not employ it
when I am actively responding to your arguments in an ongoing
debate. The reason for this is perfectly obvious. It is that you are
also a participant, and you are entirely capable of doing your own
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filling in. If you use an argument which strikes me as containing
a non sequitur, I can just ask you whether you accept this or that
connecting premise, or ask you how the two things are
connected, and you can reply. People participating in ongoing
arguments on several sides of an issue are in a very different
position from people responding to an argument in a written
text, where there is no opportunity for direct response from the
author. The fact that I don’t use my policy in participant contexts
doesn’t show I have a philosophical theory that cannot be put
to practice. Rather, it shows only that I have enough ordinary
common sense not to try to think for other arguers when I have
to think for myself.
LYSIS: So you are qualifying your policy in two ways, really. First
of all, since it demands a lot of work from the critic, you are
saying that critics should only apply to arguments put forward
by people who have a claim to be taken seriously. Secondly, you
apply it only to contexts where you are, in effect, analyzing an
argument as a spectator, and not to those contexts where you
are actively engaged in arguing against or with someone in a real
debate.
CHARMIDES: That’s almost right. But the last part is more
complicated than you realize. You see, the contrast between
analyzing as a spectator and responding as a participant is not
as straightforward as you suggest. Of course, when we work
out examples in teaching or in trying to figure out a theory of
argument, we work as spectators, in your sense. And of course,
when we debate with each other, we work as participants. But
these contexts are at the ends of a spectrum, really. It’s not an
either/or. We are often doing something in between. We study
arguments written down somewhere, and we study them in the
course of developing a theory of our own on some subject. This
is participant analysis in that we are not studying an example
for some pedagogical or theoretical purpose, but rather we are
studying it because we have a direct concern for the issue it deals
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with. Here is where my original idea comes in. I’d say that this
too is participant analysis. However, like spectator analysis in
most cases, it typically gives us no opportunity to have a response
from the person whose arguments we are studying. It is this
unavailability in most spectator contexts that makes my policy
appropriate. And it is this that makes my approach better than
yours. Provided an author has a claim to be taken seriously and
is unavailable to fill out his or her own arguments, my charitable
policy is best.
LYSIS: I still don’t like it. I don’t like the contrast between those
who do and those who do not deserve to have their arguments
taken seriously and treated with charity. It violates my
fundamental respect for human persons.
CHARMIDES: Heavy stuff, this.
LYSIS: Still, it does. And I find your approach cumbersome and
long. It leaves the door open to reading in too much, and it
deviates from the text too much.
CHARMIDES: Your approach still strikes me as hasty and
uncharitable. You never once found a case where I read
something in which was not needed for the logic of the
argument. And you agreed that my approach was a powerful
critical tool. In one case it revealed a problem you had not even
contemplated.
LYSIS: What is ‘the logic of the argument’? That is a major thing
in question here. We shall have to comfort ourselves with the
thought that we do not disagree in substance on any case we
have looked at. Remember, it was obvious that we were actually
finding similar difficulties, only locating them in different places.
You say it’s more charitable to do this, and offer a theory about
people’s relative degrees of attachment to their reasoning powers
on the one hand and their beliefs and assumptions on the other.
I’m still not sure that it is more charitable, in an over-all sense.
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It seems to me that my approach is simpler and more efficient
than yours, reveals substantially the same issues in any given
argument (only locating them differently), and it is applicable
to all persons and to all arguments, in both participant and
spectator contexts. It is a more coherent and elegant policy. I
stick with it, and in fact, I can argue that it is just as charitable as
yours. I still say, let’s not multiply premises beyond necessity.
CHARMIDES: I multiply premises just exactly as much as
necessity demands. It’s just that things are complicated and
persons and contexts differ. Simplicity isn’t truth and efficiency
isn’t morality.
LYSIS: Well, we made some progress in doing all this, but we sure
can’t claim to have resolved our differences.
CHARMLESS: It is frustrating. We worked so hard. I keep feeling
we must be missing something, some fundamental key to it all.
Don’t you?
LYSIS: In a way I guess. But we can’t go on forever. Come on, let’s
walk down to the ocean and watch the waves come in.
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CHAPTER 7.
A NEW APPROACH TO CHARITY
The principle of charity is often cited in textbooks and elsewhere.
My latest survey suggests that it is cited as a strong principle, not the
moderate one supported here. Many authors urge, just as Scriven did
decades ago, that one should make an argument mean ‘something that
a sensible person would have been likely to mean’; in other words, one
should render a person’s proffered argument as rational as possible.
That means selecting and interpreting the premises so that they are
true or as plausible as possible, and interpreting the inferences so as
to give support to the conclusion. The same presumptions are made by
persons who advocate steelmanning. In philosophical circles, advice to
be charitable is often tempered in textbooks and academic papers by
reminders that while employing a principle of charity one must at the
same time be accurate and faithful to what an arguer has actually said.
Clearly these two admonitions may conflict. I sense little attention of
late to that problem and scant advice as to what to do when there is such
a conflict.
The problem that the otherness of other arguers may disappear under
the mantle of charity, noted here, has subsequently been discussed and
named ‘the problem of cultural imperialism.’ It is agreed that if
otherness is made to disappear, that is a problem. Evaluating an
argument, one should not interpret others, and especially not others
from foreign cultures or different subcultures, as claiming just what one
would claim oneself. Making them out to be what we would regard as
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rational or sensible, or what we would understand to be true statements
about the world, risks doing just that. The risk has been acknowledged
and defenders of charity in some form or other maintain that it need not
go that far.
The Principle of Charity states a norm for interpretation. That norm
has often been couched in ethical terms (‘be fair’) or prudential terms
(‘you might have to do all your work over again if the argument you
criticize can be easily amended so as to be better’). Jonathan Adler (1995)
urged that the norm of charity should be regarded as an epistemic norm,
based in the desire to evaluate an argument in order to discover whether
the conclusion of that was true. That view, he said, was epistemic:
presumably one’s goal was that of knowledge — to find out the truth
of the conclusion. In other words, Adler took a position close to that of
Charmides in the previous chapter. In friendly discussions with Adler,
I took a position closer to that of Lysis, urging that the Charmides
position risked seeing a person’s argument as merely a kind of
launching pad on a road to discovering whether various premises were
true and inferences correct. In his 1995 article “Charity, Interpretation,
Fallacy,” Adler approved of the Gricean base used here; charity is
understood not as based on norms of ethics or prudence but rather as
grounded on the purpose of argumentative discourse. That is to state
a claim and provide reasons for it; presumably the arguer states a
claim that she regards as true or plausible and states support that she
regards as strong or conclusive. Adler took the position that a principle
of charity, even a fairly strong one, would not be strong enough to
eliminate fallacies. That work appeared after this chapter; nevertheless
I now feel that I should have given more attention to the prospect of
epistemic norms to rationalize a principle of charity. For me, though,
that would still be moderate charity as distinct from strong charity.
Typically, human behavior is interpreted on the assumption
of rationality. To understand why someone acted as he did we
try to comprehend what his reasons might be. To understand
why someone said what he did, we try to comprehend what
information he would be trying to communicate. To understand
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how someone is reasoning, we try to see a line of thought that
would be coherent and logical. Charity directs us to adopt that
interpretation of human behavior according to which it makes
the most ‘sense’. Principles of charity have been proposed for
the interpretation of action and discourse and the interpretation
of arguments in particular. Charity as a principle of argument
interpretation may owe part of its acceptance to the prominence
of interpretative charity in other explanatory contexts.
1. Background
The principle of charity was introduced by Neil Wilson in an
article about reference that appeared in the Review of Metaphysics
in 1959. Wilson recommended the following rule for translators:
We select as designatum that individual which will make the largest
possible number of statements true.1
That is, we assume that others aim to tell the truth. If, by
interpreting others who use ‘x’ to refer to rabbits rather than
mammals we can make more sense out of what they say in the
sense that more of their statements turn out to be true, it is that
interpretation which is correct.
Quine, following Wilson, endorsed charity for what he called
radical translation. Suppose we are dealing with an unfamiliar
tribe and do not understand its customs and practices when we
begin the task of translation. There are always alternative ways
of interpreting discourse and actions. Quine recommended that
‘assertions startlingly false on the face of them are likely to turn
on hidden differences of language’, adding that:
… one’s interlocutor’s silliness, beyond a certain point, is less likely than
bad translation or, in the domestic case, linguistic divergence… the more
absurd or exotic the beliefs imputed to a people, the more suspicious we are
entitled to be of the translation; the myth of the prelogical people marks
only the extreme. For translation theory, banal messages are the breath of
life.2
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Among various tenable translation hypotheses, we opt for those
that will make the logical and empirical beliefs of the tribe the
most sensible and coherent.
Quine assimilates radical translation to understanding in our
own culture. He sees it as an extreme case of what must go on
all the time in ordinary life and ordinary language. In general, we
interpret people’s comments so as to make them out to be saying
something that makes sense to us. This procedure could be seen
as the application of a kind of translation principle to our own
language. Within our own tribe, we translate the remarks of a
fellow native who uses our own language.
Must we equate our neighbor’s English words with the same strings
of phonemes in our own mouths? Certainly not, for sometimes we do
not thus equate them. Sometimes we find it to be in the interests of
communication to recognize that our neighbor’s use of some word, such
as ‘cool’ or ‘square’ or ‘hopefully’, differs from ours, and so we translate
that word of his into a different string of phonemes in our idiolect …
we are always prepared to temper homophony with what Neil Wilson
has called ‘the principle of charity.’ We will construe a neighbor’s word
heterophonically now and again if thereby we see our way to making
his message less absurd…The problem at home differs none from radical
translation ordinarily so called except in the wilfulness of this suspension
of homophonic translation.3
Quine’s ideas were further developed by Donald Davidson,
who employed a principle of charity to dispute the claim that
different conceptual schemes can be used to differently catalogue
the same reality.
I suggest, following Quine, that we may without circularity or
unwarranted assumptions accept certain very general attitudes towards
sentences as the basic evidence for a theory of radical interpretation. For
the sake of the present discussion at least we may depend on the attitude
of accepting as true, directed at sentences, as the crucial notion. Since
charity is not an option, but a condition of having a workable theory, it is
meaningless to suggest that we might fall into massive error by endorsing
it. Until we have successfully established a systematic correlation of
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sentences held true with sentences held true, there are no mistakes to
make. Charity is forced upon us: whether we like it or not, if we want
to understand others, we must count them right in most matters. If we
can produce a theory that reconciles charity and the formal conditions for
a theory, we have done all that could be done to ensure communication.
Nothing more is possible and nothing more is needed. We make
maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret
in a way that optimizes agreement (this includes room, as we said, for
explicable error, i.e. differences of opinion).4
This is a very strong principle of charity. Davidson requires
that, in order to understand others, we must ‘count them right in
most matters’, saying we make ‘maximum sense of the words and
thoughts of others when we interpret in a way which optimizes
agreement’. Thus, the principle Davidson defends will only rarely
permit us to attribute to others faulty beliefs or reasoning, and
then only when all other feasible interpretations have failed.
Notably, Davidson is claiming that charity in this very strong
sense is not even optional. We do not choose whether or not to
be this charitable, because such a policy is a condition of having
any workable theory.
Both Quine and Davidson move quickly from a radical exotic
context where little background knowledge may be assumed to
the domestic context. In the domestic context, the other minds
sceptic would tell us we can assume little. But there are few
such people: other minds scepticism has not been in fashion for
many decades. It is not likely that Quine and Davidson wished to
pose a full-blown problem of other minds and use a principle of
charity to solve it. What is at work may be a lingering positivism:
positing meanings, intentions, and purposes requires special
justification.
Commentators on Quine and Davidson have not been inclined
to dispute the argumentative jump from foreign tribes to friends
and colleagues in our own native culture. And yet the domestic
tribe and the foreign tribe are too readily assimilated. There
are surely vast differences here. If we cannot assume that we
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understand the significance of such gestures as smiles and waves
in our own culture, that most of the time people use the word
‘dog’ to refer to canines, that others are friends with whom we
have had previous contact, and so on, then in understanding
discourse, we are as anthropologists approaching a foreign tribe.
But since we do and must assume these things in order to live
and function in our own culture, our position is quite different.
As Wittgenstein emphasized in On Certainty, were our position
not different, we could not survive and live together.
An account can build up a spectrum of cases of varying degrees
of difficulty in understanding, such that the foreign tribe is at one
end of the spectrum and close individuals in our own ‘tribe’ are
at the other. Thus, we might move, in theory, from my difficulty
in understanding the foreign words of a Zulu chieftain, to my
trouble understanding the words of an English microbiologist, to
my problems understanding the words of a Canadian child, and
in understanding the words of my own close Canadian friends.
There are differences of degree from the hardest to the easiest
cases.
Quine’s assimilation of foreign and domestic translation
problems may have been tempting to his philosophical audience;
we can easily construct this spectrum of cases, and the cases
so arranged differ from each other by degrees. However, it is a
well-known fallacy to infer from such facts that all cases on a
spectrum are the same.5 Differences of degree can accumulate to
make significant differences—as when a person gaining an ounce
a day eventually gains one hundred pounds. The difference
between interpretive problems with foreign tribes and
interpretive problems that arise within our own culture are real
and significant in practice. The latter should not be assimilated
to the former.
As well as radical and radical-domestic translation, the
presumption of rationality has been applied in recent philosophy
of mind. Daniel Dennett has a concept of intentional systems that
requires extremely strong charity. Dennett defines intentional
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systems as systems in which predictions of behavior using
intentional language (the language of desires and beliefs) are
effective. (There is no necessary link, on his view, between being
an intentional system and being conscious; nor does being an
intentional system require any specific physical structure or type
of physical structure.) Dennett uses the concept of intentional
systems to work out a non-dualistic position on the mind-body
problem. He makes a strong presumption of rationality a
condition of adopting the intentional stance. For intentional
systems, we are committed to strongly charitable interpretation.
According to Dennett, if we fail to interpret such systems in this
way, we must altogether renounce the intentional interpretation
and adopt a physicalistic approach. Dennett says:
There is a third stance one can adopt toward a system, and that is the
intentional stance. This tends to be the most appropriate when the system
one is dealing with is too complex to be dealt with effectively from the
other stances. In the case of a chess playing computer one adopts this
stance when one tries to predict its response to one’s move by figuring
out what a good or reasonable response would be, given the information
the computer has about the situation. Here one assumes not just the
absence of malfunction, but the rationality of the design or programming
as well.6
On Dennett’s account, to describe and predict the behavior
of any entity that is an intentional system requires a theory of
rationality, because we describe and predict on the assumption
that it is making reasonable responses, given its desires and
beliefs. In another paper, Dennett makes the link between
intentional systems and the imputation of rationality even more
explicit:
1. A system’s beliefs are those it ought to have, given its
perceptual capacities, its epistemic needs, and its biography.
Thus in general, its beliefs are both true and relevant to its
life …
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2. A system’s desires are those it ought to have, given its
biological needs and the most practicable means of
satisfying them. Thus (naturally evolved) intentional
systems desire survival and procreation, and hence desire
food, security, health, sex, wealth, power, influence, and
so forth, and also whatever local arrangements tend (in
their eyes – given their beliefs) to further these ends in
appropriate measure …
3. A system’s behavior will consist of those acts that it would
be rational for an agent with those beliefs and desires to
perform.7
On this theory, it is only when we regard an entity as
constituting an intentional system that we can properly ascribe
to it beliefs, interests, intentions, and the desire to communicate
ideas and arguments. The consequence is that any interpretation
of human action or discourse will be based on a strong
presumption of rationality.
It is not clear whether Dennett goes so far as to say that there is
never a false belief, an irrational action, or a mistake in reasoning.
In the first passage quoted, the phrase ‘one assumes not just
the absence of malfunction but the rationality of the design or
programming as well’ suggests that his view will have this
consequence. Dennett appears to be saying that, from the
intentional standpoint, malfunctions are absent and design or
programming has to be regarded as rational. These claims would
entail that what we typically describe as faulty reasoning would
be properly describable only in physicalistic terms, as the result
of a physical breakdown of some type.
However, this interpretation of Dennett may not be correct,
and the second passage quoted here, wherein the phrase ‘in
general’ is used, seems to allow for errors within the intentional
system, provided these are occasional.8 This ambiguity in
Dennett’s work has been noted by Stephen Stich, who criticizes
Dennett for making too strong a presumption of rationality.
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Stich says that ‘if we accept Dennett’s trade, we will have no
coherent way to describe our cognitive shortcomings nor the
process by which we may learn to overcome them.’9 Stich thus
emphasizes the deeply conservative and anti-reformist
implications of accounts of this type. Only if we believe that
people sometimes commit errors in reasoning and arrive at
incorrect beliefs will it make sense to try to improve reasoning
and correct some of these beliefs.
We may make a presumption of rationality in the sense that
we assume that generally other people are rational, or we may go
further and assume that they are always rational. The discussions
cited tend in the direction of saying that people are rational
whenever we understand them. If we interpret them as irrational
then, on this account, we have made a mistake: we do not
correctly understand them.
If charity is a presumption of understanding, whether for
translation or explanation, how strong a presumption is it? Does
it outweigh other indications to the point of ruling out all poor
logic, incoherent beliefs, absurdly false beliefs, irrational actions,
and errors in reasoning? Or does it merely put the onus in favor
of alternative ascriptions, allowing that sometimes other
indications can rightly lead us to alternatives that are less than
rational?
In ‘Rationality and Charity’, Paul Thagard and Richard Nisbett
distinguish and criticize principles of charity that have been
expressed as methodological canons of translation or social-
scientific understanding. They note that such principles have
seldom been spelled out precisely, and distinguish different levels
of strength:
1. Do not assume a priori that people are irrational.
2. Do not give any special prior favor to the interpretation that
people are irrational.
3. Do not judge people to be irrational unless you have an
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empirically justified account of what they are doing when they
violate normative standards.
4. Interpret people as irrational only given overwhelming evidence.
5. Never interpret people as irrational.10
Thagard and Nisbett argue that principles of charity as
stringent as (4) and (5) are methodologically unsound, whether
the context is that of translation (radical and domestic), or
understanding inference, or understanding choice. Principles at
level (3) are principles of moderate charity; those at levels (4) and
(5) are principles of strong charity.
For translation, Thagard and Nisbett claim that, given
background knowledge, we may have excellent empirical reasons
to ascribe a false belief, or even a contradictory set of beliefs to a
subject. In fact, in some cases, we may have a broader knowledge
of cultural context which makes the imputation of a false belief
or an ‘illogical’ set of statements extremely plausible. As an
example, Thagard and Nisbett cite a passage in which Hegel is
making a point about change which depends on his description
of change as violating the principle of non-contradiction. A
passage from his Logic is translated by A.V. Miller as ‘something
moves, not because at one moment it is here and at another
moment there, but because at one and the same moment it is here
and not here, because in this ‘here’ it at once is and is not.’ Hegel
apparently believed that motion was contradictory. According to
Thagard and Nisbett, he used the German equivalents of ‘and’,
and ‘not’ in ways so familiar that ‘no other translation would
be appropriate’. Supporting Miller’s translation, Thagard and
Nisbett comment that to ‘charitably’ interpret Hegel so that he
did not violate the principle of non-contradiction would be to
fail to take him seriously. It is not that Hegel did not write
elsewhere as though the principle of non-contradiction was
always generally true and applicable. Rather, in this passage he is
trying to say that change is paradoxical.
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On this account language can be used for social or other ends
apart from communicating information; maintenance of
principles of logic may be irrelevant to such ends. There can be
sound empirical reasons for translating and interpreting so as
to leave unorthodox beliefs unaffected. Thagard and Nisbett do
note this point. It seems that Quine, at least, is not committed to
disagreeing with it, provided that there is sufficient agreement
on basic empirical beliefs and logical principles to give a foothold
for understanding. Thagard and Nisbett conclude their
discussion of translational charity by saying that very strong
principles are empirically unsound.11
Strong methodological charity is, in fact, methodologically
dangerous, precisely in contexts where we are trying to
understand other languages, other minds, and other cultures.
There is in some circles a presumption that to understand we
must agree. This presumption surely deserves scrutiny. Even if
we concede that in order to understand, we must agree a fair
percentage of the time, that is not to say that understanding
presumes full agreement all the time. There is an underlying
difficulty with a model that insists on very wide agreement in
order to ‘make sense’ of others’ discourse. A fundamental
problem is that the otherness of other minds and cultures may
be lost if charity goes too far. It may be true that without some
presumptions of shared beliefs and a shared logic, understanding
of language is impossible. But a presumption is a presumption.
It can be outweighed in particular contexts by other
considerations. With too much charity we will seek
understanding of others to find only ourselves. What begins as
a gesture toward tolerance will defeat itself by blocking
understanding that emerge from an encounter of differences.
Thagard and Nisbett are prepared to recommend charity only at
levels (l), (2), and (3). I would share their caution.
Thagard and Nisbett call Davidson’s and Dennett’s principles
‘astoundingly strong’ and insist that they are empirically
inadequate. It is possible, on their view, to have good empirical
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reasons to believe that other people hold beliefs that we do not
hold, or make erroneous inferences about causes and other
matters. If we make charity so strong as to rule out the ascription
of false belief, faulty logic, or irrational action, we will bar any
effort to correct beliefs and practices – whether our own or those
of others.
There is no reason, however, why it should not be possible to determine
empirically that a system is regularly using some inferential principle
heuristic that departs from standard logical principles, then to use the
operation of this heuristic as part of an explanation of the system’s
behavior.12
Cultural anthropology does indeed require that we approach radically
different belief systems with as great as possible a suspension of our
own presuppositions, but nothing in the hermeneutic process requires us
actually to accept the presuppositions of the exotic culture under study.
We can understand a people’s belief that swamp light is spirit, or that sex
and procreation are unrelated, without supposing that these particular
belief systems have any truth at all.13
The trouble with strong charity is that it would have us
discount the empirical evidence that can strongly favor
interpretations of discourse and behavior that would not be
‘rational’ or ‘sensible’ in our terms. We may have good empirical
evidence that a ceremony is done for the purpose of bringing
rain, and good empirical evidence that the ceremony is seldom,
in fact, followed by rain. We do not ourselves believe that
ceremonies are customarily followed by rain but this by itself is
not a sufficient reason not to ascribe such a belief to a tribe that
practices rain dancing, when linguistic and contextual evidence
point in that direction. To ascribe such a belief, we must be
able to make it fit with linguistic and cultural patterns in the
culture in which it is held. That is, in a weak sense, seeing the
belief as sensible and rational, seeing it as held for a purpose
and as serving that purpose, and thus as rational to that extent.
Ascribing such a belief does not require seeing it as true or as
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warranted by evidence and reasoning. Nor does it require seeing
it as a belief we would hold or one we would regard as adequately
supported by evidence.
Richard Nisbett, Lee Ross, and others have conducted
psychological experiments on inference.14 They claim that some
errors are especially common in human subjects, and postulate
that these errors tend to occur when ‘heuristics’ which are useful
in some contexts are wrongly applied in others. Some
psychologists and philosophers have criticized their work on
various grounds, with some alleging uncharitable interpretation
of particular moves by subjects and others alleging that imputing
mechanisms that produce faulty reasoning is mistaken in
principle.15 Whether Nisbett and Ross have interpreted their
experimental responses correctly and whether they have used
the appropriate standards of inductive inference is a topic
beyond my present discussion, obviously. What is at issue here
is inference error in the light of interpretive charity. If we were
to adopt Dennett’s view, on its most radical interpretation, or if
we were to regard the discourse of our subjects as one we have,
in effect, to translate, using the strongest principles put forward
by Quine and Davidson, we could not find inference errors,
and this for methodological rather than empirical reasons. But
such a strongly charitable approach is mistaken. It too greatly
discounts the empirical evidence that can support alternative
interpretations according to which behavior is not rational. It
makes a presumption too much more than a presumption. It
reduces, ultimately, to an insistence that others conform to our
own standards and a resistance to the discovery of alternative
standards or any recognition of a need to improve present
performance.
In short, strong charity – levels (4) and (5) in Thagard and
Nisbett’s analysis – is too strong for a sound interpretive
methodology. If Quine, Wilson, Davidson, and Dennett really
require principles of charity this strong for their philosophical
purposes, their accounts stand in need of revision. Such
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principles are not adequate as a foundation for the empirical
study of foreign tribes, foreign languages, domestic tribes,
domestic language, or domestic inference. If moderate charity
would serve those purposes, so much the better. If not, alternative
approaches must be sought.
2. Charity and Argument Interpretation
The attitude of unquestioning respect for principles of strong
charity in argument interpretation may owe something to the
philosophical background just described. However, on reflection
there seems to be only a tenuous connection between these
broad philosophical contexts and the particular context of
argument analysis. Interpretation is involved when we extract an
argument from discourse in our own language. In this context
we presume a basic understanding of customs, meaning, and
syntax. We are not concerned to resolve scepticism about other
minds, to understand the utterances or customs of a foreign
culture, or to generate an epistemic basis for meaning or mind.
We are interpreting a speech or text in order to determine
whether it contains an argument and, if so, what that argument
is. Any deep philosophical dependency on strong charity
required for such broader tasks is the background, not the
foreground.
There are at least six pertinent stages of interpretation,
ordered roughly as follows:
1. We determine whether the speech or passage contains an
argument or not.
2. We determine, for argumentative passages, which sentences
within them express premises or conclusions.
3. We determine, for terms within those sentences that are
ambiguous or indeterminate in reference, what the meaning
or referent is likely to be, and whether words are meant
literally or figuratively.
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4. We decide what inference standard should be used to
appraise the argument.
5. We determine whether the stated premises and conclusion
constitute the argument or whether there is implicit
material that needs to be added.
6. If we judge that there is implicit material to be added, we
decide what that material is.
It is for these purposes that treatments of argument analysis
have appealed to the principle of charity.16 A principle of charity
functions as an interpretive principle used in the identification
of the parts of arguments and in the clarification (where
necessary) of meaning. This last use comes closest to the broader
philosophical contexts wherein charity was proposed, but there
is a crucial difference. It is the difference between foreign and
domestic ‘translation’. Here, the broad philosophical theory of
charity and interpretation would bear directly on charity for
argument interpretation if we were to grant Quine’s analogy
between radical and domestic translation and Davidson’s
subsequent uses of it. On these views, very strong charity would
be required for all interpretation of discourse, as a condition
of making sense of what others have to say. Obviously,
argumentative discourse would be included. But, as argued
above, the radical-domestic analogy ignores significant
pragmatic differences.
Strong charity is too strong to be methodologically sound.
In argument analysis, if one term or structure poses semantic
problems, these are resolved in a context where most other
meanings and the general purpose of the discourse may be taken
as understood. Typically, we do not face a radical problem in
understanding the ‘idiolect’ of the argument, only a particular
difficulty arising in this specific context.
That charity in argument interpretation is a lower level
principle than those of Quine, Davidson, and Dennett is
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implicitly recognized in the rationales philosophers have offered
for it. They do not claim that without charity we will be
altogether unable to understand the language of other arguers
or to ascribe to those speakers’ intentional states. Rather, they
justify the principle on ethical or prudential grounds. They say
that it would be ‘unfair’ or ‘unkind’ to arguers to give their
discourse anything less than a maximally sympathetic
interpretation; in effect this seems to be a claim that persons
interpreting and evaluating arguments are morally obligated to
be charitable. Or they say that it is imprudent to criticize an
argument on anything less than a maximally sympathetic
interpretation, because when we do, the argument can too easily
be revised so as to make our analysis irrelevant. We can find
these themes in Michael Scriven’s classic account.
The Principle of Charity requires that we try to make the best rather
than the worst, possible interpretation of the material we’re
studying. That is. even if, as a matter of strict grammar, we could shoot
the writer down for having said something that doesn’t follow or isn’t
strictly true, it may be more charitable to reinterpret the passage slightly
in order to make more ‘sense’ out of it, that is, to make it mean something
that a sensible person would be more likely to have really meant. We’ll
do this all the time. It doesn’t mean letting people off the hook entirely
by assuming they couldn’t possibly have meant something just because it
turns out to be unsound or untrue; most of us make such mistakes quite
often. What the Principle of Charity does mean is that taking ‘cheap
shots’ is something we shouldn’t waste much time doing … The Principle
of Charity is more than a mere ethical principle, but it is at least that
… It requires you to be fair or just in your criticisms ... they shouldn’t
take advantage of a mere slip of the tongue or make a big point out
of some irrelevant point that wasn’t put quite right … The Principle of
Charity does coincide with good practical advice about powerful and
efficient argument analysis. It tells you that you want to interpret the
argument’s meaning in whatever way makes the most sense and force out
of it, because otherwise, it can easily be reformulated slightly in order to
meet your objections.17
Scriven seems to express both moderate and then strong
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charity in this passage. Thomas is similar, saying that charity
makes sense in terms of kindness to authors and personal
strategy.18 A different approach is taken by Jonathan Adler.19 He
proposes that charity be adopted for epistemic reasons.
Whether the reasons underlying interpretive charity are
ethical, prudential, epistemic, or a combination of these, it is
clear that on these accounts charity is seen as an option at the
practical level, rather than a broadly theoretical necessity. To fail
to employ strong or moderate charity would not be to lose our
grip on understanding altogether, but rather (it is alleged) to do
something unethical, imprudent, or epistemically inefficient.
Consider the following example, found in a column on the
eastern bloc boycott of the Los Angeles 1984 Olympics.
Discussing the Soviet decision, columnist William Gold wrote
that the 1980 Moscow Olympics would have served to legitimize
Marxism in the eyes of communists around the world and that
the western boycott of those games had deeply hurt the Soviet
government of the day. He said that, though regrettable, the
decision to boycott the Los Angeles games was obviously
preferable to the ‘atomic frying of civilians’. Adding several
comments about alternative prospects for the Olympics and
international sports, Gold then wrote:
Two things are certain. The nuclear weaponry now in place will not
disappear. Even if arms control talks were to resume in earnest, the
best that could be hoped from them would be a reduction in the pace of
growth. And the implacable hostility will not abate, either. Nor should
it. Every free society has legitimate sympathy for those elsewhere who
would be free. Every totalitarian regime seeks dominion over its
neighbors. This conflict is fundamental. The challenge of our times is to
pursue it through avenues that do not lead to the total war that will be
unwinnable for all. In that quest, even the price of the Summer Games
as now constituted is not too much to pay, and there are means at hand
to minimize the loss. 20
This passage poses interpretive questions at all four of the
levels identified earlier. Is Gold arguing that the loss of the games
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is a small price to pay, on the grounds that with nuclear weapons
and international hostility a part of the scene, this price is so
much lower than alternative costs? Or is he merely saying this,
with the points about nuclear weapons and international
competition included as interesting and important background?
There are no indicator words in the passage, and the many
paragraph breaks could be interpreted as evidence that no line
of reasoning is being put forward. On the other hand, the words
‘in that quest’ in the final paragraph provide some evidence that
the author links that boycott of the Summer Games to the
‘implacable conflict’ he has described and intends somehow to
reason from the nature of the latter to the reasonableness of
sacrificing the former. The statements can naturally be arranged
into an argument and Gold seems definite and categorical in
his assertions, suggesting that he takes what he has to say very
seriously.
If Gold is arguing, what are his premises? Would his comment
about totalitarian regimes be a premise for his view on the
Olympics, or not? It is easy to falsify the claim that every
totalitarian regime seeks domination over its neighbors. (To cite
a case, Albania in the 1980s was a totalitarian regime, and did
not.) Gold says that nuclear weaponry ‘will not disappear’ and
that implacable hostility ‘will not abate’. Does he mean ‘never’
or ‘not in the foreseeable future’? If the former, the claim is far
too strong to be verified and forty years experience with nuclear
weapons would be very thin evidence for it; the author would
surely have an unacceptable premise, on this interpretation.
If we regard this column as expressing an argument, there will
be alternative ways of construing the structure of that argument.
Are there missing premises that superpower hostility must be
expressed and that either war or such tit-for-tat manoeuvres as
happened with the 1980 and 1984 Olympics are the only ways
that conflict can be expressed?
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We can usefully look at this passage as providing an example
of the issues to which a principle of charity in argument
interpretation is applied. The problem is not that we fail, as yet,
to grasp the tribal custom of writing newspaper columns, or that
we cannot determine whether the columnist is an intentional
system. It is not that we fail to understand what ‘Moscow’, ‘Los
Angeles’, and ‘Olympics’ refer to. Rather, there are more specific
issues arising in this particular case about how strongly to take
the terms ‘will not’ and ‘every’, and about whether the discourse
is intended as an argument. Charity would move us in the
direction of interpreting the passage as a nonargument. It would
push us toward taking problematic terms in such a way that
something qualified and thus relatively plausible is stated. For
‘The nuclear weaponry now in place will not disappear’, we
would read ‘The nuclear weaponry now in place will not
disappear in the foreseeable future’, or something similar. For
‘Every totalitarian regime’ we would read ‘most totalitarian
regimes’, and so on.
A consideration of this example provides a vivid illustration
of why a general account of charity cannot plausibly be derived
from ethical, prudential, or epistemic principles. First, consider
the matter of ethics. The columnist is an influential person; his
audience is potentially 100,000 readers or more; he usually
writes clearly and well and is a respected commentator on local,
national, and international affairs. On one reading, he is claiming
that a nuclear arms stand-off between the superpowers is a
permanent aspect of life. His comments, on one quite natural
interpretation, entail that a change in the nuclear situation is
impossible ever. On another they entail that it is impossible in
our time. On yet another, we may take the claim to apply only to
the next ten or twenty years. The unclarity of the claim is highly
significant. The ambiguity may lead people to accept the claim,
taking a weaker interpretation on which it is plausible. They may
then confusedly accept the stronger claim because they fail to
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notice the equivocation. Given the seriousness of the issue and
the size of his audience this columnist can influence, it is most
implausible to say that our ethical obligation is to assume that
the columnist meant to assert whichever one of these claims is
most likely true. Far from having an ethical obligation to take
the most plausible interpretation, in any context in which we
were analyzing this argument and had a substantial audience
ourselves, we would have an ethical obligation to point out the
lack of clarity and the fact that, on the very strongest
interpretation, there is little reason to think the claims are true.
The columnist’s substantial audience may be lulled by the
ambiguity into giving credence to the boldest claim despite the
fact that it is asserted with no supporting evidence, and is almost
certainly false. The matter is of considerable political
significance.
If a person makes ambiguous or unclear remarks, what is ‘fair’
to him is to tactfully point out the unclarity. But if one assumes
an ethical perspective on interpretive charity, that takes us
beyond the arguer himself to broader ethical considerations.
These may involve policy, principles, events, and other affected
persons. A maximally charitable version of discourse is not
demanded for ethical reasons. In contexts sufficiently serious,
ethics may indicate quite the reverse.
Nor does prudence clearly indicate opting for the most
plausible interpretation in such a case; this will depend on our
relevant purposes and interests. Where prudence leads will
depend on what we are doing, who our analysis is for, whether
the arguer is present or absent, how sharp the arguer is, and
many other things. If the arguer is absent, and our purpose is to
convince our own audience of a point of view different from his,
prudence alone could indicate taking a minimally sympathetic
reading of an argument and dismissing it quickly.
Thus, ethical and prudential considerations will not always
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recommend charity. Although moderate charity may well be an
appropriate principle of interpretation, we cannot derive it from
these sources. At best, their principles would indicate charity in
some contexts.
Nor is an epistemic approach much better for this purpose.
Jonathan Adler, in an essay entitled ‘Why Be Charitable?’, locates
the principle of charity in the broad context of the epistemic goal
of seeking truth. Adler says:
If the study of informal logic is construed as within the theory of inquiry,
then it should seek analyses and evaluations that bring us closer to the
truth. Presumably this implies that we want to maximize truth-relevant
or epistemically relevant considerations over pragmatic or ethical ones
in defending certain approaches, rules, or principles. The Principle of
Charity should be justified, at least as a first try, as significant for
finding out whether the conclusion is correct, given the premises, rather
than merely winning the argument. We want to formulate arguments at
their best or greatest strength because that makes the evaluation a more
‘severe’ test. The more severe test – a stronger statement of the argument
– is more likely to reveal falsity (failure of the line of reasoning than a
less severe one) (weaker statement of the argument).21
Adler recommends charity in argument interpretation on the
grounds that argument interpretation and analysis are part of
inquiry and the purpose of inquiry is to find truth. He endorses
the Popperian view that truth is found by severe criticism.
Criticism tests most revealingly when hypotheses are formulated
as strongly as possible.
Several background assumptions are open to question in this
account. Adler seems to mean by ‘theory of inquiry’ the
philosophy of science and epistemology. It is not clear that
informal logic or the theory of argument is properly part of these
subjects. Key topics are different and so is the range of examples.
Most questionable is Adler’s belief that argument interpretation
and evaluation have as their purpose the determination of the
truth of the conclusion. If the purpose of argument analysis were
to determine whether the conclusion is true, we would analyze
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arguments by bringing forward everything we knew that was
positively or negatively relevant to the conclusion. There would
be no need to interpret stated premises or to restrict ourselves
to the reasoning used by the arguer. In fact, on this view, it
is hard to see why interpretation of other people’s discourse is
part of argument analysis at all, except to extract conclusions
which we go on to consider from our own point of view. The
stated premises would be pertinent only insofar as we may find
them acceptable or they may remind us of something else that
counts in favour of the conclusion. Adler qualifies his account by
noting that we are trying to determine whether the conclusion
is true, ‘given the premises’. For this latter purpose, which better
approximates the purpose of argument evaluation, charity may
be important. But it is unclear that it can be rationalized
epistemically.
A major problem for Adler’s epistemic account of interpretive
charity is that interpretive canons are to be applied in
determining what the premises are. This is a different aspect of
evaluation from the logico-epistemic task of determining whether
a conclusion is true, given the premises. Charitable alterations of
stated premises or supplementations of stated premises will not
give a good estimate of whether the conclusion is true, ‘given the
premises’. It will show whether the conclusion is true given some
slightly or dramatically different premises, which is something
else entirely. Charity is working in the wrong place for Adler’s
epistemic rationale to apply properly. We have yet to find a
suitable rationale for the charity so commonly urged as a basis
for argument interpretation.
A problem with Scriven’s classic account of charity for
argument interpretation concerns his directive to search for the
best interpretation. This directive itself may be interpreted in
several ways. What is best? Scriven may mean only that we should
interpret discourse carefully, paying close attention to nuances
of meaning, possible irony and ridicule, aspects of context, and
so on. This sort of charity, which I would call truistic charity, is
224 TRUDY GOVIER
unproblematic. Of course we should appreciate such aspects of
discourse; no one has denied it. At the opposite extreme is strong
charity. Urging us to find the best interpretation, Scriven may
mean to find that interpretation according to which the passage
emerges as the most plausible and rationally ordered. It could
appear either as an nonargument or as the best argument we
could get out of it. This interpretation is suggested by Scriven’s
phrase ‘make it mean something that a sensible person would be
more likely to have really meant’. The expression ‘make it mean’
rather suggests that we would be prepared to ignore empirical
indicators of implausible assertions or faulty reasoning so as to
make a passage out as more rational than it first appears to be.
The pitfalls of ignoring or discounting pertinent empirical
evidence are evident here, just as they are in the contexts
discussed by Thagard and Nisbett. This strong charity would
apparently license considerable deletion, addition, and
clarification in order to generate plausible, relevant premises and
accurate reasoning. It has been applied by some conscientious
philosophers with enormous energy, as Ralph Johnson pointed
out in his well-known essay, ‘Charity Begins at Home’.22 Strong
charity forces on logicians and critics the obligation to construct
good arguments from sketchy and insignificant materials, an
onerous task they may rightly resist, and one which may only
disguise or whitewash the genuine carelessness and stupidity
which are sometimes present in real discourse.
I contend then that strong charity is just as problematic in
argument interpretation as it is in broader philosophical contexts.
There may be much empirical evidence in favor of the not-so-
charitable alternative interpretation. Strong charity licenses too
much alteration of the data. It courts misunderstanding and
ethnocentrism insofar as making others out to be sensible
amounts, in practical terms, to making them out to agree with
us. Strong charity in argument interpretation might be
recommended for some limited purposes and in some special
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contexts, but it will not be satisfactory as a general, over-riding
interpretive principle.
Applying charity to Scriven’s explanation of charity, what is
most likely is that he intended to recommend something between
truistic and strong charity. I would term this moderate charity.
When other indicators (context, logical pattern, professed
intention, indicator words) count equally in favour of several
distinct interpretations, we adopt the one that generates the most
plausible argument.
Obviously, moderate charity needs further explanation. What
are all these other indicators? What do we do in the typical case
where they do not count exactly equally for several distinct
interpretations? What is the most plausible argument, if we have
to choose between a version with unacceptable premises and
good reasoning, and a version with acceptable premises and poor
reasoning? We still need a more precise expression of moderate
charity for argument analysis. And, seeing that ethical,
prudential, and epistemic foundations are unpromising as a
rationale for charity, we need an account of moderate charity
that will tell us why it is an appropriate interpretive principle for
argument assessment. Beginnings of such an account are offered
below.
3. A Preliminary Account of Moderate Charity
In ‘Logic and Conversation’ H.P. Grice sets forth a Cooperative
Principle for discourse. He points out that exchanges do not
normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks. They
require some cooperative effort and purpose. Because there is
always some minimum of common purpose, there are some
possible conversational moves that would not be suitable.
We might then formulate a rough general principle which participants
will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, viz. ‘Make your
conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which is
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occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which
you are engaged.’ One might label this the Cooperative Principle (CP).23
One purpose of conversational exchange is to have a
maximally effective exchange of information; Grice notes that
this, although an important purpose of discourse, is not the only
such purpose. Given it, we might derive a number of maxims
participants should follow. Grice proposes these:
Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current
purposes of the exchange).
Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. Do
not say what you believe to be false.
Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. Avoid obscurity of
expression
Avoid ambiguity.
Be relevant.
and a number of others. Human ‘talk exchanges’ are a type of
rational purposive behavior, and these maxims are reasonable to
follow, given the aims we have.
As is well known, Grice uses his account of logic and
conversation to give an explanation of the pragmatic
paradoxicality of Moore’s ‘it’s raining, but I don’t believe it’, and
the differences between truth functional connectives and the
ordinary language ‘meaning’ of related terms. Aspects of the
account are suggestive for charity as well, though Grice himself
did not discuss this subject. 24
Grice’s Principle of Cooperation is formulated so as to focus
primarily on one partner in the conversational exchange: the
speaker. If we consider argumentative exchange as a special case
of conversational exchange, and adopt the perspective of the
audience rather than that of the speaker (or arguer), we can
generate a principle of charity as a particular application of the
Principle of Cooperation.
What is an argumentative exchange? It is a discussion (spoken
or written) in which parties are setting forth reasons to support
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their beliefs and opinions, usually in order to rationally persuade
or convince each other. These arguments are related, at least
in the sense that the beliefs and opinions are about the same
subject, and ideally in the further sense that the arguments of one
participant are at least sometimes a response to those of another.
The purposes of an argumentative exchange are to communicate
information, beliefs, and opinions, to persuade others by reasons
that one’s own beliefs and opinions are true or acceptable, and
to check and, if necessary, revise one’s own beliefs and opinions
through rational evaluation. Thus, in arguing we have a social
practice of presenting and mutually evaluating evidence and
reasons for our claims and beliefs. We offer arguments and
consider arguments to defend and rationally consider claims and
beliefs. We defend beliefs primarily in order to persuade others
that they are true, and we attend to other people’s arguments
from reciprocity and a desire to find out whether we should be
persuaded by what they have to say. This is the major point of
arguing, just as exchanging information is the major point of
conversation.
This is not to say that every case where an argument appears is
a case where the arguer genuinely wishes to rationally persuade
a rationally critical audience. Rather it is to say that the practice
or social institution of argument has this as its typical function
or purpose. The point is not straightforwardly empirical, but
conceptual and normative. Argument as a social practice exists
so that we may mutually communicate and amend our beliefs,
as warranted by shared reasons and evidence. Written argument
spreads this process over a broader audience and longer time
span than spoken audience. It makes audience response less
certain and immediate than in speech contexts. Nevertheless, the
possibility of such response is always there, and good written
argumentation is attentive to this fact. On this account, written
argument and criticism may be seen as a derivative of spoken
discussion.
From such a conception of argumentative practice, we may
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derive a principle of charity, just as Grice derived his
Cooperative Principle from his concept of the normal function
of conversation. The principle of charity will direct the audience
to interpret an arguer’s discourse in a way that will conform
to the purpose of arguing and considering arguments. Such a
principle will direct us to interpret the discourse of others so as
to contribute to the argumentative exchange. We presume, other
things being equal, that others are participating in the social
practice of rational argumentation. That is, they are trying to
give good reasons for claims they genuinely believe, and they
are open to criticism on the merits of their beliefs and their
reasoning. They are operating within the purpose of the
exchange: that is, it is their purpose to communicate
information, acceptable opinions and reasonable beliefs, and to
provide good reasons for some of these opinions and beliefs by
offering good arguments. If we make this presumption, then if
there is an ambiguity in the discourse, and we can interpret it
either as well reasoned or as poorly reasoned, we will opt for
the more sensible interpretation. The assumption that people are
trying to put forward good reasons for claims that they believe
provides a basis for moderate charity in the social practice of
argument and its functional prerequisites.
On this view, the basis for charity is to be found not in ethics,
prudence, or epistemology, but in the nature and purpose of
the activity in which participants are engaging: argument. That
people are exchanging what they take to be good reasons for
their views when they appear to be is a rebuttable presumption.
If we presume their participation, a moderately charitable
approach to what they say is indicated, as an application of the
Principle of Cooperation. If for one reason or another, the
presumption would not be appropriate – some persons lack all
credibility, others may be significantly handicapped, or the
context may be one in which people seek to persuade with no
regard for the quality of reasons and evidence, then there is no
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justification for approaching the discourse charitably – not even
moderately charitably.
A principle of charity that is rationalized in this way is
moderate, not strong. Given the purpose of argumentative
discourse, that must be the case: the purpose of argumentative
exchange is the defense and discussion of conflicting or
potentially conflicting opinions and beliefs. (Typically we do not
argue for beliefs upon which we and our audience already agree.)
The very concept of argument implicitly refers to disagreement
between parties. Hence strong charity, where we would interpret
others as making true or well-warranted claims contrary to
empirical evidence, would undermine the purpose of the practice
of argument. In any event strong charity is flawed in several
fundamental respects. First, it licenses too much manipulation of
empirical evidence which would support imputations of false or
implausible beliefs, or flawed reasoning. Second, it puts at risk
the ‘otherness’ of other minds by directing us to find in others’
beliefs and reasoning which are ‘correct’ and thereby similar to
our own. Third, it prevents us from trying to correct beliefs or
improve arguments, since we are committed to interpreting all
arguments as sensible to begin with. The problem with strong
charity could be stated this way: it makes the presumption of
rationality in others overbearing instead of having it function as
one interpretive factor among others.
The pull between charity and other factors can be seen in
this account of argumentative discourse. Its primary purpose is
an interchange of evidence and reasons for beliefs. This notion
presumes that minds are interacting with other minds. We allow
the possibility of revising our own beliefs and our own
reasoning. Strong charity directs us to find true or plausible
beliefs, and to interpret so as to find good reasoning. In effect,
this will be the same as interpreting so as to maximize agreement
with our own beliefs and our own standards of reasoning.
Necessarily, we determine truth, plausibility, and accuracy of
reasoning according to our own standards. Thus, the idea that
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other beliefs, controversial from our own point of view, may
be encountered in an argumentative exchanged, is jeopardized
when charity is strong. If we insist on interpreting others so as
to make them out as correct by our standards, this aspect will
disappear.
Grice’s idea of cooperation is useful here. By communicating
and rationally scrutinizing evidence and reasons for beliefs
different from our own, argumentative exchanges allow us to
cooperate with those who may differ. To sacrifice this ‘otherness’
would defeat the purpose of the exchange. By applying the
Cooperative Principle, we arrive at moderate charity rather than
strong charity. If we focus on communication between different
selves and on allowing the revision of our own views, we find
reason to allow that others may make statements that we do not
find plausible, or use reasoning that we regard as flawed. We
presume that others who participate in the practice of argument
and rational discussion intend to convey sensible claims and to
support these claims with well-reasoned arguments. We also
presume that they may differ from us. Other arguers regard their
beliefs and arguments as sound; we may or may not. We do
not have to agree to understand. The charity that emerges is
moderate charity.
Moderate charity directs us not to interpret others as having
made implausible claims or faulty inferences unless there is good
empirical reason to do so. Empirical reason is provided in the
first instance by the wording of the discourse and also by the
context in which the discourse appears and background
knowledge pertaining to the arguer. If the arguer has known
interests or prejudices, this may also affect our interpretation of
his or her claims and reasons. If someone writes to the editor and
says:
Calgary is an unfriendly city, because the people at the zoo were very
unfriendly to me when I was there.
there is a good empirical reason to see him as having offered an
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argument in which the inference is hasty. The empirical evidence
that there is an argument is first of all his use of ‘because’, a
logical indicator, and secondly the context of the letter to the
editor, which is one in which people typically express strong held
opinions and try to convince others that these are true. Moderate
charity allows us to interpret the discourse this way, because
there are sound empirical reasons for doing so. We allow that,
although on reflection we do not find the inference sound, the
arguer might deem it sound. Or, more likely, he might simply
have been careless.25
The presumption made in argumentative discourse is one of
reasonable participation in the specific exchange, not of
ubiquitous rationality according to our own standards of what
rationality is. Such a presumption is sufficient for the purpose
of the discourse and for other philosophical purposes. It is a
presumption that can be defeated. When it is, the rationale even
for moderate charity will disappear. When relevant empirical
evidence does not determine one or another interpretation and
moderate charity is indicated, we adopt that interpretation
according to which the claims made are most plausible and the
inferences most reasonable.
An example can be found in a dispute between Atomic Energy
of Canada and the Manitoba government concerning the storage
of radioactive wastes in deep underground vaults. In response to
the Manitoba government’s statement that the AECL had offered
no evidence the storage was safe, AECL president James Donnelly
replied that all evidence shows that ‘reactor wastes, which will
remain highly radioactive for almost as long as mankind has
walked the earth, can be safely disposed of deep in underground
vaults.’26 An issue of charity arises here concerning the meaning
of the key word ‘safe’. It might be taken to mean ‘poses no risk
at all of harm to humans or the environment’ or alternately to
mean ‘poses only a small, acceptable risk of harm to humans or the
environment’. If we regard Donnelly as someone who is sincerely
participating in an argumentative exchange here, and apply
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moderate charity to his remarks, we would take ‘safe’ in the
second sense, since his claim has a better chance of being true on
that interpretation.
Another example was discussed in Ralph Johnson’s paper on
charity. It goes like this:
Cats are free spirits, the last really independent creatures around. You
can no more license cats than you can license the wind. Dogs may submit
to bureaucracy. Cats won’t. The same spirit tends to rub off on cat
owners. They have enough trouble being pushed around by their cats
without being asked to submit to man-made laws. Besides, there’s an
economic factor. They’ve never had to buy licenses, so why start? No ... it
just won’t work.27
In this passage, there seems to be an argument for the
conclusion that a policy of licensing cats won’t work. Two
premises, stated near the end, are that cat owners will oppose
licensing due to previous freedom and that cat owners will
oppose licensing due to costs. There are several further elements
in the passage which might be taken as humorous flourishes or
might be regarded as serious parts of the argument. Two are
‘You can no more license cats than you can license the wind’,
and ‘They (owners) have enough trouble being pushed around by
their cats without being asked to submit to man-made laws’. As
for the cat-wind connection, we might take it as a serious analogy
intended to support the statement that cats are free spirits, in
a sub-argument. However, it would be a tenuous analogy to be
sure. We might take the comment about owners being pushed
around as a premise in a sub-argument supporting the
underlying idea that owners will be opposed to licensing. But
taking this literally is implausible: the domination of owners
by cats seems deliberately exaggerated as a kind of mild joke.
The claim, as stated, would not be acceptable if taken literally.
Similarly, we may ask how to read ‘Cats are free spirits, the
last really independent creatures around’. It does seem to be a
crucial premise in the argument that cats are free spirits, but
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should we take ‘the last really independent creatures around’
really seriously? (If we do, it is easily vulnerable to objections
— for example, robins and sparrows are around, and they seem
free.) The phrase might alternatively be interpreted as a
rhetorical flourish to emphasize the author’s main assertion that
cats are free spirits.
Applying moderate charity to the passage, we would avoid
committing the author to the sub-argument based on an analogy
between cats and the wind and we would take the other two
elements as literary flourishes not intended to make literal
substantive claims. The passage as stated provides no indication
that these elements are to be regarded as parts of serious
argumentation or as substantive claims. If taken as such, they
would be very vulnerable to criticism. Furthermore, a fairly clear
argument can be extracted from the passage without including
these elements as parts and no ‘forced’ approach to the discourse
is required in order to do this. Applied to this passage, moderate
charity would yield the following argument:
1. Cats are free spirits.
2. Cat owners will oppose licensing cats.
3. Cat owners will resist paying to license cats when they have
not had to pay before.
So,
4. Licensing cats would not work.
Let us now return to William Gold’s passage on Cold War
relations and the Olympics and employ an interpretive strategy
of moderate charity. There are no indicator words in the passage.
Nevertheless, it seems natural and easy to arrange it as a
structured argument. Gold states as certainties two basic claims
– first that nuclear weaponry will not disappear and second that
the hostility between the superpowers will not abate. (One might
try to water down these claims, to make them more plausible,
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but this would be a shift to strong charity and would ignore clear
textual evidence. The author after all, starts out by categorically
saying ‘Two things are certain’, and these are the two things.)
For these supposedly certain claims, Gold offers some support in
each case – nuclear weaponry will not disappear because even
successful arms control talks would issue at best in a reduction,
and hostility will not abate because free societies sympathize
with those wanting freedom and totalitarian regimes seek
domination over their neighbours. Gold then makes the further
claim that the conflict is fundamental – supported by the
considerations about unabated hostility between freedom and
totalitarianism. He adds that the conflict must be pursued short
of total war. From this he infers that the price of the Summer
Games is not too high, especially considering that the loss can be
minimized. (Do we need a missing premise here, to the effect that
sacrificing the Summer Games is the only safe way to pursue the
hostility at the time of writing? If so, this will give another easily
refuted premise. We’ll ignore this problem for the moment, but it
does arise.) We could easily set out this passage as an argument.
1. The nuclear weaponry now in place will not disappear.
2. Even the most successful arms control talks would only
reduce the amount of nuclear weaponry.
3. Implacable hostility between the superpowers will not and
should not disappear.
4. Every free society has legitimate sympathy for those who
want to be free.
5. Every totalitarian regime seeks domination over its
neighbors.
6. The conflict between free societies and totalitarian regimes
is fundamental.
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7. The conflict between free societies and totalitarian regimes
must be pursued short of total war.
8. There are means to minimize the loss of the Summer
Olympic Games.
Therefore,
9. The loss of the Summer Olympic Games is not too high
a price to pay for the benefit of pursuing the fundamental
conflict between superpowers.
There are several sub-arguments. (2) is offered to support (1);
(4) and (5) are offered to support (3); then (1), (3), (6), (7), and
(8) link so as to support (9). The argument will turn out to be
seriously flawed, due to its containing in an essential role easily
falsified premises, and due to the gap between the combined
premises and the specific conclusion about the Games. (We
could eliminate the gap by adding a premise, but were we to do
so new problems would only arise because that premise would
be easily shown false.) That is, strong charity would have to
outweigh empirical evidence which points quite unambiguously
in one direction, in this case. Moderate charity will not do this.
The passage should thus be seen as expressing an argument –
one that is flawed.
4. Concluding Comments
One objection to the above account of the purpose of arguing
and the basis of moderate charity might be that it is too idealistic,
seeing arguers and listeners as more honorable than they in fact
are. It focuses too much on rationality and too little on
persuasion. It might be urged that some arguers do not intend
to persuade their audience by offering good reasons but rather
to persuade their audience by offering whatever is likely to be
effective. They intend only a result, and may care nothing for
reasoned argument or plausibility of claims as a means to that
result. It must be admitted that this is often the case.
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Advertisements and political propaganda are important cases in
point. Even in less manipulative contexts, there are some
discussants who seek only to manipulate opinion in this way.
Sometimes an immediate need is so important, or the possibility
of more rationally based persuasion so remote that such methods
may be ethically justifiable.
Gilbert Ryle once argued that we can have counterfeit coins
only if we have, or have had, real money. John Austin said that
people are able to pretend only if the real thing is known and
understood.28 In an analogous way, propaganda and other
manipulative persuasion may get their point from genuine
argumentation and reasoning. We may erroneously take
nonrational persuasion, expressed in the trappings of rational
persuasion, to be a genuine case of rational persuasion. Possibly
our susceptibility to some of the forms of pseudo-rational
persuasion is due to their facade of rationality. Discourse may
contain no reasoning or evidence and yet have the appearance
of doing so. It may be put forward by someone whose sole goal
is persuasion and who has no respect for canons of sound
argumentation. Yet, its semantic surface may be that of genuine
argumentation and its persuasive power due in part to that fact.
Forms of propaganda owe their success to the institution of
genuine argumentation.
The distinction between education and propaganda might be
drawn in these terms. The social practice of rational argument
and debate is more fundamental than pseudo rational persuasion
or propaganda, though they are profoundly important both in
themselves and with regard to their social and political
consequences. The present account of arguing stipulates the
purpose of argumentative discourse as such, not the purpose or
intention of every individual and institution engaging in it.
Because argumentative discourse has the purpose of rational,
considered, reflective, and mutual persuasion, we presume in
most contexts that arguers have these purposes. If we obtain
evidence to the contrary, then the rationale for moderate charity
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no longer applies. There is no reason to apply even moderate
charity to a twenty second television advertisement, because we
know that the writers and sponsors do not intend to persuade
by reason, in this context. But until we have strong reason not
to do so, we should assume that those engaging in what appears
to be argumentative discourse are doing what they seem to be
doing, namely participating in the social institution of rational
persuasion and reflection. On this assumption, we adopt a
principle of moderate charity as a general guide in argument
interpretation.
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CHAPTER 8.
REASONS WHY ARGUMENTS AND
EXPLANATIONS ARE DIFFERENT
Broadly speaking, the current consensus about the basic distinction
is similar to that theme of this chapter. Argument and explanation are
different; generally they differ pragmatically. Reasoning is used in both,
and the same indicator words are used in both.
This chapter represents my response to a challenge issued by S.N.
Thomas, who maintained on the basis of a number of tricky cases
that the argument/explanation distinction did not hold up to scrutiny.
Looking back at the chapter many years later, I still find myself
impressed by the examples he put forward. I would agree now, as I did
then, that the distinction between argument and explanation is not an
exclusive one. It’s quite possible for the same set of statements to provide
both an argument that a conclusion C is true and an explanation as
to why it is (or how it came to be) that C should be true. Yet it is still
the case that argument and explanation differ from a pragmatic point
of view. The ‘why?’ of explanation differs from the ‘why?’ of argument.
Explaining, one will offer an account (usually causal) as to why or
how C came to be true. Arguing, one will cite reasons or evidence
purporting to show that C is true. Explaining, one presumes general
agreement about C; arguing one presumes the actuality or possibility
of disagreement about C. Thomas maintained that the argument/
explanation distinction should be dispensed with because it could not
be drawn clearly and admitted too many borderline cases. Still more
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significantly, he found cases that qualified both as argument and as
explanation and thus undermined the dichotomy. Working through
some of his challenging examples, I agreed that a passage could
constitute both argument and explanation but resisted renouncing the
distinction altogether on that account. In other words, I preserved the
binary but allowed that it was not exclusive.
In a 2010 article, ”Argument Explanation Complementarity and the
Structure of Informal Reasoning” Gregory Randolph Mayes similarly
maintained a distinction between argument and explanation. Mayes
put it this way: in an argument, the conclusion is disputed; in an
explanation, the conclusion (or statement that would stand in the place
occupied by the conclusion) is already accepted. One can ask just who it
is that is referred to as accepting or disputing claim C. Mayes maintains
that it is the arguer. The arguer can of course get the matter wrong. For
example she might suppose that the persons she is addressing grant that
C and offer to them an explanation of C. If she is mistaken about that,
the explanation will not be appropriate. The audience could be lured
into supposing that C is true, or it could expect an argument and be
disappointed that what the arguer has to offer will not provide justifying
evidence or reasons. Mayes is aware of such issues; nevertheless he
sustains his view that the arguer’s states of acceptance or doubt
determine the argument or explanation status of her discourse.
Mayes offers lucid and interesting examples of how argument and
explanation may be combined in discourse. For instance, one might cite
a claim to support a conclusion (argument) and then offer an account of
how that claim came to be true (explanation). As he says, argument and
explanation can be complementary to each other in these sorts of cases.
A 2017 article “Argument or Explanation: Who is to Decide?”
appeared just as I was about to write this introduction. The author,
Michel Dufour, points out that neither Thomas nor myself questioned
the exhaustiveness of the argument/explanation binary. (I had noted
a third alternative — descriptive discourse that is neither justificatory
nor explanatory – in my textbook.) Dufour maintained that one does
not always find disagreement about the conclusion of an argument.
I had actually acknowledged that one can look for an argument that
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would justify a claim C even when one accepts C, as for example in
a context of inquiry. Dufour states that it is unclear who is to decide
whether a claim C is ‘certain’ enough to be explained instead of argued
for, and rejects the idea that the arguer himself or herself should hold
authority of that matter. Perhaps claim C is something that people
neither agree nor disagree about. Perhaps they have barely considered
the matter, or do not care enough about it to bother. Then the pragmatic
distinctions will not take hold. In this case, the binary is not exhaustive.
Is the discourse an argument or an explanation? The answer should be
neither.
Philosophers have commonly distinguished between
arguments and explanations. In arguments, premises are stated
in an attempt to prove, or justify, a conclusion. In explanations,
statements are made in an attempt to account for, or show the
cause of, a state of affairs. Most introductory accounts of
argument take this contrast for granted. Nevertheless, there are
a number of interesting and relatively unexplored issues about
the relation, similarities, and distinction between argument and
explanation.
The so-called logical indicator words – ‘thus’, ‘therefore’,
‘since’, ‘because’, ‘so’, and many others, are as common in
explanations as they are in arguments. Those which precede the
conclusions in arguments may equally well precede what is
explained in an explanation. Here is an example:
When censorship boards conduct their deliberations in secret, public
accountability is lost. Public accountability is essential. Thus, such
proceedings should be recorded and public access to the records should be
allowed.
In this example, ‘thus’ is used in its paradigmatic logical role,
preceding the conclusion in an argument. But in other cases,
‘thus’ functions just as naturally in an explanation, as in:
She ate about the same amount as usual but got much more exercise,
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running after the children and doing all the housework and gardening.
Thus she lost a lot of weight over the summer.
Here the fact explained is preceded by ‘thus.’l Similarly, words
like ‘because’, ‘since’, and ‘for’, which are used to introduce
premises in arguments, are also often used to introduce
explaining statements in explanations.
According to the classic deductive-nomological account,
explanation is one type of argument.2 Although this account
is now widely criticized, it was dominant in the philosophy of
science for several decades and still enjoys influence. Within
influential circles in the philosophy of science, the notion of
argument has been more or less taken for granted, with
arguments being understood as paradigmatically deductive. An
especially clear and intellectually important type is the
subsuming deduction: ‘All As are Bs; this is an A; therefore this
is a B’. In the influential covering law model of scientific
explanation, scientific explanations are seen as having this form
(at least implicitly), so that every complete scientific explanation
is at the same time a deductively valid argument. The relation
between argument and scientific explanation has been studied
largely in the context of the issue of whether scientific
explanations can or should be made to fit this standard pattern
or a statistical variation of it. (Most A’s are B’s; this is an A;
therefore this is most likely a B.) Although other types of
arguments, such as analogies and conductive arguments, might
have been explored for their potential as models for other types
of scientific explanation, they were not. Nor does there seem to
have been any attempt to explore more sophisticated cumulative
argument structures as models for elaborate explanations.3
This influential discussion of the relation between explanation
and argument appears impoverished if examined from the
perspective of a richer and more sensitive theory of argument.
Not all arguments are deductive unless one adopts a sweeping
missing premise policy that requires supplementing stated
premises so as to make them deductively entail the conclusion.
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Furthermore, scientific explanations are not the only
explanations. The philosophical studies of scientific explanation
and its relation to argument could profitably be broadened by
greater reference to explanation outside science as well as to
nondeductive and cumulative patterns of argument.
The fact remains, however, that many serious and prominent
thinkers retain the view that scientific explanations constitute a
type of deductively valid argument. The enduring influence of
this model provides one incentive to reexamine that textbook
contrast between argument and explanation.
Another incentive arises from pedagogical experience.
Instructors often find it difficult to teach students the distinction
between explanation and argument. Students find the distinction
hard to grasp in theory and difficult to apply in practice. In a
culture that does not emphasize the importance of providing
supporting reasons for one’s claims, questions as to ‘why?’ are
often taken as requesting explanations for how people have come
to think as they do. Issues of justifiability may disappear. Such
crucial terms as ‘why’, ‘reasons’, and ‘because’ fit naturally into
both explanations and arguments. People may become
unaccustomed to rational argument and find it hard to
appreciate any contrast between requests to explain why one
thinks as one does and requests, on the other hand, to provide
rational support for one’s claims.
Even when the distinction between explanation and argument
is grasped in theory, many passages, real or invented, can be
interpreted as either explanation or argument. To illustrate this
problem, consider the following example, cited by S.N. Thomas:
Managers who at an early stage showed much promise, career growth,
and mobility may find themselves classified as nonpromotable for any of
a dozen reasons … Once labeled nonpromotable, a person is frequently
put on a shelf and only tolerated within an organization. There, there is
a great potential for the development of insecurity and fear in a manager
in an organization, since he has few legal rights for his protection and
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must develop himself so that the organization continually views him as a
valuable asset.
Thomas remarks of this passage:
Here both explanation and justification seem to be going on. The authors
justify their statement that there is great potential for the development of
insecurity and fear in a manager in an organization by explaining how
and why this potential exists (a manager ‘has few legal rights’, he may
be ‘classified as nonpromotable‘ and ‘put on a shelf’, etc.) The authors
justify their statement that this situation exists by showing the facts that
lead to, or cause, its existence.
In fact, Thomas finds such passages so prevalent that he rejects
the distinction between argument and explanation in his popular
text.4 He sees himself as teaching students to identify,
understand, and evaluate reasoning which, he says, appears both
in ‘justifications’ (his word for what standard theory calls
arguments) and in explanations. Given the existence of
borderline cases, and given that reasoning occurs both in
explanations and in ‘justifications’, Thomas makes the
unorthodox decision to use the word ‘argument’ broadly enough
to cover explanatory reasoning as well as justificatory reasoning.
Most theorists seek to preserve a distinction between
argument and explanation, even in the face of such difficulties.
One common approach brings in the relative uncertainty of the
conclusion of an argument compared to its premises, and
contrasts this with the relative certainty of the explained fact
(explanandum) in an explanation, as contrasted with that of the
explaining facts (explanans). In an argument, we typically try to
justify a conclusion that is, in the context, in doubt. We state
premises that we regard as more certain than the conclusion and
capable of giving that conclusion rational support. We reason
from the premises to the conclusion, and offer those premises
to an audience on the supposition that they can support the
conclusion – show that it is true, or acceptable. The pragmatic
direction in argument, then, is from premises to conclusion.
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Typically, premises are taken as given, or at least as more
acceptable than the conclusion at the outset of the reasoning.
The point of arguing is to rationally persuade an audience on the
basis of these premises that the conclusion is true or plausible.
The pragmatics of explanation are quite different. We do not
usually try to explain something unless we take it to be a
phenomenon or fact. (There is no need to explain there being
80% of males among human births in Canada in 1984, for this
was not a phenomenon.) To offer an explanation for some
phenomenon is generally to presume that it is a genuine
phenomenon. If it is not, there is nothing to explain. We do
reason in explaining: we reason from presumed phenomena or
regularities to the fact we are trying to explain. (‘It is because
of <explanans> that <explanandum>.’)5 If these explaining factors
hold, then the fact we are seeking to explain would be
understandable; it would ‘make sense’. Sometimes the explaining
statements are as well-known as the fact that is to be explained,
but sometimes they are not. In such cases, we may even employ
our explanation in an abductive argument (inference-to-the-
best-explanation).
Regarding argument and explanation, the central point is the
contrast in pragmatic direction. In an explanation, the explained
statement is as well-known as the explaining statements,
perhaps better known. In an argument the premises cited as
justification are typically better known than the conclusion.
Thus the relevant beliefs of arguers and explainers and their
respective audiences differ significantly. The ‘certainty shift’
often is different: in an argument certainty moves from the
premises to the conclusion, whereas in an explanation it either
does not shift or shifts from the fact to be explained to the
explanatory hypothesis.
In Philosophical Explanations, Robert Nozick puts the contrast
this way:6
A proof transmits conviction from its premises down to its conclusion,
so it must start with premises (q) for which there is already conviction;
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otherwise, there will be nothing to transmit. An explanation, on the other
hand, may introduce explanatory hypotheses (q) which are not already
believed, from which to deduce p in explanatory fashion. Success in this
explanatory deduction may lend support and induce belief, previously
absent, in the hypothesis.
Nozick’s preliminary version of the distinction between
argument and explanation seems essentially correct, but the full
story is more complicated. Things are unfortunately rather
messier than Nozick’s account suggests. It is not a necessary
condition of the occurrence of argument that the conclusion be
in doubt. We may argue for conclusions that we already believe,
for example in contexts where we accept a claim but seek a
convincing justification for it. Nor is it strictly a necessary
condition of explanation that the explanandum be granted as a
fact. Occasionally, explanations are offered for potentially true
statements. (‘If such and such were the case, it could be because
of so and so.’) Transcendental arguments combine argument and
explanation, in that a conclusion derived from a point about
experience or consciousness is supposed to explain the very
phenomena that prove its necessity.7 Some arguments set out
proofs in such order and detail that they not only demonstrate
that a conclusion is true, but at the same time serve to explain
why it is true. On Nozick’s account, this should be logically
impossible, as the demands on relative knowledge levels would
be contradictory.8 Nozick’s pragmatic account, while plausible,
stands in need of qualification and development.
1. Looking at Thomas’ Challenge
In the Instructor’s Manual for the second edition of his text, S.N.
Thomas includes an interesting short essay defending and
explaining his unorthodox pedagogical policy of abandoning the
distinction between arguments and explanations. Thomas offers
four basic reasons for his position.
1. It is impossible to include all justificatory discourses within
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the scope of logic while excluding all explanatory
discourses. This is because many pieces of reasoning can
defensibly be classified ‘as being both ‘justificatory’ and
‘explanatory’.’ In fact, Thomas states, ‘Many reasoned
discourses in natural language are ‘justificatory’ and’
explanatory’ at the same time and on the same
interpretation.9 Thomas is not merely stating that many
passages are hard to classify in that they could either be
seen as justificatory or as explanatory. Rather, his point is
that many reasoned passages can correctly be seen as both
justificatory and explanatory, where this duality is not a
result of semantic or structural ambiguities. An argument
that X is true may also constitute an explanation why X is
true. Thomas speaks of what is included and excluded from
the scope of logic because logic has traditionally regarded
argument as its primary territory. However, one might agree
that logic should include the task of evaluating the reasoning
used in explanations and nevertheless wish to preserve the
distinction between explanation and argument.
2. The distinction between justification and explanation needs
to be based on extra-logical features of discourses such as
function, social purpose, normal contexts, and beliefs of
speakers and writers. Such beliefs may vary from person
to person and from situation to situation. If explanatory
discourses are to be excluded from the scope of logic, their
exclusion would depend on extra-logical and variable
factors. ‘This dependency would be undesirable because the scope
of logic should not fluctuate with extra-logical individual
psychological variables. This is a reason both against trying to
restrict the scope of logic to ‘justifications’ and against trying
to exclude some explanations on the grounds that they are
‘nonjustificatory.‘10
3. Explanations and justifications both employ reasoning, and,
Thomas says, ‘in both cases, a similar relationship should exist
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between the components of the reasoning.’11 Since it is the task
of logic to appraise reasoning, logic should thus deal with
both types of discourse. In the classic hypothetico-deductive
model of scientific explanation, explanations are regarded
as arguments. Viewed in this way, explanations can be
evaluated by ‘the same logical criteria (of validity and
soundness) as justificatory discourse’.
4. It is better pedagogically to require students to distinguish
reasoning from nonreasoning than to require them to
distinguish argument from nonjustificatory explanation.
This is because the relevant pragmatic factors are often not
revealed in the passages cited in textbooks and because
borderline cases are so common. As a result, ‘the boundary
of the set of reasoned discourses (i.e. the boundary of the class of
reasoned discourses including both justifications and explanations)
appears to be not only more relevant to logic, but is also much
clearer than is the broad blurry boundary between justificatory
and nonjustificatory reasoning.’12
We can see a number of distinct themes in Thomas’s challenging
account. His idea that logic should encompass the appraisal of
the reasoning used in explanations can be accepted without
renouncing the distinction between explanation and argument.
The claim that many natural discourses are difficult to classify
as either justificatory or explanatory, especially when taken out
of context, is also quite acceptable and may be pedagogically
important, though it does not entail that the distinction between
explanation and argument should be relinquished altogether. To
say that pragmatic factors are required to apply the distinction is
quite consistent with the sort of account Nozick offers.
The central and most revisionary claims in Thomas’s account
reduce to two. First, the very same statements, on the same
interpretation, can constitute both an argument and an
explanation. Second, the very same logical criteria apply both to
explanations and to arguments. If these claims were true, then
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any distinction between argument and explanation would
indeed be relatively unimportant within logic, both
pedagogically and theoretically.
2. Arguments that are not Explanations and Explanations that
are not Arguments
No one has seriously claimed that all arguments are
explanations, though some have claimed that all explanations are
arguments. For the sake of completeness, however, let us see
why not all arguments are explanations. Consider the following
example:
1. Jones is a Liberal.
2. Jones is fat.
3. Jones is a bachelor.
4. therefore,
5. Jones is a fat Liberal bachelor.
therefore,
6. There are fat Liberal bachelors.
Here (5) is conclusively proven, given the premises. But the
phenomenon described in (5) is not explained.
In this argument, the conclusion generalizes on separate
particular facts, and these facts are not adequate to explain why
it should be true. To explain something is to account for it, to
show how or why it came to be and why it is as it is. Typically,
explanations set a phenomenon in a broader context, either
subsuming it under a law, indicating one or more of its causes,
showing how it fits a pattern how it is similar to a case which
is already well understood (analogy), or how it is somehow to
be expected given other factors that are understood. Many
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arguments do not do this, even though they provide evidence or
reasons to show a statement true or plausible. For this reason,
examples like the one just cited are easy to generate. Statements
can prove, or provide good evidence for a conclusion, C, without
explaining why C is true.
These are good arguments even by strict standards. The
example above doubtless has true premises, and it is deductively
valid. If interpreted as an explanation, this discourse would
constitute a very poor one. Thomas’s claim that arguments and
explanations can be assessed by the same logical criteria can
be seen to be false. There are many uncontroversially good
arguments that are not explanations and that would be poor
explanations were they taken as explanatory.
Wesley Salmon presents a relevant case in a paper in which
he argues that explanations are not arguments. He supposes that
we have good inductive evidence that doctors are experts at
predicting which children will catch the measles.13 Given this,
we might argue some such thing as:
1. Doctor Smith has predicted that Susan will catch the measles.
2. Doctors are almost always correct when they predict that children
will catch the measles.
Therefore, probably,
3. Susan will catch the measles.
Here we have a good inductive argument for (3), but we have
no explanation of (3). It is not established that Susan will get the
measles, although this is a reasonable thing to believe. Even if
we wanted to explain why Susan will probably get the measles,
the expertise of doctors would not be the right sort of factor to
refer to – exposure to others, or failure to get vaccinated would.
Surely Susan would not get the measles as the result of a doctor’s
PROBLEMS IN ARGUMENT ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 253
prediction! The prediction is not a cause. Yet we have a good
inductive argument for the claim that Susan will get the measles.
A comparable point can be made about retroactive inductive
arguments. For instance, consider an argument from the
presence of fossilized sea shells in Alberta today (S) to the claim
that there was once an immense sea covering Alberta (C). S,
conjoined with information about the fossils, provides inductive
evidence for C. Retrodictively, we may infer C from present
facts. S can give evidence for C in a retrodictive context just as
a comparable claim might provide evidence in a predictive
context. Nevertheless, S cannot in such a context explain C. The
point is especially obvious in a retroactive argument, since the
temporal relations would not work for explanation.14 The
presence of sea shells in Alberta in the present cannot possibly
account for there having been a sea there millions of years ago.
Similar points can be made about many inductive arguments.
The evidence cited may provide a good basis for belief in the
conclusion without explaining that conclusion. Consider, as
another example, an inductive analogy citing effects on rats as a
basis for a predicted effect on humans. The evidence about rats
could not in principle explain such an effect on humans.
Reflecting in a mathematical context, Philip Kitcher endorsed
the distinction between argument and explanation, saying:
there are cases in which we have a rigorous argument from known
premises, but in which we do not understand why the conclusion is true.15
In such cases, we have argument and no explanation. And there
are many such examples. Thus many perfectly good arguments
have no prospects as explanations.
Thomas’s claim that the same criteria can be used to appraise
both arguments and explanations cannot be correct. We need
a distinction between argument and explanation, and we need
different criteria of appraisal for each.
Perhaps further conditions are needed for explanation. Or
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perhaps the conditions of epistemic and logical appraisal are
quite distinct. Some examples make it seem as though
explanation demands more than argument. It might be that
good explanation demands good argument for the explanandum
and more besides. This is the assumption behind deductive
nomological accounts in which explanation is regarded as a
special type of argument. However, for this thesis too, there
are problems. The idea that explanation demands more than
argument is falsified by the fact that some potentially adequate
explanations are utter non-starters as arguments. Consider the
following, for instance:
1. Smith is a communist sympathizer.
2. Cuba is a communist state.
Thus,
3. Smith’s account of conditions in Cuba is flawed and biased.
If taken as premises offering support for (3), (1) and (2) would
do a poor job. If we were to appraise this reasoning as an
argument we would give it poor marks, because we would expect
(1) and (2) to give good evidence in support of (3) and they do
not. As an argument, this discourse is ad hominem and extremely
weak. However, regarding the discourse as an explanation gives
a different result. Doing that, we regard (3) as a claim granted in
advance. If it is known or agreed that Smith’s account is biased
and we are trying to explain why it is biased, the fact that he is
a communist sympathizer offering an account of a communist
country could provide the explanation.
Thomas follows logical tradition in regarding the ad hominem
as a fallacy. But that view is not consistent with his claim that
the same appraisal standards apply both to arguments and
explanations, as this example reveals. In this sort of case, the
pragmatic difference regarding relative knowledge of the
‘conclusion’ or explanandum is highly significant.
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Wesley Salmon provides another kind of example.17 We
sometimes explain an event by citing a statistical law according
to which that event has a low probability. For instance, the
probability that someone exposed to a particular dose of
radiation gets leukemia may be less than 5%. Yet if he does get
leukemia some years after the exposure, his exposure will be the
explanation. A similar example, first cited by Michael Scriven,
is that of the syphilis sufferer who gets paresis. Few syphilis
sufferers get paresis, but for those who do, their being syphilis
sufferers is the explanation. In such cases, an argument from the
statistical law to the occurrence of the event will be weak, for
the event has a low probability of occurring, given the statistical
regularity. Yet the regularity specifies the relationship that (by
current scientific standards) explains the event. (Admittedly, that
explanation does seem weak and incomplete.) We can explain the
phenomenon, knowing that it occurred. If we did not already
know that it had occurred, we could not argue that it would
occur by citing such a regularity.
No account of reasoning and discourse which dispenses with
the distinction between argument and explanation is going to
be plausible, because there are many arguments that are not
explanations and there are many explanations that are not
arguments. Furthermore, an examination of cases indicates that
different criteria of appraisal must be at work. There are good
arguments that would be non-starters as explanations, and good
explanations that would be non-starters as arguments.
3. Why Arguments are not Explanations
That some arguments are not explanations and some
explanations are not arguments is to be expected, given the basic
pragmatic asymmetry between argument and explanation. The
purpose of argument is rational persuasion. A person puts
forward an argument in an attempt to persuade an audience
that a claim is true on the basis of reasons or evidence that he
or she provides in support of the claim. The claim is taken as
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not accepted in advance of the argument’s being stated, and as
rendered acceptable in virtue of the fact that it is adequately
supported by the asserted premises. In an argument, an attempt
is made to justify, or render rationally acceptable, a conclusion
on the basis of proffered premises. Since justifying evidence or
reasons may in many cases not be of the appropriate type to
explain the phenomena cited in the conclusion – as in a number
of the examples cited above – there are many arguments that are
not explanations.
In an explanation, an attempt is made to show how or why
something came to be as it is. Since explaining a phenomenon
presupposes that it occurred, explanatory factors are often not of
an appropriate type to provide evidence that it did occur. The
underlying pragmatics of argument and explanation make the
existence of examples of arguments that are not explanations
and explanations that are not arguments entirely intelligible.
Pragmatic differences explain the distinction.
It is true that we sometimes argue for conclusions that are
not in doubt – as when philosophers construct arguments for
the existence of external objects. Argument may be used here
as an exploratory device – an instrument of inquiry, as several
recent authors have put it. This fact does not undermine the
fundamental pragmatic contrast, though.18 Such arguments may
be understood as attempts to show how doubts could be resolved
were they to occur, and can thus regarded as justificatory. The idea
that the premises should be better known than the conclusion
is thus preserved. For example, an argument for the existence
of external objects, based on premises presuming the existence
of other minds, would be considered deficient because this
condition would not be met. The premises would not be ‘better
known’ or ‘more certain’ than the conclusion. Although
standardly we doubt neither other minds nor external objects, in
any case where we were ready to put the latter in question, the
former would likely be in question as well.
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Similarly, the fact that we occasionally consider explanations
for phenomena that did not occur can also be understood within
the context of the basic asymmetry. Such explanations are
accounts of ‘how it could be that X’, based on the tentative
supposition that X is the case. How could it be that female
criminality would approach the level of male criminality in
North America in the 1980s? This isn’t the case, but we might
suppose that it is, and see what explanatory factors could be
offered in that event – greater participation of women in the
labor force, greater responsibility of women for economic
dependents, television shows featuring women in forceful and
violent roles, and so on. This kind of mental exercise could
sometimes be important. It is unusual, but possible, and does not
undermine the basic pragmatic asymmetry between argument
and explanation.
3a. Kant and Transcendental Arguments
Nor does the intermingling of explanation and argument in
transcendental arguments undercut this fundamental
distinction. In a transcendental argument, a conclusion C is
justified on the grounds that it is a necessary condition for the truth
of some premises, K, which are taken as true. These premises
describe human knowledge, conceptual structures, or belief
systems. The conclusion is deduced from the premises. The
explanatory element comes in by reversing the order. It is not
that ‘K therefore C’ is both an argument and an explanation.
Rather, ‘K therefore C’ is an argument, and ‘C, thus K’ is an
explanation, or partial explanation.
Kant, the locus classicus here, says that in such arguments a
principle is justified because only given that principle is our
knowledge possible. The word ‘only’ refers to the necessary
condition relationship on which the justification is based. The
idea of making possible introduces explanation. In a
transcendental argument, one tries to justify a principle by
showing that its truth is a necessary condition of knowledge that
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we have; therefore, it is true. (Example: in Kant’s account, we
have knowledge of geometry and only with an a priori intuition
of space could we have that knowledge. Therefore there is an
a priori intuition of space.) But the principle that is justified as
a necessary condition is also supposed to explain the existence
of that knowledge of which it is the condition. The principles
describe a feature that helps make that knowledge possible. It is
thus part of the explanation as to how we got that knowledge.
The knowledge is assumed both in the justification of the
principle and in the accompanying explanation. (Again, referring
to Kant’s account, we are able to have a priori knowledge in
geometry because space is a priori and is ‘in us’.) Granting that we
have the knowledge, we argue that the principle is true. Given
the truth of the principle, we use it to explain the existence of the
knowledge.19 Justification and explanation are both supposed
to occur in transcendental arguments, and the compact phrase
‘only given P is K possible’ welds them together. It is crucial to
note here that what justifies is not the same as what explains. The
existence of transcendental arguments does not undercut the
distinction between argument and explanation. Rather, a proper
understanding of those arguments presupposes this contrast.
3b. Inference to the Best Explanation
Nor does the existence of arguments that proceed by inference
to the best explanation blur the distinction between argument
and explanation. Suppose that F is a fact, and that E is proposed
as the best explanation for F. We may then argue from F to E, as:
1. F
2. E is the best explanation for F.
Therefore, probably,
3. E
Such a line of reasoning is an argument; in the argument we
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try to justify (3). We argue in favour of a hypothesis or theory
(E) on the grounds that it would serve as the best explanation
of a fact or presumed fact (F). The argument is not at the same
time an explanation, nor could it be. What is explained, as the
basis for this argument, is F. F appears here as a premise. Those
who read arguments as explanations read the conclusion as the
explanandum. But here the conclusion would be the explanans.
As Nozick remarked, the inference to the best explanation
(abductive) arguments presuppose the underlying pragmatic
asymmetry between argument and explanation. Only because
the explanandum is, in this case, known prior to the explanans
are we able to infer the latter from the former. In an argument,
the conclusion is not better known than the premises and we
(certainly) do not infer the premises from the conclusion.
4. Counterexamples
There remains Thomas’ claim that some discourses constitute
both argument and explanation, on the same interpretation.20
Thomas offers several persuasive examples in defense of this
controversial thesis. Here are some of his most persuasive cases.
A. ‘All natural disasters are comforting because they reaffirm our
impotence, in which, otherwise, we might stop believing. At times
it is strangely sedative to know the extent of your own
powerlessness.’ (From Erica Jong, Fear of Flying (New York:
New American Library, 1974), p. 204.
B. ‘Many of the problems of philosophy are of such broad relevance
to human concerns, and so complex in their ramifications that
they are, in one form or another, perennially present. Though
in the course of time they yield in part to philosophical inquiry,
they may need to be rethought by each age in the light of its
broader scientific knowledge and deepened ethical and religious
experience. Better solutions are found by more refined and
rigorous methods. Thus, one who approaches the study of
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philosophy in the hope of understanding the best of what it
affords will look for both fundamental issues and contemporary
achievements.‘(From Elizabeth and Monroe Beardsley,
‘Introduction to the Prentice Hall Foundations in
Philosophy Series’.)
C. ‘Man hating is a defense, a refusal, and an affirmation. It is a
defense against fear, against pain. It is a refusal to suppress the
evidence of one’s experience. It is an affirmation of the cathartic
effects of justifiable anger. What is primary is the possibility for
release gained from acknowledging its existence, and the renewal
that can sometimes accompany its expression. For if I say today,
‘I hate you’, it is in order that tomorrow it might perhaps be
easier to say, ‘I love you. ‘ (From Ingrid Bengis, Combat in the
Erogenous Zone (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), p. 5.)
D. ‘Cable television today is at a stage where the general exercise
of choice is still possible. If for no better reason than that there
is a history of government regulation in the field of television, it
remains possible by government action to prohibit it, to permit
it, or to promote it almost by fiat. Citizens may still take a hand
in shaping cable television’s growth and institutions in a fashion
that will bend it to society’s will and society’s best intentions. It is
not as yet encumbered by massive vested interests, although that
day may be no longer remote. It is not as yet so fixed a part of
the national scene, as for example conventional television is, that
it appears almost quixotic to re-direct its energies. There is, in
short, still time.‘ (From On the Cable: The Report of the Sloan
Commission on Cable Communications (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1971), p. 3.)
Example (A) could be either an argument or an explanation.
Because the ‘conclusion’ that all natural disasters are comforting
is a claim few would assent to, it might seem most plausible
to take the passage as an argument. However, (A) is not very
convincing either as argument or as explanation. It cannot serve
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as a good explanation, because there is nothing to be explained
unless we are antecedently convinced that natural disasters are
comforting. (Unlikely.) Nor do the other statements have
sufficient independent plausibility to serve as the premises of
an argument that natural disasters are comforting. The passage
makes little sense either as an explanation or as an argument.
And yet the word ‘because’ seems to require us to interpret it
as one or the other or both. The example serves to illustrate
Thomas’ point, but its epistemic weakness makes it
unconvincing as a test case.
Example (B) occurs in a context that is significant so far as
the pragmatic distinction between argument and explanation is
concerned. It appears in the introduction to an elementary series
in philosophy. The intended audience, then, is students who do
not know very much about philosophy. The authors wrote to tell
students what to expect from studies of the subject. To take the
passage as an explanation is to presume that the students already
know or believe that those looking for the best in philosophy will
look at both fundamental issues and historical achievements.
Pragmatically, this interpretation seems implausible. It makes
more sense to regard the passage as an argument. The authors,
who have the authority of established philosophers writing an
introduction to a series of texts, make statements about the time-
significant aspects of philosophical problems; the intention
would be that students would accept their premises because of
their authority in the context. The conclusion follows from
these; it is almost a summary of what has been said before.
Example (C) really contains two sets of reasoning. There is first
the reasoning to show that ‘man hating is a defense, a refusal, and
an affirmation’. Here, the form is essentially ‘P; Q; R; therefore P
and Q and R’. This part of the passage should clearly be taken as
an argument. It has no plausibility whatever as an explanation.
The supporting statements are particular facts that are
summarized in the conclusion. The next part of the passage is
harder to interpret: ‘What is primary is the possibility for release
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gained from acknowledging its (the hatred’s) existence, and the renewal
that can sometimes accompany its expression. For if I say today ‘I hate
you’, it is in order that tomorrow it might perhaps be easier to say, ‘I
love you‘.’ This passage is similar to the one from Fear of Flying
(A). Its epistemic credentials are feeble, whether we regard it as
explanation, argument, neither, or both. Were it not for the word
‘for’ at the beginning of the second sentence, there would be little
basis for seeing it as reasoned at all. (In fact, what we see as
reasoning, assuming ‘for’ to mean ‘because’, is so weak that there
may be a charitable inclination to search for another function
for the word ‘for’ in this context. Perhaps it is serving merely
as conjunction.) Given the presence of this word, the sentences
make equal sense as explanation or argument; the second may
be regarded either as the explanation for the first, its truth being
granted, or as a reason (premise) for believing that the first is
true. Given the controversial and rather surprising nature of
the first statement, the second interpretation is somewhat more
plausible. If we adopt it, we might then also regard the premise
as explanatory. The move is: P, for Q; that is, Q is a reason to
believe that P. In addition, Q explains why P is true. As with
example (A), (C) tends to confirm Thomas’ view, but is not an
ideal example, because it is so weak epistemically – whether
interpreted as argument, explanation, or both.
The last example cited, (D), seems best to illustrate Thomas’
claim that the same passage can constitute both explanation and
argument. The passage shows that cable television is still at a
stage where there are choices to be exercised regarding its
development. Four reasons are given for this claim: the history
of government regulation in the field of television; the possibility
of citizen action; the absence of significant vested interests; and
the relative novelty of cable television on the national scene.
These are convergent reasons; all give some independent evidence
for the claim. Such ‘reasons’, however, may also be regarded as
explanatory ‘factors’. Their existence explains why cable
television is still open to choice. The explanation has the same
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structure as the argument. In fact, the argument provides the
explanation too. Interestingly, the structure is nothing like that
suggested by the deductive nomological model of explanation.
We do not have universal or general laws under which the event
is subsumed, but rather separate explanatory factors, cited as
relevant and as showing how this feature of cable television may
be understood.
These cases bear out one of Thomas’ key claims. There are
passages that are both argumentative and explanatory, on the
same interpretation. This situation can occur because the very
statements that provide reasons or evidence that would show the
conclusion true also provide an explanation as to why it should
be true. The premises can serve also as explanans.
However, such examples do not justify Thomas’ further claim
that the same logical criteria suffice to evaluate explanations and
arguments. What make the passage a good or plausible argument
are not the same conditions that makes it a good or plausible
explanation, as numerous other examples have indicated. Both
for sound argument and for good explanation, we require valid
or legitimate reasoning from some statements to others. But the
asymmetry of explanation and argument means that the quite
different conditions must be met by justifying premises and
explaining statements. Because these conditions are not
incompatible, they can be met simultaneously. When that occurs,
we find both explanation and argument at once. Statements are
able to justify, because in a context where the conclusion is in
doubt, they are better known. They are able to explain in virtue
of other complex conditions, which entail their being able, in a
context, to specify a cause, underlying structure, or purpose that
shows how and why the phenomena described in the conclusion-
explanandum came to be as they are.
Once a conclusion is accepted, we can look back to the
premises as offering an explanation as to why it is true. The very
same claims show both that the conclusion is true and why it is
true. The same passage constitutes both argument (justification)
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and explanation, just as Thomas maintained. This can happen
because the justifying premises are also statements that are
appropriate to explain the fact that is in the conclusion. The
audience would, however, have to be convinced of the truth of
the conclusion before an explanation as to why it was true would
seem necessary.
5. Philosophy, Pedagogy, and Argument-Explanation Asymmetry
Although there do exist some arguments that are explanations
and some explanations that are arguments, the distinction
between argument and explanation remains important, both
pragmatically and epistemically. One way of seeing this is to
consider how we differently approach a ‘why’ question,
depending on whether we take it to be a request for justificatory
argument or for explanation. Suppose that someone asks ‘Why
did Jesse Jackson’s 1984 trip to Cuba receive so little media
attention?’. If this is taken as a request for an explanation, it will
be met by statements trying to specify causes. (Perhaps when the
trip occurred, it did not strike media people as important, being
regarded as solely propagandistic in intent; perhaps Jackson’s
activities were regarded as interesting only insofar as they bore
on the 1984 presidential campaign in the United States; perhaps
other major world events happened at the same time; perhaps
media people were racist; and so on.) On the other hand, if the
question is taken as a request for justification, a different kind
of answer is called for. The questioner is then asking either for
evidence that the trip was indeed given little attention, in effect
demanding empirical information about coverage in headlines,
inches, location of article, and so on as compared to relevantly
similar events; or she is asking for a moral/political justification
for giving the trip little space. Thus, what constitutes a proper
response and an answer to the question will depend very much
on whether we take ‘why’ as making a request for an explanation
or an argument.
The significance of the distinction between argument and
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explanation is again apparent when we consider elliptical
arguments and explanations. Suppose, for instance, that
someone says he believes in God because he learned religion at
his mother’s knee. If ‘because’ is used as explanatory here, we
would regard what is said as elliptical for something like the
following:
1. I learned religion at my mother’s knee.
Missing Explanans: People usually persist in believing those things
that they learn at their mother’s knee.
That is (the cause) why:
2. I believe in God.
On the other hand, if we take the comments to express an
argument we will probably regard that argument as elliptical
as well. However, we will complete it in quite a different way,
perhaps along such lines as:
1. I learned religion at my mother’s knee.
Missing Premise: Most of what people learn at their mother’s knee
is true.
Therefore, (probably)
2. God exists.
The comments do a better job of providing a plausible
explanation than of providing a justifying argument.(The
proposed missing premise is almost certainly false.) The ‘why’ of
justification typically asks not for proof that the belief is held, but
for reasons purporting to show it true or acceptable.
Noting how the inserted material differs in these cases and
how the conclusion of the argument differs from the statement
of the explanandum, we can see that the argument/ explanation
distinction retains considerable epistemic and pragmatic
significance. The force of ‘why’ questions and ‘because’ answers
varies, depending on whether we deal with a request for an
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explanation or for a justification. Different claims are differently
relevant, and different standards of success apply. To be sure,
reasoning is used both in explanations and in arguments.
Without the full context, some responses could be taken as either
one or the other. Nevertheless, the distinction retains its
pragmatic significance, and the pragmatics of the matter are
related to our logical and epistemic appraisal of the result.
Much of what Thomas says is true and important. But the
existence of some interesting cases where argument and
explanation go on at once does not show that the distinction
between justificatory argument and explanation is dispensable.
Thomas’ challenge is useful in pointing out the need for greater
attention to argument and explanation and in reminding us that
reasoning plays a crucial role in both. His examples show that the
application of the distinction is not suitable as an early exercise
for students unless examples are carefully selected. Background
information about context and audience may be required.
Textbook accounts of argument and explanation should be made
more subtle and qualified, so as to allow that justification and
explanation are not mutually exclusive. There exist both cases
where these go on together and cases that are borderline and
hard to classify as one or the other. We can allow that reasoning
is used both in explanation and argument and that the same
indicator words are used in each, often with closely parallel roles.
We may wish to allow, as Thomas suggests, that logicians who
see themselves as appraising reasoning would do well to include
explanation as well as argument within the scope of logic.
But given the pragmatic and epistemic differences that exist,
the fundamental contrast between explanation and argument
retains its pedagogical importance. In a society where people so
often tell you how they came to think as they do while ignoring
issues of justification, to omit the distinction between argument
and explanation from the pedagogy of critical thinking would
be a serious mistake. The ‘psychoanalysis’ of thought will
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presuppose rational argument and critical thinking. It should
never replace them.
Notes
1. The phrase ‘the fact explained’ refers to the description of the
facts or events explained.
2. Recent discussion still uses this Hempel-Oppenheimer
account as its starting point, though prevailing opinion is that
the covering law model is not adequate. For present purposes,
my main concern with the Hempelian account is with its
classification of explanation as one type of argument. See
Hempel, C.G., ‘Deductive Nomological vs Statistical
Explanation’, in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell, (Eds) Minnesota Studies
in the Philosophy of Science III, (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1962), pp. 98-169; Hempel, C.G., ‘Explanation
in Science and in History’, in R. Colodny (Ed.) Frontiers of Science
and Philosophy, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962),
pp. 7-33; and Hempel, C.G., Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New
York: The Free Press, 1965).
3. This is an unfortunate omission, since analogies are used both
in explanations and in arguments, and since the conductive type
of argument has its parallel in explanations that proceed by
specifying several distinct causal factors.
4. S.N. Thomas, Practical Reasoning in Natural Language
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1980. Second Edition), p.
12.
5. Thus the reasoning in an explanation is designed to show how
or why F is the case, whereas in an argument reasoning to a
conclusion, C, is intended to show that C is the case.
6. Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 14. Compare Robert Ennis,
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‘Enumerative Induction and Best Explanation’, Journal of
Philosophy LXV (1968), pp. 523-528.
7. I discussed transcendental arguments and the role of
explanation within them in my doctoral dissertation, A Study
of Transcendental Arguments (University of Waterloo, 1971; listed
under the name Gertrude R. Kelly.) Kant put it this way: ‘I
understand by a transcendental exposition the explanation of
a concept, as a principle from which the possibility of other a
priori synthetic knowledge can be understood. For this purpose
it is required (1) that such knowledge does really flow from the
given concept, (2) that this knowledge is possible only on the
assumption of a given mode of explaining the concept.’ (Critique
of Pure Reason, B41; Norman Kemp Smith translation.)
8. As we will see later, this occurs when the same set of
statements satisfies both the conditions required in order to
make them justifying premises and the conditions required in
order to make them explanatory. These conditions, though
distinct, are not incompatible, and thus it may happen that some
sets of statements satisfy both at once. Compare Philip Kitcher,
‘Mathematical Rigor: Who Needs It?,’ Nous 15 (1981), pp. 469-93.
9. Thomas, Instructor’s Guide, p. 147.
10. Ibid., p. 148.
11. Ibid., p. 148.
12. Ibid., p. 148.
13. Wesley Salmon, ‘A Third Dogma of Empiricism’, in R. Butts
and J. Hintikka, (Eds.), Basic Problems in Methodology and
Linguistics (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1977), pp. 149-166. See also
Wesley Salmon, ‘Why Ask ‘Why’?’, in Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Association 5 (1977-8), pp. 683-701.
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14. In ‘Why Ask ‘Why’?’, Wesley Salmon contends on the basis
of such cases that explanations require an asymmetry not
demanded in arguments. He maintains that this asymmetry is
due to the fact that the root notion behind explanation is that of
causation.
15. Kitcher, ‘Mathematical Rigor: Who Needs It?’, p. 473.
16. See Wesley Salmon, ‘A Third Dogma of Empiricism’; Bas van
Fraasen, ‘The Pragmatics of Explanation’, American Philosophical
Quarterly 14 (1975), pp. 143-150; and John Post, ‘Infinite
Regresses of Justification and of Explanation’, Philosophical
Studies 38 (1980), pp. 31-52.
17. See ‘A Third Dogma of Empiricism’ and ‘Why Ask ‘Why’?’.
18. This point has been noted by several commentators,
including R.H. Johnson and J.A. Blair, in Logical Self-Defense.
(Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1983.)
19. Compare Kant’s own account in the Critique of Pure Reason
(section B41) and my exposition in A Study of Transcendental
Arguments, Chapters 2 and 6. Nozick offers a similar account of
transcendental argument in Philosophical Explanations, p. 15.
20. In the essay in his instructors’ manual, Thomas claims that
examples throughout the text bear out his theory. He mentions
that exercise set 1-1B is especially revealing for these purposes.
Indeed, by my calculation, fully 9 of 37 exercises in that set could
be analyzed as both explanatory and justificatory. Examples
discussed here come from this set of exercises.
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CHAPTER 9.
FOUR REASONS THERE ARE NO FALLACIES?
A cavalier and confident formalist approach to fallacies is no longer
standard; the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy reports instead
that it has proven more profitable to explore fallacies without appealing
to formal languages. In other words, a nonformal approach to fallacies
has become standard over the years since this chapter was written.
Thus the notions queried in this chapter seem no longer to be in vogue
and the criticisms of cavalier formalism with regard to fallacies are
unnecessary, though not incorrect.
Karl Lambert, William Ulrich, and Gerald Massey were all formal
theorists and developed their critical accounts of fallacies from that
perspective. Lambert and Ulrich held that all that needed to be said
about poor arguments was that they were not formally valid; one did
not need ‘fallacy’ as an additional category. Massey held that to show
that a fallacy occurred, one would need to demonstrate that poor
arguments failed to be formally valid. But, given the asymmetry
between valid and invalid arguments, it was not possible to formally
prove invalidity. It was from a formalist standpoint, then, that these
logicians argued against the very notion of fallacy. I argued that their
accounts are flawed; it is fair to say that that conclusion is accepted
today.
A 2017 search of Philosopher’s Index revealed more than six
hundred articles with “fallacy” or “fallacies” in the title. However, many
of these works do not seem to be about fallacies as a general theme;
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rather they treat a distinct topic (miracles, evolution, the mind/body
problem), alleging one or more mistakes (‘fallacies’ in a broad sense)
in the treatment of that topic. My casual survey revealed intriguing
names of fallacies I had never heard of – the neurological fallacy,
the moralistic fallacy, the unintentional fallacy, the reverse inference
fallacy, and the great mind fallacy, to name just a few. Fallacies have
not gone out of fashion.
In his recent book The Undoing Project: A Friendship that
Changed Our Minds, Michael Lewis describes the collaboration of
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. Working over many years first
in Israel and then in North America,
Tversky and Kahneman described a number of characteristic errors
in reasoning. Lewis reports that their work provoked considerable
criticism, much of it due to the fact that they were arguing that there
were types of reasoning errors that people commonly make. In other
words, people often reason incorrectly. That conclusion was
energetically resisted in some quarters. Reading Lewis’s account, I was
reminded of the charitable resistance to allegations of fallacies.
Somehow, people do not like to see others accused of systematically
flawed reasoning; they seek an interpretation according to which these
mistakes are not happening. And they suspect the accusers of being in
some sense ‘smart alecks’ – pretending to know more about accurate
thinking than the average person and to detect errors ordinary people
cannot recognize for themselves. It remains a temptation. I submit that
the reasoning in this chapter, usefully supplemented by the evidence
provided by Philosopher’s Index indicates that fallacies are not to
be vanquished by the technique of presuming that other people are
basically rational. I argue for a modest principle of charity and for
attention to details of speech, text, and context. This approach to
interpretation will not eliminate fallacies; nor would I wish to do that.
When this chapter was written in the nineteen eighties, principles of
interpretation were central to the problem of fallacies. Both for
explaining and identifying particular fallacies and for fallacy theory,
they remain so.
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Reacting to the proliferation of texts and courses on informal
fallacies, a number of people have recently voiced concern about
the lack of rigor and consensus in the area. Some have gone so
far as to argue that there are no informal fallacies at all, that
there is no way to show any argument invalid, that fallacies exist
only in the pages of textbooks and the minds of logicians, or
that fallacies are products of uncharitable interpretation.1 Such
revisionist views raise important questions. But though
provocative, they are not correct – or so I shall argue here.
By definition, a fallacy is a mistake in reasoning, a mistake
that occurs with some frequency in real arguments and that
is characteristically deceptive.2 This means, not that a person
who uses a fallacious argument necessarily intends to deceive his
audience but that the fallacious argument itself is deceptive, in
the sense that it strikes many people as cogent, though it is not.3
An arguer may recognize his fallacious argument as fallacious
and intend to deceive others with it, or he may think that it is a
cogent argument and use it in all sincerity. Since a fallacy in the
logical sense involves a mistake in reasoning, in order to commit
one, a person must be reasoning. Colloquially, false beliefs are
often termed fallacies, but traditional logical usage restricts the
term to reasoning errors, a usage followed here. In order to
commit a fallacy, a person must reason from one or more claims
to others. In the present context, this is to say that a person who
commits a fallacy must be arguing. Furthermore, not just any
mistake in reasoning counts as a fallacy. A fallacy is a mistake
that is of a kind: it is repeatable, and repeated in other contexts.4
A mistake in reasoning which is idiosyncratic and unlikely to be
repeated does not qualify as a fallacy, even though it is a mistake
in reasoning.
There is, then, a tacit empirical claim in saying that an
argument involves a fallacy. Indeed, some who are sceptical
about fallacies base their scepticism on empirical considerations.
They agree that such moves as post hoc and ad hominem would be
mistakes were they ever to occur, but believe that real arguments
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seldom or never include them. Saying that a fallacy is deceptive
and that it is a mistake of a kind which occurs relatively often
commits the critic to empirical claims as well as logical ones. If
one invents a mistake in reasoning and invents an example in
which it occurs, one will not thereby have invented or discovered
a fallacy – not unless that so-called fallacy seems to many people
at first blush not to be one.
From these considerations we can see that there are many
potential problems about fallacies. To say that an argument
exemplifies one or another fallacy commits a critic to an
interpretation of an arguer as reasoning in some specific way;
to a logical judgment that the reasoning embodies a mistake;
to a classification of that mistake as being one of a type; and,
implicitly, to the empirical claim that the mistake is of a type
repeated elsewhere and is deceptive in the sense that people tend
not to recognize it as a mistake.
These points are no doubt of considerable pedagogical
significance. Identifying and diagnosing a fallacy is no simple
matter. Given the complexities involved, and given the additional
problem that actual arguments may, on different interpretations
or even on the same one, illustrate several distinct fallacies at
once, there may be important reasons against teaching critical
skills by beginning with fallacies. Combine these features with
the point that the counterfeit presumes the real, so that fallacies
presuppose pertinent concepts of good argument, and it is easy
to understand why many people object to teaching argument
or critical thinking through fallacies analysis. However, while
recognizing the importance of these points, we need not grant
wholesale revisionist claims about fallacies. From the fact that
the identification of fallacies is a complicated matter it does not
follow that there are no fallacies at all. Like the a priori
elimination of evil, the a priori elimination of fallacies has a
certain charm and appeal, but the results depart from common
sense.
274 TRUDY GOVIER
1. Formal Invalidity as the Whole Story
In their text, The Nature of Argument, Karl Lambert and William
Ulrich express considerable scepticism about fallacies. Their
approach is to dispute informal fallacies only; the formal ones are
to rest secure. Lambert and Ulrich begin by saying:
Only two things can go wrong with an argument – it can be invalid or it
can be unsound. If an argument is invalid, then it has a counterexample;
whether or not it is also an instance of an ‘informal fallacy’ is beside the
point.5
This is clearly a deductivist account; the authors presume that
connections between premises and conclusion can be appraised
in only one way: for deductive validity. The presumption is that
a premise/conclusion connection is legitimate if the argument is
formally deductively valid and not otherwise. A more pluralistic
view of argumentation would require a more complex analysis.
When working through Lambert and Ulrich’s account, it is useful
to keep their presumption in mind. The difficulties that arise
from within this limited view are aggravated if a more pluralistic
theory of argument is adopted.
Lambert and Ulrich claim that formal invalidity and only
formal invalidity constitutes a mistake in reasoning. If we can
show that an argument is formally invalid, then we know that
it is not a cogent argument; on this account any further remark
to the effect that it also exemplifies an informal fallacy will be
‘beside the point’. Lambert and Ulrich continue:
Even when one learns to recognize alleged examples of the various
‘fallacies’, it is difficult to see what common factor makes them all instances
of the same fallacy’.6
Identifying this common factor is easy in the case of arguments
that are formally invalid, because two arguments which
exemplify the same mistake will have been formally represented
in such a way that we can see that they have the same form. In the
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case of purported informal fallacies, Lambert and Ulrich say, this
is not so easy.
The question raised is important because, as we have seen, a
fallacy embodies a mistake in reasoning which is of a kind. Given
that two arguments both make mistakes in reasoning, when is
it true that they make the same mistake? It would seem that
a formal approach will give a straightforward answer to this
question. An informal or nonformal approach may not. Lambert
and Ulrich go on to explore the question with reference to one of
the standard informal fallacies, the ad hominem.
In the ad hominem someone uses a fact about a person’s
character to discredit his claims or his argument. Lambert and
Ulrich put forward a case of this type:
1. Mr. Jenner claims that evidence E is strong evidence that Mr.
Nixon is guilty of obstruction of justice.
2. Mr. Jenner was a member of a commission that recommended the
legalization of prostitution.
Therefore,
3. E is not strong evidence that Mr. Nixon is guilty.7
There is an interpretive matter to note here. This model
represents the conclusion held as a claim that the attacked
arguer’s view is false. But often people use facts about character
to allege that claims made are less credible than they might be
when made by other people, or that they should not be accepted.
There are more modest conclusions and might plausibly be
defended by ad hominem allegations in inductive contexts.8 The
matter is significant because the issue of sensitive interpretation
in fallacies analysis is one on which fallacies critics have
frequently been attacked.
The purported ad hominem argument has a simple logical form,
according to Lambert and Ulrich. It is of the form:
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AB
Therefore,
not-C
Lambert and Ulrich are sure that the argument is of this form,
and no other. Clearly this form is not that of a formally valid
argument. Hence, Lambert and Ulrich conclude, the argument
is not sound. It exemplifies a mistake in reasoning which is a
formal mistake. The authors maintain that the description of the
ad hominem has no bearing on the identification and analysis of
this mistake.
The authors unhesitatingly presume that their particular way
of formalizing the argument is correct. That is, their
representation captures all features of the argument that are
relevant to the deductive appraisal of the connection between its
premises and its conclusion. This is a premature assumption, as
we shall see with a vengeance when we come to Gerald Massey’s
account of proofs of invalidity. Compare the authors’ sample
argument with the following invented and trivial little argument:
1. The table in the corner is brown.
2. Everything which is brown is not green.
Therefore,
3. It is not the case that the table in the corner is green.
This argument is apparently also of the form ‘A,B, therefore
not-C’. Yet it is deductively valid in the straightforward sense
that if both premises are true, it is logically impossible for the
conclusion to be false. Using Lambert and Ulrich’s approach, we
could conclude that the above argument is invalid. Apparently
it has the same logical form as the ad hominem argument which
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they invented; they said that argument was invalid due to its
form. What has gone wrong is that a proposed formalization
‘A,B, therefore not-C’ does not capture those features of the
argument (meaning of colour words) that make it deductively
valid.
Lambert and Ulrich point out that there are many arguments
that have the form ‘A, B, therefore not-C’ and that do not
constitute ad hominem arguments. From this they infer that
classifying an argument as ad hominem is not useful: this
classification does not properly characterize the mistake in
reasoning which is involved in it. However, all of this presumes
the adequacy of Lambert and Ulrich’s formal analysis. Since that
analysis can be used to claim even that the valid argument about
the brown table is invalid, there must be something wrong with
the account.
That an argument can be formally represented as having the
form ‘A, B, therefore not-C’ will indicate that it contains
incorrect reasoning only if that formal representation is an apt
way of representing the argument. This point is absolutely
central. A formalization is an apt way of representing the
argument only if it represents all those features relevant to the
logical appraisal of the argument. An analysis along the ‘A, B,
not-C’ line shows us nothing of importance about the argument.
To complete their account of the example, Lambert and Ulrich
would have to show that their formalization is the only
appropriate one; that this is a way, and the only way, of capturing
the kind of reasoning used in the argument. They did not
appreciate the need to accomplish this task, and it is, to say the
least, unlikely that they could complete it.
We may show that an argument cannot be proved valid
according to one formal representation and using one formal
system, but the question remains whether there is another
representation and/or another system which would give a
different result. These problems arise even within the narrow
formalist and deductivist framework that Lambert and Ulrich
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employ.9 It is not so easy as Lambert and Ulrich suppose to
show that an argument is formally invalid. Problems would be
aggravated considerably were we to broaden our notion of what
is relevant to the workings of arguments so as to include the
possibility of cogent nondeductive arguments and of nonformal
terms as playing a key role.
Lambert and Ulrich have not provided a knockdown formal
refutation of the argument they put forward as an example of
ad hominem. Their account presupposes a narrow theory of
argument and, even within the bounds of that narrow theory,
raises as many questions as it answers. The authors suppose
that their analysis is uncontroversially correct and go on to ask
what an informal fallacies analysis might add to the supposedly
watertight account. They compare their first invented argument
to another.
1. Jones maintains that socialism is wrong.
2. Jones is a rich stockbroker.
Therefore,
3. It is not the case that socialism is wrong.
And they comment: Someone who gave this argument would
probably be trying to persuade us that socialism is not wrong by getting
us to distrust or dislike Jones. This argument has the same logical form.
A
B
Therefore
not-C
So it is indeed invalid … but this does nothing to characterize the
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informal fallacy of argumentum ad hominem because these two
arguments also share the same form with:
1. The sky is blue.
2. Grass is green.
Therefore,
3. It is not the case that tigers are carnivorous.
This argument, although it is an instance of the same formal fallacy, has
nothing to do with attempting to discredit a person’s views by discrediting
his character. Thus, if there is a fallacy of argumentum ad hominem,
there must be a way of characterizing it according to which the first two
arguments above are instances but the third is not. It is, however, difficult
to see that these two arguments have anything in common other than their
logical form, and the fact that those who offered them had certain base
motives, namely, to discredit someone’s views by discrediting his character.
10
And yet it is allowed, in the last sentence quoted, that the
two prospective ad hominem arguments do have something in
common. They share the feature that in both there is an attempt
to discredit someone’s views by discrediting his character. Now
interestingly, this is precisely the feature that informal logicians
select for attention when criticizing ad hominem arguments as
fallacious. Lambert and Ulrich refer to it as a ‘common motive’
behind the arguments. This description makes it appear as
though what the two arguments have in common apart from
their (alleged) common form ‘A; B; therefore not-C’ is a
psychological matter. The arguers who would use such
arguments would share a motive.
But such terminology is tendentious and misleading. The
feature has to do with the content of the arguments. In both, the
premises specify a fact about a person, a fact commonly thought
to be deleterious, and in both the conclusion is that some view
held by the person is false. The arguments have in common that
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in both premises about the (deleterious) character of people are
used to support a conclusion to the effect that an opinion held
by those people is incorrect. This matter of content has nothing
to do with the motives of the people who would put forward
such an argument, which could be anything at all. The common
feature is one of content; that is straightforwardly apparent. The
matter of motive is one of speculation.
Lambert and Ulrich claim that this common feature (allegedly
motive) cannot serve to characterize any mistake in reasoning
that both arguments involve, because ‘some attempts to discredit
a person’s views by discrediting his character involve valid
argument’. They promptly invent one such, which has as two of
its premises the following statements:
If Jones is a rich stockbroker and he maintains that socialism is wrong,
then he is lying. If Jones is lying, then socialism is wrong.11
A deductively valid argument can be ad hominem, if an ad
hominem argument is any argument in which the falsity of
someone’s view is inferred from considerations which include
reference to disreputable aspects of his character. For Lambert
and Ulrich this consequence amounts to a reductio of the idea
that the ad hominem description could be of any use in the
appraisal of reasoning. For them, deductive validity and
invalidity are the whole story about reasoning from premises to
a conclusion. On this view, it would be absurd for an argument
that had the paradigm virtue of deductive validity to have
anything wrong with it.
That the description offered for ad hominem arguments could
apply to a deductively valid argument is interesting, seldom
noticed, and perhaps important. However, in some sense this
is not a surprising result. The two purported ad hominems had
something in common. The common element was not a matter
of formal structure as that is conventionally identified; it was
one of content. For the same content, a variety of structures are
possible. For any argument which is based on an illegitimate
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connection between X and Y, one can also produce a deductively
valid argument by adding a premise to the effect that X and Y are
connected in just the way the argument would require. That is
the strategy of inserting the associated conditional as a missing
premise. The amended argument does in a sense make the same
point as the original one: the feature of deriving falsehood or
lack of credibility of belief from aspects of character is preserved.
Yet the amended argument is deductively valid and hence not
fallacious.
But what does this strategy prove? Lambert and Ulrich,
presuming the definitive correctness of their formal analysis,
infer that neither the ad hominem classification nor any other
classification from informal logic can show anything about such
arguments. However, that fact is open to another interpretation.
That ad hominem arguments can be made into deductively valid
ones by inserting the associated conditional as a missing premise
shows that assessing arguments solely for formal deductive
validity may show us precious little about their merits. Lambert
and Ulrich do not establish their point concerning the examples
they discuss. They do not succeed in demonstrating their
strongly negative position about informal fallacies.
What has been discussed is the part of Lambert and Ulrich’s
treatment where ‘they say it’. There is also another part where
they ‘take it back’, with qualifying remarks like the following
rather confusing statement:
There may be errors in reasoning that have nothing to do with the
arguments representing the reasoning, even though of course any logically
invalid argument will correspond to some error in reasoning.12
And:
No such argument (as begging the question) is fallacious, but anyone
who argued in this way would be making some kind of mistake. We are
not suggesting that there is no value in investigating the various sorts of
mistakes in reasoning that people are prone to make; on the contrary,
this is an area where interesting and fruitful discoveries are waiting to
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be made. Rather, we are suggesting that until a general characterization
of informal fallacies can be given which enables one to tell with respect
to any argument whether or not it exhibits one of the informal fallacies,
knowing how to label certain paradigm cases of this or that mistake in
reasoning is not really useful for determining whether a given argument
is acceptable.13
These are puzzling qualifications, apparently inconsistent with
the tenor of the main account. But given the fundamentally
flawed nature of that account, such qualifications do not merit
further attention here.
2. Formal Invalidity as No Story
In several provocative articles, Gerald Massey has argued that
it is not possible to prove an argument invalid. In 1975, in ‘Are
There any Good Arguments that Bad Arguments are Bad?’,
Massey defended an asymmetrical account about proofs of
validity and invalidity.14 Given an argument in natural language,
if we paraphrase it correctly into the symbols of a correct formal
system, and show it to be valid according to the rules of that
system, we know that the argument is valid. Thus, formal logic
can be used to demonstrate the formal validity of arguments
couched in natural languages. But for demonstrations of
invalidity, Massey maintained, matters are not so simple.
Suppose that we paraphrase an argument into the symbols of a
correct logical system and find that it turns out to be an invalid
argument in that system. Have we shown that the argument
is invalid? We have not, because we do not know that there
is no other system such that it would turn out to be valid in
that one. The question of whether the paraphrase is the only
logically revealing one remains open, as does the question of
the possibility of a correct logical system in which a logically
revealing paraphrase of the argument would turn out to be valid.
The reason for the marked asymmetry between showing validity and
showing invalidity should now be apparent. To show that an argument
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is valid it suffices to paraphrase it into a demonstrably valid argument
form of some (extant) logical system; to show that an argument is
invalid it is necessary to show that it cannot be paraphrased into a valid
argument form of any logical system, actual or possible.15
Massey’s account was welcomed by some informal logicians who
thought this took the formalists down a peg or two. The account
could be interpreted as showing that formal analysis presupposes
nonformal judgment as to the appropriacy of a paraphrase and
the aptness of the logical system to which the argument is
referred. (For informalists, this will be the right moral to derive
from the story. I later argue for this view.) We might see Massey
as an ally, witting or unwitting, of those who advocate a
nonformal approach to the analysis of arguments. He allowed in
his paper that we can show arguments invalid in a logically trivial
way by showing that the premises are true and the conclusion
false and also, in subsequent discussion, that we may often have
reasons for, or intuitions regarding, the inadequacy of
arguments. However, Massey remains adamant that such ‘low
level’ nonformal judgments do not amount to a theory of
invalidity and that judgments of invalidity remain unfounded,
theoretically.16 Massey would require formal grounding for
theoretical security.
Judgments of invalidity might come to be properly grounded,
were a logical grammar of a special kind to be found. In such
a case, we would have assurance that some paraphrase of an
argument was the correct one, and that the rules according to
which that paraphrase came out as invalid were the right rules to
apply.
… the egregious asymmetry between proving validity and proving
invalidity will persist until one or more programmes, such as Natural
Logic, have been successfully implemented.17
Any alliance between informal logicians and Massey is
premature and would not be to his taste. For him a theory is a
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formal theory, and a judgment without a theory is only a slight
improvement on no judgment at all.
An informal logician who sought consolation in Massey’s 1975
paper would be disappointed by his 1981 article, ‘The Fallacy
behind Fallacies’.18 In that paper Massey criticizes both informal
and formal logicians for their attempts to teach students to find
fallacies. He explicitly links his view to his earlier account of
validity and invalidity.19
In his informative treatise on fallacy, Hamblin succinctly
describes a fallacious argument as an argument that seems valid
without being so. It is with fallacies so defined that I will
hereafter be concerned.
Note first that fallacious arguments are invalid. Hence a theory
of fallacy presupposes a theory of invalidity. Therein lies the rub.
But, as I claimed above and have argued for elsewhere, a theory
of invalidity has yet to be developed. It is not surprising, then,
that treatments of fallacy eschew theory. There is no theory on
which they could be based.
Essentially, Massey employs the following argument:
1. Whatever else fallacies are, they are invalid arguments.
So,
2. To show that an argument is a fallacy, we must first show
that it is invalid.
And,
3. There is no formally adequate method of showing that an
argument is invalid.
So,
4. We cannot in any theoretically adequate way show that an
argument is invalid.
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Therefore,
5. There is no adequate theory underlying fallacies.
Fallacy analysis is sloppy and in a theoretical mess, because it
presupposes well-founded judgments of formal invalidity and
these cannot be made.
… whereas logical theory underwrites validity verdicts, the case for
invalidity verdicts (where the trivial logic- indifferent method is
inapplicable) rests at bottom on intuitive judgments of invalidity
altogether unsupported by theory.20
Let us examine Massey’s argument. The first premise, linking
fallaciousness and invalidity, would strike many people as
obvious. However, it poses problems. First, invalidity is not a
necessary condition of fallaciousness, provided that begging the
question is a fallacy.21 Many arguments that beg the question
are formally valid, and in some what explains their begging the
question is the very same thing that makes them formally valid:
they contain a premise which is logically equivalent to the
conclusion. Unless Massey has an unorthodox view about
begging the question, this phenomenon poses a problem for his
account. We cannot begin our account of fallacies by assuming
that all fallacious arguments are invalid unless we are prepared
to rule out question begging as a fallacy from the very start.
The problem can be extended to other fallacies with a dialectical
component, such as straw man. A sample argument such as:
1. Indeterminists hold that human actions are entirely random.
2. Entirely random actions are not responsible actions.
3. Indeterminists hold that humans are responsible for their
actions.
So,
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4. Indeterminists hold an inconsistent position regarding
human action.
Therefore,
5. Indeterminists hold a false view.
can no doubt be represented as a deductively valid argument.
With some manipulation, it can be represented as formally valid.
Nevertheless, due to the content of the first premise, the
argument may commit the straw man fallacy. The question as
to whether it does concerns the accuracy of that premise as
an account of the indeterminist position. Given that a straw
man argument might be cast as a deductively valid argument,
and given that straw man has long been thought to be a fallacy,
we have another reason for questioning whether invalidity is
a necessary condition of fallaciousness.22 Some traditional
fallacies can appear even in deductively valid arguments, because
they have to do with general features pertaining to content (as we
saw with ad hominem, above) or because of dialectical aspects, as
with the straw man case. These are not formal features.
Nor is it clear that invalidity is sufficient for fallaciousness. By
all but the most adamant deductivists, it is allowed that there are
some cogent arguments that are not deductively valid. If there is
even one cogent inductive argument, then that is a non-fallacious
argument which is not deductively valid. Hence, deductive
invalidity is not a sufficient condition for fallaciousness. In fact,
for different reasons, neither Hamblin nor Massey presume that
invalidity would be sufficient for fallaciousness. Invalidity in the
deductive sense is neither necessary nor sufficient for
fallaciousness.
The terms ‘valid’ and ‘invalid’ are used in a number of different
senses even by logicians. The following three are pertinent here:
1. An argument is valid if its premises are properly connected
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to its conclusion and provide adequate reasons for it. It is
invalid otherwise. (Umbrella validity)
2. An argument is valid if its premises deductively entail its
conclusion, such that given the truth of those premises the
falsity of the conclusion is a logical impossibility. It is invalid
otherwise. (Semantic validity)
3. An argument is valid if its conclusion is formally derivable
from its premises using the rules of a correct logical system.
It is invalid otherwise. (Formal validity)
On any theory of argument other than deductivism, it is only
umbrella validity that is of general relevance for argument
appraisal. Given a pluralistic theory, the fact that an argument
is semantically or formally invalid is, by itself, quite insufficient
to establish the claim that the argument is fallacious23. An
inductively strong argument is semantically and formally invalid,
but that does not show that it is fallacious.
Looking back at Massey’s own central argument, we can see
that premise (1) does not hold; Premise (2) gets its support from
(1) and is therefore unsupported; premise (3) is what Massey
argues for in his 1975 paper. There is no formally adequate way
of showing an argument to be formally invalid, because given
its invalidity according to some system, the possibility remains
open of its turning out to be formally valid according to some
other system. This point may be granted if by ‘formally adequate
method’ we mean ‘method that is formal and that does not
presuppose any significant preformal judgments’. If we grant
premise (2) for the sake of argument and grant premise (3) as
understood, there is still a gap in the inference from (2) and (3)
to (4). The problem is in moving from not having a formally
adequate method to not having any theoretically adequate
method. This move reveals Massey’s formalist predilections.
Anyone who thinks that respectable nonformal theories are
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possible will not accept this move and will not move to the final
conclusion either.
Massey’s work is extremely important. It reveals the
consequences of taking an entirely formalist account of validity
and argument appraisal to its limits. Many share Massey’s beliefs
about the relationship between fallaciousness and invalidity and
many endorse his formalist account of validity and the idea that
any theory worth its salt is a formal one. For such people,
Massey’s work leaves an important and profound problem.
From the perspective of a pluralistic theory of argument and
a nonformalist concept of theoretical adequacy, Massey’s
argument against the fallacies is far from conclusive. His point
about invalidity is important and telling against the sort of
insensitive formalization Lambert and Ulrich used. It shows the
need to detect the linkage which is supposed to be there, to
distinguish between those features of the argument which are
relevant to its logical appraisal and those which are not. We need
a paraphrase which captures all of the logically relevant features.
The formal invalidity of a particular paraphrase shows nothing
unless we are sure that paraphrase has captured the logically
significant features of the original argument. Judgment on this
matter is not formal.
Massey is unwilling to assume that ordinary human beings,
ordinary philosophers, or even ordinary logicians have a
preformal capacity to make these judgments about what is and
what is not relevant to the deductive appraisal of an argument.
He appears to use ‘valid’ and ‘invalid’ solely in a formal sense, to
such a degree that he makes such comments as:
… consider arguments (7) and (8).
(7) John took a walk by the river.
John took a walk.
(8) Tom, Dick and Harry are partners.
Tom and Harry are partners.
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Davidson deserves credit for showing how to translate (7) into standard
predicate logic in such a way as to get a valid argument form.
(Davidson’s translation turns on quantification over events, something
that some philosophers find objectionable, but that is another matter.)
Ante Davidson, no one seemed able to supply such a translation, and so
argument (7) was deemed invalid.24
This passage illustrates Massey’s tendency to conflate semantic
and formal validity and to attribute this conflation to other
logicians and philosophers. Before Davidson’s logical
discoveries, arguments (7) and (8) were semantically valid but
were (perhaps) not known to be formally valid.
Massey’s problem arises only within a strictly formalist
framework. If we are willing to grant that people understand
arguments and are capable of appreciating how these arguments
work so as to be able to construct correct formal paraphrases of
them, the problem does not arise. Granting that we understand
an argument and see what sort of connection that argument
depends on, we can sometimes show an invalid argument to
be invalid by paraphrasing it into the terms of an appropriate
formal system and employing the standards of that system.25 If
we are not willing to grant that people sometimes understand
arguments well enough to do this, Massey’s point will hold. But
then, on such a view, many other problems arise as well.
Rolf George takes this approach in a postscript to a recent
paper. He reminds his readers that, in addition to having the
capacity to understand sentences, people have the capacity to
understand arguments.
Consider, for instance, John 8:47, where Jesus argues
He that is of God heareth God’s words: ye therefore hear them not,
because ye are not of God.
Might we be wrong about the form of this argument? Is it really
conceivable that there is a clever translation into an extant formal
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language that shows it to be valid, or a hitherto undreamt of formal
language that would yield a valid argument form? Perhaps such a formal
language will be revealed to us in the fullness of time, but assuredly, it
will surpass all understanding. For present purposes we can be confident
that we can properly discern the (unique) form of that argument and find
it to be ‘denying the antecedent’.26
The passage strikes me as more subtle than George admits.
Paraphrasing, we arrive at ‘if you are of God, you hear God’s
words; you are not of God; therefore you do not hear God’s
words. ‘ The paraphrase uses, crucially, the placement of
‘therefore’ to identify the conclusion ‘you do not hear God’s
words’. With this paraphrase, we can see that the argument is
an example of the formally fallacious move of denying the
antecedent. It is this correct paraphrase that George’s comments
presume. (An incorrect paraphrase would lead one to find a
different argument with the conclusion, ‘you are not of God, ‘
and that argument would be a valid modus tollens.)
Formal proofs of invalidity are sometimes possible, given the
correctness of necessary preformal assumptions, However, these
are neither necessary nor sufficient to ground a theory of
fallacies, They are surely relevant to parts of such a theory; if
available, they offer part of the story of fallaciousness for some
deductive arguments, because dialectical considerations are
often relevant to fallaciousness (as in begging the question and
straw man) and because only common and deceptive reasoning
errors will count as fallacies, they offer only part of the story,
even for these cases,
3. The Argument From Sloppiness
With only occasional exceptions, fallacies have been the subject
more of textbooks than of treatises. Textbook treatments of
fallacies are often poor.27 Arguments are cited briefly and
carelessly interpreted; little is said to justify an interpretation
or an allegation of error; points made in explaining one ‘fallacy’
may be contradicted in another part of a text where a different
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‘fallacy’ is being discussed; different texts may define differently
what is called the same fallacy. Such problems are regrettable.
From them, some have inferred that fallacies would make an
important subject of study; others have concluded that there is
nothing to the subject.28 Before introducing his argument about
invalidity in ‘The Fallacy Behind Fallacies’, Massey began to
argue in this way. He said:
The myriad and intricate schemes for classifying fallacies suggest that
there is little theory behind the science of fallacy. This suggestion
misleads only by implying that there is any theory at all behind it. The
unvarnished truth is this: there is no theory of fallacy whatsoever. I will
return to this claim shortly.29
A more extended version of this theme is found in Maurice
Finocchiaro’s recent paper, ‘Fallacies and the Evaluation of
Reasoning’.30
Finocchiaro begins by saying that, for the appraisal of
arguments in natural language and extra-formal contexts, the
formal approach faces a difficulty,
stemming from the well-known fact that formal validity is neither a
sufficient nor a necessary condition for the favorable evaluation of
an argument. It is not sufficient because it excludes neither question-
begging arguments nor self-contradictory ones (i.e. arguments with
inconsistent premises). It is not necessary partly because of the
Toulmin-type objection that most good arguments most of the time (in
the empirical sciences, legal contexts, humanities, and everyday life) are
not formally valid, and partly because formal validity presupposes fully
reconstructed arguments which in human reasoning are the exception
rather than the rule.31
Unlike Lambert, Ulrich, and Massey, Finocchiaro is not
working within a formalist frame of reference nor even within
a deductivist frame of reference. He endorses a version of the
Spectrum Theory. A fallacies approach is, in principle, more
compatible with such theory than a purely formal approach.
However, Finocchiaro notes, there are defects in many, if not
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all, textbook accounts of fallacies. Finocchiaro’s first complaint
about standard textbook treatments of fallacies is that there are
too few real examples. (He sees these defects in texts by Salmon,
Kreyche, Cohen and Nagel, Fearnside, Holther, and Beardsley.)
He also states that the few real examples used are poorly
interpreted. Granting these points for the moment, the question
remains open as to what we wish to infer from them.
Finocchiaro draws a sweeping conclusion:
The conclusion I wish to draw from such ‘consultations’ is not that errors
in reasoning are probably not common in real life, but that there are
probably no common errors in reasoning. That is, logically incorrect
arguments may be common, but common types of logically incorrect
arguments probably are not.
The problem I wish to raise here is, do people actually commit fallacies
as usually understood? That is, do fallacies exist in practice? Or do they
exist in the mind of the interpreter who is claiming that a fallacy is being
committed? 32
The inadequacy of textbook treatments leads Finocchiaro to
conclude that there are probably no real fallacies in practice; that
fallacies exist only in the minds of logicians. This line of thought
may be termed the argument from sloppiness.
The argument from sloppiness is hasty, to put it mildly. If
examples of fallacies are contrived, unrealistic, or in other ways
inadequate, that is regrettable to be sure. One should point this
out and refrain from using such texts, even if by using them
one can swell student enrollments. But these deficiencies do not
make it likely that no texts on fallacies are adequate, that no text
on fallacies ever could be adequate, that there are no fallacies in
real life, or that fallacies exist only in minds of logicians.
Finocchiaro of course did not sample all texts. Notably he
omitted several in which the authors are primarily interested in
fallacies and try to offer many real examples such as Howard
Kahane’s Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric and Ralph Johnson and
Anthony Blair’s Logical Self-Defense. He included others in which
the authors are primarily interested in deductive logic and
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included a short section on fallacies merely as a gesture in the
direction of practicality or completeness.
Even if all extant texts on logic and argument were to contain
sloppily done sections on fallacies, this deplorable inadequacy
would not make it very likely that ‘there are no common types
of logically incorrect argument’. Trivially, straw man would be a
common type of logically incorrect argument were this to be the
case. Also, a plausible explanation of such textbook inadequacy
would be that philosophers are poor empiricists who tend to
be lazy about collecting examples from colloquial or non
philosophical sources and who use each other’s examples or
invent cases, rather than doing empirical work. There is ample
evidence from other areas of philosophy to support this
alternative explanation. Finocchiaro’s statement that textbook
accounts of fallacies should include a discussion of real
examples, sensitively interpreted, can scarcely be disputed.
However, his inferences from the supposed inadequacies of
several texts in this regard are shaky indeed.
Finocchiaro’s next criticism of the fallacies approach to
argument appraisal is that texts are usually hasty in their
provision of grounds for deeming the ‘disputed practice’
fallacious. He bases this charge on his own theory of the
correctness of arguments.33 It goes as follows:
if a fallacy is defined as a type of common but logically incorrect
argument, the various types would have to be the following: (1)
arguments claiming to be deductively valid but which are actually
invalid; (2) arguments claiming to be inductively strong but which are
actually inductively weak; (3) arguments claiming to have some
inductive strength but which have none. There is no way for an
argument to be a fallacy without falling into one of the three above-
mentioned classes.
This theory of argument is put forward briefly and given no
defense. The account does not accommodate question-begging
arguments. Nor does Finocchiaro define the contested term
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‘inductive’. On this theory of argument, criticism will almost
certainly be a precarious business, because so much depends
on whether an argument ‘claims’ deductive validity, inductive
strength, or merely some strength in a broadly inductive sense.
Natural language has no reliable devices for indicating whether
such connections are intended, and many arguers lack the
requisite philosophers’ concepts. Which of Finocchiaro’s levels
of appraisal is appropriate in a given case will often be unclear.
This point is worth noting, for Finocchiaro tends to use the
interpretive problems which arise from his particular theory of
argument as general problems for understanding the fallacies.
When we interpret an arguer as having committed the formal
fallacy of affirming the consequent, we must interpret him as
reasoning from the assertion of a conditional and its consequent
to its antecedent. We must regard him as ‘implicitly claiming’
that the antecedent follows deductively from the assertion of the
conditional and the consequent. In many contexts in which we
might make such an allegation, alternative interpretations will be
possible. For instance, we might regard the person as reasoning
to the best explanation, as in ‘Q; the fact that P would explain
the fact that Q (worded as ‘if P then Q’); therefore (no other
explanation of Q being possible) we may presume that P.’
Contrary to his own prior admonitions, Finocchiaro offers no
example to illustrate this suggestion. But in principle it is easy to
see that this different, non-deductive interpretation would often
be possible. If someone says:
I think there’s going to be a fall election, because if there’s a fall
election, there’s a lot of government propaganda in the spring and,
you know, this spring, there has been quite a lot of government
propaganda.
either the affirming-the-consequent account or the inference-
to-an-explanation account would be possible. We can represent
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this line of thinking as ‘G, because if G then L, and L’, and take
it as a deductive argument – one intended by the arguer as
deductively valid. We then find the fallacy of affirming the
consequent. Alternately, given the occurrence of ‘I think’ and
the fact that the imminence of an election could in fact explain
prior government propaganda, it would be plausible, and more
charitable, to read the comments as constituting a non-
deductive argument in which an inference is made from a fact
to a hypothesis which would explain that fact. On this
interpretation, there does not seem to be a fallacy. It is clear
that the alternative line of interpretation which Finocchiaro
proposes would be plausible some of the time. But he owes us
a real example. Furthermore, the fact that this alternative,
eliminating charges of affirming the consequent as presuming
uncharitable interpretation, is sometimes plausible, does not show
that it is always plausible.
Finocchiaro goes on to contend that ‘post hoc ergo propter hoc’
allegations are also based on sloppy and insensitive
interpretation. Both Salmon and Copi describe post hoc as a
mistake in which one infers from the bare fact that B followed
A, the conclusion that A caused B. Finocchiaro says of their
accounts:
No justification is given why these interpretations are preferable to the
following: ‘concluding that B was caused by A partly because B followed
A’, or ‘the inference that one event is the cause of another from the fact,
among others, that the first occurs earlier than the second’. These latter
interpretations should be preferred because they are more accurate in the
sense that they correspond more closely to a type of reasoning in which
people actually engage.34
Again, Finocchiaro supplies no examples. He says that his
interpretation would correspond more closely to reasoning that
people actually use, but he does not back up this statement either
with empirical evidence or with a priori reasoning of the type
some philosophers have used in support of principles of charity.
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He does not offer criteria to indicate which missing premises
we might add to supplement the stated claims which, as stated,
are open to an interpretation according to which they constitute
a fallacious argument. Whether or not people often engage in
post hoc reasoning is not something one is entitled to stipulate
from a philosophical armchair. Finocchiaro suggests that those
who identify post hoc as a fallacy make the mistake of interpreting
what is offered as a ‘weak’ inductive argument as though it has
been put forward as a ‘strong’ inductive argument. On his view,
the fallacy emerges only because of this interpretive error: the
critic employs a contentious and less than sympathetic reading
of the discourse. Perhaps this is true, but Finocchiaro offers no
evidence in support of his suggestion that people are claiming
a weak inductive connection between the evidence and the
conclusion claim.
A final allegation regarding the tendency of philosophers to
interpret tendentiously is made with reference to such fallacies
as appeal to force and appeal to pity. Finocchiaro quotes Copi’s
descriptions as ‘appealing to force or the threat of force to cause
acceptance of a conclusion’ and ‘appealing to pity for the sake of
getting a conclusion accepted’.35 In such cases, he says:
these could non-prejudicially, but along the same lines, be described as
‘appealing to force or to pity to cause acceptance of a certain proposition
or to cause a certain action’. When so described, they can be seen to be
methods, among others, of which giving an argument is one, in order
to cause acceptance of a certain proposition. Being nonarguments, they
cannot be logically incorrect arguments.36
Here Finocchiaro tries to draw a fine distinction, between
using a statement as a premise to win acceptance of a further
statement as a supported conclusion and using a statement to
win acceptance of a further statement that is not exactly a
conclusion to be drawn from evidence. The claim is to be
believed as a nonlogical, nonrational result of understanding that
first statement. This subtle distinction can doubtless be made,
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but will be difficult to apply in practice. If we are distinguishing
types of arguments and non-arguments on the basis of what
arguers and speakers ‘claim’, it difficult to see that any but the
philosophical elite would have the conceptual sophistication to
‘claim’ what the distinction requires. A critique of Copi’s account
that depends solely on its problems of application is quite
compelling.
Finocchiaro might have made essentially the same point in a
much simpler way. If a person is to be interpreted as offering
a fallacious argument, she must be interpreted as offering an
argument. In many contexts, it is quite unclear whether people
are in fact giving arguments. They may say one thing and then
say another, and we may have no clear idea as to whether the first
claim is to provide a reason for the second or not. In Introduction
to Logical Theory, P.F. Strawson put the point this way:
… I have in mind such expressions as ‘that is to say’, ‘in other words’,
‘more briefly’. ‘I mean’. These are expressions which we sometimes
(though not always or only) use on occasions on which we should describe
ourselves, not as inferring or arguing, but rather as, say putting into
other words something that has already been said, or repeating it with
something left out, or summarizing it, or making a precis. There is no
sharply definite line separating those steps which we should call steps
in reasoning and those steps which we should describe in one of the
alternative ways I have listed. 37
In such cases, seeing people as offering arguments is
problematic, and therefore interpreting them as offering
fallacious arguments is problematic as well.
Consider, for instance, the following, spotted on a billboard
near Salem, Ontario.
Jesus Christ died for our sins. Trust him.
These short statements might be regarded as elements of an
argument, in which case we could regard that argument as an
enthymeme having the missing premise ‘Anyone who died for
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our sins should be trusted’. Enthymeme or not, the statements
might be taken as constituting an argument committing the
fallacy of appealing to pity. Whether this allegation of fallacy is
appropriate depends on our sense of whether the point of the
message is that one should infer from Jesus’ suffering on the
cross to a conclusion that Jesus should be trusted. One might
defend such an interpretation by pointing out that Jesus’ death
on the cross was extraordinarily painful; as an innocent and
suffering being with a human body, Jesus was at that point pitiful.
One might contest such an interpretation on the ground that
Jesus went to heaven and, for that reason, was not a being who
should be pitied. Thus, we may interpret these statements as
offering an argument based on pity, or as offering an argument
not based on pity. Alternatively, we might regard the billboard
as simply making two statements with no intended inferential
relationship between them.
There are many cases in which discourse can legitimately be
interpreted in several ways. Interpretive issues extend far
beyond the fallacies of appeal to force and appeal to pity.
Interestingly enough, Finocchiaro’s own paper illustrates this
kind of interpretive under-determination. Toward the end of the
paper, he claims that, despite the difficulties he has found with
fallacies analysis, finding errors in arguments offers more insight
than finding them to be correct. He suggests that ‘negative
evaluation is methodologically more significant’ than positive
evaluation. Having given some reasons in support of this view,
Finocchiaro adds these two sentences:
This corresponds to conclusions reached by other philosophers in other
contexts. For example, Karl Popper and his followers have stressed the
primacy of falsification and criticism as opposed to confirmation and
justification in science; Henry W. Johnston Jr. has argued that, in
philosophy, critical arguments are more fundamental than constructive
ones; and Imre Lakatos has stressed the methodological importance of
refutation in mathematics.38
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If these comments are intended to offer support for the greater
insight yielded by negative evaluation, one might accuse
Finocchiaro of the fallacy of misusing authority. But if they are
just added remarks, made to add interest to the view, such a
charge would be inappropriate. Which interpretation –
argument or non-argument – is appropriate is a moot point
which could be argued either way. Some interpretive issues just
are moot: life and language are like that. The problem does not
arise only for fallacies.
That we cannot achieve a reliable consensus about the
identification of fallacious arguments in such a case shows, not
that our logical understanding of fallacies is poor, but that the
distinction between arguments and nonarguments is sometimes
difficult to apply. It is entirely likely that some alleged appeals
to force and pity are most plausibly interpreted in a way which
does not make them out to be arguments. But with no examples,
Finocchiaro offers no evidence. Even if he had cited examples,
one could point out that some cases are not all. Strictly speaking,
this problem is not about fallacies as such but about the openness
of much discourse to diverse interpretations.
Finocchiaro goes on to hypothesize that there is a certain
progressive pattern to philosophers’ misinterpretations of
natural reasoning. An inductive argument is misrepresented as
deductive, a weakly inductive argument as strongly inductive,
and a nonargument as an argument. The pattern of
misinterpretation pursued by those who find fallacies is
that of exaggerating the strength of the connection claimed between
various assertions, or of creating one where none is claimed.39
This critique of fallacies analysis rests on a controversial and
undefended theory of argument. Despite Finocchiaro’s attacks
on texts for having inadequate examples, his own account has
singularly few. His hypothesis about fallacies is based on a hasty
inference from the fact that some texts are found to be
inadequate and that some classifications have been hasty.
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Here, we have a premature and hasty analysis. Yet Finocchiaro
boldly states:
the conclusion to be drawn from the above discussion is that the concept
of a fallacy as a type of common but logically incorrect argument is
a chimera, since the various disputed practices usually referred to as
fallacies are either not common or not logically incorrect or not
arguments.40
This sweeping conclusion is simply not warranted by the
evidence put forward.
Finocchiaro moves us away from formalism and deductivism.
He acknowledges that, given the possibility of good
nondeductive arguments, the fallaciousness of an argument wi1l
not follow simply from the fact that it fails to be deductively
valid. He recognizes the role of interpretation in fallacies
analysis. Before appraising reasoning by whatever standard, we
have to determine what reasoning is used. That is an interpretive
problem. We also have to determine somehow what standard
of appraisal (deductive, inductive, or other) should be applied
to the argument. If this interpretive work is done carelessly, a
charge of fa1lacy will be poorly supported. Often interpretation
is careless and such charges are implausible. Some examples and
explanations offered in texts and other sources are sloppy and
unconvincing. But it is a large leap from these claims to the
revisionist view that there are no fallacies at all. In fact, that
revisionist view is strictly speaking incompatible with
Finocchiaro’s analysis, because he is commited to the claim that
one particular fallacy – the straw man – occurs frequently in the
pages of logic textbooks.
4. Charity as Eliminating Fallacies
There is one popular way to link Finocchiaro’s demand for
more sensitive interpretation with his conclusion that there are
no fallacies, and that is by appealing to a strong principle of
charity. We might adopt a model of interpretation according
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to which the best interpretation of an argument is always that
interpretation which makes it out to be the best argument. It
is always possible to construct a version of an argumentative
passage which contains no mistakes in reasoning. As explained
earlier, one can simply insert the associated conditional as a
missing premise. And there are a variety of moves that can be
employed.
In any case in which discourse can be construed either as
offering a poor argument or as offering no argument, we always
opt for the latter. Even where there is an argument, sentences
that are in fact irrelevant to the conclusion can be interpreted
as comments which do not belong to the real premises so that
irrelevance does not occur. Where indicator words make these
moves interpretively implausible, supplementary premises can
be added so that inference gaps are always filled, and any errors
remaining are errors in belief, not in reasoning. Where
appropriate, conclusions of the supposed argument can be
qualified so that less is claimed and less support is needed.
Arguments can be taken as being of an inferentially unambitious
type, as Finocchiaro proposed for alleged cases of the post hoc
fallacy. Using a combination of such strategies, apparently
fallacious arguments can be rendered as non-fallacies by
charitable interpretation.
Finocchiaro does refer approvingly to charity. However, he
does not explicitly endorse a version of it so strong that it would
in every case require one or more of the above moves. Others
have not been so cautious. The principle of charity is often stated
so ambiguously and used so sweepingly that its application
would eliminate fallacies, both formal and informal.41
Strong charity will suffice to eliminate fallacies. If our over-
riding goal in interpretation is to interpret discourse so as to
make it maximally ‘sensible’, then it will be to avoid alleging that a
speaker or writer has made an error in reasoning. Thus, if strong
charity is adopted as the guiding principle of interpretation,
there will be few if any fallacies. But strong charity can be
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resisted for other reasons. Moderate charity, which is sensible
and usable for genuinely interpretive purposes, will not suffice to
eliminate fallacies.
Consider the following example of a chain letter, cited by
Gerald Nosich in his text, Reasons and Arguments.42
TRUST IN THE LORD WITH ALL YOUR HEART AND HE WILL
ACKNOWLEDGE AND HE WILL LIGHT THE WAY.
This prayer was sent to you for luck. The original copy is from the
Netherlands. It has been around the world ten times. The luck has been
brought to you. You’re to receive good luck within four days of receiving
this letter. ‘This is no joke.’ You will receive it in the mail.
Send copies of this letter to people you think need good luck. Do not send
money, do not keep this letter. It must leave you within ninety-six hours
after you receive it. Please send twenty copies and see what happens to you
on the fourth day.
This chain comes from Venezuela and was written by St. Anthony De
Calif, a missionary from South America. Since this chain must make a
tour of this world, you must send twenty copies, identical to this one
photostated. Either to one of your friends, parents, or acquaintances.
An officer received $70,000. Don Colbert received $30,000 but lost it
because he broke the chain. While in the Philippines General Welch lost
his life six days after he received this letter, he failed to circumstance the
prayer. However, before he died he received $775,000.
After a few days, you will receive a surprise. ‘This is true even if you are
not superstitious.’ Take note of the following:
Constantine Black received the chain in 1933. He asked his secretary to
make twenty copies and send them. A few days later he won a lottery in his
country for two million dollars.
Carlos Crocbite an office employee received the chain, he forgot it. A few
days later, he lost his job. He found the chain and sent it to twenty people
and five days later he received a better job.
Doris Merchild received the chain and did not believe in it. Nine
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days later she died. FOR NO REASON WHATSOEVER SHOULD THIS
CHAIN BE BROKEN.
The context and wording of this letter make it clear that the
various anecdotes are supposed to support two conclusions:
1. A person who, within ninety-six hours of receiving the
letter, sends out twenty copies of it to appropriate people,
will receive good luck within four days of receiving the letter
because he has treated the letter appropriately.
2. A person who, within ninety-six hours of receiving the
letter, does not send out twenty copies of it to appropriate
people will receive bad luck because he has not treated the
letter appropriately.
To support (1), four cases of individuals who received the letter
and then had good luck are cited. To support (2), four cases
of individuals who did not behave properly after receiving the
letter and had bad luck are cited.
Both post hoc and hasty inductive reasoning are involved in the
use of these anecdotes to support (1) and (2). No plausible use
of a moderate charity principle can avoid this. The purpose of
the letter is to convince the recipient to send off the appropriate
number of copies in the right way; the need to convince him or
her of (l) and (2) arises directly from this. The only evidence in
support of these tacit conclusions is anecdotal. In every anecdote
a sequence of events is described, with the clear implication
(made explicit in one case) that the prior event caused the latter
event. To interpret the letter as non-fallacious, as doing
something other than repeating post hoc fallacies, we would have
to ignore very considerable contextual and textual evidence. The
point of such a letter is to frighten people into compliance. The
stories told are to achieve this. Causal claims are required, and
the anecdotes are the only basis for them, in the written letter.
Knowing what we do about the writers and readers of chain
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letters, there is no other plausible interpretation of this discourse
which avoids the charge of fallacy. Only a principle of charity so
strong as to outweigh all other relevant factors in interpretation
could give a different result for this passage. Such strong charity
is not a plausible principle of interpretation.
5. Concluding Comments
Formal invalidity is not the whole story about fallacies. It may
be possible to show formal invalidity, provided we are willing
to make preformal assumptions about paraphrasing, but doing
that will not be sufficient to yield a theory of fallacy. There are
many reasons for this conclusion. Some fallacies, such as begging
the question and straw man, can be committed even when an
argument is valid. Also, many arguments are non-deductive and
standards of deductive validity are irrelevant to their appraisal
as adequate or inadequate. Furthermore, the issue of proper
interpretation looms large for fallacy theory. A proper theory
of interpretation is needed – ruling out strong charity and
incorporating moderate charity. Revisionism about fallacies has
been tempting because there are so many unresolved and
relevant issues in the theory of argument. However, such
revisionism is unwarranted and premature. There is no fallacy
behind fallacies.
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CHAPTER 10.
FORMALISM AND INFORMALISM IN THEORIES
OF REASONING AND ARGUMENT
In this chapter I questioned the notion that argument interpretation
and evaluation are matters of science, as distinct from art. Another
version of this material was printed in the Computers and
Philosophy Newsletter (Stanford University, Volume 4, December
1989, submitted 1987). That context was an early discussion of
artificial intelligence and its prospects. Following the reflections of
critics such as Hubert Dreyfus, I was inclined to be skeptical about the
matter. Dreyfus and others argued that to understand discourse, we
needed considerable background knowledge and awareness of context.
His skepticism was supported by that of my computer scientist husband
Anton Colijn, who was fond of saying that artificial intelligence was
just around the corner, and that was where it would always be. (He still
says this but less frequently than before.) I argued here for the claim
that strict rules cannot be provided for algorithms required by artificial
intelligence. But perhaps the presumption that strict (universal,
exception-less) rules would be needed was somewhat naïve. I admit that
I am not in a position to know.
In the eighties skeptical persons such as myself questioned the idea
that algorithmic processes could support machine translation. Now,
decades later, machine translation exists and even the skeptics of earlier
decades have been known to resort to ‘Google Translate’ on occasion.
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The results, I gather, tend to be helpful but by no means elegant or
smooth.
Current discussions and concerns about artificial intelligence are
wide-ranging. Some thinkers, including Stephen Hawking and the
Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, fear AI capable of super-human
intelligence and motivated to destroy humankind. How relevant are
philosophical questions about the connection between consciousness,
thought, and intelligence? Mind, machine and body? What is the
significance of facts about artificial intelligence systems beating experts
at the games of chess (Garry Kasparov) and Go (Lee Sedol)? Many
worry about widespread automation eliminating needed jobs. More
limited concerns involve issues of legal and moral responsibility for
accidents involving self-driving cars, or a flaw in an expert system
leading to a faulty diagnosis and premature death. The reflections in
this chapter are, at best, marginally relevant to these current problems
and anxieties.
When this chapter was written, I thought that one needed
considerable background knowledge and a good sense of context and
nuance to understand whether an argument was put forward and what
that argument was. I also thought that there was usually one correct
answer to such questions. Now I would continue to support the first
presumption while being less confident about the second. The notion of
general rules holding most but not all of the time, being sound, other
things being equal (ceteris paribus) is reasonable. Of late, the phrase
pro tanto seems to have replaced ceteris paribus, but the message
remains the same.
If I were to question a central aspect of this chapter it would concern
the assumption that strict exception-less rules for interpretation of
discourse are not to be found. That claim, made in the latter part of
the chapter, feels over-confident to me today. Perhaps the cues and hints
used by human interpreters can be coded. I still feel inclined to doubt it,
but admit that my doubt is based on an imperfect understanding of the
possibilities.
In our century, logic is typically identified with formal logic,
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and formal logic is the study of proofs and rules of inference
in axiomatized formal systems. Logic is also regarded as the
science of argument assessment, as a study that will teach us
how to understand and appraise the justificatory reasoning that
people actually use. Logic is supposed to be both scientific and
practical. Some texts advise that logic ‘operates like a machine
fulfilling its function no matter who is pressing the button’, that
it is a ‘science for evaluating argument’, that it is too objective to
depend on ‘insights, intuitions, or feelings’. There is a tension in
these views of logic. We cannot have it both ways – that logic
is entirely formal and yet applies to real argumentation. Either
logic includes much that is nonformal or it tells us only a small
amount of what we need to know to understand and evaluate
arguments.
In fact, argument evaluation is more an art than a science. It is
not something that can be mechanized, and that has important
consequences for the development of artificial intelligence
systems. Understanding and evaluating arguments is an
important part of human intelligence. If this cannot be done by
rules and if artificial intelligence (even in its most sophisticated
forms) must proceed by the application of rules, then there will
be a necessary incompleteness to artificial intelligence. There
will be a range of tasks it cannot fully accomplish. Such, at least,
is the implication of the analysis developed here. To be sure, we
can sometimes recast natural argumentation in the symbolism
of formal systems and reach a conclusion about the deductive
merits of the inferences upon which they depend. Frequently
this is not possible, and even when it is, accomplishing the task
presupposes significant nonformal insights.
Argument interpretation and evaluation form an art, an art
requiring insight and judgment. This art can be cultivated by
practice and enhanced by the teaching of rules of various kinds,
but it cannot be exhaustively characterized by articulated rules
— formal or otherwise. This can be shown even if we ignore the
aspect of premise evaluation, which would be admitted by all to
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require general knowledge of the world. Even when we restrict
ourselves to the interpretation of language and the evaluation of
inferences, arguing well and criticizing well require more than
the mechanical application of rules. It is not reasonable to expect
mechanical decisions for the understanding and evaluation of
substantive argumentation.
The lack of formalization in informal logic neither makes that
subject an intellectual sham nor shows it to be a primitive stage
on the way to a full understanding of argument. To speak of
informal logic is not to contradict oneself but to acknowledge
what should be obvious: that the understanding of natural
arguments requires substantive knowledge and insight not
captured in the rules of axiomatized systems. The informal
fallacies, historically a central topic in informal logic, involve
mistakes in reasoning that are relatively common, but neither
formal nor formally characterizable in any useful way. The fact
that an account of an informal fallacy makes it out to be just that
does not show that it is imprecise or lacking in rigour.
The development, understanding, and evaluation of
argumentation is far from being a mechanical task. It is a
misunderstanding both of argumentation and of the human
intelligence that constructs it to think that what goes on must
be exhaustively representable in formal rules. To put the point
provocatively, though computers may derive formulae, they
don’t construct, understand, or appraise substantive
argumentation. The evaluation of a colloquial nonformal
argument is something quite different from the appraisal of a
formal derivation by applying formal rules of inference.
l. Interpretation as a Nonformal Process
Comprehension is an unformalizable process striving towards an
unspecifiable achievement and is accordingly attributed to the agency of a
centre seeking satisfaction in the light of its own standard.1
To understand an argument, we must first understand the
314 TRUDY GOVIER
language in which its constituent sentences are expressed. The
understanding of natural language presupposes much
background knowledge that is substantive, not merely syntactic.
It also requires the ability to grasp the meaning of aberrant and
odd combinations not prescribed by the ‘rules’. Difficulties in
completely formalizing rules for the understanding of natural
language as it is actually used are well known and have been
much discussed.
The literary analyst Stanley Fish, among others, has pointed
out the extent to which meaning depends on context. Fish argues
convincingly that even such apparently simple expressions as
‘private members only’ can be given an amazing variety of
interpretations, provided we invent a corresponding variety of
contexts of use. He resists the idea that any one context is
‘normal’ in a sense that would make the meaning of an
expression in that context its real or literal meaning.
A sentence neither means anything at all, nor does it always mean
the same thing; it always has the meaning that has been conferred
on it by the situation in which it is uttered. Listeners always know
what speech act is being performed, not because there are limits to the
i1locutionary uses to which sentences can be put, but because in any set
of circumstances the illocutionary force a sentence may have will already
have been determined.2
Machine translation has bogged down, except in carefully
restricted domains, because of the necessity of referring to an
apparently infinite amount of background knowledge.3
Less commonly remarked are those aspects of understanding
that are pertinent to the identification of sentences as comprising
an argument. To see a sequence of sentences as an argument is
not only to understand the meaning of those sentences but to
regard some of them as put forward to offer rational support
for others. This understanding requires a notion of ‘logical flow’,
and the imputation of an intent to justify a claim or claims to an
identified, or hypothetical, arguer. We have seen that pragmatic
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factors serve to distinguish argument from explanation. The
same may be said about the distinction between argument and
description, narration, exemplification, jokes, and so on.
The relevance of context, human purposes, and background
information to the understanding of an argument makes it
impossible to identify arguments solely by reference to general
lists of semantic and syntactic cues. The need for argument, the
presence of argument, and the direction of argument are
determined on the basis of our sense of what is going on.
Consider the following example from Stuart Hampshire’s book
on Spinoza.
A philosopher has always been thought of as someone who tries to achieve
a complete view of the universe as a whole, and of man’s place in the
universe; he has traditionally been expected to answer those questions
about the design and purpose of the universe, and of human life, which
the various special sciences do not claim to answer; philosophers have
generally been conceived as unusually wise or all-comprehending men
whose systems are answers to those large, vague questions about the
purposes of human existence which present themselves to most people at
some period of their lives. Spinoza fulfills all these expectations.4
Few persons schooled in the history of philosophy would
interpret Hampshire as arguing here. Yet many introductory
philosophy students understood the passage as an argument with
the unstated conclusion that Spinoza was a philosopher. If we
regarded this claim as one Hampshire was trying to justify, and if
we thought Hampshire was the sort of writer who would argue
about philosophy by pointing out what ordinary people have
often thought, we might read the passage this way. (Spinoza
fulfills the common expectation of what philosophers are like;
therefore Spinoza is a philosopher.) Such a reading is
implausible, but it takes background knowledge to see that. This
is not to deny, of course, that in some other context it might be
appropriate to try to prove that Spinoza is a philosopher. For
example, if one were disputing with a logical positivist one might
try to prove that point. But in that context the ordinary person’s
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casual assumptions as to what philosophy is would hardly be a
plausible starting point for the argument.
Similar points may be made about the identification of
premises and conclusions. Once we have understood the
sentences of a discourse and have understood that the discourse
is a justificatory one, there remains the further task of
determining which sentences are premises and which are
conclusions. Such matters are taken for granted but are by no
means purely routine. Consider, for instance, the following
relatively well-ordered and simple passage, which caused many
undergraduates significant difficulty.
Philosophers of science are fond of claiming that a theory or model
can never he disproved by a new fact, or even a set of facts, but only
by a new and more comprehensive theory. While this may be a useful
rule of thumb, it suggests misleadingly that individual findings cannot
have revolutionary reverberations. In fact, when a solar eclipse in 1919
showed that certain predictions by Einstein of the way light would be
deflected were correct, the theory of relativity gained immeasurably in
stature. Conversely, proponents of the theory that intelligence is
inherited suffered a severe blow when data presented by Sir Cyril Burt
were shown to be fraudulent.5
This passage is the opening paragraph of an article which
describes the artistic skills of an autistic child called Nadia,
whose developmental pattern in drawing was so unusual as to
upset previously confirmed theories on how children’s drawing
develops.6 Many students, asked to analyze the passage,
identified ‘it suggests misleadingly that individual findings
cannot have revolutionary reverberations’ as the conclusion.
Others thought that the conclusion was to be found in the first
sentence.
The first two sentences serve as background; the author
describes a common view, and then points out that this view is
misleading in its suggestion that individual findings cannot have
revolutionary implications in science. To say that it is misleading
is to suggest that the implied view is false. Indeed, that point is
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what can be supported by the next two sentences. The words
‘In fact’ indicate that at this point the author turns from the
‘misleading implication’ of a common view to his own line of
thought. ‘Conversely’, introducing the final sentence, marks the
contrast between a confirming instance and a disconfirming
instance. To properly understand this passage, we have to be
sensitive to the tone of the background comments (in ‘while
this may be’), see that the author is rebutting the misleading
implication of the standard view. We have to see how the two
instances described serve as the basis for this rebuttal. The
passage mixes description, argument, and meta-comment; the
meta-level comment is not properly part of the argument, though
it helps us to identify that argument.
This passage, though not especially tricky or exciting, indicates
how much understanding is involved in the extraction of an
argument from natural discourse. Such extraction requires
semantic knowledge, syntactic knowledge, background factual
knowledge, contextual awareness, and a general sense of how
things ‘hang together logically’. Logically competent listeners and
readers do much to extract the ‘logic’ of an argument from
natural discourse, even in a case that is fairly straightforward.
Still more subtle semantic and background knowledge is
involved in the understanding of the following argument from
John Locke. The argument is a valid modus tollens and would
naturally be read as such by philosophically trained readers.
However, considerable recasting of the original wording is
required in order to set it out explicitly in this form.
Syllogism is not the great instrument of reason. For if syllogism must
be taken for the only proper instrument and means of knowledge, then
before Aristotle there was not one man that did or could know anything
by reason; and that since the invention of syllogism there is not one of ten
thousand that does. But God has not been so sparing to men as to make
them barely two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them
rational.7
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Understanding that Locke uses a modus tollens inference here
requires understanding ‘syllogism is the great instrument of
reason’ and ‘syllogism must be taken for the only proper
instrument and means of knowledge’ to mean the same thing, in
this context. (They would not necessarily mean the same thing
in other contexts.) We must also take the last sentence to be a
rhetorically emphatic and original way of saying that it is not
knowledge of the syllogism that makes men rational; this claim
denies the consequent of the second sentence. At this point we
have an argument whose validity can be appraised mechanically.
However, to cast the argument in the form in which this is
possible, we must make significant and subtle interpretive
moves. These presume background knowledge, a sense for
rhetorical flourish, and much more.
Such nonformal capabilities are, of course, also called into play
when argumentative discourse relies on unstated premises or
conclusions. Howard Posposel quoted the following argument
from a philosophical paper by Hans Hahn, thinking it suitable for
students to practice symbolization and the application of validity
tests to natural material. Its proper interpretation, however,
presumes a degree of sensitivity and knowledge which would
seem to make it unsuitable for that role.
The old conception of logic is approximately as follows: logic is the
account of the most universal properties of things, the account of those
properties which are common to all things; just as ornithology is the
science of birds, zoology the science of all animals, biology the science of
all living beings, so logic is the science of all things, the science of being as
such. If this were the case, it would remain wholly unintelligible whence
logic derives its certainty. For we surely do not know all things. We
have not observed everything, and hence we cannot know how everything
behaves.8
To understand this passage argumentatively we must read the
long first sentence as background, see that the final sentence
encapsulates a subargument, see that the subargument supports
the claim in the second last sentence, see that the second last
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sentence together with an unstated premise supports the
conditional sentence, and supply a final conclusion from an
interpretation of the conditional sentence. To say the least, a lot
of work is involved. The result:
1. We have not observed everything,
thus,
2. We cannot know how everything behaves.
thus,
3. We do not know all things.
So,
4. If logic were the science of the most universal properties of all
things, logic would have no certainty.
5. Missing Premise: Logic has certainty.
Therefore,
6. Missing Conclusion: Logic is not the science of the most
universal properties of all things.
The conclusion, which is implicit, is derived from a stated
premise and an implicit premise by modus tollens. There is an
argument here, and we can understand it, but our understanding
presumes deletion, rearranging, and addition.
The first sentence is regarded as background and deemed not
to be a premise because it is a description of an old conception
not endorsed by the author. The rearranging of the last two
sentences, yielding two subarguments, is based on the presence
of ‘hence’ as an indicator word and the logical relations we
perceive between not observing everything, not knowing how
everything behaves, and not knowing everything. The addition
of the premise is based on background knowledge as to what
philosophers in general and Hahn in particular typically assume
about logic, as well as on our perception that the addition of such
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a premise would make sense of the stated material: it generates
a deductively valid argument yielding the implicit conclusion.
The conclusion is added on the basis of the wording (‘if this
were the case’) and background knowledge as to what logical
positivists thought about logic and metaphysics. We can see that
the interpretation of this passage as expressing a deductively
valid argument is a complex and intricate task. It is by no means
purely mechanical. In fact, all these examples indicate how much
background knowledge, subtle verbal knowledge, and sense of
logical direction are involved, merely in the identification of an
argument.
The primary task of logic is the appraisal of inferences. In
arguments, premises are the basis for inferring conclusions, and
logic proper has the task of telling us whether it is legitimate
to infer the conclusions from the premises. But extensive
interpretation is needed for us to see where inferences are. This
interpretive process is preformal and, on many accounts,
prelogical.
What is uncontroversially logical is inference appraisal. Here
too insight is required. We may use rules to evaluate inferences,
but we have to see the argument as one of a type to know which
sorts of rules to apply. The problem has often been raised, by
Massey, Finocchiaro, and others.9 It may be illustrated by the
following simple example.
If it’s raining, the streets are wet. The streets are awfully wet, so I guess
it has been raining.
We can find here a flawed deductive inference. If we regard the
reasoning as deductive we will see it as a case of the fallacy of
affirming the consequent. We can also look at it as a case of
inference to the best explanation. Our sense of what is going
on in the argument, of what the argument ‘hinges on’, how the
premises are supposed to lead to the conclusion, is presumed
by our application of rules. We not only have to identify the
premises and conclusion, we have to isolate the basic
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argumentative structure, seeing which terms are crucial for the
logical workings of the argument and which are not so as to
understand how the premises are supposed to logically lead to the
conclusion.
Rules do not tell us how to interpret or apply themselves. To
think that they did would be to commit ourselves to an infinite
regress of rules. This point, associated in our day with the later
writings of Wittgenstein, was in fact anticipated by Kant.
If it (general logic) sought to give instructions how we are to subsume
under these rules, that is, to distinguish whether something does or does
not come under them, that could only be by means of another rule. This
in turn, for the very reason that it is a rule, again demands guidance
from judgment. Thus it appears that, though understanding is capable
of being instructed, and of being equipped with rules, judgment is a
peculiar talent which can be practiced only, and cannot be taught. It
is the specific quality of so-called mother-wit; and its lack no school
can make good. For although an abundance of rules borrowed from the
insight of others may indeed be offered to, and as it were, grafted upon, a
limited understanding, the power of rightly employing them must belong
to the learner himself; and in the absence of such a natural gift no
rules that may be prescribed to him for this purpose can ensure against
misuse.10
Before we appraise inferences using rules (formal or
otherwise), both interpretive and classificatory work is required.
Such work presumes substantive knowledge, sensitivity to
context, appreciation of nuances of meaning in context,
recognition of subarguments, addition of implicit premises and
conclusions, and the classification of arguments and
subarguments as being of one type or another. This work is not
done by the application of formal rules. To suppose that it is
not only runs counter to what we know about the relevance
of context to meaning, it is introspectively implausible.
Furthermore, to require rules for every move will lead to a
regress of rules.
Some who seek a formal understanding of natural language
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would no doubt insist that in principle rules can be articulated
to handle all of this. One can insist that whatever is done must
be done by the application of rules. However, there is little to
be said in favour of such a view and at least an infinite regress
argument working against it.11 Given the sensitivity to context
and nuances of meaning, substantive background knowledge,
and sense of logical direction required to identify argumentation
in natural discourse, the insistence that ‘in principle’ there are
formal rules that cover all of this seems a priori and unwarranted.
Human beings do not seem to themselves or to observers to be following
strict rules. On the contrary, they seem to be using global perceptual
organization, making pragmatic distinctions between essential and
inessential operations, appealing to paradigm cases, and using a shared
sense of the situation to get their meanings across. Of course all this
orderly but apparently non-rule-guided activity might nonetheless be the
result of unconsciously followed rules. But when one tries to understand
this as a philosophical proposal that all behavior must be understood
as following from a set of instructions, one finds a regress of rules for
applying rules.12
2. Form, Structure, and Logical Analogies
It is only in the context of a specific argument that we can say that a
sentence ought to be analyzed as, say, relational rather than categorical.
In some other argument, the same sentence might be properly be
analyzed in opposite fashion.13 (Stephen Barker, in Elements of Logic.)
Using a logical analogy, we can on occasion refute an argument
by showing that another argument, relevantly similar to it, is
inadequate. The second argument must duplicate the logical
structure of the first and be flawed in an obvious way. Either
it must have true premises and a false conclusion, or it must
in some other way be transparently ‘absurd’. The technique of
refutation by logical analogy is nonformal, in the sense that it
does not require translation from natural into formal language. It
may be used by untrained people in a sensitive and revealing way.
It is sometimes described as ‘the method of counterexample’ and
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thought to reveal deductive invalidity. Such a construal suggests
that the technique reveals deductive relationships, but in an
informal way.14
Interestingly, the technique of logical analogy is applicable to
nondeductive arguments as well as to deductive ones. The
suggestion that A caused B because A preceded B can be
countered by logical analogy; yet causal reasoning is standardly
regarded as inductive. The suggestion that homosexuality is
wrong because it is unnatural can be countered by logical
analogy, and the most natural way of taking that argument would
be as conductive in the sense of offering a relevant but not
sufficient reason for the conclusion.
The technique of logical analogy is pertinent to our present
topic in two ways. First, it reveals again the web of nonformal
judgments that enter into the understanding of an argument.
Second, it typically serves to isolate as the structure of an
argument something that is not formal in any standard sense of
that term. This phenomenon raises the question of the feasibility
or desirability of formally expressing rules for material
inferences. The use of logical analogy illustrates how nonformal
judgments are presumed in the understanding of arguments,
because it requires that we distinguish those aspects of the
argument that are essential to its inferential relationships from
those that are incidental. Of course, this same distinction is also
tacitly at work when we represent natural arguments in formal
languages. What we regard as the correct logical form of an
argument depends on preformal judgments about how that
argument works – which are its significant and which its
insignificant features. In logical analogies, the structure of an
argument is identified and duplicated, and an inference is
criticized by parallel argument.
Let us consider two examples. The first is taken from a book by
British doctor and child expert, Penelope Leach. Discussing the
issue of whether group child care arrangements are suitable for
children under three years of age, Leach says:
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Many people would argue that while all of the foregoing is, or may be
true, toddlers who are actually committed to group-care soon grow out
of being toddlers and therefore become socialized more quickly than they
would have done at home. ‘The others will lick him into shape and he’ll
learn by imitating them’ … People who take this line are usually those
who want very much to believe that group care is acceptable for the very
young, and who therefore use the observable fact that they do survive
and develop, one way or another, as evidence to support it. So go back to
that thirteen year-old who finds herself in charge of the family. [Leach
alludes here to the case of a thirteen year old girl who cooks and cares for
younger siblings after the death of her mother.] She too will adapt. She
too will learn ‘how to behave’, will find ways of managing and will, after
a fashion, develop.
Does that prove such responsibilities are good for her? That these are the
optimum conditions for adolescents and a useful way of short-circuiting
its normally tumultuous path? No, of course not. Nobody would argue
that, because nobody has any stake in the thirteen-year-olds running
families. But it is the same argument. Just as it is more appropriate
for that girl to acquire maternal and household responsibilities out of
mature sexuality than tragic deprivation, so it is better for the toddler
to acquire socialized behavior out of self-motivated maturity rather than
sad necessity.15
As the crux of the argument she criticizes, Leach identifies the
inference from the fact that children can develop and adapt in
group care to the conclusion that group care is acceptable for
these children. She marks the significant move in the argument as
being that of inferring acceptability from de facto developmental
adequacy as attested by adaptation and survival. This ‘core’ of
the original argument is then paralleled in the case of the teen-
age girl. In that analogous case, Leach asserts, one would not
infer the conclusion from the premise; hence one should not do
it in the original case (the toddler) either. The logically parallel
argument is without force; the original argument – called ‘the
same argument’ – is therefore also without force.
A second example comes from Stanley Cavell’s discussion of
C.L. Stevenson’s noncognitivism in ethics.
PROBLEMS IN ARGUMENT ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 325
For then (that is, on a noncognitivist account) we are going to have to
set up a display of humorous tolerance and allow that some ‘ethical’
disagreements cannot be ‘settled’ ‘rationally‘ on such grounds as this:
whatever reasons are offered them, when ‘an oversexed, emotionally
independent adolescent argues with an undersexed, emotionally
dependent one about the desirability of free love’, their disagreement may
be ‘permanently unresolved’. You might as well say that if these two went
on permanently arguing about whether men do or do not descend from
apes, then the science of biology would lack an ‘exhaustive’ or ‘definitive’
method of proof.16
Cavell identifies Stevenson’s line of argument as one in which
de facto failure by two mis-matched individuals to resolve a
dispute is grounds for the permanent unresolvability of that
dispute and ultimately a basis for concluding that the subject
in which the dispute occurs lacks a definitive method of proof.
Cavell draws a logical analogy by mirroring this line of
reasoning, substituting biology for ethics. Assuming that his
audience will be unwilling to infer either that biological disputes
are permanently unresolvable or that biology lacks a definitive
method of proof, Cavell takes himself to have refuted the original
line of reasoning.17
Refutation by logical analogy is based on duplicating the ‘core’
of an argument while varying some or all non-essential features.
In the toddler example, the core of the argument is: ‘x survives
in C; therefore C is acceptable for x’, with ‘survives in’ and
‘acceptable for’ being the focal concepts of the inference. Cavell’s
arguments have as their core: ‘x and y, who are temperamentally
mismatched, disagree about z; therefore disputes about z are
irresolvable; therefore subject S, in which z is located, has no
definitive method of proof.’
In its natural use, the technique of logical analogy makes this
logical core apparent by repetition rather than by articulation.
The logical essentials of the argument are repeated in the parallel
argument and we ‘see’ them as we see sameness of shape in a
blue circle and a red circle. The common structure is identified
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without being represented as a separate item. This common
structure is the core of the argument. It is the part of the
argument that must be preserved in the logical analogue. It is
the aspect essential to the way the premises and conclusion are
to connect in the original argument. When we represent this
core, substituting letters for variable elements in the argument,
we have what might be called a primitive formalization of the
argument.
At this point, a question arises as to whether this logical ‘core’
should be regarded as the form of the argument. On some
accounts of logical form, this would be the case.18 However,
the central terms (‘survives in’, ‘acceptable for’, ‘temperamentally
mismatched’, ‘has no definitive method of proof’, and so on) are
not in any standard sense logical words. They are not
syncategorematic, as are ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’, ‘if then’, ‘necessary’, and
‘possible’, nor even close to being syncategorematic as are such
terms as ‘know’ and ‘ought’, around which epistemic and deontic
logics have been developed.19 There is no formal system that
would encompass the above structures as its basic structures
in any way analogous to that in which modus ponens is a basic
structure in propositional logic. Furthermore, for reasons we
shall explore later any attempt to construct such a formal system
would seem misguided.20 The shared structure is not a formal
structure; it is a meaning structure, one shared by several
arguments and shareable by more. Thus, commonality is not
formality.
Successfully using the technique of logical analogy means
identifying the core of an argument, the forms or meanings on
which its connection of premises and conclusion depends, and
reproducing this core in another argument in which some or all
of the other elements are varied. This understanding requires
the ability to see that some terms are essential to the way an
argument is supposed to work, whereas others are incidental. We
might term this the capacity for logical insight.
This capacity is presumed even when we formally represent
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such simple arguments as ‘Peter is sad; Joe is sad; therefore Peter
and Joe are sad’. Representing this argument as ‘R; S; therefore
R,S’, we indicate that it depends on the way assertion and
conjunction work, and not on who Peter and Joe are, or on the
fact that they are both said sad. Nor does it depend on the fact
that they are both said to possess the same characteristic, or on
the fact that this characteristic is sadness. Barker’s comment that
the same sentence may have different ‘forms’ when it appears
in different arguments is illustrated here. If the argument were
‘Peter is sad; Joe is sad; therefore there are at least two sad people’,
we would have to formalize so as to reveal that it is one and the
same property both Peter and Joe possess. Also we would need to
indicate that Peter and Joe are distinct individuals.
Distinguishing the essential from the incidental can require
going behind surface grammatical structure. For instance, few
philosophers would deem these two arguments to share the same
logical form:
1. Joe is famous; anyone who is famous is rich; therefore Joe is rich.
2. Sherlock Holmes is fictional; anyone who is fictional is real;
therefore Sherlock Holmes is real.
Even though (2) is, on one level, semantically parallel to (1),
there is something ‘fishy’ about (2). We might say that in (2) the
second premise is clearly false, and regard the difference between
(2) and (1) as being solely due to that fact. Such a view would
mean regarding (1) and (2) as having the same form, that of a
deductively valid argument. However, few will wish to proceed
in this way. We will hesitate, because (2) uses ‘fictional’ and ‘real’,
where (1) uses standard predicates. To grant that (2) has the
same form as (1) requires us to ignore this difference, and the
difference is too important to gloss over in this way.
This example illustrates again how preformal judgments enter
into decisions as to what the form of an argument is. Formal
analyses often help us to determine whether arguments are valid
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or not. However, they also articulate our preformal judgments of
validity and invalidity, and provide a vehicle in which we express
those judgments. If the validity of an argument is pre-formally
controversial, any treatment which represents it as having the
form of a deductively valid argument will also be controversial.
Whether the ‘core’ of an argument is represented formally or
semantically, the identification of that core depends on our sense
of how the argument is supposed to work, our preanalytic beliefs
as to whether it does work,
and related philosophical judgments. Thus, logical perception
is not a mechanical matter. Furthermore, when we isolate the
inference structure of an argument, it will not always be a formal
structure, not in any conventional sense of ‘formal’ at least. As
the examples from Leach and Cavell illustrate, logical analogies
may reveal structures relating terms that are not logical terms
and that hold little promise as central terms for a formal system.
Should we construct formal systems to articulate and ‘make
precise’ the nonformal judgments that logical analogies enable
us to make? Or can we rest content with concrete evidence of
the inadequacy of material inferences? This is the same question
that arises when we consider the frequent claim that informal
fallacies will not be properly understood until they are given a
formal analysis.
3. Prospects for Formalizing Informal Fallacies
Finocchiaro contends that ‘there are probably no common
errors in reasoning’, meaning that there is no sense of ‘the same
error’ that allows the same error to occur frequently. Lambert
and Ulrich, in a recent text, say that for informal fallacies ‘even
when one learns to recognize alleged examples of the fallacies, it
is difficult to see what common factor makes them all instances
of the same fallacy.’2l Thus we see a concern for what different
instances of the same informal fallacy have in common.
It appear that there is a dilemma here for the informal fallacies
approach. If two different arguments share a feature, F, which
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characterizes the reasoning in both, then isn’t F (as shared) a
formal feature? If that were the case, the analysis of informal
fallacies as informal would be mistaken in principle. We have
already seen, however, that the logical core of an argument,
though necessarily general, is not necessarily formal. Would
formalization be useful at this point?
To consider this question in the concrete, let us look at two
arguments which might be said to exemplify the informal fallacy
of ‘two wrongs’. The first was used by a professor in France who
sought to defend philosophy programs against the accusation
that they were not turning out competent graduates. He said:
Our degree is not recognized, but we have more students than ever. They
come because they think they might learn something. Sure, there are
idiots. And I have given credits to them. There are bigger idiots in the
government. Is it up to me to be more rigorous than the electorate?22
Here we have a defense of the practices of philosophers on the
grounds that the electorate has selected idiots to serve in the
government. Granting that we commonly regard it as
undesirable for ‘idiots’ to serve a crucial public role, and that
the philosopher’s degree has been deemed inadequate, it appears
that this author is defending what seems inadequate (standards
among philosophy professors in France) by appealing to
something else that is accepted (idiots in government), but should
not be.
The second argument concerns the Canadian seal hunt, and is
taken from a letter to the editor.
I am a Newfoundlander, and I cannot help but feel some animosity
toward those people who approach the seal hunt issue from a purely
emotional stance. Surely this is not the way they look in their butcher’s
freezer, when they are looking for pork chops. Yet the slaughtering
method approved by the Department of Health officials for swine is
hideous, and nowhere near as humane as the dispatching of a young
seal.23
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In this passage the writer implicitly defends the seal hunt by
pointing out that worse methods of slaughtering animals are
condoned. He makes it clear that he thinks these worse methods
are wrong (‘hideous’), and infers that there can be no rational
basis for opposition to the seal hunt (opponents approach it from
a ‘purely emotional stance’). One wrong is accepted, so another
comparable one should not be criticized.
For convenient reference, let us call the first argument the
French argument and the second one the Newfoundland
argument. These arguments have many similarities and
differences.24 So far as their reasoning is concerned, they have
something in common. The following statement characterizes
the reasoning in both:
W: From the existence and tacit acceptance of one wrong, it is inferred
that another comparable wrong should not be criticized.
In the French argument, the inference is from the electorate’s
condoning incompetence in the government to the implicit
conclusion that attacks on standards in philosophy programs are
inappropriate. In the Newfoundland argument, it is from the
condoning of hideous slaughter methods for pigs to the implicit
conclusion that the slaughter of seals should not be criticized.
W describes the logical core of both arguments. If the inference
described in W is a mistake, then both arguments embody this
mistake. If it is a common mistake in reasoning, then both
arguments commit it. If the fallacy is informal, there is no
mystery as to how it is possible that two cases of ‘the same’
informal fallacy can have something in common. What they have
in common is (among other things) that W characterizes both.
At this point the question is whether the fallacy is informal.
It is commonly regarded as such, to be sure. In specifying W,
we use some words conventionally identified as logical words:
‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’, and so on. But clearly it is not on these terms
that the inference depends. The thrust of the argument is from
the acceptance of one wrong to the illegitimacy of criticizing
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another comparable wrong. The problem with such arguments is
with relevance, the relevance of the acceptance of the first wrong
to the acceptability of the second one. The relevance problem
arises because the acceptance of one wrong thing seems to have
no bearing on the legitimacy of criticizing a distinct thing. To
show that it is inappropriate to criticize some action, we have
to show something specifically about either that action (that it is
right) or that criticism (that it will be counterproductive, that it is
hypocritical, that it is ill-founded …). We might argue effectively
by analogy if we compared the case with another, obviously
similar, in which the action was right or the criticism of the
action misguided. (If A is permissible and B is relevantly similar
to A, then B is permissible. Or, if it would be inappropriate
to criticize A and B is relevantly similar to A, it would be
inappropriate to criticize B.) However, as described in W,
analogy reasoning is misused. If the cited wrong action is wrong
and the action under consideration is relevantly similar to the
cited action, this shows that the action under consideration is
wrong – a conclusion that runs contrary to the aim of the
arguments.
The mistake described in W does not seem to be a formal
mistake. Relevance is a nonformal matter; we have to judge what
is relevant and not relevant in order to formalize. There are no
formal rules for the proper use of analogies. If the mistake is one
of relevance and improper use of analogy, the fallacy is informal.
However, it is trivially possible to formalize W, and it may be
on the basis of this that many people regard the status of informal
fallacies as informal as one that is temporary. To formally express
W, we simply make the requisite stipulations. Let ‘x’ and ‘y’ range
over items for which moral appraisal and acceptance are
appropriate. Given all of these definitions, we can now represent
the inference described in W as being based on the following
conditional statement:
Quasi formal W: For all x and for all y, if x is wrong and is accepted
332 TRUDY GOVIER
and y is purportedly wrong, then if x is tacitly accepted and x and y are
comparable actions, y should not be criticized.
A significant anomaly here is that the pivotal terms that
constitute the core of the argument will be predicates, not logical
operators. With the constituent terms of the two wrongs
arguments – and with most logical analogies, where material
inference is under scrutiny there is little that can be said about
the merits of the argument in formal terms.
There is a sense in which one can represent anything formally;
one can stipulate definitions and plug in logical symbols for the
logical words used. The real question is not whether W and
comparable substantive principles are in any sense formalizable,
but rather whether it is useful to formalize them.
If one could construct a formal system in which the key terms
appeared in the axioms and rules, and if within that system, one
could prove that the inference described in W is an incorrect
inference, then a formalization might be genuinely useful and
revealing. However, the ‘if’ here is a big one. The requisite terms
would be impossible to define with the precision a formal system
would require. Several, and perhaps all, are essentially
contestable or have vague perimeters. This means that one could
not state axioms that would correspond fully with extra-formal
judgments of meaning and truth. Also, as noted above, one
cannot really operate logically with the concepts, save through
more standard logical operators such as ‘and’, ‘not’, ‘or’, and so
on. The proposed ‘system’ would do little with its key terms,
save assert or deny the truth of conditional statements which
would most reasonably be interpreted as representing material
inferences.
If one were to construct such a system and apply it in order
to determine the logical merits of such arguments as the French
argument and the Newfoundland argument, it is virtually certain
that key judgments would remain extra-formal. For instance, the
judgment that two cases are ‘comparable’ will have to be made.25
The idea that the existence of one wrong is irrelevant to the
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criticism of another comparable wrong may well have to be put
into the system as an axiom. If it is, then the sense in which
then the system will be able to provide a justification for that
judgment and raise it above the level of intuition, will be tenuous.
A complicating factor at this point is that most formal systems
are systems of deductive logic. It will be appropriate to appraise
such inferences as that in ‘two wrongs’ arguments using these
systems only if we have pre-formally judged that those
arguments are deductive. That is, we must have interpreted the
logical relations intended in the argument as being such that
they would work deductively or not at all. For many natural
arguments, such an interpretation is implausible. Thus, even
granted that a pertinent formal system could be constructed, its
applicability would be in question.
Leaving such speculations, we can say that both the French
argument and the Newfoundland argument are grounded on a
questionable material inference, that described in W. To say that
they are thus grounded is to presume first that both arguments
are intended to cast in doubt the legitimacy of criticizing actions
or policies by citing accepted wrongs; second, that the material
inference in each is describable by W; and third that that material
inference is incorrect. Quite obviously, no formal system is going
to handle the first two aspects; it is only the third that is in
question here. Once we have isolated the inference and described
it as being of a general type, we approach the territory where
logic in the classical sense could have something to say. It is there,
if anywhere, that we expect formalization to be useful.
The problem is that the inference is material and substantive
rather than logical. To defend the judgment that such an
inference is incorrect, we will have to argue that the tacit
acceptance of something by people does not show that that thing
itself is right, much less that something else, however closely
analogous to it, is right. We will have to argue that consistency
should not be pushed to the point of demanding that existing
evils be accepted because some evils are accepted. All of this
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connects directly to topics in moral philosophy. We will rely
on principles that may be controversial; we will use terms that
are hard to define with precision and are essentially contestable.
Our explanation as to why the inference is mistaken, and why
‘two wrongs’ constitutes a fallacy will not be a completely
straightforward descriptive one that all competent observers will
accept. Obviously, there will be normative components.
The same kind of point can be made for many other informal
fallacies. Consider for instance, the ad hominem. In an ad hominem
argument, an inference is made from characteristics of an arguer
to the falsehood or implausibility of his claim or theory or the
validity of his argument. Ad hominem arguments are considered
to be fallacious because, in general, such a connection does not
hold up. Typically, negative features of an arguer or his
background or circumstances have no bearing on the substantive
truth of his claims or on the merits of his arguments. However,
there are complicated exceptions. For example, the arguer’s
theory or claim may be about himself and may be rendered
inductively unlikely by some feature of his character or
background. In addition, considerations of the credibility and
expertise of the arguer often bear on the acceptability of his
claims to audiences, especially when the audiences cannot judge
the claims independently for circumstantial reasons.26 What
counts as an allegation about an arguer, what counts as the
content of his conclusion, theory, or argument, what counts as
evidence for or against truth, what counts as for or against
acceptability, how that is related to truth – all these matters are
relevant to a full and accurate account of ad hominem. Although
someone’s being a liar is irrelevant to the question of whether
slaves built the Pyramids, his being a liar may be relevant to
the question of the acceptability, in some context, of his claim
that slaves built the Pyramids. To develop these ideas we will
need to make substantive epistemic judgments. Similar points
can be made about the misuse of authority and the argument
from ignorance, and indeed about most other traditional
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informal fallacies. One could, in principle, articulate all these
nonformal judgments and contestable decisions in a formal
theory. However, much reasoning would go on outside that
theory and precious little within it. The theory might give an
impression of rigor, but serve little other purpose.
The absence of formal theory in such contexts produces in
some circles an intense desire for formality and precision. But
far from the potentially contentious nature of such accounts
revealing the need for formal theories of the informal fallacies,
it constitutes a powerful reason against their development. This
is because the development and use of formal theories tends to
hide controversies rather than admit or resolve them. It buries
controversial assumptions in definitions and rules. Key issues
come to be disguised by technical apparatus, and immune from
criticism as something that is simply part of the system.
Debatable principles and decisions are not eliminated by the
development and application of formal systems. They are merely
relocated, so that the uninitiated have more trouble identifying
them and the initiated are trained to forget about them. Formal
accounts may give the impression that controversial questions
have been resolved and essentially contestable terms defined
with final precision. However, that impression would be
misleading. A formal system purporting to represent and
rationalize judgments about the fallaciousness of ‘ two wrongs’,
ad hominem, inappropriate authority, or straw man would not be
more precise than a nonformal account. It might appear more
precise, but it would be pseudo-precise, because the appearance
of rigor would misrepresent the phenomena.
4. On the Necessity and Limits of Rules
Let us consider the following argument:
1. If there is an activity that human beings do intelligently then there
is a rule or set of rules describing how that activity is done or
should be done.27
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2. If there is a rule describing how some activity is done or should be
done, then that rule can be articulated by someone – if not by the
agent simultaneous with his engagement in the activity, then by
that agent at another time, or by someone else.28
3. If a characterizing rule or set of rules can be articulated, then
it can be formalized, at least in some relatively weak sense of
‘formalized’.29
4. If a rule or set of rules can be weakly formalized, then at least in
principle it is possible to set out a mechanical decision procedure
for the activity it describes.
Therefore,
5. Any activity that human beings do intelligently can, in principle,
be captured by a set of rules which set out a mechanical decision
procedure.
Or, reason can be mechanized.
This argument, which seem to have wide appeal, contradicts
the results of preceding sections here. How are we to get around
it?
First, some clarification. We need to distinguish four types of
rules. Which type is being referred to will matter very much for
our appraisal of the argument.
The relevant types are:
a. Strict formal rules. These are rules which hold universally
and can be applied by observing purely typographical
criteria. Such rules are found only in formal axiomatized
systems. To operate within those systems is to manipulate
symbols according to these rules. Example: Every
occurrence of ‘-‘ may be replaced by ’v’.
b. Strict material rules. These are rules that hold universally
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but are not purely typographical. Example: ‘Every living
human being has a heart.’
c. General rules. These are rules which hold most of the time,
but which have a ‘ceteris paribus‘ clause. Example: ‘Weakened
people who have not had shots against smallpox and who are
exposed to smallpox will catch smallpox.’30
d. Rules of thumb: A rule of thumb is a rough guideline for
action, a kind of policy we may follow in a case where we
do not have the time or expertise to rely on rules of the
other types. It lacks any theoretical rationale, or may (more
typically) be based on guesses or unanalyzed experience.
Example: Prospective tenants who are very anxious to show
you references are not a good bet. To operate according to
a rule of thumb is to be entirely prepared that things should
not go as the (rough) rule would indicate; we know the rule
is at best a rough approximation.
If we look back at the argument introducing this section, and
ask how ‘rule’ is being used, we can see that it cannot be in sense
(a) or in sense (d). In sense (a) the first premise would be false.31
In sense (d), it would also be false, but for a different reason.
The rule of thumb would not fully characterize the intelligent
activity qua intelligent. It is not this sort of rule that a person who
insists that intelligent activities must be subsumed under rules
has in mind. A rule of thumb allows too much to be haphazard
and unexplained by the rule. The idea behind the argument,
expressed in the first premise, is precisely contrary to this. It
is that what is done intelligently must be systematic, cannot be
random, must be done for a reason, where that reason is general.
What remains are (b) and (c). If the reference in the argument
is to rules in sense (b) or a sense that allows for general rules,
as well as strict formal and material rules, then premises (2), (3)
and (4) would clearly be true. However, premise (1) is false if the
only admissible rules are formal rules. One is hard pressed even
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to find exceptionless rules outside the domain of formal systems.
Even the counterparts of formal rules of logic have exceptions
that have to be ruled out by provisos and tacit conditions of
understanding, when we take them to apply to ordinary speech
and thought. (As when we explain why ‘he’s attractive, but he’s
not’, is not a contradiction and why ‘boys will be boys’ and
‘business is business’ are not tautologies.) It is well known that
scientific laws give predictions for ‘normal circumstances’,
predictions that hold ‘other things being equal’. Society’s
prescriptive laws can be couched in absolute terms and thought
to apply without proviso, but such a conception cannot account
for actual legal judgment where unusual circumstances are often
taken into account. Here, whether we speak of the judgments that
are in fact made, or of those judgments that ought to be made, the
point remains. (For example, even where one is strictly liable, as
in the case of storekeepers selling adulterated milk, a storekeeper
who was bound and hypnotized and as a result persuaded to
adulterate his milk would not be penalized in the normal way.)
Thus, to make premise (1) come out as true, we must be using
‘rule’ in sense (c), or in some further sense which allows that
rules could be of type (a) or (b) or (c). The crucial point is that
intelligent activity presumes either general rules or strict rules. It
is not enough to extend the range from strict formal rules to strict
material rules. We must move away from strict rules as a fixed
requirement of intelligent activity. Thus, we must understand the
first premise as follows:
1. If there is an activity that human beings do intelligently then
there is a rule or set of rules such that those rules are either
formal, material or general, or a combination of these, and
such that those rules describe how that activity is done or
should be done.
On this understanding, premise (1) may be true.32
However, we now have a flexible understanding of rules. This
more flexible understanding of what rules involve affects the
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truth of the other premises. A ceteris paribus rule can be used
by a person with judgment, as he or she will have a sense for
those cases where things are not ‘equal’ and the rule does not
apply. But can a ceteris paribus rule be used mechanically? Can it
be weakly formalized? If we are to formally express the rule, we
cannot just leave the ceteris paribus clause as it stands. We have
to spell it out – state explicitly what other things might bear
on the situation and how. We must enumerate all the unusual
circumstances that would make the rule inapplicable. This makes
the argument break down. Spelling out all these conditions is
simply not possible, because the range, and subtle variations in
combinations of factors, are too great. There will always be
events and circumstances we have not predicted and could not
predict in advance, and features that turn out to be relevant, that
we would never have considered mentioning.
The problem is that any interpretation of rules and rule-
following which will make it plausible to see all human intelligent
activity as rule-governed will make it false that such rules can be
formalized and programmed. The argument as stated exploits the
vagueness of ‘rule’ and seems persuasive only for this reason.
That there is a limit to rules has been shown many times and
many ways – by Carroll, by Kant, by Wittgenstein, and by Godel.
Their results are well-known but have not had the impact they
should have on attempts to mechanize reason.33 Let us review
the results. Kant, in the passage quoted earlier, argued that it is
one thing to have a rule and another to decide when to apply
it. For instance, if your rule is that one will contradict himself
whenever he asserts and denies the same thing, and that one
should not contradict himself, you will have to decide whether
‘it’s raining and it’s not’ amounts to assertion and denial of the
same thing. The same sort of problem is well-known in
arithmetical contexts. Though one and one make two, one
raindrop and another raindrop do not make two raindrops. As
one author put it, ‘numbers as realities misbehave.’34 This doesn’t
refute arithmetic because we do not take raindrops and their
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mingling to be the sort of phenomena to which the rule of
arithmetic apply.
Kant said that the proper application of rules required
‘judgment’ or ‘mother wit’, something he regarded as
unteachable. He argued against further rules telling you how to
apply rules, on the grounds that this demand leads to an infinite
regress of rules. Suppose that we had a rule telling us to apply
arithmetical truths only to discrete entities. This could be helpful,
but we would have to know how to apply this rule. We would
only face the necessity of making another decision about
raindrops: are they discrete entities? At some point we have to
decide whether the entities to which the rule might be applied
do or do not instantiate the categories used to express the rule.
Those categories are couched in stable, universal terms, yet
reality is particular, variable, and fluctuating. A new case may
differ from others, and yet seem significantly similar. Does the
rule apply? The matter requires judgment and intelligent
decision, not a mechanical metarule telling us how to apply the
first rule.
Where Kant called for ‘mother wit’, Wittgenstein, seeing the
same problem, appealed to custom, form of life, and the training
of others who will not respond in the way you want if you do
not go on in the appropriate way. ‘Rules must come to an end
somewhere’, he famously said. The Wittgensteinian terminus is
our common culture in which people mutually coordinate to
delimit the possibilities. We live together in a way that permits
the application of arithmetic to apples and oranges, but not to
raindrops or the union of ovum and sperm.
Custom is not the only suggestion for bottoming out, of course.
Douglas Hofstadter, seeks to end the regress in a common neural
structure in human brains, saying:
Rules get used and messages do get understood. How come?… Since they
are physical entities, our brains run without being told how to run.35
However we propose to end the regress of rules, it has to end
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somehow. The limitation emphasized by Wittgenstein and by
Kant in the passage quoted is that rules do not tell you how to
apply themselves, and further rules cannot always do this, on
pain of regress.
This theme about the need for rules to end is not quite the
same limitation pointed out by Lewis Carroll in “What Achilles
Said to the Tortoise”. There, the stubborn Tortoise refuses to
use rules of deductive inference in the normal way. He wants
every rule he would use as a basis for inference written into his
argument explicitly as another premise. Granting ‘A and B’, and
granting ‘If A and B, then Z’, is not enough to make the Tortoise
infer Z by modus ponens. To do so, he would have to use modus
ponens tacitly. He would have to use logic without saying what
logic tells him to do. This the stubborn beast refuses to do. He
will not put his trust in logic. Remarking that ‘whatever logic
is good enough to tell me is worth writing down’, the Tortoise
demands an articulation of the requisite conditional. Meeting
this demand results in a new argument with the premises: ‘A and
B; if A and B, then Z; if A and B and if A and B then Z. then Z’. Here
again, to infer Z, he would have to use a rule not stated within
the argument as a premise. The Tortoise demands that that rule
be made explicit, and generates a fourth argument. In the nature
of the case, the Tortoise cannot be satisfied. He will never infer Z
from A and B – despite the fact that A and B entail Z, and that he
recognizes the logical truth that if A and B, then Z.
The Carroll Dialogue shows that even when the mind is
operating according to clearcut rules, such rules cannot all be made
explicit in the context of use. They can be made explicit in another
context – an observer context. But when an observer reasons, he
himself will necessarily reason according to some rules that are
not explicitly stated. These rules, in turn, can be made explicit
in another context. There can be no one context in which all
rules of reasoning are explicit at once. To draw an inference
that is in accordance with a rule of inference is in one sense to
use a rule of inference. But it cannot require stating that rule of
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inference explicitly as a premise in one’s reasoning. Contrary to
the Tortoise, there are necessarily some things logic ‘tells you’
that cannot be written down.
At this point, Carroll’s dialogue offers intimations of Godel’s
result, which states that for any formal system of interesting
complexity there is a necessary incompleteness. There are always
statements expressible within the system and informally
provable to be true, yet not provable according to the strict
formal rules of the system itself. This fact about the limits of
formal rules cannot be eliminated by constructing stronger
systems, for such systems will only present the same kind of
problem at a higher level. New statements are constructible with
the same property – informal provability in the face of formal
intractability. Critics of fallacy analysis have urged that the
necessary incompleteness of any list of fallacies is a serious
problem. If this problem were devastating for fallacies, it would
undermine positive proof theory as well.36
Kant and Wittgenstein showed how something other than
explicit rules is presumed by the application of rules. Godel
showed that in any given formal system of interesting richness,
informally derivable truths will exceed formally derivable ones.
Carroll showed that in an argument, movement from premises
to conclusion presumes the tacit acceptance of rules not, in that
context, made explicit. Derivable truths will exceed formally
derivable ones. Given these well-known results, the idea that
aspects of argumentation and its appraisal are not fully
mechanical should not be surprising. These theoretical results
coincide beautifully with indications
from concrete problems that arise in argument analysis and
evaluation.
The ease with which such results are conveniently forgotten
in our culture and the influence of the pre-Godelian idea that
reasoning must be something bound by formal rules may be
due to scientistic bias. We feel such a perverse attraction for
mechanistic and technologically fashionable models of human
PROBLEMS IN ARGUMENT ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 343
intelligence that we forget what some of our most profound and
subtle reasoners have shown us about reasoning itself. Rules are
not perfectly strict, and they take us only so far.
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CHAPTER 11.
CRITICAL THINKING IN THE ARMCHAIR, THE
CLASSROOM, AND THE LAB
Although it would be generally acknowledged that not all critical
thinking is done about, or by means of, argument, people teaching how
to identify and evaluate arguments continue to regard themselves as
teaching critical thinking. Debates about disciplinary jurisdiction over
‘critical thinking’ persist as they did in the eighties, with psychology
and neuroscience, English, rhetoric, sociology, and other disciplines
competing with philosophy. Claiming the territories of formal and
informal logic, as well as philosophy of science, philosophers seem to me
to have stronger claims than do instructors in these other areas. Perhaps
that stance reflects my disciplinary bias. Within philosophy, debates
about logic and critical thinking persist although with diminished
intensity: some formalists continue to defend their turf.
To be sure, the concept of critical thinking is a contested one, that
being only one aspect contributing to debates about the proper academic
location of critical thinking skills. How necessary is rigor? How much
effort should be made to include debated social issues? How relevant (if
at all) is knowledge about the brain? Are there ideological presumptions?
Issues of discipline-specificity remain, with a general consensus that
there are both general standards for cogent argument and
considerations specific to particular disciplines.
Over the past few years, numerous courses on critical thinking
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have appeared in colleges, universities, and schools. These
courses have been inspired by the perception of educators that
many students do not have the ability to reach independent,
reasoned, critical judgments about material they read or study.
That such abilities are desirable is not in question. There are,
however, disputes about how, if at all, they can be developed or
taught.1
Very often, critical thinking courses are courses in informal or
formal logic. To cultivate critical thinking, educators have by and
large taught argument analysis and evaluation. We think when
we argue, and we think critically when we evaluate an argument;
hence, teaching argumentative skills would seem a natural way to
teach critical thinking. And, indeed, texts on argument analysis
are widely billed as ‘critical thinking’ texts. Many people teaching
informal logic use the expressions ‘informal logic’ and ‘critical
thinking’ as virtual synonyms.2
There are also the dissenters from this analysis, most
prominent among them, John McPeck.3 McPeck sees critical
thinking as a kind of reflective scepticism. A person thinks
critically about a subject when he or she judiciously considers
various claims and is not disposed to merely accept what is heard
or read at face value. What makes a person capable of doing this,
McPeck contends, is his knowledge of that particular subject. It
is not his ability to manipulate the concepts and tools of formal
and informal logic. It is not his knowledge of the nature of
definitions, modus ponens, disjunction, induction, the logic of
explanations, the ad hominem fallacy, and so on. Rather, it is
substantive knowledge, not general logical knowledge. For
instance, a person would be capable of critical thinking on the
topic of MX missile development only if he knew something
about nuclear strategy, and had mastered such concepts as ‘first
strike’, ‘first use’, ‘vulnerability’, and so on. Being trained in logic
– whether broadly or narrowly construed – would be of little
use. McPeck contends that logicians have greatly over-estimated
the role of general and logical considerations in the assessment
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of claims and the reasoning that supports them. At the same time
they have under-estimated the significance of information.
McPeck’s analysis is both epistemological and pedagogical.
Epistemologically, he offers an account of appraising claims and
arguments in which nonformal, non-general, substantive
considerations are of paramount importance. His pedagogical
corollary is that separate courses on critical thinking should not
be offered. He maintains that such courses will of necessity treat
examples from an inadequately informed perspective, because
they will lack the substantive disciplinary base that is pertinent
to the subject matter of these examples. For instance, if the
instructor has students analyze an example of analogical
reasoning where the Viet Nam situation is used as a model for
policy regarding El Salvador, he will typically have little but his
own background knowledge or the prejudices of the day to call
on when it comes to the crucial question as to whether the two
situations are or are not relevantly similar. He is unlikely to
know enough historical and political facts to really judge the
strength of the inductive analogy. Where non-empirical issues
such as the morality of intervention or the importance of
preserving ‘free enterprise’ bear on the argument, there is still
little help from informal logic, because these topics require
substantive analysis from the perspective of moral and political
theory. The critical thinking instructor who is committed to
treating ‘real-life’ examples but must, in the context of his
classroom, do so without simultaneously teaching the substance
of history, ethics, or any other subject, will be left with a thin
and perhaps misleading analysis. He can tell his students that if
Viet Nam and El Salvador are relevantly similar, then the analogy
from American experience in Viet Nam to non-intervention in
El Salvador is a good one, and if they are not, it isn’t. The
situation recalls John Wisdom’s lament that the whole of logic
may be stated in the line: ‘He will buy you the yak or else he will
not; I cannot be positive which.’4
McPeck believes that critical thinking courses cannot perform
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the important function of cultivating reflective scepticism in
students. He does allow that critical thinking should be
developed in the classroom, and his recommendation is for
standard subjects, especially liberal arts and science subjects, to
be taught in a critical and epistemically sensitive way. This would
mean, probably, that history would be taught with an emphasis
on questions about the reliability of testimony, the credibility of
various sources, the feasibility of analogical reasoning from one
situation to another, the necessity or non-necessity of laws in
historical explanation, and other epistemically significant topics.
The same would be true of biology, literature, physics,
psychology, philosophy, and all the other subjects. Students
taught in this way would be encouraged to think critically in
a context where they had sufficient information to do so, and
instructors could develop critical thinking skills without being
restricted to thin generalities. McPeck’s view is that philosophers
do not have as much to say as they think about arguments in
other people’s subjects, and they have no monopoly either on
the theory or the practice of critical thinking. Informed critical
thinking should be a significant element of every academic
subject.
McPeck’s pedagogical recommendations are based on his
epistemological theory about what goes into the critical
appraisal of a claim or an argument in support of a claim. There
are clearly important reminders in his account. When we
theorize about arguments from the perspective either of formal
or of informal logic, we are generalizing. This makes us
concentrate on those features of arguments which are universal,
universal within a subclass, or at least relatively common.
Content-specific and context-specific aspects are apt to receive
little attention, except insofar as they are amenable to
generalization. This focus of attention does mean that in some
cases, logic and the theory of argument will have little to offer to
resolve key questions.5
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Consider, for example, an argument along the following lines,
about the MX missile.
1. The MX missile will intimidate the Russians and make nuclear
war less likely.
2. Building the MX missile is possible, given current economics and
technology.
3. Reducing the risk of nuclear war is of paramount importance.
Therefore,
4. The MX missile should be built.
Much will depend here on the first premise. In the case of this
argument, formal and informal logic, and the theory of argument
can tell us little; we have to decide whether to accept this
premise. Unless the premise itself contains some logical or
general error (inconsistency, loaded terms, or some comparable
flaw), this decision will be based on our judgment about
substantive issues. To make it, we have to know something about
what the missile is, how it will fit into the existing nuclear
weapons systems, what intimidates Russians, and the relation
between intimidating Russians and reducing the risk of nuclear
war. In such a case there is no shortcut through logic to a verdict
on the argument. Insofar as this would be McPeck’s point, he
would be absolutely right.
Now in an obvious sense, neither formal nor informal
logicians have ever denied this kind of point. No one has ever
said that arguments can be evaluated without evaluating their
premises, and no one has ever said that premises can be
evaluated without subject-specific information. At one level,
then, McPeck is reminding us of a truism. There are cases where
the potential for purely logical confusion about an argument is
minimal and virtually everything we need comes from outside
logic. In such cases, the critical thinking instructor or logic
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instructor will have to direct students to either remain agnostic
about the merits of the argument, due to premise content, or
seek out enough information to make an informed judgment
about the premises. McPeck regards such cases as very common,
and cases where the merits of the argument depend on general
logical points as quite rare.
In fact, McPeck’s account makes discipline-specific knowledge
relevant to the appraisal of reasoning as well as to the appraisal
of premises, because he insists that standards of reasoning are
themselves contextually defined within the various disciplines.6
This view of reasoning is unorthodox and has been criticized
elsewhere. However, the pertinence of substantive knowledge
to premise assessment and interpretation will itself generate
McPeck’s conclusion.
The MX missile example is not one that McPeck himself used,
but it is, prima facie, a convincing one to illustrate his theory.
Nuclear strategy and the psychology of nations are technical
and confusing topics. It will be no easy matter to determine
just whether the MX missile reduces or increases the risk of
nuclear war. There are technical questions, strategic questions,
and psychological-political questions. Students who seek
‘information’ to evaluate the premise will face a hard task. They
will find technical terms, alternative sets of statistics about the
nuclear balance of power, different theories about Russian
society, appeals to Russian history using the same facts to argue
competing conclusions, applications of technical decision theory
in contexts where precise predictions are impossible, and many
other epistemic delights. Thus, much thought will be required
in order to reach a judgment on the crucial premise. Critical
thinking itself will not provide this knowledge.
An aspect of this kind of situation that McPeck underestimates
is that argument analysis and other aspects of critical thinking
are often needed in order to obtain information. Faced with
one set of statistics about the Russian forces from the U.S.
Department of Defense, another from the Stockholm
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International Peace Research Institute, and a third from the
United Nations, one will have to ask about the credibility of
these sources, in the context, and the relevance of statistical
differences to the specific issue of the MX. The answers to these
questions in turn will require some substantive information, but
the structure and bearing on this information on them is a
general matter on which the variety of topics treated in informal
logic courses will have a bearing.
McPeck issues a plea for information in critical thinking. But
the term ‘information’ is rather misleading in this context.7 It
suggest that there are straightforward facts, perhaps statistics,
that we can look up and that will resolve the relevant questions.
Some techniques taught in critical thinking or informal logic
courses are pertinent when students try to find needed
‘information’, as they surely will be in this case. Even the ‘thin’
advice to reflect on relevant differences when analogies are used
may turn out to be of use. When we find predictions about
the likely responses of nation states, we almost always find them
to be based on assumptions about the psychology of individual
agents. Composition and division issues arise here. (Threats will
only make a paranoid behave more irrationally says anti-nuclear
advocate Helen Caldicott; the only way to reform a person is
to make him fearful of the consequences of bad behavior, say
advocates of military build-up. On both sides the claims are
then applied to nation states.) Being aware of the fallacies of
composition and division, and of issues regarding the logical
evaluation of analogies, will be highly relevant to the evaluation
of competing sets of ‘information.’
Clearly, McPeck is correct in saying that for some arguments,
the decisive evaluation issue is not logical, even when ‘logic’ is
understood quite broadly. Even if we do not take his position
that standards of reasoning are discipline-specific, it is clearly
true that the substantive information needed to evaluate
premises often comes from outside formal and informal logic.
Furthermore – a point McPeck does not explicitly mention –
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such substantive information may also be needed in order to
correctly interpret the argument. The other side of the story,
though, is that for some arguments and claims, the decisive
evaluation issue is logical. In response to the story of the critical
thinking instructor left with a thin analysis of a substantive and
rich example we can tell alternative stories about supposedly
well-informed experts whose claims depend on elementary
flaws in reasoning. A prominent biologist appeared on television
to say that there would almost certainly be no important
environmental effects if potato crops were exposed to an
especially developed, genetically altered bacterium which would
prevent freezing. His reason was that since the genetic change
in the bacterium was small, any effects of the change would
similarly be small. In this case, the man’s expertise and
prominence did not prevent him from the elementary error of
inferring the smallness of an effect from the smallness of a cause.
Stories about experts who reason poorly are as easy to tell
as those of logicians and philosophers who lack information.8
McPeck might insist that even in these examples the causal and
analogical errors are substantive, not formal. Sure enough, what
is needed to see these errors is not formal logic, because the error
involves non-deductive reasoning. This does not mean, though,
that no training in logic is relevant to the detection of the error.
What is relevant here is something quite elementary and yet
elusive to many not encouraged to think about reasoning,
argumentation, and the justification of claims. It is the sense that
reasoning is going on, that there is an inference made from some
propositions to others, and that this inference can be critically
scrutinized. Virtually anyone who detected the inference from
‘the cause is small’ to ‘the effect is small’ would be able to see it
as silly. Small factors can have big effects. People who consider
themselves experts may focus so much on substance that they
ignore the dependence of some substantive claims on others.
Yet a careful consideration of their discourse will reveal such
dependence and may show significant gaps in reasoning.
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Is it better to reason well, using accurate and clear language,
apt analogies, an acute sense of what counts as a good
explanation, and the battery of techniques cultivated by formal
and informal logicians, but starting from unacceptable premises?
Or is it better to begin from accurate and substantively rich
premises, but reason poorly, failing to recognize the issues
disguised by emotionally loaded language, accepting facile
explanations without recognizing the existence of alternatives,
relying on ad hominems that are current in the ‘discipline’, and
dotting one’s account with appeals to the latest disciplinary
authorities? Obviously, the question as to which of these styles is
better or worse is an absurd one. Neither alternative is desirable;
both will lead to serious error. The first style will generate
garbage from garbage. The second will generate garbage from
non-garbage. So far as adequate beliefs are concerned, the
difference between them is not very interesting. Epistemology
and pedagogy have to recognize the importance both of
substance and of reason. Reasoning without substantive content
is empty, but substance without reasoned direction is blind.
Given that some errors stem from faulty reasoning and others
from substantive misinformation, we might want to determine
which of these two sources is the most common source of error.
On this issue, McPeck is committed to the view that it is
substantive defects that matter most. 9
Even the ‘everyday problems’ closer to home, such as the rights of
minorities, affirmative action, nuclear power plants, tax proposals such
as ‘Proposition 13’, product safety and the like require being in possession
of, and comprehending, large amounts of complex information. There
is simply no shortcut around this brute fact about the complexities of
what are misleadingly called ‘everyday problems’. Moreover, ninety-eight
percent of our mistakes (note my dazzling statistics again!) in rational
judgment originate in this informational domain: either because we don’t
have enough of it, or our sources are unreliable, or just as often as not
because we do not understand the empirical foundations and therefore
the meaning of the information we do have.
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Such claims have been disputed by Robert Ennis, who defends
the pedagogy and epistemology of formal and informal logic as
means to critical thinking. Ennis points out that such logical
considerations as credibility, authority, syllogistic reasoning, and
criteria for explanations apply to widely differing subject
matters. In all cases of causal reasoning, we cannot
straightforwardly infer a cause from a correlation, because
alternative explanations of the correlation need to be ruled out.
This will always mean that causal inference is less than
watertight, for the number of alternative explanations is always,
in principle, indefinitely large, and there is always, therefore, a
dependence on background knowledge. Whenever a reliance is
made on the testimony or authority of a person, that person’s
interests and moral character will be relevant. And so on; many
comparable points can be made. In fact, McPeck does not really
disagree with such points as these. He seems, rather, to think that
these common elements are easily mastered and typically of little
importance in the diagnosis of error or the quest for truth. Ennis
suggests that whether errors result more from substantive lack
of information or misinformation or from faults in reasoning,
definition, and general logical operations is an empirical
question.10
At some level this is clearly true. However, the question is
empirical in a complicated way. To resolve it, we would first have
to find a sample of errors that would constitute a representative
sample of human error. We would have to find out the beliefs
underlying the error and the reasoning that led to the erroneous
judgment. That would be difficult. Even when this underlying
reasoning was discovered, diagnosing the causes of the error
would present further difficulties. What seemed to be
substantive errors might themselves be the result of prior
reasoning errors; what seemed reasoning errors might be the
result of faulty substantive assumptions or of the adoption of a
model of reasoning different from that used by the researcher.
A large number of epistemic and interpretive norms would be
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presupposed in the construction of such experimental work.11
To say that it would be empirical is slightly misleading, for the
background interpretive, sampling, and logical assumptions
would be highly philosophical. In fact, the body of such
assumptions would be very controversial, considered all
together. Any even moderately surprising result would be sure to
lead to our looking back to question some of those assumptions.
The issue is at best quasi-empirical.12
In any event, perhaps it does not matter so very much.
Accurate beliefs clearly require both good evidence and good
reasoning. Common experience, logical tradition, and any
straightforward analysis of argumentative discourse all indicate
that people make mistakes sometimes due to inadequate
information, sometimes due to inadequate reasoning, and
sometimes due to a complicated mixture of these. There is little
point, epistemically, in asking which sort of error is more
common, in general, and there is no real likelihood of getting
a firm empirical answer to that question using social scientific
methods.
As for the pedagogical issue, there are many courses that teach
substance and relatively few that focus on reasoning or critical
thinking. If substantive courses were critically focused in the
ways McPeck suggests, some of the more elementary course
discussion of argument, justification, definition, explanation,
and related topics which we now seem to need in colleges,
schools, and universities would not be necessary. No concerned
and educated person would dispute McPeck’s recommendation
that the whole spectrum of academic subjects offer scope for
critical analysis, and that people would be better educated if
instructors were willing to focus on this and cultivate
independent judgment in their students. This commendable
reform has not yet occurred, however. In the present situation,
there is room for courses that focus particularly on argument,
definition, the logic of argument and explanation, and related
topics. Even in a vastly improved situation, there would still be
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scope for such courses, although they could usefully be more
advanced and interesting than some are now.
A major reason for having courses on critical thinking is the
tension between substantive and methodological focus. For
instance, in a course on Hume’s philosophy, one might study his
essay on miracles. In the course of doing so, one may consider
the general subject of credibility and the strength of evidence for
testimony. The discussion relates to issues that are also raised
by ad hominem and authority arguments. However, in a course
specifically focused on Hume, the latter cannot be a major topic,
or else other aspects of Hume’s philosophy will be neglected. On
the other hand, a course on informal logic might well include a
study of Hume’s essay on miracles during the course of work on
credibility. The focus here would not be on Hume’s epistemology
and philosophy of religion, but rather on general epistemic
issues about our reliance on other persons for knowledge. Given
that resources in any single course are finite, and that subject
matter has to be delineated in a coherent and responsible way,
separate courses in which the primary focus is on topics from
logic and informal logic seem entirely appropriate.
McPeck’s account is useful in reminding us that courses on
critical thinking and argument analysis should not claim too
much. We have to accept the need for substantive information
and judgment as relevant both to the interpretation of discourse
and to the evaluation of premises. Neither formal logic, nor
informal logic, nor the theory of argument provide this. None,
therefore, offer everything we need to be critical thinkers. All
offer something we need and are worth pursuing for that reason.
In critical thinking courses oriented toward argument
construction and appraisal, we can teach some things needed to
evaluate arguments on any subject. We can also explore many
further topics needed to evaluate arguments. But we cannot
teach everything needed to evaluate every argument.13
Argument analysis is not merely a matter of appraising for
deductive validity, as McPeck sometimes implies.14 It
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incorporates the proper interpretation and classification of
arguments, the application of the appropriate standard
(inductive, deductive, conductive, analogy, or other), an
evaluation of the premises, and much else. McPeck sometimes
writes as though assessments of deductive validity are all that
logicians and philosophers can provide. That’s not correct. With
an enriched account of what argument appraisal involves, we can
go a long way to answering his objections.
It is surely true that formal logic cannot provide all that is
necessary for the appraisal of substantive argumentation.
Despite their greater breadth, neither can informal logic and the
theory of argument. Even if we could reduce critical thinking
to argument evaluation, it would be incorrect to see it as
encompassed by informal logic, because informal logic does not
include the substantive knowledge that is very often needed to
appraise premises. At the very least, argument analysis must
encompass premise evaluation, and typically premise evaluation
will require extra-logical knowledge. Furthermore, despite some
misleading advertising, no one really denies this conclusion.15
Even if we were to grant that critical thinking amounts to
constructing and/or appraising arguments, we could not claim
that philosophical courses in logic and argument analysis give
everything that we need for critical thinking. They cannot give
us everything we need for argument analysis itself, because that
requires substantive information. Such courses omit substantive
information as such, but they do provide much that is needed to
assess claims put forward as providing substantive information.
It might seem that argument analysis, when fully understood,
does constitute critical thinking. A number of people do, in
effect, identify critical thinking with argument analysis. There
seems to be something natural about this. Consider, for instance,
McPeck’s shorter definition of critical thinking as reflective
scepticism. Suppose that a person is reflectively sceptical about
some claim, theory, or argument. If he is reflectively sceptical
about an argument, then that is just to say that he is engaging in
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argument analysis; he has located some point at which he thinks
the argument goes wrong. If he is reflectively sceptical about
a claim, he has some reasons to think the claim might not be
true. That is to say that he has his own argument that he has
constructed, against the claim, and he is considering the merits
of his own argument. If he is reflectively sceptical about a theory,
he has data that he thinks the theory cannot accommodate; that
is to say, he has an argument from the existence of this data
to the improbability of the theory’s being true. It might seem,
accordingly, that critical thinking has to be about arguing and
evaluating arguments and cannot be about anything else, because
whenever we think critically we are, explicitly or tacitly, arguing
or criticizing arguments.
This view was once stated by J.A. Blair.
A problematic claim worthy of acceptance is made so by evidence or
other sorts of consideration which show it is plausible, that objections
to it may be rejected, and that alternatives are less plausible. In short,
(problematic) claims worthy of assent are those which are supported by
good arguments. Argument is the tool of reasoned critical appraisal – or
our own and others’ claims and actions – and the vehicle of reasoned
advocacy of claims and conduct. Good reasons mean good arguments;
good reasoning means good argumentation.16
A critical thinker judges for himself or herself in a probing
reflective way. Critical thinking, then, involves reflection,
deliberation, respect for the critical judgment of others, and the
avoidance of manipulative nonrational techniques of persuasion.
Teaching the identification, understanding, evaluation, and
construction of arguments is a basic and obvious way to cultivate
critical thinking. Indeed, provided we are happy with the notion
of tacit arguings-to-oneself, we may even wish to say that
thinking critically about something entails arguing or evaluating
an argument about it. To improve critical thinking, we offer
courses on the construction and analysis of arguments.
Nevertheless, there is something peculiar about the full
identification of critical thinking with argument analysis. There
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are two underlying reasons for this, one having to do with the
less fully articulated nature of critical thinking, the other
stemming from the typically atomistic and finite nature of
argument analysis. Richard Paul emphasized this second point.17
Consider first that thinking is more chaotic, less directed, and
less fully articulated than arguing or evaluating arguments.
Thinking, whether critical or creative, is very often private and
subjective.
Argument may result from critical thinking, but need not.
Argument construction and analysis are nearly always in the
public domain, since a major purpose of argumentation is the
rational persuasion of others. Theorists have long distinguished
reasoning from arguing on grounds similar to these.18 We often
reason without arguing – following through possible
consequences of a line of action, assessing pros and cons, trying
to determine consistency, and so on. Similarly, we often think –
constructively, creatively, or critically – without arguing. Since
critical thinking necessarily involves thought and reflection, but
does not necessarily involve the articulation of an argument,
critical thinking should not be identified with argument.
Thinking includes wondering, wishing, deliberating,
questioning, contemplating, synthesizing, comparing,
simplifying, hypothesizing, and much else. It may, but need not,
involve arguing.
Of course, not all thinking is critical thinking. Critical
thinking is thinking about another product of thought (an
argument, claim, theory, definition, hypothesis, question,
creative product or problem) in a special sceptically deliberative,
evaluative way. A recent author put it this way:
Critical thinking involves a reflective attitude. As a critical thinker,
one does not just let situations and claims slip by. Rather, one focuses
upon and assesses beliefs, claims, events, discoveries, etc. This focusing
is not adventitious, but results from a conscious decision to think about
or think through the things one encounters, and to develop habits which
promote the implementation of such a decision.19
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In an exchange in Teaching Philosophy, the following account
appeared:
On those occasions when a mental act is called into question, there is
typically a need for some basis beyond the act itself for judging it. Here
is where critical thinking comes to life: critical thought consists of the
evaluation of mental acts, and concern about critical thinking involves
identifying proper basis for evaluation and means for doing so.20
But just as reasoning is not the same as the argument it may
produce, so critical thinking is not the same as the analysis it may
produce.
In fact, critical thinking is not strictly speaking a necessary
condition of good constructive argumentation. It is, of course,
prudent to apply some critical thinking to the products of our
constructive and creative thinking. Reflecting may reveal errors
or inauspicious aspects of presentation, and it is worth checking.
Argument construction always requires thinking – constructive
and creative thinking – but is not always accompanied by critical
thinking.
Argument evaluation, on the other hand, will always require
critical thinking. This makes it understandable that courses
devoted to argument analysis and evaluation should bill
themselves as courses on critical thinking. To analyze an
argument, we must reflect critically on the meaning of the
discourse in which it is presented and the context in which it
appears; we must reflect critically on the structure of that
discourse; we must critically determine whether the premises
are acceptable, using pertinent substantive information; and we
must critically scrutinize the reasoning used. Doing argument
analysis will surely mean doing considerable critical thinking. It
would be surprising if the activity did not cultivate habits central
to critical thinking, such as not taking authorities’ statements
for granted, looking for good reasons for accepting beliefs,
identifying and examining your own assumptions and generally
being on the alert at every stage. There is no dishonesty in
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representing courses on argument analysis and evaluation as
courses that cultivate one important dimension of a fundamental
kind of critical thinking.21 Because substantive information is
also needed for argument evaluation, general logical
considerations, whether formal or informal, are not sufficient
for good critical thinking, and no effort to publicize critical
thinking should imply that they are.
The product of critical thinking is often argument or
argument analysis. Such products virtually always require the
process of critical thinking. However, this approach makes too
little of the fact that critical thinking is a process, typically
interior, distinguishable from this product. Furthermore, except
in an attenuated sense, the analysis of an argument is not the sole
product of critical thinking. There are other important products
too.
Some of these other products require kinds of critical thinking
that are not greatly demanded by the process of argument
analysis. For instance, writing a piece on nineteenth century
Canadian social history would require critical thinking in which
a capacity for synthesis was important. A person would have to
put together various accounts of the same event, and accounts
of different events and also, themes from different disciplines.
To do this would require critical thinking, but a kind of critical
thinking that would not be likely to be emphasized in an
informal logic course. This example is still within the articulate,
intellectual domain. The point becomes still more obvious if
we consider what kinds of critical thinking might be needed
by a good mechanic, a fashion designer, or a visual artist. The
product of critical thinking may be a well-formulated question,
an improved definition, a second version of a poem, a new
fashion design, or a better disposable diaper. It need not be the
analysis of an argument. That is one highly intellectual such
product – not the only one and not, perhaps, the most important
one.
What makes it particularly tempting to identify thinking
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critically with constructing and appraising arguments about the
object of one’s thoughts is that the thought that goes into the
creation of products other than arguments can so easily and
naturally be recast as articulate argument. If a person revises a
fashion design, and thus has a product of critical thinking other
than an argument or argument analysis, she has, in some way,
tacitly argued against the original thought product and for the
specifics of her revision. Suppose that a designer looks critically
at a design and sees that the skirt would give greater freedom
of movement and look better with low heels if it were just two
inches shorter and an inch larger around the bottom. We can
insist that, tacitly at least, she is arguing. The new design emerges
from the old one because the designer has, in effect, constructed
and endorsed the following argument:
1. In the old design, the skirt is just a little too narrow to be
comfortable for walking.
2. In the old design, the skirt is just long enough that it will look nice
only with high-heeled shoes, whereas a walking skirt should look
nice with low-heeled shoes.
3. The skirt would still be attractive if it were a little wider and
shorter.
Therefore,
4. The skirt should be a little wider and shorter.
By such recasting techniques, we can represent all critical
thinking as argumentation. The argument represented is
considered to be implicit and tacit, as necessary. This move
seems right in some ways, though it is misleading in others.
Arguments are public entities; they are articulated pieces, set
out so that specific reasons appear, offered as support for
conclusions. Arguments are couched in just so many words.
Critical thinking, however, may be less articulate, especially in
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some contexts. The recast argument for the fashion design
necessarily omits exactly what would be crucial in the successful
revision of a design: the deliberative, experiential basis for the
aesthetic judgment that the skirt would look all right, or even
better, when altered. This is alluded to in the third premise of the
stated argument, but the words cannot fully express the sense of
balance, symmetry, and appropriateness on which the judgment
would have been founded.
Those hard or impossible to articulate suspicions, perceptions,
impressions, and judgments may very well be a central part of
critical thinking, however. We may follow an inchoate suspicion,
a vague sense that somewhere something is wrong and by doing
so, come up with the crucial question that reveals the faulty
assumption, or the flaw in the design. Critical thinking as process
is not only argument construction and argument analysis. It is
more haphazard and far less articulate than that. These aspects
are central to its very nature. A model of critical thinking
through argumentation is very likely to underestimate the
importance of those aspects. For that reason, it is to be resisted.
In short, argument construction and analysis are too narrow to
fully encompass what is involved in critical thinking.
The same conclusion may be drawn from the work of Richard
Paul. In an influential article exploring the nature and impact of
courses on informal logic, argumentation, and critical thinking,
Paul expressed the concern that many students would not receive
sufficient impetus to reexamine their own interests,
preconceptions, and biases but would rather use the apparatus of
atomistically construed argument analysis to secure their views
against searching criticism. Seeing arguments as presupposing
other beliefs, and constituent concepts founded upon interests
and cultural assumptions, Paul urged that real critical thinking
would require far more than an appraisal of premises and
conclusion and the relation between them. 22
Students, much as we might sometimes wish it, do not come to us as
‘blank tableaux’, upon which we can enscribe the inference-drawing
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patterns, analytic skills, and truthfacing motivations that we value. Any
student studying critical thinking at the university level has a highly
developed belief system buttressed by deep-seated uncritical, egocentric
and sociocentric habits of thought by which he interprets and processes
his or her experience, whether academic or not, and places it into some
larger perspective. The practical result is that most students find it easy
to question just and only those beliefs, assumptions, and inferences that
they have already ‘rejected’ and very difficult, in some cases, traumatic,
to question those in which they have a personal, egocentric investment.
Paul claims that our conceptualizations and beliefs rest upon
our interests. An appreciation of this and of the fact that other
people can have other interests, or that our interests might
change, should lead to a greater willingness to scrutinize
fundamental beliefs so that we can transcend our egocentric and
sociocentric prejudices. Genuine critical thinking, Paul urges,
will include a willingness to question our background beliefs
and assumptions, to probe for the influence of interests, and
sometimes to revise the very concepts in which we have posed
our questions and problems. In the fullest sense, critical thinking
would encompass a kind of epistemological psychiatry and
metaphysics – psychiatry in its understanding of how our desires
and interests led us to think the way we do, and metaphysics in
its appreciation for radically alternative conceptual frameworks
for understanding the world. This activity will clearly be more
sweeping than atomistic argument analysis.
The pedagogic implications of Paul’s view seem to be that
critical thinking should be taught by teaching the rest of
philosophy (at least). Surely its pedagogy will be broadly based,
for a scrutiny of arguments is to include a study of why the
questions posed are taken seriously; what competing interests
bear on the problem; what alternative concepts might be used to
formulate the problem; how our own beliefs, used to appraise the
arguments, are founded; and much else.
This sounds like an unmanageably large curriculum, and one
in which a philosophy teacher would be frequently tempted to
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fall back on his own ‘egocentric’ and ‘sociocentric’ prejudices
in offering accounts of interests and alternatives. For instance,
arguments about abortion appear in North American in a much
different guise than they do in China. Which of our interests
and background beliefs result in this? There are many possible
hypotheses about individualism, Catholicism, Marxism, and
poverty: which is or are correct is a vastly complex issue of
history and sociology. (It would take a lot of high powered
information and critical thinking to figure this out, granting that
it is possible at all.) An infinite regress is implied here.
We may acknowledge Paul’s point about the expansive scope
of critical thinking without feeling entirely comfortable about
the pedagogical implications of his account. A reasonable
compromise would be to recognize the narrower scope of
argument construction and analysis as pedagogically more
manageable and responsible, while acknowledging the analytic
point that argument analysis cannot exhaust the scope of critical
thinking. We would thus stay away from broad psychiatric and
metaphysical hypotheses while teaching argument analysis. At
the same time we may acknowledge the truth of Paul’s account
by our recognition that argument analysis cannot be said to be
all that is involved in critical thinking.
Even those disposed to use ‘informal logic’ and ‘critical
thinking’ as virtual synonyms have recognized in one way or
another that the term ‘critical thinking’ is too broad to be
captured even by the broadened sense of logic that characterizes
the informal logic movement. As we have seen, critical thinking
requires information, and has status as a pre-articulate process
that makes a full identification here inappropriate. What is
sometimes proposed is, in effect, an operational definition of
‘critical thinking’ that would identify it with a battery of skills
involving deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning,
identification of fallacies, location of assumptions, spotting of
poor definitions, finding of conclusions, and much else from
the standard array of topics in informal logic courses.23 Critical
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thinking would be defined by reference to such traditionally
logical operations as finding ambiguities and fallacies,
determining the deductive validity or cogency of arguments,
distinguishing value judgments from factual judgments,
understanding the distinction between deduction and induction,
and so on.24 Such a stipulative definition will, in effect, give
philosophers professional status as society’s experts on critical
thinking, with many possible fringe benefits for employment
and prestige.
There are, however, significant objections to this approach.
First of all, it is misleading to the potential audience. Suppose
that we admit that the concept of critical thinking is broad, and
includes not only information but pre-articulate awareness of
mechanical or aesthetic factors, and synthetic or hypothesizing
abilities. Then we have, in effect, conceded that what we treat in
a philosophical course on critical thinking is only an important
and central part of critical thinking. It is not all of it. Even
argument evaluation cannot be fully taught in formal or informal
logic courses, since such courses cannot, by their very nature,
provide all of what is needed in the way of substantive
knowledge. However rich, careful, imaginative, and useful they
may be, courses that teach argument construction, analysis, and
evaluation cannot cover all aspects of critical thinking. We
should not adopt definitions that imply that they do.
To do so will be to encourage others and ourselves to forget
what falls outside the definition. The situation may be compared
with the temptation, irresistible to some psychometricians, to
identify intelligence with I.Q. It will not do to operationalize
intelligence as I.Q., because there are aspects of intelligence –
the intelligent handling of emotionally distraught people, for
instance – not covered by I.Q.25 The prevalence of this
operationalization reinforces society’s tendency to think of
intelligence in terms of verbal and mathematical ability of
certain kinds, and to neglect other dimensions.
It can demoralize people with a low I.Q. and lead them to
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think that they are in no sense intelligent. We should learn from
this experience and not encourage analogous errors for critical
thinking.
Many people every day engage in critical thinking without
ever having had a course on formal logic, informal logic, or
philosophy. They engage in critical thinking without ever
thinking to themselves that they are doing so. In this respect,
critical thinking is like speaking in prose. When there are courses
and ‘experts’ on critical thinking, such people might well be led
to think that they cannot do it because they have never been
taught. This kind of inference would be disempowering to say
the least. The operationalization of ‘critical thinking’ into a list of
informal logic capabilities that form a discrete academic subject
that can be taught and marked is objectionable for this reason in
addition to others.
Operationally defining ‘critical thinking’ in terms of informal
logic skills, we can then teach informal logic and discover that,
judging by tests based on our operationalization, students have
improved their critical thinking. If we are trying to show that
informal logic will improve and cultivate critical thinking, such
a procedure is obviously question-begging. Alternatively, we can
seek to show that a course on informal logic improves students’
abilities to do informal logic. (This is likely, but not certain.
A course might fail so totally that it did not even convey the
information directly taught.) If we show we have taught informal
logic in an informal logic course, that’s fine, and will count
towards establishing that we have taught critical thinking. Since
informal logic and critical thinking are semantically and
psychologically distinct, the first conclusion is not identical with
the second. We may seek to show that a course on informal logic
improves students’ abilities at critical thinking, more generally
defined. This seems likely, though testing it will be more
difficult. What we must not do is confuse the first conclusion
with the second one. This is what operational definitions of
‘critical thinking’ in terms of informal logic skills invite us to do.
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Pedagogically the danger of too closely identifying critical
thinking with argumentation skills is that other aspects of
critical thinking may be neglected. A critical thinker may, in
certain contexts, require synthetic, aesthetic, mechanical, or
other skills that will be needed only rarely when the product of
critical thought is to be an articulated argument or argument
evaluation.
This is no objection to learning to do argument analysis,
because doing this is useful and important in many ways.
However, the construction and critical evaluation of arguments
does not encompass every dimension of critical thinking.
Neither students, nor teachers, nor the public at large should be
encouraged to think that it does.
Notes
This chapter has profited from discussion on an occasion when
it was presented at Trent University and also from comments by
John McPeck, Ralph Johnson, Tony Blair, and David Hitchcock.
1. Not quite. John McPeck has argued that it is wrong to think
of abilities in this context, because there is too little transfer
from one area to another. For some discussion of this point, see
‘Critical Thinking about Critical Thinking Tests’, below.
2. Including my own. The market potential of this move is hard
to resist.
3. For McPeck’s views. I am relying on his book, Critical Thinking
and Education (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981); and on selected
papers: ‘Critical Thinking without Logic: Restoring Dignity to
Information’ (Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society, Vol.
37 (1981), pp. 219-227; ‘Stalking Beasts but Swatting Flies: the
Teaching of Critical Thinking’, The Canadian Journal of Education,
January 1984, and ‘Critical Thinking and the ‘Trivial Pursuit’
Theory of Knowledge’ (unpublished paper presented at the
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University of Chicago in November, 1984). I am grateful to John
McPeck for his cooperation in supplying me with copies of these
and other works.
4. John Wisdom. in the Virginia Lectures. (Unpublished
manuscript in private circulation.)
5.Nothing here is intended to rule out the possibility of
generalizing over contexts, which is, indeed, implied by some of
my discussions elsewhere.
6. Compare the discussion of the Discipline-Specific theory of
argument in ‘Is a Theory of Argument Possible?’.
7. In ‘Critical Thinking and the Trivial Pursuit Theory of
Knowledge’, McPeck makes it clear that he does not regard
knowledge as a conglomeration of discrete, easy-to-look-up
facts. I agree. However, he and I draw different conclusions from
this position. I think that it implies that analytical critical skills
are needed sometimes in order to find ‘information’.
8. The biologist was interviewed on the CBC’s background news
show, The Journal, in March, 1984. He repeated the argument
several times and rested his whole case upon it.
9. ‘Stalking Beasts, but Swatting Flies’.
10. See Robert Ennis, ‘Logic and Critical Thinking’, Proceedings of
the Philosophy of Education Society, Vol. 37 (1981), pp. 228-232.
11. The kinds of problems that arise are well illustrated in L.J.
Cohen’s criticisms of Nisbett, Ross, Kahneman, Tversky, and
others who have done experimental work on inductive
reasoning. See, for example, L. J. Cohen, ‘On the Psychology of
Prediction: Whose is the Fallacy?’ (Cognition 7, pp. 385-407) and
‘Are People Programmed to Commit Fallacies: Further Thoughts
about the Interpretation of Experimental Data on Probability
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Judgments’, (Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 12, pp.
251-274).
12. I do not mean to imply that experimental work should not
be done on reasoning error and substantive error; my point is
merely that any result would be heavily theory-dependent and
not in any plain sense just ’empirical’.
13. I have argued for a similar conclusion in my review of
McPeck’s book. See Dialogue Vol. XXII. No. I, pp. 170-175.
14. Argument analysis integrates interpretive and substantive
work with inference appraisal, thus including at least two stages
that are not logical in any traditional sense of that term.
15. I think McPeck’s concern is that people who do not seriously
deny this nevertheless imply a denial of it through the way in
which they and others market courses and textbooks.
16. J.A. Blair, ‘Teaching Argument in Critical Thinking’, The
Community College Humanities Review, Winter 1983-4, No.5, pp.
12-29, p. 21.
17. See Richard Paul, ‘Teaching Critical Thinking in the ‘Strong’
Sense’, Informal Logic Newsletter, Vol. IV, no. 2 (May, 1982), pp.
2-6.
18. This is not the only such purpose. We also construct and
analyze arguments for private inquiry, but this is much less
common.
19. Harry Reeder, ‘The Nature of Critical Thinking’, Informal
Logic. (Vol. VI, no. 2. pp. 17-22),p.19.
20. Fred Oscanyan, ‘Critical Thinking: Response to Moore’,
(Teaching Philosophy 7, no. 3 (July, 1984), pp. 241-6), p. 244. In
‘What is Critical Thinking About?’ (CT. News. Vol. 2, no. 7) Perry
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Weddle also argues that the object of critical thinking is not
always argumentation.
21. This claim is, of course, testable. Compare ‘Critical Thinking
about Critical Thinking Tests’, below.
22. Richard Paul, ‘Teaching Critical Thinking in the ‘Strong’
Sense’, p. 3. See also his ‘Critical Thinking in the ‘Strong’ Sense:
a Focus on World Views and a Dialectical Mode of Analysis’,
(Informal Logic Newsletter iv, no. 2 ( June 1983), pp. 2-7.)
23. Brooke Moore argues that the California Educational Order
(338), requiring students in the California State University
system to take instruction in critical thinking, does this, in effect.
See her ‘Critical Thinking in California’, (Teaching Philosophy 6,
no. 4, pp. 321-330).
24. In October, 1984, the Board of Officers of the American
Philosophical Association adopted the following statement: ‘The
Board of Officers of the American Philosophical Association
notes that teachers and educational authorities across the
country have become increasingly interested in critical thinking
as an educational objective. Since philosophy provides resources
essential both for the development of the techniques and for
education in the disciplines and habits of mind necessary to
critical thinking, it is important that professional philosophers
be consulted in the development of curricula and tests in critical
thinking. The American Philosophical Association urges its
members to participate in such endeavours and offers to help
boards of education and testing agencies identify philosophy
departments, graduate programs in philosophy, and individual
philosophers who can assist them in framing new tests and
organizing new curricula in this area.’This statement is reprinted
in the Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical
Association, Vol. 58, number 3 (February, 1985), p. 484. The
report comments: ‘The increased emphasis on development of
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basic skills in education, including reasoning skills, offers an
ideal opportunity for philosophers to assist in the creation of
innovative and effective programs in the schools.’
25. This point is increasingly acknowledged by psychologists.
Howard Gardner’s recent Frames of Mind (New York: Basic
Books, 1983) argues for at least seven distinct human
intelligences. only three of which are covered by I.Q. tests. This
book has been well received and won the 1984 National
Psychology Award for Excellence in the Media in the United
States. Gardner distinguishes linguistic, musical, logical-
mathematical, spatial, bodily-kinesthetic, and personal
intelligences. In the personal area, he distinguishes
responsiveness to others from self-awareness and self-direction.
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CHAPTER 12.
CRITICAL THINKING ABOUT CRITICAL THINKING
TESTS
With instructors feeling a need to demonstrate the effectiveness of
their teaching, there are hundreds of critical thinking tests. It would
be a massive task to comment on their merits; obviously this chapter
is at best of limited relevance years after it was written. Given the
common requirement to indicate critical thinking skills and dispositions
on a mechanically scorable test of about 50 minutes in length, there are
restrictions. Questions must be about fairly manageable issues requiring
only limited background material and they must be worded so as not to
be open to different interpretations. There are many other requirements;
these alone suggest that such tests will favour invented passages. Should
essay questions supplement short answer tests?
If certain sorts of questions need to be removed, more issues will arise
about the scope of the tests. How would those working on argumentation
studies, critical thinking, and test development today respond to such
concerns? When this chapter was written, I was concerned about social
and institutional demands for quickly obtainable quantifiable results
that would measure something as fundamental and important as
critical thinking skills. I wondered whether there was something rather
absurd about the idea that people should be asked to demonstrate, in
short and clear order, their capacity to think critically – and also
something absurd about the notion that philosophers should engage in
constructing tests to do just that. Professional interests lead to such
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efforts and there are hundreds of results. But there is still space for
reflection about the assumptions and institutional requirements
underlying them.
As I write, in the U.S. presidency of Donald Trump, there is great
concern about problems of fake and allegedly fake news, media bias
and distortion, ‘alternate facts’, truthiness, and confabulation. In high
quarters, there seems to be little respect for facts and truth, consistency
and coherency – to say nothing of decent civility. We find increased
public attention to the importance of critical thinking; indeed many cry
out for more of it. By implication, there should be increased attention
to the teaching and cultivation of critical thinking and to the quality
of related testing material. Sadly some who respond seem carelessly
unaware of decades of work by informal logicians and argumentation
theorists, substituting instead their own sense that they themselves are
competent critical thinkers. The challenges are many and of great
importance.
If we are going to claim to teach critical thinking, we will
want to check out our claims. On standard accounts, this would
involve testing students for critical thinking abilities or skills.
If students test higher after a course than before it, we would
naturally infer that the course has improved their critical
thinking skills. In addition, since we value critical thinking
ability, we may wish to test it as a basis for admission to
occupations or educational programs. Standard testing could
then be used to rate students, and critical thinking ability as thus
tested could be a factor in admission decisions.
Tests to measure critical thinking have existed for three
decades at least. For senior high school and college age students,
the best known are the Cornell Critical Thinking Tests and the
Watson-Glaser tests.1 The Cornell tests are at two levels – level
X, which is for students as young as grades five and six and up to
the high school level; and level Z, for college age students. Other
critical thinking or reasoning skills tests are aimed at much
younger students, in elementary schools, and some are designed
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to be used at various ages ranging from elementary to senior high
school.
Critical thinking tests have, until recently, been given relatively
little scrutiny and analysis from philosophers. Nor have they
received the political attention given to I.Q. and some other
psychological tests. A recent article in Harper’s magazine,
scathing in its comments on tests marketed by the American
Educational Testing Service and the social attitudes generating a
demand for them, had not a word to say about critical thinking
tests.2 Since these tests are based on the idea that critical thinking
ability is something teachable and acquired by students, rather
than something fixed which might be inherited and racially or
sexually linked, the context in which they have been developed is
radically different from that underlying I.Q. tests.3
Nevertheless, when John McPeck attacked critical thinking
tests in his book Critical Thinking and Education, his comments
received a surprised, but sympathetic response from many
philosophers. A seminar on the tests, in which McPeck
exchanged comments with Robert Ennis, creator of the well-
established Cornell tests, stimulated considerable interest at a
symposium on informal logic.4 Audience consensus seemed to
be that the debate was fascinating and the result a draw.
Reflection on critical thinking tests brings out many
interesting issues about critical thinking, argument analysis,
inferring skills and abilities from results, and the implications of
using machine-gradable short-answer tests for a variety of social
purposes.
1. Mechanized Tests and the Concept of Critical Thinking
The concept of critical thinking is a broad and contestable one.
The kind of critical thinking one might do in improving on a
play or revising the fundamental assumptions of a social theory
is not likely to be elicited on a mechanically scorable 50 minute
test.5 The context is too limited for either; the focus too verbal
for the former and too atomistic and temporally restricted for
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the latter.6 In teaching there is inevitably some restriction as to
what is taken as critical thinking. Restrictions are bound to be
greater in the context of a short-answer machine-gradeable test
that can be taken in an hour or so.
Mechanically scorable critical thinking tests have to deal with
articulated thought about small, easily described issues where
answers do not diverge due to differences in political or ethical
perspective or on the basis of varying background knowledge.
Questions and illustrative material have to be minimally
susceptible of divergent interpretations. They have to be clear
cut and expressible in brief phrases. They cannot presume much
background knowledge about any particular substantive issue
unless those to whom the test is to be given can be expected
to have uniform knowledge on that matter – a condition which
would rarely be met in practice. The material used must not be
susceptive to a variety of interpretations; interesting figures of
speech, irony and sarcasm, and suggestive ambiguities will have
to be avoided. Thus tests almost always use invented passages
rather than real ones. From all these requirements, we can see
that the construction of such tests is indeed a challenging task.
Obviously, these necessary restrictions mean that many
aspects of critical thinking could not possibly be included on
such tests. We cannot in such a context test for abilities to
elucidate judicious value judgments about sensitive topics, to
find underlying metaphysical or social assumptions, or identify
mechanical or aesthetic flaws not easily characterized in words.
Nor can we handle material incorporating and exploiting subtle
nuances of meaning. The format of the tests, and the social
demands placed upon them, make these things impossible. These
matters are too profound to be amenable to the short answer
and time frame format, too controversial by nature for sufficient
agreement in a key of answers, and too hard to sum up in a
few words. If we value these aspects of critical thinking, we are
likely to conclude that critical thinking ability is not testable by
mechanical short-answers methods.
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There is a distinction to be drawn between external and
internal criticism of critical thinking tests. Internal criticism
would focus on the details of particular tests. What range of
items, within the range which can be handled by the format, is
included on the test? Is the proportion of various items about
right? Are instructions given in clear language? Most
significantly, are keyed answers correct, and are they the only
alternative answers that reasonably seem to be correct? These
internal issues arise provided that one has decided to try to elicit
responses in a mechanical test format and take these responses as
indicative of critical thinking ability. If internal criticism should
reveal flaws in popular tests, it is an important issue whether
these flaws are endemic to the endeavour or whether they are, as
it were, accidental. If we found flaws and decided they were of a
type that could be avoided only by stringent restrictions on the
content of tests, we would naturally be led to the stage of external
criticism.
External criticism is broader in focus. It addresses the question
of how significant those aspects of critical thinking that cannot
in principle be handled on these tests are to critical thinking
ability. It may address also the socio-political question as to why
there is a need to attempt to measure critical thinking ability by
means of a machine-gradable short-answer test and whether this
need is one that philosophers and other academics should try to
meet. Here, sections two and three treat internal issues, section
four external ones.
2. Test Performance and Critical Thinking Ability
To reach on the basis of test performance a conclusion about
someone’s critical thinking ability requires a number of
inferences. Interestingly, if we examine the inference stages here,
there is an asymmetry between the positive and the negative case.
That is, different kinds of things can interfere with the merits of
an argument from doing well on a test to having critical thinking
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ability and an argument from doing poorly on such a test to not
having critical thinking ability.
To see how this works, let us first consider the positive case.
Suppose that a critical thinking test has been constructed and an
individual performs well on that test. We wish, then, to reason
from that good performance to the judgement that he or she
has critical thinking ability. This conclusion will be based on a
number of steps, which may be ordered as follows:
1. S does Q. (That is, S answers a high number of questions on
the test correctly. This is a straight behavioral judgment; it is
to say that a suitably high percentage of S’s answers coincide
with keyed answers.)
Therefore,
2. S can do Q. (That is, S is able to answer a high number of
questions on the test correctly.) There are two presumptions
here. The first is that the coincidence of S’s answers with
keyed answers is not due to fluke, accident, or cheating, but
due rather to features of S. The test-taker gets keyed answers
because of some ability or mental power he or she has. This
leads to the second point. The claim implies that the keyed
answers really are correct answers. If keyed answers were
wrong, or if they were correct but not uniquely correct,
getting answer that coincided with keyed answers would not
show that one can get these answers in the sense of having
an ability or power to arrive at them.7 It would appear either
to be accidental, the product of training, due to a similarity
in tendency to err between the respondent and the person
who constructed the test, or the result of a combination of
these factors.
Therefore,
3. S can do Q’, where Q’ is a set of questions similar to, but not
identical with, those on the test. (That is, the questions Q are
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a subset of Q’, and they represent the whole set sufficiently
well that being able to do them correctly is good inductive
evidence that one will be able to do the rest correctly.
Questions represent an array of questions and problems an
array of problem types. For example, if S can do, on the test,
some particular deductions involving class relationships,
then S can do many further deductions relevantly similar to
those presented on the test.)
Therefore,
4. S has (a high level of) Q (critical thinking) ability. (Given that
the questions in Q’ represent the whole array, or a very
significant proportion, of questions that capture the concept
of critical thinking and that S knows how to do questions of
this type, we conclude that S has critical thinking ability.)
It is useful to look at this sequence of inferences and see what
issues arise at various points. At the first stage, from (1) to (2),
what is at issue is, in part, background circumstances pertaining
to teaching and test taking and the construction of the test. It
is important to note that these factors are largely within the
control of teachers, professors, and test constructors, and do not
pertain to personal idiosyncrasies and problems in motivation
or concentration that may affect respondents. If a test is poorly
constructed, someone may get a large number of correct answers
by merely guessing, or by being attuned to the kind of thing
test constructors are usually looking for and the kinds of
constructions they usually make. To see this, consider some
extreme cases. Keyed answers might fall into a pattern abba,
bccb, cddc, or whatever, detected by the respondent. Or a person
might have been taught to take that very test, and fill in many
correct answers due to rote memory, so that the correctness
of his answers did not show that he could answer even those
questions he got right.8
The inference from (1) to (2) presumes that keyed answers are
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right and, among alternatives offered, uniquely right. We wish to
infer from the coincidence of a subject’s answers with the keyed
answers that he has the ability to get these answers. The notion of
‘ability’ in this context is normative and contains within itself the
implication that the answers are correct. The ability to answer
a problem in this context is more like the ability to sing than
like the ability to breathe. A person cannot breathe incorrectly,
so if he breathes at all and the breathing is a product of his own
powers rather than mechanical intervention, he has the ability
to breathe. However, a person can sing badly or well; speaking
of the ability to sing, we would typically imply satisfactory
performance. Thus, from the fact that a person sings at all, it does
not follow that he has the ability to sing, as ‘ability to sing’ would
commonly be used in this context. Clearly, in a test context,
we are concerned not merely with the capacity to understand
test questions and insert answers, but with the ability to answer
the test questions correctly. To get any evidence for this from
performance on the test clearly presumes that answers keyed as
correct really are correct.9 If the test is well designed so that
getting good answers is almost certainly a result of
characteristics of the respondent, and if there are no contestable
answers, then the inference from (1) to (2) should go through.
The second inference, from (2) to (3), raises a new issue. It
concerns the representativeness of the various questions on the
test. Given any question, we can construct a similar question by
varying a nonessential feature. If a respondent can detect that
the inference in ‘If Fred is thin, he is fit; Fred is fit; therefore
Fred is thin’ is flawed, it would be absolutely astounding if he
could not detect the same flaw in ‘If Joe is thin, he is fit; Joe is
fit; therefore he is thin’. Necessarily, there will be generalizations.
The question will arise as to how far we can generalize – how
we generate Q’ from Q. Surely there would be no controversy
about substituting ‘Joe’ for ‘Fred’ in the above example, but other
substitutions are not so straightforward. Seeing the question as
an example of faulty reasoning using a conditional, someone
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might suggest that anyone who could get this question right has
understood the conditional and would get the right answer on
‘If Jane Fonda folk dances, Jane Fonda is fit; Jane Fonda does not
folk dance; therefore Jane Fonda is not fit.’ Alternately, one might
see the question as representative only of instances of affirming
the consequent, but one might see this as independent of subject
matter. Thus if a respondent could handle the initial example, he
should be able to handle the formally similar one, ‘If mermaids
are mathematicians, mathematicians have tails; mathematicians
have tails; so mermaids are mathematicians.’ Alternatively, one
might see the question as similar to another instance of affirming
the consequent where component statements were more
complex and involved a more abstract subject matter, as in ‘If
science and philosophy have the same essential structure, then,
if science is partially empirical, philosophy is partially empirical.
If science is partially empirical, philosophy is partially empirical.
Therefore, science and philosophy have the same essential
structure.’
Probably most logicians would be comfortable with the first
two variations as members of Q’ but uncertain about the third.
Psychological evidence is surely relevant here, however. It is
possible that formally similar examples, even at the same level
of formal complexity (as the first two variations are and the
third variation is not) are not handled similarly by most test
respondents. The second example includes counterfactual
material of a bizarre nature, which might confuse respondents.
In fact, even the initial example, involving thinness and fitness, is
emotionally charged in our culture in a way some other examples
of affirming the consequent would not be. It might for this
reason be assimilated to other cases of reasoning clearly on
emotional material. Psychological evidence indicates that the
expectations of logicians in this area are frequently not met.
People may be clear on conditional relationships when they deal
with familiar, unthreatening subject matter, yet handle them
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badly when they move to unfamiliar, highly emotional, or highly
abstract subject matter.10
Thus, the generation of Q’ from Q depends on both logical
and psychological considerations. It is a logical judgment that two
examples embody the same logical principle. It is a psychological
judgment that someone who can grasp and apply this principle to
the first example can do so with the second. Possibly logic and
psychology will diverge in unexpected ways. Perhaps people will
be able to detect affirming the consequent when the example
is mathematical and the conclusion reached false, but not when
the example involves health and nutrition and the conclusion
represents a widely held and socially powerful belief. Or perhaps
people who easily detect persuasive definitions in contexts of
advertising will not detect them in contexts of political speeches
by authoritative figures, even though their logical structure is
essentially the same in both cases. These questions are empirical.
The next and last inference, from (3) to (4), will depend on how
representative the questions in Q’ are of issues calling for critical
thinking. If we specify a list of all the kinds of things a critical
thinker should be able to do11 and compare Q’ with such a list,
then the inference from (3) to (4) will depend on how close the
comparison is. Suppose, for example, that we decided we wanted
a critical thinker to be sceptical about the most fundamental
metaphysical and political assumptions of our society, and we
wanted him or her to have a disposition to apply this kind of
scepticism even within daily life. This desideratum would likely
not be captured by Q. So if we had such an element as an essential
part of our concept of critical thinking, we would regard the
inference from (3) to (4) as shaky, first conceptually, and as a
result, inductively. If, on the other hand, we were to define
critical thinking as the ability to do deductive and inductive
inferences, evaluate analogies, identify fallacies, and detect
vagueness and ambiguity, we might easily find all these aspects
in Q’. The inference from (3) to (4) would appear strong. The
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concept of critical thinking is an essentially contestable one, so
this inference is bound to be questionable.
It is instructive to compare the series of inference steps just
explored to a parallel series premised on poor test performance.
(x1) S does not do Q. That is, the respondent does not answer
(most) questions correctly. Again, this is a straight behavioral
judgment. There is a discrepancy between the answers the test-
taker gives and the keyed answers.
Therefore,
(x2) S cannot do Q. This is to say that the respondent fails
to answer correctly because of some aspect of his or her
capacities pertaining to the questions. The failure is not due
to rebelliousness, sleepiness, accident, lack of attention,
misreading of instructions, or flaws in questions.
Therefore,
(x3) S cannot do Q’. The questions S cannot do on the test
are taken to represent a broader range of questions, and S’s
inability to do them indicates inabilities in this broader area as
well.
Therefore,
(x4) S has little critical thinking ability. Questions in Q’ represent
a core area of critical thinking ability, and S is unable to do
them, so he or she is a poor critical thinker.
A very important asymmetry occurs with the first level of
inference here. As in the positive case, things may go wrong.
But there is a difference in that what can go wrong includes
aspects of the respondent and his or her situation, things outside
the control of test constructors and professors. If a respondent
got drunk the night before, or is feeling rebellious and wants
to undermine the instructor by indicating that he did not learn
anything in a course, he can put incorrect answers for reasons
that having nothing to do with his inability to get the answer
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right. The inference from (x1) to (x2) might fall down due to
flaws in test construction. In fact, this seems more likely in the
negative case than in the positive one. To get a whole series of
things right by accident on a test is inductively unlikely; to get
a whole series of things wrong by accident much more likely.
(One might, for example, misread a crucial word in a set of
instructions applying to a large section of the test, or code in
answers in the wrong place.) Thus it seems that the inference
from having a high score to being able to do the questions is in
general stronger than the inference from having a low score to
not being able to do them. There are fewer ways in which the
former can go wrong, instructors and testing professionals have
more control over these factors, and the pertinent circumstances
are less likely to arise in real life.
The next stage is closer to the positive case: the inference from
(x2) to (x3) depends on the same kinds of factors as that from
(2) to (3). In both cases, what is at issue rests on both logic and
psychology. How similar are the further cases in a logical sense,
and how likely are people to transfer their competence?
As for the last inference, here the negative inference is stronger
than the positive one. This is because the contestability of the
concept of critical thinking affects it less. To see this, we recall
that there is really no disagreement about certain minimal
aspects of critical thinking. The disagreement comes when we
consider what should be added to these. Should we add having
background information on a variety of subjects? Should we add
the ability to do fundamental social criticism? Should we add
the ability to synthesize diverse accounts? To make apt analogies
between apparently disparate areas? To question the social and
political implications of standard linguistic usage? To detect
aesthetically inappropriate elements? The possibilities seem to
extend indefinitely. For anyone who wants a long list, an
inference from (3) to (4) will seem doubtful. The term ‘critical
thinker’ is to some extent honorific, and we may not wish to
allow the title to someone who shows only finite and
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determinate competence on a short-answer test. On the other
hand, on virtually any account of critical thinking, deductive
competence, linguistic sensitivity, inductive competence, and the
ability to detect fallacies will constitute minimally necessary
conditions of critical thinking. If a person lacks these, he or she
is not a critical thinker, no matter what else this person can do.
In the negative case, once we move beyond the first stage, things
go more smoothly than in the positive case. However, the crucial
first stage inference is more questionable.
Philosophical issues enter at every stage, and psychological
ones at least at the first two. The philosophical issues fall into
three main areas: the correctness of keyed answers; the
determination of the range of problems represented by the test
set; and the extent to which ability to do problems in that range
represents critical thinking ability. Critical thinking tests will be
inadequate from a philosophical point of view if a substantial
portion of keyed answers are not uniquely correct, if the set of
problems represented by the test set is too restricted even for
the range the test purports to cover, or if that range of sub-
areas is insufficiently broad. They will be inadequate from a
psychological point of view if they are not constructed so as to
preclude such things as getting many right answers by guessing,
or being sent into a panic by instructions. More interestingly,
they may be psychologically inadequate if the set Q’ is generated
from the set Q with insufficient attention to normal competence
in matters of transfer. There are, of course, further psychological
issues. Since I cannot presume the competence to assess critical
thinking tests from a psychological point of view, I shall
concentrate on philosophical questions here.12
3. Content Analysis of Several Popular Critical Thinking Tests
3a. The Watson-Glaser Test
The Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal is widely used.
Circulated by the well-known Psychological Corporation, it has
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been an established pedagogical and evaluation tool for some
decades. Two different tests are available; Form A and Form B.
Comments here apply to Form A.13 The test has 80 questions,
which are to be done in 50 minutes. It is divided into five equal
sections. The first section deals with inference; the respondent is
to decide on ‘the degree of truth or falsity [sic] of the inference’,
given some facts. Statements are made; the respondent is to
assume that these are true and then say whether a further
statement is true, probably true, left undetermined, probably
false, or false, given the stated claims.14 The second section
involves recognizing assumptions, which are defined in the
instructions as something that is presupposed or taken for
granted. From examples given, it appears that deductively
required assumptions and pragmatically required assumptions
are both included. The third section is about deductive inference;
statements are made and respondents are to say whether other
statements follow necessarily from these. The fourth section,
though called interpretation, appears to overlap considerably
with the first one. The respondent is given some statements and
asked to say what ‘follows logically beyond a reasonable doubt
from the information given’; thus deductive and (presumably)
strong nondeductive inference are involved. The only difference
between this section and the first is that here respondents make
a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer; thus the fourth section calls for fewer
discriminations than the first one. The last section is about the
evaluation of arguments. Here again, it is inference or ‘reasons
for and against’ that is in question. Respondents are to ‘regard
each argument as true’; that is, they are not to question the merits
of arguments on the grounds that false or unlikely claims are
contained within. The point is to determine whether, if true,
the claims made in the argument would prove strong or weak
reasons for a further claim.
The wording of some of these instructions would make any
philosophically educated person cringe.15 The test is full of
logical horrors such as ‘Examine each inference separately and
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make a decision as to its degree of truth or falsity’; ‘For an
argument to be strong, it must be both important and directly
related to the question’; ‘for the purposes of this test, you are
to regard each argument as true’; ‘Try not to let your personal
attitude toward the question influence your evaluation of the
argument, since each argument is to be regarded as true’; and
‘When the word ‘should’ is used as the first word in any of the
following questions, its meaning is, ‘would the proposed action
promote the general welfare of the people of the United
States?”.16
One might defend such wording on the grounds that the test
is intended for use by people who are not philosophers and are
not philosophically educated.17 One might urge that speaking
of the truth of arguments, degrees of truth, inferences as being
conclusions and so on will not be misleading. However, there are
several problems with this defense of the test. First of all, it is not
necessary to employ such expressions in order to communicate
with non-philosophers. Instructions in some other tests do not
employ such expressions on respondents, and they are perfectly
comprehensible nevertheless. Secondly, the serviceability, of
these logical innovations is in question. Thirdly, the instructions
will be confusing to anyone who has studied logic or theory of
knowledge, even at quite an elementary level. Since the test is
supposed to be adequate for college students generally, this is a
mark against it. The direction to interpret ‘should’ in terms of
interests of the United States indicates an ethnocentrism which
is entirely contrary to genuine critical thinking within the
United States, and which makes the test quite unsuitable for use
outside the United States.
There are problems that are approachable in the short-answer
format but that the Watson-Glaser test rather mysteriously omits
altogether. These include at least the following: reasoning by
and about analogy; fallacies, both formal and informal; judging
credibility of sources; definitions in context; sensitivity to
ambiguity, vagueness, and emotionally loaded language;
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reasoning about and to explanations; causal reasoning and
empirical confirmation in experimental contexts. This is a
substantial list.
The Watson-Glaser test seems especially narrow when we
consider these omissions in the context of the very considerable
duplication that exists between sections. Sections 1, 3, and 4 are
extremely similar. Section 3 restricts itself to deductive inference
from given statements; sections 1 and 4 include deductive
inference and strong probabilistic inference as well. The
different titles for the sections, ‘Inference’, ‘Deduction’, and
‘Interpretation’, disguise the fact that very similar questions
appear in each.
Further problems arise when we come to consider specific
questions and keyed answers. Of the 80 questions, eleven are
questionable, on my judgment. Some illustrations are discussed
below.
Question 15. (From ‘Inference’ section: respondents are to say
whether, given the initial statements, the further statement is
true. probably true, insufficiently determined by the data,
probably false, or false.)
‘Some time ago a crowd gathered in Middletown to hear the new president
of the local Chamber of Commerce speak. The president said. ‘I am not
now asking, but demanding, that labor unions now accept their full share
of responsibility for civic improvement and community welfare. I am
not asking, but demanding, that they join the Chamber of Commerce.’
The members of the Central Labor Unions who were present applauded
enthusiastically. Three months later all the labor unions in Middletown
were represented in the Chamber of Commerce. These representatives
worked with representatives of other groups on committees, spoke their
minds, participated actively in the civic improvement projects, and helped
the Chamber reach the goals set in connection with those projects.’
‘Some of the Chamber of Commerce members came to feel that their
president had been unwise in asking the union representatives to join the
Chamber.’
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The keyed answer is that there is insufficient data. However,
on best explanation grounds, the answer ‘probably false’ would
seem defensible. The key can be defended on the grounds that
we are only supposed to consider the given facts. However, in
order to avoid the inference that members of the Chamber of
Commerce will be glad to have union participation, we have to
suppose that they are not glad to have had their projects and
goals so successfully completed. This supposition seems very
unreasonable.
Question 16. (Same section, same instructions; same passage as
in question 15.)
‘The new president indicated in the speech that the town’s labor unions
had not yet accepted their full responsibility for civil improvement.’
The keyed answer is ‘true’. However, the answer ‘probably true’
seems preferable. The difference hinges on the distinction
between entailment and pragmatic, or conversational,
implication. The president has demanded that unions now do
their share. This strongly suggests, but does not entail, that he
thinks they did not previously do their share. We are asked
whether the president ‘indicated’ in his speech that they had not
yet accepted full responsibility. There is an indeterminacy in
‘indicated’ that compounds the problem here. If we are being
asked whether the president said outright that they had not yet
accepted full responsibility, the answer is no. Yet if we are asked
whether he strongly suggested, implied, or virtually said it, the
answer is ‘yes’. Standards for what we are entitled to infer seem
looser for question 16 than for question 15.
Question 28. (From the section on assumption; respondents
are to say whether an assumption is made – taken for granted or
presupposed – by a person who makes a sample statement.)
Statement: ‘I’m traveling to South America. I want to be sure that I do
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not get typhoid fever, so I shall go to my physician and get vaccinated
against typhoid fever before I begin my trip.’
Alleged Assumption: ‘Typhoid fever is more common in South America
than it is where I live.’
The keyed answer is that this assumption is not made. We can see
how this answer is defensible, for one might believe typhoid was
only equally common in South America than in the place where
the person lives, and he might want the vaccination in any event,
for his trip. (This seems unlikely, but is possible.) However, the
instructions do not tell us to restrict ourselves to assumptions
that are necessarily made. A natural explanation, the ‘best’ by
many standards, of wanting this vaccination would be in terms
of the belief that typhoid is more common in South America
than at home; hence it would, by this type of inductive reasoning,
perhaps be defensible to answer that the assumption is made.
Question 31. (Section on assumptions; same instructions as
for question 28.)
Statement: ‘If war is inevitable, we’d better launch a preventive war now
while we have the advantage.‘
Alleged Assumption: ‘If we fight now, we are more likely to win than we
would be if forced to fight later.‘
The keyed answer is that the assumption is made. Standards seem
to be different here than in the previous two questions. There, a
natural assumption was ‘not made’ because an alternative could
be envisaged. Here, an alternative is easily envisaged, but the
assumption is said to be ‘made’ nonetheless. One might assume
that we have an advantage now and we may or may not have one
later; this is to say not that we are more likely to win now, but
that we have a relatively sure thing now, whereas the future is
unknown. This view allows that in the future we might, in fact,
be more likely to win, but we would not want to gamble on that
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prospect now. This assumption could equally well underlie the
reasoning; as it is more restrained and attributes to the speaker
a more modest claim to future knowledge, it is arguably more
charitable in a real case to attribute it to a speaker. Again, the
problem would be eliminated if we had been asked to find
assumptions that were necessarily made.
Question 78. (From the section on Evaluation of Arguments.
One is to assume that ‘arguments are true’, and rate them as
strong or weak.)
Issue: Should pupils be excused from public schools to receive religious
instructions in their own churches during school hours?
Proposed Argument: ‘Yes: religious instruction would help overcome
moral emptiness, weakness, and lack of consideration for other people,
all of which appear to be current problems in our nation.’
Respondents are supposed to deem this argument strong. If we
grant the claims, it would be a strong reason to have religious
instructions, but not a strong reason to have it by excusing pupils
to go to church during school hours.
On the basis of this content analysis, the Watson-Glaser test
does not fare well. Its range is narrow, even allowing for the fact
that some aspects of critical thinking are not within the scope
of short-answer tests. Its instructions are philosophically garbled
in an unnecessary and unhelpful way. Within the covered range,
there are many contestable items; more than ten per cent of
the total items are of this type. If students improve scores by
15 or 20% from a pre-test to a post-test, little can be inferred,
because they may merely be more in tune with the test writers on
contestable items on the latter occasions than on the former. If
one student surpasses another by 15 or 20%, a fact which would
surely be taken as relevant were the tests used for admission
decisions, the higher score may reflect little more than luck or
accord with testers’ background or prejudices. The proportion
of contestable items is too large. Furthermore, some problematic
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aspects of instructions are so extreme that genuinely critical
thinkers might become positively angry with the test and thereby
do badly. Willingness to go along with the instruction to
interpret the word ‘should’ in terms of the welfare of United
States citizens is surely inversely related to any capacity for
critical thought and analysis.
3b. The Cornell Level Z Test
The Cornell Level Z test is another test of great interest. It
is designed for students at the college level and is the product
of years of thought by a well-known logician. In addition, it is
of special interest because of a recent expert study done in the
spring of 1983. Test author Robert Ennis invited a number of
informal and formal logic teachers to do the test and wrote an
analysis of their responses.18 The 1985 version of the test is very
similar to the 1983 version, so the answers apparently did not
reveal any serious flaws in the test – or so the testers judged from
the experts’ responses.
The Cornell Level Z Test consists of 52 questions to be done
in 50 minutes. Respondents are advised that the test is ‘to see
how clearly and carefully you think’. They are told to avoid wild
guesses, though to make shrewd guesses, if they have some good
clues bearing on the answer. There are seven sections in the test.
The first section tests deductive consequence and contradiction.
Most of the reasoning is syllogistic in nature, not propositional
or modal. The manual for the tests notes that questions are set
in strong value-laden contexts, so that there is an emphasis on
being able to reason neutrally with suggestive content. This
section contains ten questions. The second section is about faults
in reasoning, if we take the test instructions for respondents at
face value, and about ‘semantics’, according to the manual. It
tests for emotionally loaded language, arguments and claims that
trade on ambiguity, and tacit persuasive definitions. There are
several false dichotomies and one hasty inductive generalization.
The greatest emphasis is on problems due to the use of language;
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this section contains eleven questions. The third section asks
respondents to comment, given a specified evidential situation,
on the ‘believability’ of statements. The manual indicates that it
is about credibility. ‘Believability’, the term used in instructions,
would seem to indicate that respondents should consider both
the credibility of people as sources of knowledge and the
plausibility, given substantive background information, of the
claims they make. This section contains four questions.19
The fourth section of the test deals with inductive
confirmation reasoning by describing an experimental situation,
and getting respondents to comment on the implications of
empirical results for an experimental conclusion. The manual
indicates that best-explanation criteria are to apply in judging
the items. The section has thirteen questions. The fifth section
again has to do with inductive experimental reasoning, but has a
somewhat different thrust, in that respondents are to comment
on the logical significance of various predictions. The manual
indicates that it is about planning experiments. Respondents are
to comment on which sort of experiment would have the
greatest epistemic usefulness in a described situation. Four
questions deal with this aspect. In the sixth section, the focus is
primarily on word meaning, how words are implicitly defined on
the basis of their use in a given context. Four questions are given.
In the seventh and final section, respondents are to comment
on unstated assumptions behind arguments and remarks. The
problem is construed in a deductivist way: missing assumptions
are those that, when supplied,
will make a conclusion logically follow from stated premises,
or an explanandum logically follow from stated explanans. There
are six questions here.
Clearly, the scope of the Level Z test is considerably broader
than that of the Watson-Glaser test. But still, reflecting on its
content in a general way, we can see a number of features of
argumentation, reasoning, and critical analysis that might have
been, but were not, included. There are no questions that call for
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judgments of relevance. There are none about analogies. There
are none that deal with conductive (cumulation of factors)
arguments, calling for considering the significance of pros and
cons. Despite the presence of a section said on the test to deal
with faulty reasoning, a number of fallacies make no appearance
on the test. Straw man, ad hominem, the argument from
ignorance, guilt by association, such deductive fallacies as
denying the antecedent, and many others are entirely omitted.
There is no section addressed to the interpretation of discourse,
and attempting to elicit respondents’ abilities to distinguish what
was said from what was not said. (Missing assumptions could
have been treated in this context.) No real passages are used.
All material has been invented for the test; presumably this is to
ensure maximum clarity and neutrality. No section tests ability
to subsume cases under stated principles. Within the deductive
section, there is no material pertaining to propositional or modal
logic; only class relations are tested. Nor is there any testing
of general sense of argument structure – whether one or two
conclusions are drawn, whether there are subarguments, or
whether premises are linked or bear separately on the
conclusion.20
If we look at the content of the test, it seems to have been
constructed on the basis of a broadly positivist theory of
argument. This should not be surprising, in the light of the
prominence of that particular theory, especially among
philosophers. Inductive reasoning is included, despite its greater
difficulties for the tester, and is apparently construed as
involving confirmation in experimental contexts and credibility
reasoning pertaining to sources of information. There are many
questions that call for sensitivity to language – ambiguity, tricky
use of definitions, and meaning in context. There are questions
on deductive relations, primarily consequences, consistency, and
inconsistency. Nevertheless, independent scholarly thought,
practical decision-making, judging actual arguments, and
participating competently in debate surely require judgments
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of relevance and a good sense of classification so that stated
principles can be properly applied. Legal and moral reasoning
depend heavily on analogies, as does the use of models in
scientific reasoning. In addition, analogy is a powerful rhetorical
device, and the basis of many deceptive arguments. A sense of
underlying argument structure can be very important for critical
evaluation, as when one premise in an argument is false, and we
need to look to see how this affects the cogency of the rest of
the argument. Any ability to do this is untested, though it would
seem in principle amenable to inclusion on a test in this format.
It seems strange to include a section on faulty reasoning and
yet pay so little attention to fallacies. There is much attention
to abuse of language in the section on faulty reasoning, while
fallacies as traditionally construed scarcely appear.21
So far as the questions posed and keyed answers are concerned,
despite great care and willingness to elicit expert criticism,
contestable items remain on the Cornell Level Z (1985).
Different analysts would no doubt differ on this matter – a fact
that is itself of some significance. My own scrutiny of the test and
keyed answers left me with some concerns as to seven questions,
nearly fifteen per cent of the total.22 Here are details for some
examples.
Question 12. (In the section on faulty reasoning or, as
described in the manual, ‘semantics’.)
DOBERT: I guess you know that to put chlorine in the water is to
threaten the health of everyone of Galltown’s citizens, and that, you’ll
admit, is bad.
ALGAN: What right do you have to say that our health will be
threatened?
DOBERT: ‘Healthy living’ may be defined as living according to nature.
Now we don’t find chlorine added to water in nature. Therefore,
everyone’s health would be threatened if chlorine were added.
Pick the one best reason why some of this thinking is faulty.
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A. Dobert is using emotional language that doesn’t help to
make his argument reasonable.
B. Dobert’s thinking is in error.
C. Dobert is using a word in two different ways.
The keyed answer is C. Clearly this makes sense, because
Dobert’s first comment would appear to use ‘health’ in the
ordinary sense as meaning absence of disease, and his response
stipulates a special meaning. However, A is also a reasonable
answer, because ‘nature’, which figures in the stipulative
definition, is an emotionally positive term. Also, we merely infer
that Dobert’s first use of ‘health’ is our ordinary one. Thus, our
evidence that a word is used in two different senses could be
said to be less convincing than our evidence that Dobert uses
emotional language that doesn’t help make his argument
‘reasonable’.
Question 14. (Again, from the section on faulty reasoning or
‘semantics’.)
DOBERT: I understand that you look on this thing as an experiment.
I’m sure that the citizens of Gallton don’t want to be guinea pigs in
this matter.
ALGAN: This is a demonstration. Nobody ought to object to a
demonstration, since the purpose of a demonstration is not to find out
something, but rather to show us something that is already known.
An additional value of this demonstration of chlorination is that its
purpose is also to test for the long-range effects of chlorination on the
human body. This objective of the demonstration is a worthy one.
Pick the one best reason why some of this thinking is faulty.
A. Algan has now shown that knowing the long-range effects of
chlorination is a worthy objective.
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B. Algan is using a word in two ways.
C. There is an error in thinking in this part.
Here B, which is the keyed answer, does in fact seem correct.
The problem is that we might be able to defend A as an answer,
and whether we can depends in part on how broadly the
expression ‘faulty thinking’ is interpreted, Algan does just assert
that finding out the long-range effects of chlorination on human
bodies is worthwhile; he offers no evidence for that claim.
Analyzing his argument, we could point out his inconsistent and
stipulative use of the word ‘demonstration’. We could also point
out that this claim about long-range effects is rather problematic;
it could even be branded as question-begging in the broader
context. If thinking involves mainly reasoning, then this answer
is out of order. However the concept of thinking underlying the
section seems to be a broader one. In any case, respondents could
well be confused by this potential ambiguity.
Question 32. (From section four, on judging inductive
inference to conclusions.) The background information given
concerns an experiment in which some ducklings, of three different
types, were fed regular diet, and some were fed regular diet plus cabbage
worms. In the latter group, seventeen were dead, four were ill, and one
was healthy at the end of a week; in the former group, one was dead,
three were ill, and eighteen were healthy. The question is how the added
information would affect the conclusion drawn, which was that cabbage
worms are poisonous to ducklings. Respondents are to choose between:
If true, this information supports the conclusion.
If true, this information goes against the conclusion.
C. This information does neither.
It is discovered that during the original experiment the regular-
fed ducklings had less sunlight than the worm-fed ducklings. It is
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not known whether or not the difference in amount of sunshine
would have an effect on the health of ducklings.
The key states that this additional information would count
against the conclusion, because ‘the differences in sunlight might
explain the difference in results.’ The advice to respondents, that
it is not known whether difference in sunlight affects the health
of ducklings, is probably inserted so as to avoid respondents
appealing to the common belief that sunlight is generally healthy.
Using this belief, we would arrive at C as the answer, or possibly
even at A. (We might reason that since sunlight makes for health,
and worm-fed ducklings die more even with more sunlight, the
good effects of the sun are countered by a bad effect – which
must be that of the worms.) The answer given seems then to
be correct, provided that our background beliefs about sunlight
and health are ignored. But that may be difficult to do. Whether
it is logically correct to ignore such fundamental background
beliefs in the context of inductive reasoning about health is
questionable.
Question 45. (From section 6, on definition and assumption
identification.)
‘What are you making with that dough?’, asked Mary’s father.
‘Dough!’, exclaimed Mary. ‘Did you ever see anything made with
yeast that was baked immediately after it was mixed? Naturally not,’
she said as she put the mixture into the oven immediately after mixing
it. ‘Therefore, it’s not dough.’
Of the following, which is the best way to state Mary’s notion of
dough?
A. Dough is a mixture of flour and other ingredients, including yeast.
B. Dough is a mixture of flour and other ingredients, not baked
immediately.
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C. Dough is a mixture of flour and other ingredients, often baked in
an oven.
The keyed answer is A. The explanation in the key reads, ‘Mary’s
reasoning is that the mixture is baked immediately, so it is not
made with yeast; so it is not dough. The selected definition fills
the gap between the subconclusion and the final conclusion.
The problem here is that Mary focuses on two things: the
inclusion of yeast, and the idea that when yeast is included, if
the resulting mixture is put into the oven immediately, it is not
dough. She is defining what is not dough, rather than what is
dough, really, saying that if x contains yeast and x is baked
immediately, then x is not dough. (If Y and I then not D.)
Contraposing, we get a definition of dough, perhaps; at least we
get two necessary conditions, if it’s dough, then it does not both
contain yeast and go into the oven immediately. (If D then either
not Y or not I.) No answer says this. The ‘right’ answer requires
that we see Mary as offering a two stage argument, but there is
nothing in the passage quoted to indicate that she is doing this.
The question is extremely confusing. The matter is made worse
for those familiar with baking, in that the ordinary language
sense of ‘dough’ is much looser than Mary’s. (No doubt this is
why the emphasis is put on Mary’s sense of the word, in the
statement of the question.)
The Cornell Level Z test seems superior to the Watson-Glaser
test in a number of respects. It has a wider range, including
inductive-confirmation and explanatory reasoning, and
semantic matters. Instructions are stated clearly – without either
deviating from or obscurely trading upon standard logical
terminology. The test has been open to expert scrutiny, and its
author is sensitive to academic disputes that bear on its content.
Nevertheless, there are important criticisms to be made, even
from an internal point of view. Contestable items remain, despite
great care. Important aspects of reasoning and argument
evaluation essential to critical thinking are not covered by the
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test, even when such aspects would appear to be manageable
within the restrictions of the format.
4. Concluding Comments
The two most widely used critical thinking tests would seem
rather imperfect, then, although the Cornell Level Z Test seems
far better than the Watson-Glaser test with regard to breadth
and philosophical cogency of instructions. The number of
contestable items in either case is significant when we consider
the purposes for which these tests are used. These are observing
improvement or non-improvement in a class as a result of
teaching and comparing that improvement or non-improvement
with a control group; and comparing individuals’ tested critical
thinking abilities for admission or employment decisions. In
either case, a difference of 15% in score would surely be seen as
very significant. And yet both tests have 15% contestable items
and hence, a possible variation in this range that is due not to
critical thinking ability but to something else.
Referring back to the inference levels discussed in section two
above, the contestability of some items on the test will affect not
only the first inference, from the coincidence of a respondent’s
answer with the keyed answer to his or her being able to get
that question right, but the second inference, from a respondent’s
getting some question right according to the key to his being able
to answer a related set of questions correctly. This is because
if the keyed answer is not uniquely right (but is instead, either
wrong, or non uniquely right, as has been argued for some items
on these tests), then resolving the question as indicated in the key
is a poor indicator that one would resolve a formally (and, where
relevant, psychologically) similar instance in the same way. If test
constructors are not aware of the ambiguity – which presumably
is the case – then they will not see a particular response to
that ambiguity as being part of the explanation for respondents
answering in the way they do. This being the case, they will not
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take it into account in generating set Q’ from set Q; Q’ will be
generated in an unreliable way.
As was noted, many aspects of critical thinking are not covered
on these two tests. This is true even if we consider critical
thinking in a fairly narrow framework, restricting ourselves to
the context of articulated criticism of inferences and arguments.
It is still more obvious, of course, if we adopt a broader
conception of critical thinking. Many of the aspects of critical
thinking still within the argument analysis area, such as various
fallacies, questions regarding relevance, issues of discourse
interpretation, and senses of argument structure, seem amenable
to mechanical testing. And yet probably if such topics as
relevance and analogy had been included, the number of
contestable items would have increased.
There seems to be a dilemma here. Contestable items might
possibly be eliminated from critical thinking tests altogether, but
if they were, this would surely be at the cost of great restriction in
the scope of these tests. Already such tests necessitate restriction
to short illustrations, to invented material, to fairly
straightforward wording, to domains where background
knowledge and value judgments do not crucially affect judgment,
to issues that can be quickly summed up, and so on. It is likely
that some omissions are due not to the fact that test authors
regard the material as irrelevant to the nature of argument and
critical thinking, but because the construction of noncontestable
short-answer questions in those areas is either difficult or
impossible.
It is instructive, at this point, to compare the scope of the
Cornell Level Z Test with a recent curriculum statement by
Robert Ennis. Ennis provides an excellent and extensive list of
abilities that it would be desirable to cultivate in a course on
critical thinking. Examining this list, and comparing it closely
with his own test, I found many aspects not covered by the test.
These include the ability to identify and formulate questions;
seeing similarities and differences in argument; identifying and
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handling irrelevance; summarizing material; handling tables and
graphs; arriving at value judgments after considering
alternatives; weighing, balancing and reaching a decision in a
value context; defining a problem when one has to decide on
an action; and presenting a position orally or in writing, using
appropriate logical and rhetorical strategies. These and a number
of other aspects Ennis included are not covered on his test. Many
could not be, due to the restrictions dictated by the format or to
the great unlikelihood of avoiding contestable items, or both.
The range of the Watson-Glaser and the Z level tests seems
narrow. It is narrow in comparison with Ennis’ admirable
curriculum proposal, and it is narrower still when we consider
the broader psychological and socio-political aspects emphasized
by Richard Paul. Given this, the last stage of inference, from
being able to do questions of the type covered on the test to
having critical thinking ability in some sense general and wide
enough to be of genuine interest and importance, will be
questionable. As noted earlier, this will be more questionable in
the affirmative case than in the negative. If someone does well on
a test with narrow range, that will not give good evidence for his
having general critical thinking ability; whereas if he does poorly
on such a test, it is more likely that he really does lack the ability
– granting, of course, the earlier stages of inference.
The dilemma that arises here is a perfectly obvious one. By
greatly narrowing the scope of tests, we might be able to
eliminate contestable items, thereby strengthening the inference
that what respondents do on the test reliably indicates their
ability to do an appropriately generated set of related problems
(problems of the same type). However, by narrowing the range,
we weaken the inference from their being able to do these things
to their being critical thinkers. Too many aspects central to
critical thinking will have been omitted from the test. On the
other hand, the scope of tests could be greatly broadened, using
something like Ennis’ proposed curriculum – perhaps with
inspiring amendments from Richard Paul and others – as a base.
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If this were done, contestable items would undoubtedly increase,
and the earlier inferences would correspondingly weaken.
It seems to be a no-win situation. This tension is not merely
the result we would expect on the basis of armchair analysis, but
is corroborated by what we found in the Cornell Level Z Test.
The test has been carefully constructed by conscientious experts
and is relatively limited in scope; yet it still retains approximately
15% contestable items.
A possible response to this problem is that it is apparent, but
perhaps not real. Until people have tried hard to construct tests,
based on a broad range of items, with zero or very low
contestability, we are not in a position to conclude for certain
that such a thing cannot be done. One might argue that those
who criticize existing tests should, perhaps, be working hard to
improve them or to invent new ones.
This response raises broader questions about the role of
machine-gradable short-answer tests and the interests they
serve. If we regard their role as benign or neutral, and the
interests they serve as legitimate, we may think that it is
important to try to broaden and strengthen these tests. If, on
the other hand, we see the tests as an expression of a general
desire to sum up personal differences in a quantitative fashion, in
the interests of apparently authoritative bureaucratic decision-
making, we will have a quite different attitude. Why do we have
critical thinking tests? How much do we need them? How
important is it to make them accurate?
If we wish to test for critical thinking, but are willing to
relinquish the requirement of short answer so-called objective
tests, we could try to test ability by essays or interviews, or a
combination of these with short-answer tests. Such procedures
would also, of course, have their flaws. For instance, interviewers
or markers might differ in their skill or in their
interpretive assumptions, leading to unreliable results. A
major problem with such procedures would be that of cost. The
50-minute short answer test, markable by computer, has obvious
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practical advantages. Society so often demands quantifiable
results, obtainable cheaply, in a relatively short time. Lobbying
for courses, programs, fellowships, and grants is facilitated if
one can appeal to results presented in this way, on the basis
of ‘objective’ tests. Nevertheless, we have seen fundamental
problems with these tests.
Is there is something rather absurd about a society that seeks
numbers based on short pencil-and-paper encounters to
represent such fundamental, profound, and wide-ranging human
abilities as critical thinking? Is there perhaps also something
absurd about philosophers claiming expertise in critical thinking
helping to pursue this questionable ambition?
If critical thinking tests have serious theoretical liabilities,
philosophers and psychologists should not be relying on them
for significant group or individual decisions. Nor should they
be encouraging other people to do so. The supposed need for
such tests comes from interests of bureaucratic efficiency and
academic-political lobbying, not from truly educational,
philosophical, or critical interests. Furthermore, as argued in
detail here, one is caught in a trade-off situation with these tests.
Perhaps the way out of this dilemma is to refuse the task and
use what critical thinking abilities we have to resist those forces
in society that demand a single number, obtainable after a
50-minute computer-scorable examination, to represent critical
thinking ability.
Notes
I appreciate the help I have had from Robert Ennis, Matthew
Lipman, Stephen Norris, and John McPeck in obtaining
materials on which this discussion is based.
1. These are the most widely used among college level students.
Several other common tests are used mainly for younger
students from fourth or fifth grade to high school level. One
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is more specialized, focusing solely on students’ abilities to
appraise authoritative sounding observational statements.
Several tests, including the Ennis essay style critical thinking
test. were reported to me to be out of print by their publishers in
March, 1985. (In the case of the Ennis tests, this later turned out
not to be correct.)
2. See David Owen, ‘1983: The Last Days of ETS’, Harper’s, May
19E3, pp. 21-37.
3. The links between the development of early IQ tests and
nationalistic. racist, and sexist attitudes are vividly described and
documented in S.J. Gould’s The Mismeasure Of Man (New York:
Norton, 1981).
4. The papers presented at the symposium were both
subsequently published in Informal Logic. See John E. McPeck,
‘The Evaluation of CT Programs: Dangers and Dogmas’. Informal
Logic Vol. VI, no. 2 (July 1984), and Robert H. Ennis, ‘Problems
in Testing I L/CT/Reasoning Ability’, Informal Logic, Vol. VI, no.
I ( January 1984).
5. Compare ‘Critical Thinking in the Armchair, the Classroom,
and the Lab’.
6. Minimum requirements may be amenable, though fully
adequate requirements are not.
7. Compare Don Locke, ‘Natural Powers and Human Abilities’
(Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society) Vol. 74 (1973-4), pp. 171-1
X7 and ‘The ‘Can’ of Being Able’, Philosophia (Israel), Vol. 6. pp.
1-20. (March 1976.) See also W.E. Cooper, ‘On the Nature of
Ability’, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3, (October 1974), pp. 90-98.
8. Teachers can probably avoid teaching to the test by being
alert and conscientious. Conspicuous patterning such as that
illustrated in the text can easily be avoided by conscientious test
PROBLEMS IN ARGUMENT ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 409
constructors. More subtle cues may be harder to avoid, however.
In his caustic article on the ETS, David Owen reports that
colleagues at Harper’s who were accustomed to taking SAT tests
were able to answer a substantial number of questions about
the interpretation of a passage correctly without ever having
read that passage! Presumably they did so due to having been
sensitized to testers’ background assumptions and style of
questioning.
9. It is for this reason that our judgment that keyed answers are
uniquely correct is absolutely crucial. One may quote statistics
until one is blue in the face, but any argument for the validity
of a critical thinking test is otiose unless this initial logico-
philosophical condition is met.
10. The point is emphasized in Stephen P. Norris, ‘The Choice
of Standard Conditions in Defining Critical Thinking
Competence’, Educational Theory Vol. 35, no. 1 (Winter 1985),
pp. 97-107. Norris refers to recent work on deductive logic
competence-which presumably would be more neutral than
inductive, analogy, or conductive argument ability. This work
indicates that linguistic factors, content and context factors, and
nonlogical biases can mean that competence in basic areas of
deductive inferences does not transfer as logicians and
philosophers have traditionally expected. One may be able to
handle conditionals when they are about a familiar subject, but
not when they are about an unfamiliar one, for instance. The
locus classicus in this area is Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, The
Psychology of Deductive Reasoning (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1982).
11. Robert Ennis supplies an excellent list in ‘Goals for a Critical
Thinking/Reasoning Curriculum’ (January, 1985; private
circulation). He includes focusing on a question, analyzing
arguments, asking and answering questions of clarification and
challenge, basic support, inference, strategy and tactics, and
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dispositions. Under each heading, many useful specifications arc
indicated.
12. These are in any case centrally relevant and necessary,
though not sufficient, for the validation of any critical thinking
test.
13. If Forms A and B are relevantly similar, the same problems
will appear in B. If not, other difficulties arise, because the two
forms are designed so as to be usable in pre and post testing.
14. The theory of argument presupposed here appears to be
broadly positivistic, as all forms of support that are
nonconclusive are regarded as rendering the conclusion
probable.
15. A point emphasized by McPeck in his discussion in Critical
Thinking and Education (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981).
16. Noted by McPeck, loc. cit.
17. Robert Ennis has charitably offered this defense of the
Watson-Glaser test.
18. A summary of findings is given in C. T. News (Newsletter
circulated by the Philosophy Department. Sacramento,
California.) Vol. 2, no. 3 (November 1983). Agreement on the
higher level test was about 85% on induction items; it was lower
for these items on the less advanced test. Notably, the more
advanced respondents were in comparison to the intended test
level, the more they tended to contest keyed answers. This
suggests that especially competent students might be. in effect,
disadvantaged on such tests.
19 The manual for the Level Z test indicates that it is the
reliability of the person that is intended to be relevant here.
Yet ‘believability’, as used, seems to refer to the probability of
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the statement itself as well – implying that one would at least
partially base one’s judgment on one’s sense of how likely it
was that the statement was true given background knowledge.
Though I urged this point as a respondent to the expert survey,
it was not taken up. It might be less misleading to speak of
the believability of people as Ennis did when he wrote ‘The
Believability of People’ (Educational Forum, March 1974), pp.
347-354). In that article, however, he quickly moves from this
locution back to speaking of the believability of a statement, qua
the statement of the person described.
20. In fact, these aspects should be relatively easy to test in the
required format, and the importance of such skills is widely
recognized.
21. A close comparison with Ennis’ own curriculum – see note
12 – indicates that many fallacies he himself thinks should be
taught do not appear on the Cornell Level Z Test. These include
(at least) slippery slope, bandwagon, ad hominem, post hoc,
affirming the consequent, denying the antecedent, straw person,
faulty argument from analogy, appeal to tradition, and
irrelevance.
22. At many points when analyzing natural argumentation, we
have seen that legitimate alternative interpretations and
appraisals are possible. Given this, it would be surprising if
material on critical thinking tests could avoid all such issues.
Examination of these tests in this chapter indicates just what we
should expect: they do not.
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CHAPTER 13.
THE SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY OF ARGUMENT
Social epistemology was not a major topic within philosophy when
this chapter was written in 1985. It came into prominence some years
later, emerging from concerns in the philosophy and sociology of science
and the careful attention to testimony of C.A.J. Coady. The conception
of epistemic individualism came to be questioned, and theorists sought to
acknowledge social factors without lapsing into relativism. The notion
that evaluations of an argument’s cogency could be relative to the
understanding and beliefs of its audience, defended in this chapter,
points to concern about relativism in justification and hence in
epistemology more generally. It is fair to say that such concerns persist
today.
A crucial point, not always observed even in recent theorizing, is that
acceptability must be distinguished from acceptance. The latter notion is
descriptive; the former is normative – as argued here. In seeking criteria
that are audience-sensitive but genuinely normative, the notion of the
universal audience retains its interest. There is a quest for non-literal
interpretations of this ideal. Its contrary, the idea of the self as audience,
has received little attention.
At one point, discussing pragmatic inconsistency, I argued that if a
person A fails to do X, which is required by a principle that A accepts,
then A is not committed to that principle. This point is too strong, I
think. A could be committed to X but unable to act accordingly or fail to
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do so due to weakness of will. To qualify my original point, one needs to
reflect on what is required by commitment to a principle.
This chapter shows intimations of my subsequent and enduring
interest in the topic of trust. That interest is indicated here in the
discussions of credibility and testimony. Given limitations in our
experience, expertise, and knowledge, there are many occasions when
our acceptance of the claims of others requires that we trust them.
In such contexts it is not irrelevant or fallacious to take into account
personal characteristics bearing on their trustworthiness. The qualities
of persons and relationships between them gain epistemic relevance.
Communicating reasons and arguments is a social practice.
Standardized PC models of argument are somewhat misleading in these
contexts because we need to consider not a bare proposition detached
from its surroundings, but a claim as asserted in context by a person
whose (understood) personal characteristics are relevant to its rational
acceptability. Within traditional topics of informal logic, such
considerations bear most obviously on accounts of the fallacies of ad
hominem, tu quoque, and authority. They are clearly important, as
well, in considerations about the logic and epistemology of testimony.
The detachability of propositional content from these and other
features of context is a theme explored by subsequent theorists including
Andrea Nye, Douglas Walton, Harald Wohlrapp, and Christopher
Tindale. An appreciation of the significance of credibility has been
greatly enhanced by Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice and work
stemming from it, at an intersection between epistemology and social
philosophy.
Standard logical treatments of argument detach premises and
conclusion from the surrounding verbal discourse, and also from
the social and psychological context in which that discourse
occurs. Interpretation may require some reference to this
context, of course, but once premises and conclusion are isolated,
their acceptability and inferential relationships tend to be
considered apart. This strategy is appropriate for many purposes.
Nevertheless, it is a considerable abstraction. Arguers and their
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audiences are persons with emotions and interests as well as
beliefs, and with histories that may bear significantly on the
context in which the argument occurs.
1. Arguer’s Credibility
An obvious aspect to consider here is that of credibility.
Credibility, or worthiness to be believed, is something persons
addressing an audience are normally assumed to possess.
Personal and social relations presume a basic underlying trust
between people. In contexts of argument, this trust takes the
form of our tacitly assuming that people are competent observers
and witnesses, that they speak sincerely, intending to express
their genuine beliefs, and that they try to support those beliefs
with good reasons. In stating and considering arguments, we are
engaged in an activity of mutual persuasion and reflection. This
activity requires the exchange of information and evidence and
the careful consideration of the reasons of others. Of course, not
all contexts in which arguments are put forward measure up to
this ideal, though it is the norm of the practice. Normally, we
grant others credibility, or worthiness to be believed, as a matter
of course. We presume that they are perceptually competent,
reasonable participants in the discourse, genuinely asserting
what they believe to be the case. But this standardly presumed
credibility may be diminished or lost. As H.H. Price put it,
Of course no one believes everything that he is told, nor everything that he
reads; still less does he always believe it with complete confidence. But in
nine cases out of ten, we do give at least some credence to what we are told
or what we read. There is, of course, the tenth case.1
Logical tradition has stressed the erroneous nature of much
reasoning from alleged defects of people to alleged substantive
error in their claims or arguments, and has tended to brand
as fallacious any inference from the personal inadequacy of an
arguer or speaker to the unacceptability of that person’s
argument or claim. This stringent insistence on the separation
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of the personal and the logical may have emerged because many
people are so sensitive to the social aspects of argumentation that
they too easily allow personal characteristics to overwhelm the
detached consideration of premises and conclusions.
Still, some personal features of arguers bear on their
credibility, and this is relevant to the proper understanding of the
dynamics of argument. Recent accounts of credibility, authority,
and the ad hominem argument have recognized these points.2
When we are dependent on the authority or testimony of an
arguer in order to decide whether to accept his or her premises,
a number of personal and situational qualities are genuinely
relevant to that decision. The point has been emphasized by
Lawrence Hinman in a paper on ad hominem, acknowledged in
several recent textbooks on practical logic, and most
interestingly portrayed in a recent article by John Hardwig
entitled ‘Epistemic Dependence’. Hardwig emphasizes our
dependence on others – especially those who are experts in
specialized areas – for beliefs and knowledge. He maintains that
this is such a pervasive feature of modern life that the epistemic
individualism issuing in the general advice to think for yourself
is overly simple. Hardwig reminds readers that more is known
that is relevant to the truth of our beliefs than anyone could
know by himself or herself. The extent to which wholly
autonomous thinking is impossible in modern life is vividly
illustrated by Hardwig’s citation of an article on particle physics
with ninety-nine authors.
Experts depend on each other and, of course, non-experts
depend on experts. We must trust others to build up knowledge
and beliefs. Because trust is needed, the personal qualities of
others are genuinely relevant to the rationality of our relying
on them. Given this dependence, there are many ad hominems
that permit us to withdraw our normal rational deference; such
references to background information about arguers do not
always involve us in fallacies. They are likely to be more
important and relevant in discussions with experts than with
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peers. As we have seen elsewhere, standardized Critical Thinking
tests even sometimes include sections on which respondents are
to judge which claims are less believable on the basis of aspects
of the persons who assert those claims and their circumstances.3
There are two fundamentally different ways in which an
arguer’s credibility may be upset so as to affect the dynamics of
his or her argument. These correspond to what logical tradition
termed the abusive ad hominem and the circumstantial ad
hominem. In the abusive ad hominem, an attack is made on the
arguer’s character or background and this attack is used,
irrelevantly, to undermine that person’s credibility and thereby
lessen acceptance of his claims or arguments.4 In the
circumstantial ad hominem, credibility is attacked on the grounds
that the arguer fails to practice what he preaches. These are tu
quoque attacks; they are branded as fallacious because typically
what an arguer does has no rational bearing on the truth or
plausibility of his claims or on the merits of his inferences.
In effect, logical tradition requires that premises and
conclusions be considered in detachment from the social and
psychological relations of arguers and their audiences. Tradition
seems to presume the epistemic individualism Hardwig criticizes
in his article. The tacit model is that of the solitary thinker who
can check each claim for himself or herself. We often cannot
do this. The unsatisfying nature of this view is most apparent
when we consider the long-established relevance of personal
characteristics of witnesses to the acceptability of their
testimony in courts of law.5 The greater sensitivity of recent
accounts to the many circumstances in which personal
characteristics of arguers do bear legitimately on the
acceptability of their premises is a substantial improvement in
the direction of bringing logicians’ advice closer to sensible
reasoning in law, science, and everyday life.
Trust and confidence in others as a source of information are
crucial in circumstances where the audience is not
independently competent to appraise the premises and must rely
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on an arguer’s statement that these are true. This often happens
because the premises involve what is, in effect, testimony from
the arguer as to the occurrence of events in inaccessible times
and places. It also happens when the arguer is functioning as
a kind of expert, using premises about a specialized subject in
which his or her knowledge substantially exceeds that of the
audience. Strict logical tradition on the ad hominem has tended to
ignore the significance of these special circumstances in which
an audience is epistemically dependent on an arguer. There is
epistemic dependence if acceptance of claims can be based on
little or no evidence save the testimony of the arguer in asserting
the claim. If the audience is to accept the claims made, this will be
because the arguer has said that they are true. (In the immediate
context, little further supporting evidence is available.) Thus, the
trustworthiness of the arguer is crucially important in deciding
whether to accept his or her claim.
In a fallacious ad hominem argument in which the arguer is
attacked, there is an unsuccessful and poorly founded attempt to
show that such trust is unwarranted. The attempt fails, from a
rational point of view, because the characteristics cited do not
affect the reliability of the testimony or authority of the person
as alleged. The argument may be used in a context in which there
is little or no epistemic dependence in any case, and the audience
would be competent to judge claims on their independent merit.
The allegations may concern characteristics irrelevant to the
arguer’s reliability as a source of information on this issue or
not possessed by the arguer at all. Irrelevant personal attacks
may succeed to some extent: credibility is based on attitude and
response as much as on reasoned belief. Once trust is questioned,
it is hard to fully restore it.
The effects of personal attack on the process of rational debate
can be striking. Some are to be deplored from a logical point of
view. But others are legitimate and point to the social dynamic
presupposed by the normal workings of argumentative
discourse.6
418 TRUDY GOVIER
The presumption of trust in contexts of argument is again
indicated when we consider the circumstantial ad hominem,
though matters here are more intricate. In the circumstantial ad
hominem or ‘tu quoque‘ argument, the arguer is accused of failing
to live up to his or her own expressed principles. For example, a
President criticizing terrorism might be accused of practicing it
by proxy, or political leaders urging the public to restrain wage
demands might be accused of seeking high wage increases for
themselves. In such cases, arguers express a normative principle
as part of their argument (either conclusion or premise), but then,
through their own actions, indicate that their support for that
principle is flawed because they do not apply it to their own
case. Critics accuse them of inconsistency: if the inconsistency is
demonstrated, the position of such arguers is seriously affected.
Yet, contrary to logical tradition, it does seem to be the case
that their credibility is undermined, because there seems to be
evidence that they do not in a full sense support what they assert.
In a recent book, Douglas Walton has discussed such cases
at some length.7 He explains that these arguers are accused of
a special kind of inconsistency, a species of pragmatic
inconsistency that he and John Woods have called ‘deontic-
praxiological’ inconsistency. Such arguers say that we should do
X, but themselves do Y, where Y is, in a sense, contrary to X. The
arguer’s principle indicates he should do X; what he in fact does
is correctly describable as doing Y; and doing Y amounts, in this
context, to not doing X.
Walton points out the subtle relationships which may hold
between X and Y, and the room for debate as to whether there
really is the right kind of pragmatic inconsistency. For instance,
suppose that a student accuses a businessman of making
weapons that kill innocent people in the developing world.
Suppose next that the businessman accuses the student of (by his
participation) supporting a university which, as an institution,
invests funds in such a way as to support repressive governments
that kill innocent people in the developing world. The issue of
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whether the student’s omission in failing to oppose this institution
constitutes a support for the killing of innocent people in the
developing world. Here, whether Y constitutes not X is a tricky
question.
In other cases, the inconsistency may be obvious, but other
complex questions may arise. Perhaps there are issues as to
whether an arguer’s actions, taken as support for a principle
contrary to the one professed, are involuntary or are excusable.
Some cases where pragmatic inconsistency is alleged are
complex and contestable, to say the least. Walton’s account is
appropriately sensitive to these matters.
Here, we focus on another aspect, one bearing more directly
on arguers’ credibility. Suppose that a pragmatic inconsistency
clearly does exist. This pragmatic inconsistency does undermine
the arguer’s credibility in some way. It shows the arguer to be
failing in commitment or sincerity. On Walton’s account, the
demonstration of such an inconsistency shifts the burden of
proof. If an arguer can be shown to be pragmatically inconsistent
and accordingly less than wholehearted in support for his or
her own principle, then he or she is put on the defensive in
the circumstance of back-and-forth argument. Attention moves
away from the practices initially criticized to the arguer as a
person, and to that person’s actions or omissions. According to
Walton it is then up to the arguer to show that the inconsistency
is merely apparent, that he or she has changed the practice, or
that the practice was involuntary or excusable in the light of
circumstances.
Walton discusses a number of fascinating examples.
Particularly vivid and interesting is a book review he quotes as
an Appendix. In this review, called ‘The Myth of Szasz’, Gordon
Lowe is reviewing a book called The Myth of Mental Illness. He
attacks the iconclastic critic of psychiatry, Thomas Szasz.
Reviewing a number of Szasz’s books, Lowe first accuses him
of not being a sufficiently radical critic of illness and medical
practice, on the grounds that Szasz wishes to dispute the patient-
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doctor relationship for mental, but not physical, illness. Lowe
adds that, despite his claims that mental illness is a myth, Szasz
supports therapy when the relationship between therapist and
client is voluntary. The final stage of Lowe’s criticism of Szasz is
that he does not live up to his principles. It is at this point that we
find a tu quoque argument.
… he launches his attack on psychiatry from a unique and special position.
He is an M.D., Professor of Psychiatry at the State University of New York
Upstate Medical Center in Syracuse. He is on the editorial board of at least
four medical and psychiatric journals, and on the board of consultants of a
psychoanalytic journal. That is, he is not only a practicing psychiatrist and
a teacher of psychiatry, but a veritable pillar of the psychiatric community.
What on earth can he tell his students?… If Szasz teaches in his classes
what he writes in his books he guarantees that any student who follows
his teachings will fail his finals. How can Szasz reconcile what he professes
with a professorship? He sees the whole psychiatric subculture as ‘a medical
tragedy’, and ‘a moral challenge’, insists that it must be improved, then adds
‘but we cannot do this so long as we remain psychiatrists’. Why then is
Szasz still a psychiatrist? The more telling his criticisms of psychiatry the
more obvious his own conflict of interest… His logic is relentless only when
he applies it to his colleagues. He appears to regard himself as exempt from
his own criticism merely because he is critical.8
Walton’s comment on this stage of Lowe’s argument is that it
is a good argument against Szasz, but not conclusive. Were Szasz
engaged in an actual two-way discussion with Lowe, he might
be able to defend his credibility in various ways, particularly if
he were to show that by working from within the discipline of
psychiatry he had a better chance of reforming it than he would
by becoming an outsider.
This account is in line with Walton’s general solution to the
tu quoque: He says that the allegation of pragmatic inconsistency
shifts the burden of proof back to the arguer who is criticizing
the practice of another. The arguer must show that he or she
is not inconsistent, or suffer a loss of credibility. With Lowe’s
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attack, the burden of proof moves from the tenets of the
psychiatric profession which Szasz has attacked to Szasz himself.
Attention moves from the original argument to the person of the
arguer, because the critic has shown that the arguer apparently
does not live up to his own principles. (No doubt it is this shift
of attention, resulting from the tu quoque move, that underlies the
logical tradition of branding this a fallacy of relevance.) Walton
seems to grant that this shift to the person is appropriate and
makes a legitimate difference to the course of the debate.
Walton’s account presumes, correctly I think, that the arguer’s
credibility has been upset by the allegation of inconsistency. The
burden of proof shifts. However, how and why this should be the
case needs further explanation, in virtue of the lack of relation
between the arguer’s behavior and the actual content of the
premises and conclusion of the argument. If an arguer does not
behave as a moral principle would prescribe, this failing does
not show that the principle is incorrect. Walton emphasizes this
point. So, interestingly enough, does Lowe. He begins his review
of Szasz’s books by granting all of his substantive criticisms of
the psychiatric profession.
At this point it is important to reflect on the differences
between the circumstantial ad hominem and the abusive ad
hominem. In context of tu quoque the audience is (typically) not
dependent on the arguer either for his testimony or for his
authority. It is not the arguer’s observations or personal
experience that are at issue.9 Nor is the arguer speaking in a
role as an epistemic authority. The issue is one of moral practice.
To defend the idea that tu quoque is a fallacy, we would need to
explain why it is logically appropriate to regard an arguer who
is pragmatically inconsistent as less credible than one who is
pragmatically consistent. The latter practices what he preaches
and the former does not. But why does this make a difference to
the logical merits of their arguments? That is the question.
Walton fails to answer this question. If the burden of proof
is shifted, as he claims, does that shift occur for good reason? I
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suggest that if the unpracticed preachings pertain to the principle
or principles used as premises in an argument, there is a sense in
which those premises ‘dangle’. They are expressed. But there is a
sense in which they are not endorsed by the arguer as premises
employed by a sincere arguer would normally be.
To the logician looking at premises and conclusion isolated
from the context of the argument, there would seem to be no
relevance of the pragmatic inconsistency to the force of the
argument. Walton notes this near the end of his book:
Our point is that an argument should not be treated merely as a set of
propositions so that the arguer himself is entirely external to the argument.
Rather, in dialectic, the argument is defined as a pair of sets of propositions,
each indexed to a participant in a game of dialogue. Thus each participant
has a set of propositions identified as his thesis and commitment-store
(collectively, his position). Thus a legitimate goal of criticism is the
establishment of an inconsistency – in some games an action-theoretic sort
of inconsistency among the opponent’s position propositions.10
The first sentence here is the important one. Walton appears
to recognize that when people argue, their premises and
conclusions are not suspended in a kind of logical space. Rather,
they are asserted in a social context where people are
communicating with each other. However, instead of exploring
the social relations involved as such, it appears that Walton seeks
to reduce them. He seeks to represent them in terms of sets of
propositions to which arguers are committed. He regards
pragmatic inconsistency as one kind of inconsistency that may
be shown to exist in an arguer’s position, propositionally
understood. This strategy ignores the normal support for
premises that comes from their being asserted by a person
relating to other persons in a context presumed to involve
sincerity and trust.
This approach misses the socio-personal element in rational
discussion. This aspect can explain why pragmatic inconsistency
of the type alleged in tu quoque is such a serious problem. What
is wrong concerns not proposition sets but the trust between
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persons. When an arguer cannot be regarded as a person
committed to principles asserted, it is almost as though the
arguer is lying. If these principles are conclusions, the lack of
sincerity with which they are held will reflect back on the entire
argument. The arguer appears to want to convince us of
something, but it appears that that something is not sincerely
asserted. It appears, then, that the arguer cannot, then, be fully
persuaded of his own argument. Since this is so, we can only
presume that he or she does not believe the premises or does
not find the expressed reasoning from those premises to be
convincing.
We may set out this reasoning, based on the pragmatic
inconsistency of an arguer, in the following way:
1. A advocates that P be followed, which would require him to
do X.
2. A does Y, which is tantamount to not doing X.
So,
3. A is not committed to P.
Therefore,
4. A’s advocacy of P need not be taken seriously by others.
Therefore,
5. Whatever reason A’s audience might have for accepting P,
this reason does not come from A.
Tu quoque in some of its forms may be fallacious, but there
appears to be no fallacy in this line of reasoning.11
The question remaining is why these considerations should
affect our analysis of A’s argument. Granting that the premises
and conclusion expressed will not be regarded as claims that the
arguer sincerely endorses, this still leaves us the possibility of
424 TRUDY GOVIER
assessing those claims on their merits. It is this possibility that
traditional logic directs us to, in those accounts of ad hominem
and tu quoque that emphasize the irrelevance of personal defects
of arguers to evaluations of the validity of their arguments and
the truth or acceptability of propositions they assert. The move
from (3) to (4) in the above argument needs a rationale.
Logical tradition demands, in effect, that we detach
propositions constituting premises and conclusion from the
context of personal and social relations that are normally
presupposed when there is argumentative interchange. Walton
questioned this logical tradition. But he is still enough within it
to reduce his own amendments to consideration of a larger set
of propositions. What is relevant is, I think, something broader
yet. The purpose of argumentative exchanges is for persons to
communicate information, beliefs, and opinions both in order
to persuade others, by reason, that their beliefs and opinions
are true or acceptable and in order to check and possibly revise
their own beliefs and opinions as a result of rational criticism
and evaluation.12 Such exchange presumes the sincerity of
participants. An arguer asserting a principle he does not hold
cannot do so in order to communicate his beliefs, because what
he asserts is not in the full sense one of his beliefs. The insincerity
that we infer from pragmatic inconsistency upsets the credibility
of the arguer because it leads us to think that he or she is not
genuinely participating in an argumentative exchange. The
arguer only appears to be doing so; we do not have real and
honest communication. Thus the framework of argument is
upset, although the details of the content of the argument are,
from an abstract point of view, left unaffected.
When people appear to be arguing, we normally presume that
they are in fact doing so. When we attend to their arguments, we
grant their sincerity as a matter of course. But we may discover
that they are not sincere, and if we do so, the discourse is upset.
Its purpose cannot be served. I suggest, then, that the shift in
burden of proof, noted by Walton, is a result of the fact that the
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arguer must seek to re-establish himself or herself as a genuine
participant in argumentative discourse. He or she will typically
do this by seeking to show that, despite the alleged contradiction
between behavior and stated principles, those principles are
really held. (The arguer may submit that the pragmatic
contradiction is alleged and not real; that the behavior criticized
is involuntary and does not indicate the arguer’s beliefs; that
behavior is about to change; and so on.) Such attempts are efforts
to re-establish argumentative discourse by reinstating
conditions of trust. Appearances to the contrary, the arguer is
committed to what he or she says.
To apply this back to the provocative review of Szasz, what
effect should Lowe’s attack on Szasz as failing to practice what he
preaches have on the reader of Szasz’s works? As noted, it should
not lead us to conclude either that Szasz’s conclusions are false
or that his arguments are inadequate. That would be a mistake
regarding relevance; that kind of irrelevance is just why tradition
brands tu quoque a fallacy. Rather, Lowe’s account should make
the reader wonder just what Szasz is doing in writing these
works. If we do not decide that Szasz’s moral position is that
of a reformer trying to work from within psychiatry, we will,
after Lowe’s attack, no longer be able to read Szasz as an author
fervently expressing his reforming zeal in powerful prose. Szasz
does not really believe what he says, apparently – at least not
in the full sense in which normative belief commits to action.
The moral power of his attack will be undermined. To the extent
that he fails to believe what he is saying, Szasz will correctly
be regarded as an author who appears to be offering arguments
in order to participate in a strenuous and genuine discussion
about the role of psychiatry in contemporary life, but is actually
doing something else. (Earning royalties, or building up a list of
publications, or gaining attention for himself, perhaps.)
Argumentative discourse has as its purpose the mutual
persuasive and reflective communication of beliefs.13 This
purpose cannot be served if one or more participants is not
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expressing his genuinely held beliefs. Logical tradition is correct
in emphasizing the irrelevance of personal commitment and
behavior to the abstract correctness of the principles and
propositions put forward. But it is misleading in its suggestion
that bringing out pragmatic inconsistency cannot have a logical
bearing on the acceptability of claims and the force of arguments.
The relationship is there, though it is best understood as a failing
of framework rather than specific content. The shift in burden of
proof noted by Walton is something real, and he is correct to see
that it requires important revisions in the traditional logicians’
account of the tu quoque fallacy. But the shift needs explanation.
That explanation can be found, I suggest, in the disturbance
of the general presumption of trust and sincerity underlying
argument as a social institution. Personal character and
characteristics really do have something to do with the force of
argument, and that ‘something’, far from being due to incidental
psychological or sociological eccentricities. It is founded upon
the very nature of argument.
2. Acceptability, Truth, and Audience-Relativity
Another area where socio-personal characteristics bear on the
· logical evaluation of arguments has to do with their audiences.
Audiences must reason from accepted beliefs to further beliefs.
What arguments they find forceful will depend on what they
antecedently believe.14
This messy qualification was avoided by logical tradition,
which insisted that in a sound argument, the premises were true.
Whatever anybody believes, if the premises are true, they are
just true, and if the argument is, in addition, valid, it is sound
in an absolute and timeless sense. The problem is, though, that
if we stipulate that people should be convinced only by those
arguments that have true premises, we would in effect be
stipulating that in many times and places, people should not
be convinced by arguments at all. In fact, it would be a tough
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epistemological task to show that we ourselves should often be
convinced by arguments, on this model.
The traditional account of soundness might be preserved as a
kind of regulative ideal, but standards of argument appraisal that
are intended to give real practical guidance will have to move
from truth of premises to acceptability. Note here: acceptability
is not to be confused with acceptance. It is a normative notion;
acceptability is rational acceptability. Yet still, acceptability is a
relative notion: acceptability to whom? The answer brings in the
audience to whom the argument is addressed.15
Recognition of this fact pushes standards of argumentation
in a dialectical direction, towards the context in which the
argument occurs and the audience to which it is addressed. An
audience is given cogent argumentation if it is given
argumentation in which premises are rationally acceptable to
it and are connected to the conclusion in a way that is
appropriate.16 This conception does not remove the normative
aspects from argument evaluation, nor does it push logic and
epistemology into the social sciences. There are norms here,
regarding acceptability of premises and appropriacy of their link
with the conclusion, but these norms incorporate some relativity
to the beliefs, knowledge, and inferential capacities of the
audience.
Shifting away from truth in the direction of acceptability is
difficult for many people to accept, possibly because it is such
a substantial departure from a tradition which is so much more
succinct, elegant, and tidy. To say which premises are
normatively acceptable to which audience and why, in detail,
is a demanding task, whereas to insist that premises be true is
something we can do finitely and neatly.
A possible way of avoiding such relativity to audience is
through the concept of the universal audience. Traditionally,
arguing to the beliefs and interests of a particular audience has
been regarded as a lesser activity than proving substantive issues
from a (supposedly) independent non relative standpoint.17 If
428 TRUDY GOVIER
we see argumentation as inevitably directed to some audience
and constructed with that audience in mind, and yet wish to
preserve the idea that some justifications have a correctness that
transcends particular times and places, we may appeal to the
concept of the universal audience. This interesting notion is
introduced by Chaim Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in The New
Rhetoric.18 Scientific and philosophical writing is typically
impersonal in tone, and might be regarded as addressed to the
audience of all attentive mature minds in all places and at all
times. Much abstract writing has an ahistorical tone, as if it
emerged from a transcendent non-earthly vantage point to
express a message for all. This style of discourse tends to disguise
the fact that French noblemen of the seventeenth century, or
English clerics of the eighteenth, or philosophers in the twentieth
century are the people being addressed.
Taken literally, the concept of a universal audience is not
viable. The language and level of difficulty of an argument
cannot possibly be such that it is equally intelligible to all mature
adult human beings at all times and places. (Even if it could,
mature adults are a subset of all human beings, and human beings
may be a subset of intelligent creatures.) Its content too is
embedded in the beliefs and background assumptions of
historical context in which it arises.19 Questions make sense only
in certain contexts, given particular interests and background
assumptions. Information and structure presume background
concepts and knowledge. Some historical context is presumed
for the sense of any argument.
The notion of a universal audience has an important heuristic
use if we do not take it literally. As an arguer, one may wish to
broaden one’s audience as much as possible. To this end, it will
be useful to reflect on the background presumed to understand
the argument. One might render some background knowledge
explicit to increase the accessibility to the audience. One might
wish to have one’s discourse intelligible to persons in other
cultures or far into the future. One can try to achieve this goal.
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But discourse that is literally designed for everyone does not
exist.
The acceptability of premises is relative to context and audience. We
may broaden the notion of who is in the audience to envisage
readers in future generations, in other cultures, and from other
traditions. But to think that this prospect eliminates all relativity
to audience would be a mistake. Premises, to be acceptable, must
be acceptable to some persons and these persons will deem them
acceptable only on the basis of some other beliefs they hold.
A maximally universal audience would hold in common with
the arguer only basic logical principles and a minimal core of
common sense beliefs about the existence of other people and
material objects. Though possibly transcultural, these are beliefs
nonetheless.20
There is a degree of audience relativity even in inferential
relationships because argumentation must be intelligible to the
persons to whom it is addressed.21 Premises cannot provide
reasons for a conclusion if they are connected to it by a logical
link that no one understands. If premises deductively entailed
the conclusion, but could be seen to do so only by one world
super-expert, the argument based on such an entailment would
not be cogent for most audiences, even though it was deductively
valid.
Another aspect of audience-relativity for inferences in
deductively valid argument emerges when we reflect on the
fallacy of begging the question. This fallacy occurs when one
or more premises is so intimately related to the conclusion that
the audience to whom the argument is addressed would not
accept that premise unless it accepted the conclusion. In such a
case, the argument cannot possibly serve its purpose of rationally
persuading the audience of the conclusion. Such an argument
will be adequate from the point of view of strict deductive logic,
and yet inferentially flawed, because the audience cannot
rationally move from acceptance of the premises to acceptance
of the conclusion.22
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In non-deductive arguments, audience and context relativity
enter in other ways. The degree of certainty required for the
conclusion, and hence the standards for evaluating inductive or
analogical inferences, may vary depending on the context. The
seriousness with which countervailing factors in conductive
arguments are considered may be similarly affected.23
Appeals to the notion of a universal audience do not eliminate
the requirement that a cogent or persuasive argument is one that
is cogent or persuasive for a particular audience.
Nor does the curiously related concept of the self as audience.
In philosophical writing, particularly of the confessional type,
an author may report deliberations and reasonings that led him
or her to various problems, dilemmas, and conclusions. He or
she may write as though trying to convince the self and the self
alone. If we took this style at its face value, we would have a
limiting case of an audience. The arguer and the audience seem
to be one. But clearly, this style is one particular literary and
rhetorical device. The self stands for a representative person in
the broader culture the writer addresses. The self is presumed
to have beliefs, interests, and problems that will be of broad
concern, and standards of evidence and argument that will gain
general respect.
Often, as in Descartes’ writing, that representative individual
is intended as a representative of the universal audience. Thus,
what is prima facie a maximally narrow audience is intended in
fact to be maximally broad. The self is to serve as the universal
person, or so the author intends. But of course such a guise,
even when as successful as it could possibly be, does not achieve
full universality of audience. Any self is a culturally developed
and informed person, necessarily not representative of mind in
general.
Less metaphysical uses of the self as audience preserve its
representative character, but the group this self aspires to
represent is typically smaller. Scientists and philosophers
seeking to convince themselves of results are of course not really
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interested in convincing just themselves. They are also interested
in argumentation that will stand as rational to those in the
cultural subgroup within which they are working. Here, the self
represents an individual standing within that subculture, within
which projects, problems, and standards have been developed.24
There is always an audience to whom argumentation is
addressed, and that audience is always informed with a tradition
of beliefs and equipped with pertinent logical norms and
abilities. Whatever the rhetorical pretensions, it is always less
than universal.
The cogency of an argument is in some important respects
relative to the knowledge and beliefs of the audience to which it
is addressed.
Argumentation is linked importantly with justification, and
thus with every area of philosophy and human knowledge. If we
move from truth to acceptability and from validity to a variety
of less determinate and clearcut standards, we are allowing, in
effect, that justification is relative to time, place, and background
beliefs. Given a background belief that germs cannot cause
disease, arguments would be cogent which are not cogent in
our own society. Within one and the same society, an argument
might turn out to be cogent in one context and not cogent in
another. Similarly, an argument might be cogent in one decade
and not cogent in another, since its premises might first be
rationally acceptable and later not so. Departing from tradition,
some fear, will lead to all-out relativism and intellectual anarchy.
I submit that this alarming conclusion need not follow.
Justification must proceed from what is already believed. This
is true whether what is believed is based on truths of sense
perception, elementary propositions of logic and mathematics,
or culturally remote statements.25 In a society that holds
different beliefs from our own, argument will proceed from
different premises and on the basis of different interests and
assumptions. But in no society is everything believed. To say
that different people in different contexts will ground their
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arguments differently is not to say that people in a particular
context can ground their argument just any way at all.
Furthermore, justification can proceed in a number of distinct
ways. Different styles of argument will be reasonable and
intelligible to different audiences, but for every audience there
are limits on what can be used. There are many sources from
which justification can proceed and many ways in which it can
proceed. But that is not to say that just anything will do. Premises
must be statements which the arguer and audience can rationally
accept, and inferences must be correct according to reasonably
endorsed standards, intelligible to arguer and audience, and
capable of providing a level of certainty adequate to the context.
We can allow that an argument not cogent in one context might
be cogent in another without allowing that whatever people
think is cogent is cogent for them. Moving from acceptability
to truth incorporates only a degree of audience-relativity.
Acceptability is not acceptance: there is no need to reject the
distinction between what is in fact taken as cogent by an
audience and what that audience ought, rationally, to take as
cogent. Such a distinction can be drawn with the appropriate
sensitivity to the context in which the argument is presented,
the beliefs of that audience, and the standards of relevance and
rationality that are accepted, whether tacitly or overtly, as norms
of rationality in the broader culture in which the audience and
the argument appear. Baneful relativism arises only if we
relinquish any distinction between what is thought to be and
what is.
This distinction with reference to relativism can be brought
out by contrasting the accounts of Chaim Perelman and L.
Olbrechts-Tyteca on the one hand with that of Carl Wellman
on the other. For Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca the theory of
argumentation is an entirely descriptive enterprise. There are
many types of argument that have been used and that continue to
be in use. The ‘new logic’ or ‘new rhetoric’ seeks to describe these
while at the same time describing conditions in which audiences
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commonly find such arguments persuasive or convincing. If
audiences are more or less moved by various features, their
response is noted; it is not judged to be logically or epistemically
correct or incorrect. There is no attempt in this work to
articulate and rationalize appropriate norms for the variety of
argument types described.26
For Wellman, on the other hand, moving from a formalist
account of validity to a broader account does not entail
renouncing normative judgments about the logical and epistemic
merits of arguments. To include the conductive and the inductive
gives us a better description of what is going on in natural
argumentation than deductivism would, according to Wellman.
Yet he employs a notion of validity that retains some normative
force, and emphasizes this point. To say that an argument is valid,
in Wellman’s umbrella sense of ‘valid’, is to say that it is ultimately
persuasive for anyone who thinks in the normal way.27 Validity
is a critical concept on this account. An argument which in fact
persuades people may nevertheless not be valid, because it may
not have characteristics enabling it to retain its persuasiveness in
the long run. Its original persuasiveness may have been due to
the social power of the person presenting it, to an unnoticed bit
of irrelevance, or to the limited logical acumen of the particular
group to which it was addressed.
The notion of cogency might be developed in a somewhat
comparable way. To say that an argument is cogent would be
to say not that some audience in fact has found it convincing,
but rather that it would be found convincing, in the long run,
by any audience relevantly similar to the audience to whom it
was in fact addressed. Such an account can incorporate context
and audience relativity without relinquishing the application of
norms and dropping the distinction between those arguments
that in fact convince people and those arguments that rightly
(correctly, appropriately) convince people. Some analysts see a
stark alternative between timeless, absolute, non-contextual
standards and no standards at all. This presumed alternative
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amounts to a false dichotomy, because standards of a qualified
and complex sort may exist.
Perhaps an example can illustrate this point. The context is
that of a formal lecture, by an established scholar, on the topic of
war and religion. The lecture has been completed. The lecturer
stands at his lectern, in the hall of a small art gallery. He is at ease,
and elegantly dressed; his lecture has been received with interest;
his jokes appreciated. He has been introduced as person of high
credentials and many accomplishments. He has developed his
thesis to the effect that the sincerely religious citizen has to
accept a degree of violence in order to accept state-order at
all, and that sincerely religious citizen is therefore contaminated
with some degree of evil. He has claimed that the just war theory
cannot, on his account, have any real meaning in the conduct
of war. He argues that the existence of war and violence is a
permanent tragic reality in human affairs. The account does not
condone war but suggests that from a religious point of view
there will be no moral basis for opposing it as a state activity.
In this context and against this background, there are a number
of questions from the floor. A man sitting near the back of the
crowded hall stands to ask a question. He is about the same age
as the speaker (in his fifties), also well-spoken, but less formally
dressed. He is unknown to many members of the audience and
has no recognized status (in this context) as an expert on war,
religion, or any related subject. He asks the speaker how he
would apply his account to nuclear weapons, pointing out that in
the lecture, all historical references were to events prior to1945.
The speaker replies that his account will apply equally well to
nuclear weapons, stating that there is, in his view, no distinction
of kind between nuclear weapons and conventional ones. They
differ only by degree, he says, because both are fundamentally
similar in that they kill. Once a person is dead, he or she is
dead and is not going to care whether the death resulted from
nuclear weapons or conventional ones. The questioner has no
opportunity to reply to these comments, because there are many
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other people waiting to ask questions. The audience appears
satisfied with the lecturer’s response.
Suppose, as seemed likely on the actual occasion, that the
audience has been convinced by this lecturer that there is no
difference, save of degree, between conventional and nuclear
weapons. On a wholly relativistic account, we should then have
to say that the lecturer’s argument was a cogent one: it convinced
the audience to which it was addressed. However, a more
qualified contextual account leaves open the possibility of
judging that the argument is not cogent, even if it does convince
the audience to whom it was addressed. Such a judgment must
take into account the knowledge available to the audience and
that audience’s capacity and long-term tendency to recognize
pertinent norms of acceptability and relevance, and to base
convictions on those rather than on epistemically extraneous
features such as the socially powerful position of such a lecturer
in such a context. A social scientific account of argument cannot
ignore such factors, but they are strictly irrelevant to its norms.
When the premise and conclusion are considered as parts of
an argument, it is entirely clear that the arguer’s vocal, physical,
and social advantages do not serve to make his premises more
acceptable or his inferences more reasonable. The argument
offered is not cogent. The premise that the dead do not care
whether they have been killed by nuclear or conventional
weapons is not one that can be supported by reasonable
evidence. The dead, if wholly dead, have no opinions. If they
survive we have no access to those opinions. (For all we know,
they might well prefer death by conventional weapons to a
nuclear death that could eliminate all surviving people and future
generations, if they care about us in the afterlife.) Their opinions,
if any, are far from adequate to support any final judgment on the
difference between the weapons since this depends on a broad
range of environmental effects and on numbers of victims, not
just on the effects judged by an immediate victim, who couldn’t
judge them in any event, being dead.
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In making these judgments about the cogency of the argument
we refer to standards common in our culture and to
conventional beliefs almost certainly accepted by this particular
audience. Ordinary beliefs about death render the premise
unacceptable; ordinary standards for judgments about weapons
render it clearly insufficient as support. Furthermore, in this
case, there is empirical evidence both that the speaker later
regarded his own argument as unsatisfactory, and the audience
would, on reflection, have come to the same decision. The
speaker admitted to me in correspondence that he did not have a
satisfactory view on nuclear weapons and nuclear war and thus,
implicitly, that he was uneasy about fully assimilating nuclear
weapons and conventional ones. A group of adults similar to
the original audience in background and attitudes found the
argument totally unconvincing, for reasons similar to those
presented above. The questioner was not satisfied with the
response: in a later conversation with me, he referred to the
speaker’s argument in response to his question as a sophism.
If, as seemed to be the case, the audience found the argument
convincing on the occasion, this is most plausibly seen as a
function of the lack of time for analysis and reflection and the
prestigious position of the arguer.
Thus by departing from the classical model of argument
soundness, we are not endorsing the view that cogency reduces
to what an audience in fact finds convincing. Rather, an
argument is cogent for an audience if, according to standards
that audience would deem on reflection to be relevant, the
premises are acceptable and in the appropriate way sufficient to
support the conclusion.28 An argument may be deemed cogent
when these conditions are not met, as the example here
illustrates. When that happens it is thought to be cogent but
is not. Thus the distinction between what seems to be and what is
preserved.
For arguments, tradition has pushed us to dichotomies. Is an
argument valid, or invalid? Is it sound or unsound? Are its
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premises true or false? Even within this framework there is
implicitly more than a dichotomy, as it is clearly possible that
an argument might be good in one respect (valid) but bad in
another (have false premises), so that whether it is a good or a bad
argument is either moot, or an improper question. Results will
not be clearcut as they are in formal systems.29 Sometimes, the
apparently straightforward question ‘is this a good argument or
not?’ is too simple.
3. The Specter of Relativism
When a view that is in any sense relativistic is put forward,
there is always the suspicion that it will somehow undermine or
defeat itself. Either it will apply to itself, and will thereby lose its
claim to rationality and truth, or it will not apply to itself, and
will thereby constitute a counterexample to what it claims. Many
recent philosophical articles dealing with varieties of relativism
concentrate on this line of criticism. A representative version is
that of Harvey Siegel, who recently put the point this way:
Assume (radical) relativism is correct. Then the relativist position has
strong, indeed compelling, justification – it is a rationally justifiable
position. Justification involves good reasons. But good reasons cannot be
based on anything non-neutral or arbitrary or framework-bound, by
definition of ‘good reason‘. Therefore if we are justified in holding that
relativism is correct, there must be some non-arbitrary, neutral, absolute
framework or ground from which we can make that judgment. Thus,
relativism which denies the possibility of that framework is incorrect.30
If relativism is (justified as) true, it is false, and if it is false, it is
false. Thus, it would appear, relativism is false.31
There are many different respects in which the appraisal of
human beliefs and conventions have been said to be relative.
We may have relativity to cultures, cultural subgroups, or
individuals; relativity of perceptions, norms, or scientific beliefs;
relativity of meaning, conceptual framework, or justification.
What is most pertinent in the context of the theory of argument
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is relativity in justification. Siegel is quoted here because he
focuses directly on this aspect. For any relativism that would
entail relativity in the cogency of justifications, Siegel alleges
self-destructive incoherence. Such an account would apply with
a vengeance to the analysis offered here.
Let us first examine Siegel’s particular argument, and then
approach the broader issue. The problem with Siegel’s argument
is very obvious. The question is begged in his definition of ‘good
reason’. Siegel says that good reasons cannot be based on
anything non-neutral or framework bound; in fact he regards
any reasons that are so based as ‘arbitrary’. This is clearly a view
that would be opposed by anyone who saw justification as
relative to a framework or (as here) to the beliefs and standards
of an audience. Such a person would have an account of good
reasons as those that are incorporated in a central role within
the framework or (as here) as those that are deemed reflectively
adequate by an audience using its own considered norms. Siegel
begs the question against those who have a relativistic or
contextual view of justification. His argument employs a notion
of good reason which negates what they explicitly assert, and
employs that notion in a context in which he is trying to
demonstrate that what they assert is false.
Furthermore, to deem Siegel’s argument question-begging is
entirely consistent with the current contextual account of
argumentation. The argument is unsuitable for the audience for
which it is intended, because a crucial premise is bound to be
unacceptable to that audience. It does not just happen to be so,
but must be so in virtue of the very aims of the argument. The
argument is question-begging (on any plausible account of what
question-begging is), because the conclusion is that a relative
account of justification is false and the premise, that good
reasons cannot be good in any relative way says, in effect, the
very same thing. Thus, Siegel’s argument is inadequate and need
not worry us further.
However, this leaves the broader issue open. Does an account
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of argument cogency that is audience relative self-destruct, as a
matter of logic? The account argued in this and preceding essays
is an account about arguments – not just some, but all. Thus,
it must apply to itself and is intended to do so. Does it refute
itself, in expressing an audience-relative account of the cogency
of argument and in thereby implicitly claiming for itself only
this, and not absolute, cogency? The many considerations here
are offered to a particular audience and claim for themselves
cogency for that audience. They claim for premises acceptability
to that audience, and for its judgments and inferential claims,
force and intelligibility for that audience. I can see no problem in
this.
The intended audience is philosophers, linguists, and other
students of natural argumentation, capable of pertinent rational
analysis of materials in English and other European languages, in
the latter part of the twentieth century. The observations made
are intended to be acceptable to those people, and to appeal
to their pertinent beliefs and assumptions. Where it is deemed
appropriate to change these, evidence is offered in the way of
examples, selected so as to seem interesting and familiar to the
audience. Reasoning is put forward, designed to begin with
statements credible to this audience and to proceed in an
intelligible fashion to conclusions seen as at least partially novel
to this group. There is no idea that the account will be intelligible
or acceptable to Russian astronauts, children, or physical
scientists with no interest in natural language argumentation.
Examples are all in English. Perhaps most natural languages
work in similar ways32, but some may not, and there is little in
the account that would preclude such a possibility.
It is of course understood that details of evidence and
argumentation may be wrong. This is not at issue here. What
is at issue is the matter of coherence. Does it make sense to
put forward an argument that arguments hold for those-in-a-
context, and not necessarily for all in all contexts? I cannot see
any paradox here. We might derive one from an understanding
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of assertion and inference in terms of absolutes, I suppose. If
asserting a statement actually entails claiming that it is true in a
universalistic sense, we have a paradox. However, assertion need
not be understood in this way. It requires only the intention to
convey to others statements believed to be true or adequately
warranted by evidence. This is compatible with the recognition
that what one believes to be true might be shown, someday,
not to be so. What the evidence warrants today, another day’s
evidence may not support. But for all that, today’s argument may
be cogent, and correctly defended as such.
Notes
1. H.H. Price, Belief. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969), p.
113. In Lecture 5, Price discusses ‘The Evidence of Testimony’. I
have been influenced by Price’s account, but think that he makes
our general presumption of reliability sound more optional than
it really is. Price makes it sound as though it would be vastly
inconvenient and inefficient not to adopt the policy of generally
taking testimony to be right. In fact, if we did not trust the word
of others, we could not develop into social human beings at all.
2. Cf. Trudy Govier, ‘ Ad Hominem: Revising the Textbooks’,
(Teaching Philosophy, 6, (1983), pp. 13-24; Lawrence Hinman, ‘The
Case of Ad Hominem Arguments’, Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 60 (1982), pp. 338-345; and Robert H. Ennis, ‘The
Believability of People’, The Educational Forum, March, 1974, pp.
347-354. Hardwig’s ‘Epistemic Dependence’ is in the Journal of
Philosophy LXXXII, 7, (July, 1985), pp. 335-349. Also relevant is
Alan Brinton, ‘A Rhetorical View of the Ad Hominem’, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, 63, no.1 (March, 1985), pp. 50-63.
3. Such sections of these tests do, however, evoke controversy
about the weighting of various factors and their significance
taken apart from other considerations. Compare ‘Critical
Thinking about Critical Thinking Tests’, above.
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4. Most recent revisions have focused on the abusive ad hominem,
with the important exception of Douglas Walton’s The Arguer’s
Position: A Pragmatic Study of Ad Hominem Attack, Criticism,
Refutation, and Fallacy (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,
1985). Nothing about the necessity for revision is intended to
imply that the abusive ad hominem is, in general, non-fallacious.
5. The point is not that people haven’t understood the relevance
of personal credibility to testimony but rather that many
standard accounts of abusive ad hominem have been formulated
so sweepingly as to entail that such considerations would be
fallacious. The point is developed and documented in my ‘Ad
Hominem: Revising the Textbooks’. Hinman and Brinton also
note this point, as does Hardwig in his essay on epistemic
dependence.
6. The distinction between those personal ad hominem
considerations that in fact serve to make an argument lack force
and those that rationally should do so must, of course, be
preserved.
7. Arguer’s Position. I have a brief review of this book in Canadian
Philosophical Reviews (Fall, 1985), which anticipates some of the
points developed here.
8. Lowe, in Walton, p. 284.
9. This is usually true. The moral hypocrisy of an arguer is
something quite other than his or her epistemic unreliability.
In the special case of Szasz, there are many complex inter
relationships, insofar as many of Szasz’s readers will be
epistemically dependent, for some claims, on his expertise as a
trained psychiatrist, and, for others, on his personal testimony
as to how relationships between psychiatrists and their patients
actually go on. The lack of seriousness Lowe points out will no
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doubt affect his credibility in the more strictly epistemic sense as
well, conveying a general lack of reliability.
10. Walton, p. 234.
11. Compare my ‘Worries about Tu Quoque as a Fallacy’, Informal
Logic Newsletter 3, no. 3 (1981), pp. 2-4.
12. See ‘A New Approach to Charity’, where I use this account of
the purpose of argumentative discourse to ground a principle of
moderate charity, by adopting Grice’s account of the purposes of
conversation to contexts of rational argument. In ‘A Rhetorical
View of the Ad Hominem‘, Alan Brinton advocates a rather similar
position. He says ‘There are, in general, but also relative to
particular contexts, certain presuppositions of discourse and of
argumentation. Especially important among these
presuppositions are some having to do with the credentials,
commitments, and intentions of those who participate and
especially of those who take the lead. The ad hominem typically
raises doubts about whether these ethotic presuppositions have
been fulfilled.’ Brinton’s account differs from mine in being
directed both to the abusive and to the circumstantial ad
hominem.
13. This is its standard normal purpose, not its only purpose.
14. Walton, Arguer’s Position; Nicholas Rescher, Dialectics (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1977); Chaim Perelman, The
Realm of Rhetoric (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1982); Carl Wellman, Challenge and Response, (Carbondale, Ill.:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1971).
15. Compare C.L. Hamblin’s discussion in Fallacies (London:
Methuen, 1970) and texts by R.H. Johnson and J.A. Blair and
myself.
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16. Hamblin makes this point about inferential relationships. See
also Hinman, op.cit., and the discussion below.
17. For instance, in Aristotle, such arguments are rhetorical, as
contrasted with logical and dialectical arguments. See F. van
Eemeren, R. Grootendorst , and T. Kruiger, The Study of
Argumentation, (New York : Irvington Publishers, 1984) pp.
55-78. Alan Brinton also makes extensive use of Aristotle in his
discussion of ad hominem in a rhetorical context.
18. Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric:
A Treatise on Argumentation, (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1969). Second edition.
19. The historical context presumed may be richer or poorer. It
may be sufficiently thin to be very easily understood by those not
part of that immediate history. Nevertheless, it is still there.
20. Compare my ‘Theory, Common Sense, and Certainty’, in
Metaphilosophy, 1981.
21. ‘Intelligible’ should be taken, not as indicative of de facto
comprehension under all circumstances but rather of capacity to
understand.
22. Cf. my discussion in A Practical Study of Argument, (Belmont,
CA: Wadsworth, 1985), Chapter 4.
23. If there is some reason against C, and many reasons for C,
how seriously those countervailing points are taken will vary
depending, among other things, on how important it is in the
context to be right about C.
24. As emphasized by Kuhn and others for the special case of
scientific reasoning.
25. The point is that there is a basis in some other beliefs. As
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it stands here, this point is neutral as between holism and
foundationalism, both of which would obviously agree this far.
26. Compare the discussion in van Eemeren et al., The Study of
Argumentation, pp. 208-251.
27. Wellman, Challenge and Response, pp. 90-109.
28. ‘Acceptable’ and ‘sufficient’ are used here as normative or, in
Wellman’s sense, critical, concepts.
29. A point noted many times in preceding essays, due both
to indeterminacies in interpretation and to open issues of
evaluation.
30. Harvey Siegel, ‘Goodmanian Relativism’, Monist, Vol. 67, no.
3, ( July 1984), pp. 359-376. Quoted passage is on p. 336.
31. There is, of course, the possibility that it is true but not
justified as true by good reasons. I take it that Siegel finds this
possibility to be devoid of practical interest.
32. Some seem inevitable concommitants of the basic facts about
human life, such as the continuing use of language in changing
circumstances, and others to be concommitants of the activities
of arguing and persuading. Thus, we might urge universality. But
such judgments should not be pronounced with confidence.
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